Prośba w perspektywie teorii aktów mowy Johna Langshawa Austina

Abstract

The article is an attempt at a preliminary analysis of requests according to J. L. Austin’s original speech act theory, rejecting its most popular continuation developed by J. Searle. The central issue is to look at the successive stages of the speech act of request from the perspective of its participants, both the speaker and the hearer. The specific character of the request lies in the assumption of free choice, absent in other types of directive speech acts. Consequently, the hearer is aware that the action the speaker is requesting of them is voluntary and there will be no sanctions if it is not carried out, while the speaker should anticipate the hearer’s agreement as well as refusal. The scenario of a speech act of request provides a place for verbal reaction. Such a reaction is included in the very definition of the illocutionary verb ‘to request’. A request obligates the hearer morally, not institutionally, despite being formulated in the speaker’s own interest. That is because it assumes a partnership between the interlocutors, making the possible hierarchical relationships secondary.