What’s Really Wrong with Postmodernism?

Abstract

This paper offers a new critique of postmodernism by focusing on the inadequacy of postmodernism’s underlying philosophy of mathematics, which we argue is more philosophically fundamental, and yet compatible with more common critiques of postmodernism, such as those exposing its self-referential incoherency. We define postmodernism as any philosophical system assuming a critique of the objective nature of rationality. Thus, firstly, this paper is devoted to a brief historical overview and argument for this understanding, with an emphasis on the implicit conception of mathematics (and reason) within it, which we argue is largely Kantian. We then turn to an analysis of Kant’s theory of mathematics as it appears in the First Critique and the Prolegomena. Finally, we argue as follows: if Kant’s theory of mathematics is incorrect, then postmodernism’s “metaphysical” pretensions as a critique of rationality, which both arise from and refer back to a Kantian view of mathematics, are bankrupt. The paper concludes by suggesting that the affirmation of intelligibility’s reality implies a theistic metaphysics, uniting philosophical and theological reason