The Question of the Value of Human Life in Theoretical Discussions and in Practice. A Legal Philosophical and Theory of Law Perspective

Abstract

The value of human life has a basis in cultural norms, both moral and religious. In democratic states it is reflected in the right to life, which has become a foundation for all other human rights and freedoms. Nonetheless, in contemporary legal philosophical thought, the treatment of life as an absolute value and as absolutely inviolable is not the only perspective. Alongside the traditional principle of the sanctity of life, there are those who propose to give precedence to its quality. That quality is gradable and depends on biological and genetic factors. Such a view brings to light new aspects of legal interference in the domain of the life of individuals. It justifies, for example, the permissibility of abortion in the case of a foetus suffering lethal defects. It raises the possibility of allowing claims for redress for harm done by bringing about wrongful life (“life that is not worth living”) or wrongful birth. These issues are highly controversial from an axiological standpoint, while also becoming a source of moral dilemmas. At the same time, given the progress currently being made in biotechnology, they demand legal regulation.