REPOZYTORIUM UNIWERSYTETU
W BIAŁYMSTOKU
UwB

Proszę używać tego identyfikatora do cytowań lub wstaw link do tej pozycji: http://hdl.handle.net/11320/16832
Tytuł: Pomiędzy interesem prywatnym a dobrem publicznym - zaangażowanie wojewody kijowskiego Tomasza Zamoyskiego w organizację i przebieg kampanii chocimskiej 1621 roku
Inne tytuły: Private interest and public welfare - Tomasz Zamoyski's, Kiev Voivode's involvement in the organization and course of Chocim Campaign in 1621
Autorzy: Kupczewska, Marta
Data wydania: 2019
Data dodania: 4-lip-2024
Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne
Źródło: Honestas et turpitudo. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku, pod redakcją Ewy Dubas-Urwanowicz, Marty Kupczewskiej, Karola Łopateckiego i Jerzego Urwanowicza, Białystok 2019, s. 331-370
Konferencja: Ogólnopolska konferencja naukowa „Honestas et turpitudo. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku”, Augustów 10–12 września 2015 r.
Abstrakt: Tomasz Zamoyski's conduct during Polish-Turkish Campaign of 1621 seems to confirm that he valued private interest more than the public one. It is, however, misleading. He belonged to the group of magnates who decided to give their funds for Poland's military expenditure. He did it in two ways: forming and maintaining troops of 1500 soldiers, who afterwards were to be supported by the Crown Treasury, and paying large amounts of money for the country's defense preparations. Such acts meant he was operating as a military contractor. This was overshadowed by his reaction to the king's failure to arrange certain private matters to Zamoyski's liking. Yet, Zamoyski's decision not to come to the Chocim camp and remain in the rear of the royal army was affected by some other factors too: a lack of the royal court's decision, organizational chaos, and lingering troops. The idea to deploy forces near Tarnopol was strategically a good solution because Polish army commanders did not provide protection for their own transport routes expecting it would be done by levy en masse and pritrate magnate detachments gathering near Lviv. This mistake could contribute to Jan Karol Chodkiewicz army's defeat. Zamoyski's grouping was too weak to protect the rear and provide food and meals to the Chocim camp. When Zamoyski became aware of the threat, he attempted to prevent it. He was collecting food and ammunition and made efforts to strengthen his forces by taking private troops that did not come to Chocim under his command. It was necessary to guarantee safety to Chodkiewicz's army and Polish lands in danger of Tatars' attacks. What is more, failure to gather required 1500 soIdier troops was not a circumstance to incriminate him. The state suffered similar difficulties - it gathered a smaIler army than envisaged by the Sejm resolutions. EvaIuating Tomasz Zamoyski's commitment and attitude during Chocim Campaign, it should be acknowledged that even though it was not completely uninfluenceq by his private interest (using state soldiers to protect his own estate, or getting involved in the campaign provided the king arranged Zamoyski's private matters to his liking), his service for the state was predominant.
Afiliacja: Uniwersytet w Białymstoku
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11320/16832
ISBN: 978-83-955346-8-3
Typ Dokumentu: Book chapter
Właściciel praw: © Copyright by Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne &: Authors
Występuje w kolekcji(ach):Materiały konferencyjne (WH)
Ogólnopolska konferencja naukowa „Honestas et turpitudo. Magnateria Rzeczypospolitej w XVI–XVIII wieku”, 10–12 września 2015 r.

Pliki w tej pozycji:
Plik Opis RozmiarFormat 
M_Kupczewska_Pomiedzy_interesem_prywatnym_a_dobrem_publicznym.pdf8,33 MBAdobe PDFOtwórz
Pokaż pełny widok rekordu Zobacz statystyki


Pozycja jest chroniona prawem autorskim (Copyright © Wszelkie prawa zastrzeżone)