Dyrektywalna teoria znaczenia a możliwe użycie terminu „prawdziwy”

Abstract

At the time when Ajdukiewicz was developing his theory of meaning, he tried to avoid in his papers the term “truth”. This reluctance was the result of long lasting and severe difficulties with formulating a proper formal definition of that notion. Consequently, if the term “truth” occurs in his works from that period, the context is usually designed in such a way as to elim-inate the slightest suspicion of providing any kind of a theory. Nevertheless, having no intention of formulating such a theory one might safely raise a question about the meaning of the adjective “true” within some (already formulated) theory of meaning. In fact, Ajdukiewicz poses such a question, though very cautiously, in one of his essays from that period. In this paper I discuss some consequences which his remarks may have on the rules of using this term.