REPOZYTORIUM UNIWERSYTETU
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Tytuł: Polityka wojskowa radykalnej lewicy polskiej 1917-1921
Inne tytuły: Military policy of the Polish radical left 1917-1921
Autorzy: Miodowski, Adam
Data wydania: 2011
Data dodania: 13-maj-2022
Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Abstrakt: Before taking up studies on the issue of military policy pursued by the radical left emigrants on the threshold of Poland's independence and during the time Poles were struggling to preserve it, it is necessary to establish a nature of involvement of groups co-creating this environment in the military field and evaluate its consequences with reference to both their participants as well as in a wider geopolitical context. On the threshold of the second decade of the 21st century, we actually still do not know much about this despite the fact that the interwar, Marxist and contemporary historiography have dedicated numerous opinions to the actions undertaken by the Communist Party of Poland and its political and organizational ancestors. During the inter-revolutionary period, the priorities of military policy pursued by the radical left emigration derived frorn the attitude assumed in this matter by the Bolshevik faction of the SDPRR (Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party). Such reliance, accompanied by indifference towards Poles' independence aspirations, doomed left emigrant radicals to progressing alienation within the circles of Polish Diaspora in Russia. It was only after 7th November, 1917 that radical emigrant groups made an attempt to break their own isolation. Ambitious plans assumed various activities both at an emigrational and national level. After both factions of the radical left were united under the name of KPRP (Communist Party of Poland), actions aimed at the organization of revolutionary eastern forces intensified. These were to be the bases for the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of Poland intended to support a revolution being prepared in the home country. Since the confrontation with the Polish Army was inevitable in this situation, it was decided to disintegrate its structure beforehand. Destructive actions undertaken by ideological opponents were parallel to those that were constructive in their nature in their own ranks which involved, inter alia, enlarging the Red Guards fighters units and taking over control of the PPS (Polish Socialist Party) People's Militia. However, because of too excessive ideological orthodoxy of the party leaders who derived from the emigrant faction of the SDKPiL (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), who even did not tolerate inter-party compromises, all such efforts were doomed to failure. This only intensified dependence of the Polish radical left on Bolshevik protectors. Deprived of its own military infrastructure in exile and not capable of creating it in the home country, the Polish left in 1920 could not hope to carry out political changes on its own any longer. It was even less realistic since the level of revolutionizing among the Polish Army soldiers was still too low. Therefore the initiatives that had been undertaken since 1917 in the sphere of military policy came to nothing. In a critical moment, it appeared that everything done so far had been insufficient. Under such circumstances, support from the outside was considered as the only alternative. The acceptance of this fact, however, entailed serious and far-reaching consequences. Creating TKRP (Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee) in Bialystok and supporting revolutionary warfare carried out with the use of the Red Army forces against Poles, left radicals discredited themselves completely in the eyes of their countrymen. After Bolsheviks' defeats in the Battle of Warsaw and the Neman River, KPRP's activists lost a lot of their previous qualities from their perspective as well. In a new phase, functioning within internationalist structures of the Comintern, there were no longer suitable conditions neither to voice assumptions nor pursue one's own military policy. Ambitions of Polish radical activists had to be adjusted to new circumstances and they had to satisfy themselves with a possibility to carry out subversive and intelligence tasks that were assigned in Lubyanka. [Translated by Ewa Wyszczelska-Oksień]
Sponsorzy: Wydanie publikacji sfinansowano ze środków Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Opis: Zdigitalizowano i udostępniono w ramach projektu pn. Rozbudowa otwartych zasobów naukowych Repozytorium Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, dofinansowanego z programu „Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki” Ministra Edukacji i Nauki na podstawie umowy SONB/SP/512497/2021.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11320/13255
ISBN: 978-83-7431-260-8
Typ Dokumentu: Book
Właściciel praw: © Copyright by Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Białystok 2011
Występuje w kolekcji(ach):Książki / Rozdziały (WUwB)
Książki/Rozdziały (WH)

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