Osoba – dusza – mózg. Co gwarantuje status ontologiczny człowieka

Abstract

The concept of man’s ontological status, which is being hotly debated in current discussions on the relationship between the mind and the body, has its roots in European thought. This article indicates where answers to the question of the man’s ontological status in the context of the current cultural mind-body debate can be found. Since the history of the mind-body debate is long and extremely rich, the following anthropological terms that were defined in Western antiquity will serve as a backdrop for the reflections presented below: 1) the soul as the material part of the human body, which is the starting point for later reductionist views; 2) the soul as an immaterial and immortal reality imprisoned in the human body, which gives rise to dualistic definitions of man; and 3) Aristotle’s approach, which describes man in terms of matter (ὕλη) and form (μορφὴ), where the soul is neither reduced to the material parts of the body nor treated as a separate substance present in the body. A response to the question regarding man’s ontological status will be formulated in light of the theoretical similarities between Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophies and the natural sciences, especially current physical theories (quantum field theory, QFT) and different kinds of research on the human brain (brain neural field studies).