The Relation Between Classical and Legal Education – the Role of Myth in Educating Lawyers

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explore the classical understanding of the concept of myth and its potential usefulness in legal education. Its primary objective is to show, by analysing Aristotle’s ways of obtaining knowledge, that the idea of myth (mythos) should not be viewed as contradictory to reason (logos). Rather, it can be interpreted as a practical mode of reasoning that aligns with the Aristotelian concept of phronesis. In the initial section, the concept of myth is examined in relation to logos and aletheia. They are portrayed as distinct types of knowledge positioned on opposite ends of the spectrum, with myth embodying the notion of a “golden mean” between them. This trio is then contrasted with the methods of acquiring knowledge, namely techne – phronesis – episteme. These comparisons introduce a new conceptual framework and suggest the potential application of the concept of “myth” in legal sciences by juxtaposing mythos and phronesis. Mythos represents a fluid, changeable, and relational knowledge, while phronesis represents the ways of acquiring it. For legal studies, which still predominantly align with either episteme or techne, acknowledging the novel role of knowledge presented by myth can offer an alternative framework of education and practice. This could lead to the creation of lawyers who are not solely passive (as described by Arendt), nor are the “mouth that merely pronounces the words of law” as Montesquieu desired, but rather as the phronimoi that can evaluate reasons, consider social context, deliberate well, and make thoughtful judgments and decisions that impact present-day society.