Between Oversight and Overload: Strategic Use of Public Information Law (by NGOs) in Poland

Abstract

Goal – The article investigates the growing tension between democratic oversight and procedural exploitation in the implementation of Poland’s public information access regime, particularly by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It aims to clarify how the constitutional right to information, while essential for accountability, can be strategically misused to burden administrative institutions and distort participatory governance. Research methodology – The study employs a combination of doctrinal legal analysis, empirical audit data on information requests, and comparative examination of foreign access-to-information frameworks. This mixed approach allows for identifying patterns of instrumental use and assessing their compatibility with the constitutional and European transparency standards. Score – The findings reveal three interrelated forms of misuse: quantitative overload, qualitative manipulation, and procedural weaponisation, all of which undermine administrative functionality and erode the intended participatory role of transparency law. To address these issues, the article develops a purpose test designed to differentiate legitimate civic oversight from tactical exploitation. Two normative variants of the test are proposed: a codified legislative model and a judicial interpretive model, each offering distinct institutional safeguards. Originality/value – The article contributes a new conceptual and policy framework for balancing transparency with administrative sustainability. It reframes the debate from a dichotomy of openness versus restriction toward a proportional recalibration of access rights, preserving democratic accountability while mitigating systemic abuse.