Dwuznaczność metafor i gier językowych w filozofii

Abstract

The problem of the ambiguity of metaphors and language games in philosophy is significant. On the one hand, we can talk about philosophers’ openness to specially inaccurate issues. On the other hand, we can note that it is not enough to stand face to face with the problem, or, what is even more difficult, determine and accept the right solution. In the context of the considerations, in my opinion, the thoughts which are especially worthy of attention are the ones of Plato and Wittgenstein, who, although from different perspectives, would reduce the problem of metaphors and language games most willingly, even excluding them from the use, or at least significantly reducing their impact on people. While the former one even “excludes” poets of the ideal state, the latter one practically leaves no room for poetic wordplay, basically pushing so understood non-literality outside his “chessboard”. However, as I wanted to show, Plato as well as Wittgenstein largely “created” poetry themselves, though they were not poets in the strict sense. In the mind of each of them, undoubtedly, there is some ambivalence in the approach to these issues. In my work I attempt to look at the problem from the perspective of deconstruction too, because I think that it sheds new light on it and allows a deeper reflection on the subject. The end of the text provides an incentive to philosophical thought in general which, despite its complexities, brings hope of redemption from daily life.