Human Rights and Digital Choice: Rethinking the Right (Not) to Use the Internet

Abstract

As digitalization permeates nearly all areas of life, access to the internet has become essential for the exercise of numerous human rights, including freedom of expression, access to information, and participation in public life. However, the growing expectation to engage digitally may undermine individual autonomy, especially when access to fundamental services or legal entitlements depends on being online. This article examines the underexplored concept of the right not to use the internet as a human rights issue. It argues that digital non-use – whether by choice, necessity, or circumstance – must be recognized as an aspect of informational self-determination rooted in the principles of dignity and autonomy. While access to the internet facilitates other rights, the freedom to disconnect is equally essential to prevent new forms of exclusion, coercion, and surveillance. Drawing on evolving interpretations of existing rights – particularly the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination – the paper proposes that digital autonomy requires protecting both positive and negative dimensions: the right to use the internet and the right not to use it. It hypothesizes that formally recognizing a ‘right to digital non-use’ as a separate human right faces significant challenges in highly digitalized societies, while the existing European human rights framework is sufficiently robust to protect this right. The analysis supports both hypotheses.