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    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19796</link>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 19:11:10 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-06-01T19:11:10Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Caught in the Middle: Overcompliance and Non-Compliance with EU Sanctions</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19804</link>
      <description>Tytu&amp;#322;: Caught in the Middle: Overcompliance and Non-Compliance with EU Sanctions
Autorzy: van Essen, Frederik
Abstrakt: This article examines the phenomenon of overcompliance with European Union (EU) sanctions, particularly in the context of measures imposed in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overcompliance occurs when companies and individuals exceed the legal requirements of sanctions, often due to regulatory uncertainty, broad and ambiguous legal provisions, overlapping responsibilities, ethical considerations, and external pressures such as public opinion. The article situates EU sanctions within both foreign policy and domestic regulatory frameworks, highlighting the dual expectation placed on EU companies: to further geopolitical objectives while independently interpreting and implementing complex regulations in daily operations. The lack of precise, binding guidance from EU authorities compels companies to calibrate their own compliance &#xD;
measures, leading to a cautious approach that can blur the line between compliance and overcompliance. The article argues that overcompliance is not merely an anomaly but also an inherent feature of the EU sanctions regime, reinforced by the “obligation of result” approach. To navigate this landscape, companies are encouraged to take proactive ownership of their compliance processes – assessing, documenting, and communicating their roles and responsibilities, and engaging with other stakeholders to clarify expectations. Ultimately, effective sanctions implementation depends on informed, calibrated, and collaborative compliance strategies that balance the risks of both overcompliance and non-compliance, with the overarching aim of securing the sought-after middle ground.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19804</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>The Dutch Perspective on the Enforcement of the EU Sanctions Against Russia: Legal Challenges, Case Law, and Institutional Practice</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19803</link>
      <description>Tytu&amp;#322;: The Dutch Perspective on the Enforcement of the EU Sanctions Against Russia: Legal Challenges, Case Law, and Institutional Practice
Autorzy: McNaughton, Katarzyna J.
Abstrakt: This article examines the evolving legal and institutional framework for implementing and enforcing EU sanctions against Russia in the Netherlands. It highlights key developments, including the Dutch courts’ expanding interpretation of sanctions law, the landmark Dieseko settlement involving the Crimean Bridge, and reforms to the 1977 Sanctions Act. Drawing on recent case law, interviews with legal practitioners, and analysis of enforcement mechanisms, the paper shows how Dutch authorities are balancing regulatory compliance, due process, and financial sector duties. It also addresses institutional fragmentation and the government’s proposal to establish a Central Reporting Office. Through case studies, including trade-based sanctions evasion, real estate linked to sanctioned individuals, forced buyouts of sanctioned minority shareholders, and banking sector disputes; the paper argues that Dutch courts are shaping a nuanced national model of sanctions enforcement. This model emphasizes low thresholds for criminal intent, transparency, and proportionality. The Cicerone case illustrates &#xD;
how courts adapt sanctions enforcement under geopolitical uncertainty, combining EU sanctions law with Ukrainian anticorruption efforts. It reflects a willingness to diverge from EU guidance to protect public interest and legal clarity. Meanwhile, the ABN AMRO case demonstrates a dual expectation of financial institutions: rigorous sanctions compliance and fair treatment of clients. Here, the duty of care doctrine counters excessive risk aversion. Together, this paper offers critical insights for regulators, compliance professionals, and scholars into how EU sanctions are interpreted and enforced at the national level under complex, highrisk conditions. It not only analyzes key court cases, but also &#xD;
contextualizes them within broader legal reforms, institutional dynamics, and evolving enforcement strategies in the Netherlands.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19803</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Beyond AML: Learning the Hard Way About Sanctions Compliance Gaps in EU Financial Institutions</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19802</link>
      <description>Tytu&amp;#322;: Beyond AML: Learning the Hard Way About Sanctions Compliance Gaps in EU Financial Institutions
Autorzy: Kemmerer, Damian
Abstrakt: This paper examines the structural and operational challenges financial institutions face in developing effective sanctions compliance frameworks within the European Union, particularly in comparison to the more mature Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes. Drawing on recent work at a medium-sized EU-based bank, the research reflects on how sanctions exposure can be systematically incorporated into institutional risk assessments and compliance practices. A case study of institutional responses to the sudden&#xD;
extraterritorial designation of several EU entities and individuals by U.S. authorities highlights the vulnerabilities smaller institutions face when confronted with conflicting legal regimes, in the absence of harmonised sanctions compliance standards. The analysis shows that, although Directive (EU) 2024/1640 expands the visibility of sanctions within the AML compliance architecture, it leaves significant operational uncertainties unresolved, particularly regarding implementation and supervisory oversight. The paper concludes by outlining key areas for capacity-building, including improved risk identification, targeted due diligence instruments, contractual safeguards, contingency planning, and organisational awareness, in order to strengthen sanctions compliance even in the face of fragmented regulatory frameworks.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19802</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The (Global) Magnitsky Act(s): Has Combating Corruption and Human Rights Abuses Ever Been at the Forefront of the Sanctions Space?</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19801</link>
      <description>Tytu&amp;#322;: The (Global) Magnitsky Act(s): Has Combating Corruption and Human Rights Abuses Ever Been at the Forefront of the Sanctions Space?
Autorzy: Belfiori, Ornella
Abstrakt: The various initiatives adopted (also, following the death of Sergei Magnitsky) in the United States and in the European Union to counter corruption and human rights violations through sanctions, were seen by some as a critical advancement in international efforts to combat such kind of abuses through, amongst others, individual designations and other targeted sanctions. But, has this ever been the case? After an overview of the main thematic sanctions programs related to human rights violations and corruption, the paper will attempt to examine the effectiveness of such initiatives. Particular attention will be devoted to enforcement, to better understand whether anti-corruption sanctions were recently 'neglected' due to, amongst others, an increased focus on other trade restrictions against Russia, or they actually were never enforced quite vigorously. The paper will also consider the challenges encountered so far in the implementation of such measures, including circumvention by designated individuals, often facilitated by professional enablers, which contributes to undermine their efficacy. Finally, the paper will conclude with policy recommendations, including enhancing international cooperation, fostering national sanctions enforcement,&#xD;
implementing new strategies for tackling sanctions circumvention and strengthening laws related to asset transparency and beneficial&#xD;
ownership, in order to improve the effectiveness of such sanctions regimes.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/11320/19801</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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