Amerykańska interwencja w obronie Dien Bien Phu w 1954 roku. Próba nowego spojrzenia

Abstract

Dien Bien Phu was a French base in a remote place near Laos. The commander of French forces in Indochina, general Navarre, chose this spot to thwart a possible communist attack on Laos and release pressure on the Tonkin Delta by destroying Viet Minh forces in the region. It is possible he was not entirely forthright in his reasons and therefore American intervention to save Dien Bien Phu was not plausible. Contrary to popular belief, the battle was not part of the Navarre Plan and Laos was invaded during the siege. The French lacked reinforcements and the forces they had were purposefully fragmented (Operation 'Atlante'). Americans were often puzzled as to the logic of the operation at Dien Bien Phu and frustrated by half-hearted attempts to relieve the defenders. It may be argued that the battle was devised as a political ploy on the part of some of the French politicians to involve the U.S. in the war through unofficial manipulation; the two requests for American bombing raids were never made formally on behalf of the French government. In the spirit of the United Action proposal advocated by John Foster Dulles, both requests were turned down. American bombing was conditioned on France granting Indochinese states complete independence and support of both U.S. Congress and close allies (especially the British). These conditions made American intervention quite impossible.