Kartezjańska podmiotowość w fenomenologii Jean-Luca Mariona

Abstract

The point of departure of this study is marked by the question of Husserl's Cartesianism. We provisionally assume that it can be confirmed by Husserl's adoption of a notion of subjectivity clearly inspirated by the French philosopher and particularly evident in the Husserlian reformulation of methodical doubt. Such subjectivity may be defined as a first-person operator performing the reduction and opening the way to the sphere of phenomena. J.-L. Marion takes back and extends the Husserlian undertaking in a double sense. firstly, inspired by Levinas, he defines subjectivity as an instance which emerges as an answer to an originary call preceding it (here we name it the 'interlocutive model'). Secondly, with reference to Michel Henry's Cartesian analyses, Marion advances another description of subjectivity as based on the experience of autoaffection (we call it the 'flesh model'). Both models, apart from the problem of their mutual compatibility, are formulated as an outcome of phenomenological readings of some decisive fragments from Descartes' Meditations on the first philosophy and Passions of the soul. This is why we feel justified to determine theses concepts as Cartesian.