

# THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Vol 1

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## Chapter 10

# Strategic Landscape of the Transatlantic Partnership

ELŻBIETA KUŹELEWSKA\*

## 10.1 Introduction

Needless to say, the course and results of World War II created new political situation in Europe. On the one hand, weakened and politically unstable Europe was threatened by communism and the Soviet Union, on the other it was offered help from the US. Both Western Europe and the US shared the same values, being the part of the same Western civilization and being the allies in the War against fascism and communism. After World War II, it was the US that was strengthened whereas Europe was economically ruined. During the War the idea of Atlantic community was born as a strategic basis for the whole Western world (“free world”). Initially Western Europe made an attempt to organize for security, the result of which was the Treaty of Brussels (1948). However, France and the UK requested the US to create an alliance pact that would also involve the US in providing security and defense for Western Europe. As a response to this offer, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1949, providing mutual defense on both sides of North Atlantic. During the Post-Cold War era Europe still remains a strategic area for the US security, and alliance relations with Europe still seem to be a pillar of Washington’s European policy.

The North Atlantic alliance, formed after World War II, was a response to the expected attack of the USSR. The end of Cold War removed an important element of North Atlantic Alliance – the war with communism. It created the need to develop a new formula of mutual relations. The Conflict in Iraq demonstrated that an attempt to build single European foreign policy based on the opposition to the US could result in an unnecessary division of Europe and concurrent worsening of transatlantic relations.

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Although the end of the Cold War brought about many structural changes in the international system, it did not change the fundamentals of the transatlantic relationship. The United States and Europe still face many common security threats. The transatlantic relationship will continue to be strong, and it will continue to be cooperative.

The aim of the paper is to present the basis of cooling of transatlantic relations and re-defining the roles of the US and NATO (being an institutional basis for the US presence in Europe). Cooperation between the states on both sides of the Atlantic has faced difficult moments, even crises, over the years. First of all, I would like to indicate the common values connecting Western Europe and the US and underlying transatlantic cooperation. Then I would like to present the factors that contributed to the weakening of transatlantic ties. Thirdly, I am going to analyze briefly the US hegemony and strengthening the Sino-American cooperation.

## 10.2 The Base and the Strength of Transatlantic Relations

### 10.2.1 Common Values

The end of Cold War strengthened the American administration in belief that it was Europe that could be a partner for the US in a new distribution of forces on a global scale and that Europe would have to take bigger responsibilities having declared that role. On both sides of the Atlantic there was an unquestionable conviction that both the character of transatlantic community and the intensity of ties between the US and their European allies are determined not only by the same values being shared but also by the convergence of long-term political, economic and security interests. A significant factor was the awareness of the fact that it was the cooperation that allowed both partners to achieve their shared essential goals. Both American and European societies strongly support the idea of transatlantic partnership.

Clinton administration supported the process of European integration recognizing the importance for the US of creating a homogenous domestic market, introducing euro and accession of Central and Eastern Europe states to the EU. The integration would mean establishing a zone of stability, security and prosperity in both the US and Europe. In 1990s, the process of forming the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the NATO operation in former Yugoslavia largely influenced transatlantic relations. The latter pointed to the EU Member States' military weakness, inducing them to make a decision to build up the EU autonomous military

capabilities in order to undertake military operations in a situation when NATO fails to undertake them. Formally, Clinton administration declared support for strengthening military capabilities of European states to take action in crisis situations, being in favor of these capacities controlled by NATO or being its part.

Signing the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) by NATO and the EU in December 1995<sup>1</sup> was a significant fact for tightening transatlantic partnership. NTA confirmed the EU's subjectivity in economy, foreign affairs, security and defense areas. The emphasis was put on a common strategic vision of European security as well as indivisibility of transatlantic security with NATO connecting North America and Europe. The willingness to create transatlantic market was declared and numerous initiatives aiming at increasing social support for transatlantic partnership were endorsed.<sup>2</sup> Developing bilateral relations on different levels and in various areas contributed to tightening the cooperation. Regular meeting agenda, including UE–US summits with the US President, the President of the European Commission and the head of the EU presidency, was extended by regular talks with American Secretary of State and EU troika, including EU Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Member State holding of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Other essential initiatives determining frames of extended transatlantic cooperation were: Transatlantic Economic Partnership<sup>3</sup> (1998), which replaced the idea of New Transatlantic Marketplace,<sup>4</sup> and the Bonn Declaration of 1999,<sup>5</sup> setting out developing future mutual relations.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> European Union. Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, *New Transatlantic Agenda*, 3 December 1995, <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm> (12.01.2012).

<sup>2</sup> See more: S. Serfaty (ed.), *Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: the United States, the European Union, and NATO*, Significant Issues Series 2005, vol. 27(8), p. 144 ff; Transatlantic Policy Network, *Completing the Transatlantic Market*, February 2007, <http://www.tponline.org/TPN%20transatlantic%20market%20paper%20FINAL.pdf> (12.01.2012).

<sup>3</sup> Transatlantic Economic Partnership 1998, [http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans\\_econ\\_partner\\_11\\_98\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_econ_partner_11_98_en.pdf) (02.01.2012).

<sup>4</sup> European Union. Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, *The New Transatlantic Marketplace*, 11 March 1999, <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/ntm/contents.htm> (02.01.2012).

<sup>5</sup> United States Mission to the European Union, *Transatlantic Relations*, 21 June 1999, <http://useu.usmission.gov/bonn-summit-99.html> (02.01.2012).

<sup>6</sup> A. Jarczewska-Romaniuk, *Unia Europejska a idea transatlantycka – Partnerstwo Transatlantyckie u progu nowego wieku*, [in:] E. Halizak, S. Parzymies (eds.), *Unia Europejska – nowy typ wspólnoty międzynarodowej*, Warszawa 2002, p. 279.

## 10.2.2 Economic Ties

The initiatives realized within NTA accelerated the process of market integration on both sides of the Atlantic. The following issues were considered to be the most important: standardization of regulations and procedures, better access to both markets in various fields, and gradual elimination of the trade barriers. Integration of both markets contributes to increasing their competitiveness on a global scale. The US and the EU economies, which hold the 50% share of world GDP, are the biggest trade partners for each other. Products using the latest technologies account for one-fifth of their export. Extensive and dynamic common economic relations join both the EU and the US. The EU and American markets are strongly connected due to direct investments. An important factor is a bilateral trade exchange and investment flow – they remain high and relatively stable. In 2009, the EU accounted for 23% of the US merchandise trade in goods and services. The importance of the EU is even greater on the foreign direct investment side, where European companies accounted for \$1.5 trillion, or 63%, of total foreign direct investment in the US and the US companies accounted for \$1.7 trillion, or about 50%, of total foreign investment in Europe in 2009.<sup>7</sup>

## 10.2.3 NATO as a Special Link Between Europe and the US

There are no doubts that NATO links Europe and the US in a special way. At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, NATO had to face the challenge to re-evaluate its role. Contemporary task of NATO is to re-define the scope of its operations in geographic and subject-matter terms and the need for its further extension. There are two different concepts among its members. According to the US and the UK, NATO ought to maintain global character, defying the new threats even if they occur in the territories being distant from the US. This concept is a prevailing one, since NATO is involved in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Libya. France is in favor of NATO being responsible for the security on Atlantic and in the neighboring territories.

First, the extent of undertaken missions should be narrowed, the EU should be responsible for civilian actions, and actions far from Euro-Atlantic territories would not be the main objective of NATO. Due to French consistent efforts to level the division of spheres of influence within NATO, the French Fifth Republic is often regarded as enfant terrible of NATO.<sup>8</sup> Paris wants to

<sup>7</sup> R.J. Ahearn, *U.S.–EU Trade and Economic Relations – Key Policy Issues for the 112th Congress*, [http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/economy/U.S.\\_EU\\_Trade\\_and\\_Economic\\_Relations\\_CRS.pdf](http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/economy/U.S._EU_Trade_and_Economic_Relations_CRS.pdf) (20.10.2011).

<sup>8</sup> E. Posel-Częścik, *Sojusz Północnoatlantycki w polityce zagranicznej Francji*, „Biuletyn” PISM 16.04.2004, no. 15 (203), p. 1101.

be a partner equivalent to the US, although it is neither a military power, nor a serious player on an international arena. France has been a leader in efforts to develop an independent European force in a form of the so-called European Rapid Reaction Force. French efforts to organize an armed force for Europe, however, cannot be interpreted as a counterbalance to NATO or the US. The Rapid Reaction Force is too small to serve as a counter to the US military power and French officials have stated repeatedly that NATO will remain primary defense organization of Europe.<sup>9</sup>

Second, the US supports the idea of NATO enlargement, so the scope of transatlantic community is extended with new countries being included into the organization. The US championed the expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, not considering the fact that Russian officials complained at that time about what they perceived to be an American attempt to extend influence into the previously Russian sphere.<sup>10</sup> Washington also did not take into consideration possible protests of the allies, especially the UK, France and Germany.<sup>11</sup> The question that European allies asked was whether NATO enlargement was a good idea and whether it should have become the US policy?<sup>12</sup> One of the reasons for enlargement was the Clinton's administration belief that NATO needed a new lease on life to remain viable. The viability of NATO, in turn, was important because the alliance did not only help to maintain the position of America as a European power, but it also preserved hegemony of America in Europe.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, in 2004 seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe were admitted to NATO: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2008.

Third, the increase in number of NATO members means both strengthening its role as a guarantor of stabilization in Europe and contribution to strengthening American leadership in NATO and the US influence in Southern and Eastern Europe. The growth of NATO members' territory is also an important factor to be mentioned. Having accepted three former Soviet republics, NATO did

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<sup>9</sup> D. Lemke, *Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective*, [in:] T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Stanford University Press 2004, p. 60.

<sup>10</sup> See more: S. Plekhanov, *NATO Enlargement as an Issue in Russian Politics*, [in:] Ch.-P. David, J. Lévesque, *The Future of NATO. Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, Quebec 1999, pp. 168–185.

<sup>11</sup> D. Lemke, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>12</sup> R.L. Kugler, *Will Enlargement Succeed?*, [in:] Ch.-P. David, J. Lévesque, *The Future of NATO. Enlargement, Russia, and European Security*, Quebec 1999, p. 51.

<sup>13</sup> R.J. Art, *Europe Hedges its Security Bets*, [in:] T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Stanford University Press 2004, p. 193.

something that seemed to be impossible earlier – it entered the territory of the former Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> NATO membership for Croatia and Slovenia, i.e. the republics of former Yugoslavia, meant both overcoming the divisions in Europe and Europe becoming reunited.

Undoubtedly, NATO is the premier organization supporting the security *status quo* in the world. The expansion of NATO to new members in the Eastern Europe has strongly reinforced the transformation of their societies from communist states to democratic market economies of the satisfied coalition.<sup>15</sup>

Fourth, if mutual relations among partners of NATO are observed deeply, it needs to be noted that there is a clear discrepancy between European and American interests and also an attempt to reduce American dominance by European allies. The American ability to form a situation in transatlantic system proved to be weakened by the failure of Bush's actions during NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. America did not succeed in welcoming Georgia and Ukraine into the Membership Action Plan. Merkel and Sarkozy, fearing the reaction of Moscow, effectively blocked Bush's plans.<sup>16</sup>

To sum up, nowadays it seems that NATO is no longer the centerpiece of the transatlantic security relationship, and it is becoming less and less important for the US – European relations. NATO is gradually withering away.<sup>17</sup> The form of transatlantic security relationship is changing. The core of the new transatlantic security network consists of bilateral relations between the US and the leading European powers: France, Germany and the UK.

NATO now plays a secondary role, and it has to compete with other institutions. After the September 11, the US went first to the United Nations – not NATO – to gather support for retaliatory action. Yet that was also for a case in Afghanistan. Most recently, the NATO operation in Libya exposed its problems: only eight members taking part in air missions, weapons deficit and defense budget cuts.<sup>18</sup> However, it is important to note that despite the crisis and cuts in costs, European response in Libya was more effective than in the Balkans in the 1990s. France and the UK proved to be global powers in spite of the fact that their military potential did not match their political aspirations.

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<sup>14</sup> J. Kiwerska, *USA – UE. Stan i perspektywy relacji transatlantyckich*, „Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej” 2010, no. 4, p. 80; D. Lemke, op.cit., p. 69.

<sup>15</sup> D. Lemke, op.cit., p. 69.

<sup>16</sup> J. Kiwerska, op.cit., p. 73.

<sup>17</sup> Ch. de Jonge Oudraat, *The New Transatlantic Security Network*, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies 2002, <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/articles/Chantal.pdf> (20.10.2011).

<sup>18</sup> T. Bielecki, *Europa zdala test w Libii*, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 27.10.2011, p. 9.

## 10.3 Cooling of the Transatlantic Relations

In late 1990s the processes of weakening the transatlantic relations became evident. Reasons thereof can be found on both sides. On the European side, it was mainly the integration process, introducing common currency, accession of new Member States to the EU, forming the CFSC and the ESDP, being critically perceived by Washington.<sup>19</sup> The EU aiming at playing more independent part in international relations, including transatlantic ones, strengthened integration processes. A significant factor then was the competition among the EU Member States that concerned the influence on EU international politics.<sup>20</sup>

### 10.3.1 Transatlantic Partnership and the War on Terrorism

The so-called war against terrorism influenced transatlantic relations significantly. States on both sides of the Atlantic became closer after September 11.<sup>21</sup> The sense of solidarity and the readiness to help dominated in Europe whereas America was aware that it needed wide international cooperation in their fight against terrorism. Allies, invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, offered support to the US immediately after the attack: Secretary-General George Robertson invoked the Mutual Defense Clause of the NATO<sup>22</sup> founding treaty for the first time, declaring that a NATO member had been attacked, and that it was the task of all member countries to help. At the beginning, in the flush of enthusiasm, many Europeans believed that the US now realized that its response to terror could only be multilateral.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> D. Milczarek, *Stosunki transatlantyckie w sferze polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa: kontynuacja czy przełom? Polski punkt widzenia*, „Studia Europejskie” 2008, no. 2, p. 34.

<sup>20</sup> K. Larres, *EU Trilateralism: Germany, France, Britain, and the Failed Attempt to Turn the EU into a Serious Global Player*, <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/20yearsunity/larres.aspx> (20.10.2011).

<sup>21</sup> Al-Qaeda wanted to compel the United States to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf (and, in particular, from Saudi Arabia), and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Al-Qaeda's leaders also hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a U.S. overreaction, and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other pro-American regimes in the Middle East, and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments, F. Layne, *The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony*, [in:] T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford University Press 2004, p. 107.

<sup>22</sup> B. James, *Citing Mutual Defense Clause, Allies Say Attack Was Directed at All: NATO Commits to Supporting the U.S.*, “New York Times” 14 September 2001, [http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/news/14iht-t4\\_22.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/news/14iht-t4_22.html) (02.01.2012); RTE News, *NATO invokes mutual defence clause*, 2 October 2001, <http://www.rte.ie/news/2001/1002/natoreax.html> (02.01.2012).

<sup>23</sup> J.S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Global Politics. Discourse and Democracy in a Divided World*, Cambridge 2006, p. 131.

The EU also provided an extensive and unconditional support to the US. However, Europeans were surprised by the attitude of the American government: it was interested neither in forming anti-terrorism coalition under the auspices of the UN, nor in setting the campaign in a formula of NATO action. Washington resolved to coalition, based on bilateral relations with a state, the help of which was needed at a particular time.<sup>24</sup> *Le Monde*, which on September 12 published an editorial “We are all Americans”, would five months later lead with the headline “Has the United States gone crazy?”<sup>25</sup> President Chirac and his Foreign Minister, Vedrigne, represented Europe’s fears by describing the US as a “hyperpower”.<sup>26</sup>

In the first stage of the anti-terrorism campaign, NATO share was not impressive. In December 2001 and in early 2002 the US signed an agreement with EUROPOL, tightening the cooperation to fight organized crime and terrorism.<sup>27</sup> The EU was generally perceived by the US as the major ally in the fight against terrorism. In September 2002 the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Solana, Commissioner for External Relations Patten, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel (Belgium held then the EU presidency) met the American Secretary of State Powell and the American National Security Advisor Rice in Washington.<sup>28</sup> After 9/11, the US government sharpened its policy towards the states supporting terrorism or trying to get access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The result of this policy was launching military operation in Afghanistan by the US, their NATO allies and the several EU states in 2002.

However, initially Europeans did not take a military cooperation with the US during the operation in Afghanistan. In October 2001, just after Washington started the military operation against al-Qaeda, the EU General Affairs Council issued a statement giving a full support for the US actions, being a consequence of persistent unwillingness of Taliban to give Osama bin Laden residing in Afghanistan over to Americans.<sup>29</sup> Yet transatlantic

<sup>24</sup> J. Stachura, *Meandry europejskiej polityki USA*, „Studia Europejskie” 2004, no. 3, p. 37.

<sup>25</sup> Ch. de Jonge Oudraat, op.cit.

<sup>26</sup> F. Layne, op.cit., p. 119.

<sup>27</sup> Supplemental Agreement Between the Europol Police Office and the United States of America on the Exchange of Personal Data and Related Information, [https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/flags/supplemental\\_agreement\\_between\\_europol\\_and\\_the\\_usa\\_on\\_exchange\\_of\\_personal\\_data\\_and\\_related\\_information.pdf](https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/flags/supplemental_agreement_between_europol_and_the_usa_on_exchange_of_personal_data_and_related_information.pdf) (02.01.2012).

<sup>28</sup> See more: D. Eggert, *Przewartościowania w stosunkach transatlantyckich w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa w czasie prezydentury George’a W. Busha*, „Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations” 2004, no. 3–4, pp. 117–118.

<sup>29</sup> Council of the EU, 2416<sup>th</sup> Council meeting – General Affairs – Brussels, 11 March 2002, 6596/02 (Presse 48), [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/69769.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/69769.pdf) (02.01.2012).



solidarity significantly weakened at the beginning of 2002, when in his State of the Union Address, President Bush singled out terrorist organizations and Iran, Iraq and North Korea as their terrorist allies, constituting an “axis of evil”. Countries of Western Europe became worried by the willingness of Washington administration to take action in order to get rid of regimes in the “axis of evil”, especially by the preparations to intervention in Iraq.<sup>30</sup> The reason to link three “rogue states” was WMD/I, particularly the quest for, or possession of, a nuclear capability, accompanied by anti-US, anti-Western tendencies.<sup>31</sup>

The attack on Iraq in 2003 was an element of American “war on terrorism”. The direct reason for the attack was Iraqi failure to respect the UN resolution concerning the control over Iraqi installations that might have been used to produce WMD.<sup>32</sup> American attack on Iraq was chimed with statements from US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, urging a doctrine “pre-emptive” action,<sup>33</sup> reflected in the US National Security Doctrine.<sup>34</sup> The UK joined the US in the invasion in Iraq. It needs to be mentioned that since the end of the Cold War, Britain has been a steadfast American ally, British forces fought alongside American in Iraq (twice), Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Britain has not removed itself from NATO, has not undertaken any extensive military buildups, has not formed or even discussed counterbalancing alliances to offset American hegemony, and has not adopted any policies that might be interpreted as either balancing or buck-passing.<sup>35</sup>

Troops from Poland, Australia, Denmark, Spain, Italy and Hungary supported American invasion in Iraq. France and Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg did not approve of military action there. It was believed that what American administration wanted to achieve was not disarmament of Iraq but settling pro-American regime there. The UN Security Council provided a mandate for the American military occupation as late as in 2004. The American motivation was a conviction that the regime change in Iraq would weaken Palestinian radicalism. The lack of support from the new Iraqi government (favorable to the US) towards radical Palestinian groups, such as Hamas or Jihad, would have weakened their influence in the struggle for Palestinian independence against Israel, which would have finally strengthened Israeli security. The concept of exporting

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<sup>30</sup> J. Stachura, op.cit., p. 38.

<sup>31</sup> J. Gow, *Defending the West*, Cambridge 2005, p. 65.

<sup>32</sup> See more: World Socialist Web Site, *Weapons of mass destruction in Iraq: Bush's "big lie" and the crisis of American imperialism*, 21 June 2003, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jun2003/wmd-j21.shtml> (02.01.2012).

<sup>33</sup> See more; <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/westphal.pdf> (02.01.2012)

<sup>34</sup> J. Gow, op.cit., p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> D. Lemke, op.cit., pp. 59–60.

democracy to Iraq, intended to be successful, was supposed to cause political changes in other Arab countries (e.g. Syria) and the democratic reconstruction of the Middle East. This concept was not entirely realized and there are numerous indications that the situation in Iraq would be far from stable.<sup>36</sup>

The least controversial cooperation concerning war against terrorism seems to be mission in Afghanistan. In 2001 the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1386 authorizing the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF). However, at the initial stage of the mission in 2001–02 it was only the UK which contributed substantially to military response in Afghanistan. Other European countries confined to cooperation between European secret services, sending limited number of troops or, in case of Germany, logistic teams and teams halting the proliferation of chemical weapons.<sup>37</sup> European allies did not respond enthusiastically to the Bush administration's appeals convincing them to increase their military contingents in Afghanistan. According to America, Afghanistan clearly proved European unwillingness to support and be involved in American efforts. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan in March 2009. It was welcomed by the European allies.<sup>38</sup> However, there was no positive response to his appeal to send additional troops to the Hindu Kush.<sup>39</sup> Now there are over 60,000 NATO soldiers taking part in the mission in Afghanistan (including 29,000 American and 2,000 Polish troops).

In spite of the close cooperation in the war against the Taliban (EU police mission EUPOL was launched in Afghanistan in 2007), the situation in Afghanistan is not stable. What is more, there are more and more opinions that the war was lost.<sup>40</sup> In Afghanistan the Taliban are still a strong group, and the events in Pakistan in 2007–08<sup>41</sup> might be evidence of strong fundamental Muslim influences in this region. Islamists oppose Pakistani authorities openly, criticize their pro-American politics and express the demand for stopping cooperation with the West and establishing the Islamic law in the country.

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<sup>36</sup> See: U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher R. Hill On the Current Situation In Iraq*, 18 June 2009, <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2009/125138.htm> (02.01.2012).

<sup>37</sup> D. Eggert, op.cit., pp. 119–120.

<sup>38</sup> V. Morelli, P. Belkin, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124771.pdf> (02.01.2012).

<sup>39</sup> J. Kiwerska, op.cit., p. 79.

<sup>40</sup> Compare: K. Volker, *Afghanistan war: Is the US in it to win it?*, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0928/Afghanistan-war-Is-the-US-in-it-to-win-it> (20.10.2011).

<sup>41</sup> In 2007 state of emergence was declared by the President Musharraf, in 2008 general election took place.

### 10.3.2 Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism

On the American side, there was an increasing tendency to conduct unilateral actions.<sup>42</sup> Among others, America aspired to have a free hand to perform actions on an international scale, unlike other states, not to be obliged to accept commitments resulting from multilateral agreements, and to approach international organizations distrustfully unless the US has a position of the leader. Americans have always tended to divide the world in a Manichean way, into the good and the evil, preferring to take firm actions based on force and pressure rather than on persuasion. They have never hesitated to use military force.<sup>43</sup> European states, however, put special emphasis on solving difficult international problems through multilateral treaties, which they regard as the basis for an international order and cooperation.

Second, different US and EU attitudes are not only the consequence of their disproportional potential. European states, being much weaker than the US in terms of their military potential, have a more unfavorable attitude towards using force. America and Europe are different due to different historic tradition and experience, e.g. constructing European integration by compromises and a consensus method. Bush administration accused Europe of unwillingness to share responsibility for an international order, not being ready to accept strategic military challenges and ignoring dangers posed by WMD and their transfer to terrorists or to “rouge countries”. Americans emphasize that Europeans owe their sense of security to the protection that is provided by the US military potential.<sup>44</sup>

Undoubtedly, both the disintegration of the Eastern block and the victory in Persian Gulf War (1991) meant the triumph of American unipolarity<sup>45</sup> which was not easily accepted by the EU Member States, particularly France. There are numerous examples of American unilateral activities. The US withdrew its acceptance of the ICJ in 1995 after a ruling on the US policy in Nicaragua.<sup>46</sup> Despite intense pressure from Europe, Canada and many NGOs, the US refused to adhere to the landmine agreement because of the concerns of its army about the effects of a ban on a safety of American soldiers. The US alone rejected a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The US blocked agreement on

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<sup>42</sup> Dorota Eggert comprehensively presents Bush’s drifting apart from Clinton’s multilateralism towards unilateralism, D. Eggert, op.cit., p. 115.

<sup>43</sup> D. Milczarek, op.cit., p. 37.

<sup>44</sup> J. Stachura, op.cit., p. 35.

<sup>45</sup> Ch. Krauthammer, *Unipolar moment?*, „Foreign Affairs” 1990/91, no.1, p. 32 ff.

<sup>46</sup> See: A.L. Paulus, *From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication*, <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/15/4/379.pdf> (02.02.2012).

a Small Arms Treaty by refusing to regulate civilian ownership of military weapons and to restrict arms supply to rebel movements. The US opposed the Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture which would have allowed international inspection of the US prisons (including the one at the Guantanamo Bay).<sup>47</sup> European states were unfavorable to American decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas reduction announced at the end of March 2001. The increasing dislike for American persistence made other issues of disagreement significant, such as attitude towards death penalty or function of religion in public life.

Operation in Afghanistan in 2002 could have made Americans realize the short-sightedness of unilateral politics and Washington be keen on cooperation with the European allies. However, the US focused on its right to exercise its own foreign policy, according to American interests – with no multilateral cooperation. European partners regarded this decision as ignoring both international law and American allies' opinion, leading, as a result, to arguments and divisions weakening transatlantic solidarity. European states became cautious towards American unilateral policy.

American unilateralism was present in Bush's announcement to build Ballistic Missile Defense, although European states and Russia opposed it. Missile Defense (MD) aimed at the US protection against ballistic missiles from Iraq, Iran, North Korea and lately Libya – countries being then referred to as the "axis of evil". The EU feared that the increased sense of security on the other side of the Atlantic, being the result of MD, could cause a new wave of isolationist tendencies in the US. It could mean smaller American involvement into defense in Europe and a weaker sense of security among European members of NATO. Events of September 11 and the subsequent presidential elections in the US made MD issue less relevant.

American military operation in Iraq in March 2003 became an accelerating factor for serious dissonance. American war against Iraq (violating the resolution of the UN Security Council and ignoring the opinion of most of the EU Member States) challenged the transatlantic partnership and weakened the CFSP cohesion. The response of Bush administration to September 11 attacks was to intensify the hypersecuritization and unilateralism already under way as a result of a unipolarity. Bush declared a war rather than a police action.<sup>48</sup> A direct reason for the American attack was a violation by Bagdad of the UN resolution concerning monitoring Iraqi installations ready to produce WMD.

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<sup>47</sup> B. Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers. World Politics in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 168–169.

<sup>48</sup> B. Buzan, *Ibidem*, p. 174.

In practice, this operation was a part of an ambitious plan to reconstruct the geostrategy in the “Broad” Middle East in order to strengthen the states being friendly to the US to oppose its enemies and to support the ideas of democracy and freedom. Gaining allies’ support for the operation in Iraq was a test for Washington leadership and NATO cohesion. Part of allies, including France, Germany and Belgium, started a dispute with the White House, considering the threat from Bagdad regime to the world peace. The differences were related to the issue if the threat was so serious that it needed an immediate American intervention, even without the support of the UN Security Council. The states with critical attitude towards American plans, worried that the intervention would cause destabilization of the region, more dangerous than the *status quo*. Public opinion worldwide, including Western Europe, opposed the war in Iraq. The UK,<sup>49</sup> Spain, Portugal, Denmark and “new” NATO and the EU Member States, including Poland, supported the policy of Bush administration. As a result, troops from the UK, Poland, Australia, Denmark, Spain, Italy and Hungary were involved in the Iraq War.

Difficult relations with the allies inclined the Bush administration to act in a selective way and prefer relations with the states having more favorable attitude towards American postulates, as well as win the differences between particular partners at the expense of the relations with the EU or the European partners of NATO being treated as a whole. This attitude resulted in the increased American “caution” towards European integration and temporary weakening of the EU as a US partner. Rumsfeld, then US Secretary of Defense, on 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2003 in his statement divided Europe into “Old Europe”, not accepting American leadership, and “New Europe”, being pro-American and supporting American policy. According to Washington, the “Old Europe” (France and Germany) refused to co-operate. The “New Europe”, as a counterbalance to France and Germany, would have been formed by the UK, Spain, Poland and new NATO members, which in January 2003 signed the Letter of Eight,<sup>50</sup> strongly supporting American plans in Iraq.

The problem of support for the operation in Iraq became a test for Bush’s policy towards Europe, leadership capacity of the White House, NATO cohesion and European allies’ willingness to act out of territories of member states.<sup>51</sup> It

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<sup>49</sup> Tony Blair insisted that the emerging campaign against Al-Qaueda was not a “war”, and that attention had to be paid to the root causes of terrorism, J. Howorth, J.T.S. Keeler, *The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, [in:] J. Howorth, J.T.S. Keeler (eds.), *Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, Palgrave Macmillan 2003, p. 13.

<sup>50</sup> EurActiv, *Does ‘gang of eight’ letter sound the death bell for CFSP?*, <http://www.euractiv.com/security/gang-letter-sound-death-bell-cfsp/article-111961> (02.01.2012).

<sup>51</sup> J. Stachura, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

should be emphasized that both sides aspired to appease the dissonances and they were quite successful in the attempt.

### 10.3.3 Differences in Approach to the Use of Military Force in International Relations

Other reasons for dissonance between the US and Europe apply to different opinions concerning using military force in international relations. The vision that prevails in the EU is that of co-operative security and group security whereas Bush administration opted for military measures to maintain security. A different American attitude certainly results from strengthening of US military power in the post-Cold War era. The US military spending accounts for over 40 per cent of the world military expenditure. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Pentagon budget was equal to military budgets in 15 countries of the highest defense expenditure. As Cooper says: „The most striking features of the world today is US military dominance. And the contrast between US military capabilities and Europe grows wider all the time”.<sup>52</sup> Yost, however, appears to be more careful while explaining this matter:

„it is difficult to make comparison between US and European military capabilities for at least three reasons. First, (...) different capabilities can be used to achieve similar results; similar capabilities can be used in different ways to achieve distinct results and so on. Second, even in a simple comparison of similar capabilities (for instance, air-refueling aircraft) basic problems in counting rules arise, quite aside from the quality of the aircraft and the readiness and proficiency of the personnel (...). The third factor complicating a US-European capabilities-gap assessment also involves complex political judgments: the possibility of EU access to common NATO assets and even, in some circumstances, US national assets under the auspices of Alliance-approved CJTFs”.<sup>53</sup>

The central fact of geopolitics today is the US military power. As I mentioned, America accounts for more than 40 per cent of all military expenditure in the world and a much higher proportion of a military capabilities. There is no conventional force in the world that could fight and all-out war against the US and win.<sup>54</sup>

The US military power reinforced numerous American politicians' activities aimed at perceiving the US to be “a world policeman” or an imperial

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<sup>52</sup> R. Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, London 2004, p. 156.

<sup>53</sup> D.S. Yost, *The U.S. – European Capabilities Gap and the Prospects for ESDP*, [in:] J. Ho-worth, J.T.S. Keeler (eds.), *Defending Europe. The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Au-tonomy*, Palgrave Macmillan 2003, pp. 81–83.

<sup>54</sup> R. Cooper, op.cit., p. 45.

power. The asymmetry between the US and its NATO allies in their military expenditure was distinct. The asymmetry in satellite reconnaissance, air force and the capabilities of Quick Reaction Force was a significant factor in the conflict in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. European aspirations of parity with the US, however, are limited to the economic sphere – there is no chance that Europe could gain such a position militarily in the next decade. The EU Member States show no sign of investing in the military research and development needed to eliminate their security dependence on the US even during two or three decades.<sup>55</sup> During American involvement in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, European partners were convinced that the US diminished the role of NATO. NATO appeared to be less and less suitable for the US since it became a constraining factor for its military activity. This approach of the American government during the operation in Afghanistan was affected by the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, when American politicians were critical of a slow process of military decision-making, being the consequence of the necessity to consult the decisions with the biggest NATO members. Europeans realized that they needed the US military power, especially the headquarters and planning capabilities of NATO. They also realized that Washington's military intervention was a „near miss” and that the US might not be willing to intervene in the next European crisis.<sup>56</sup> During the first stage of the operation in Afghanistan, NATO was not sufficiently taken into consideration.

#### 10.3.4 European and American Attitudes Towards the International Law

The dissonance between the US and Europe also results from a different approach to abiding by international law. The US is quite flexible concerning international law principles, particularly these constraining its actions. World public opinion regarded as scandalous US refusal to ratify the ICC Statute.<sup>57</sup> The EU also criticized the White House severely for insisting that foreigners suspected of Al-Qaeda affiliation who had been captured during the American Anti-Terrorism Action in Afghanistan were not granted the POW (Prisoner-Of-War) status under the Geneva Convention.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> M.R. Brawley, *The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory*, [in:] T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford University Press 2004, p. 96.

<sup>56</sup> R.J. Art, op.cit., p. 196.

<sup>57</sup> S. Bieleń, op.cit., p. 324.

<sup>58</sup> J. Stachura, op.cit., p. 36.

During the Bush administration, the concept of preventive strike dominated. It was a meaningful example of the US unilaterally granting itself the role of a superior arbitrator while solving international conflicts. The concept of preventive strike might be dangerous, as military force could be used not only in case of a real threat from a certain state but also against the state presumed as violating international norms. (It would be a recourse in international law advancement.) The concept of preventive strike was applied by the US in Iraq. (No materials to produce the WMD were finally found in Baghdad.) What was at stake in the conflict on how to solve the Iraqi problem was not Iraq itself but the bases of international order. While opposing American politics, France, Germany and Russia did not call into question the US leadership but opposed violating the principles being beneficial for the whole international community. The dispute over Iraq was the dispute over the character of American leadership in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – based on the power of ideas and economy or the military power. As Art says “Kosovo War and the second Gulf War demonstrated two faces of the US unilateralism: an overwhelmingly powerful but potentially stand aloof United States, and overwhelmingly and highly interventionist United States. Neither unilateralist face pleased the Europeans”.<sup>59</sup>

### 10.3.5 Is the EU “Jealous” of American Hegemony?

This question is humorous as the concept of jealousy does not exist either in the politics or in international relations. That means the EU is not “jealous” of American hegemony. However, if we put the question of competition between the EU and the US resulting from American hegemony, the answer is not so simple. It seems that the EU cooperates rather than competes with the US (economy and military cooperation; the EU has ceded to the US military power). However, some single European states (especially France and Germany) have taken feeble attempts to the political rivalry within the US (e.g. Iraq War). It does not change the fact that “synergy” of transatlantic relationship dominates. The EU is aware of its ability as well as the US power.

America is not an imperial power in the classical sense, i.e. seeking territory abroad. America is hegemonic – it does aim to control foreign policy. The hegemony is a part of bargain in which America provides protection and allies offer bases and support. From the American point of view, countries can choose either to be allies or to be irrelevant, in which case they can be left alone.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> R.J. Art, *op.cit.*, p. 200.

<sup>60</sup> R. Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 48.



American hegemony, clearly formed at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, was a result of using American power actively. Washington hegemony was perceived in a positive way as long as it was used to maintain an existing international order. However, when the US began to impose its own model of the international order, American hegemony started to be regarded as a threat of abusing an unlimited mandate in order to use force in international relations.<sup>61</sup> The US is the only power with a global strategy – in some sense it is the only power with an independent strategy at all. Every other country defines its strategy in relation to the US.<sup>62</sup>

Despite the significant dissonance and cooling of transatlantic relations, neither the US, nor its European allies wanted them to result in a serious and a permanent crisis. They moved towards resolving the deadlock and minimizing the consequences of the dissonance. The US remained the most important strategic partner for the EU, and the Bush's National Security Strategy had a huge impact on forming the foreign and security policy of the EU. In 2000s, the American failures in the Middle East urged the White House to co-operate with the allies. Another factor conducive to a better atmosphere around transatlantic relations was a more conciliatory leadership style adopted by Bush.

The Obama administration is expected to deepen transatlantic cooperation. On such matters as human rights promotion, promotion of democratic values, fight against terrorism, stopping the WMD proliferation, resuming the Middle East peace process, which appear to be the most critical problems related to international politics and global security, the states on both sides of the Atlantic take a concurrent stand. The American administration assigns a great importance to tightening the cooperation with the European allies as well as coordinating politics towards Russia, Iran, the Middle East and towards global problems (trade liberalization, climate change, etc.) In 2009, a better atmosphere in relations between Washington and Moscow caused certain anxiety in European countries and made transatlantic relations more complicated. America accused Europe of not being able to form a common vision and strategy in relations with Russia. The EU took up a discussion neither on Russian president Medvedev's proposal for the new security strategy nor energetic security. There were three obvious and unavoidable differences: interests, standpoints and opinions concerning various matters relating to the US, the EU or its particular member states. These differences appear to be unavoidable.<sup>63</sup> Both parties are aware of common interests and

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<sup>61</sup> S. Bieleń, *op.cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>62</sup> R. Cooper, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

<sup>63</sup> J. Kiwerska, *op.cit.*, p. 82.

hope to achieve a kind of mutual flexibility, particularly in issues of secondary importance.

A noticeable spirit of *détente* in transatlantic relations began during the Russian-Georgian War (August 2008). Both Americans and Europeans strongly opposed Russian hegemonic politics. Both sides of the partnership condemned Russia for its actions, although the official statements varied in tone.<sup>64</sup>

## 10.4 Cooperation Alternatives for the US and the EU

### 10.4.1 The US–China Relations: Any Competition?

For some years after September 11, relations between the US and China appeared to be on a steadily rising course. As Washington turned its attention to the urgent dangers of terrorism and proliferation, it seemed less inclined to see China as a strategic competitor (actual or potential).<sup>65</sup>

When Obama entered the White House, all the talk was of a potential G-2, i.e. Sino-US leadership,<sup>66</sup> instead of already well-established G-20. Some people predicted comeback to bipolar balance of power with one new player. Obama's economist Summers said there was "no question the relationship between the US and China will prove of larger historical importance than either the Cold War or anything that happens with the Islamic world".<sup>67</sup> In 2009 Hilary Clinton chose China for her first official visit as the Secretary of State. Upholding human rights was no longer a priority for Washington, but cooperation on trade and climate change. However, as Shambaugh says: "differing political values and systems will continue to be a barrier; volatile nationalism in China remains a wildcard; economic protectionism embodied in low renminbi and competition is not going to disappear; mutual strategic interests in Asia only partially converge and China's military modernization will continue to alter the regional balance of power".<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> See more: D. Milczarek, op.cit, pp. 44–45.

<sup>65</sup> A.L. Friedberg, *The Future of U.S.–China Relations. Is Conflict Inevitable?*, "International Security" Fall 2005, vol. 30 (2), p. 7.

<sup>66</sup> K. Rafferty, *Chilling U.S.–China Relations*, "The Japan Times", 23 November 2011, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ea20111123a2.html> (20.12.2011).

<sup>67</sup> M. Strachan, *Larry Summers: 'No Question' U.S.–China Relations More Important Than The Cold War*, "The Huffington Post", 18 March 2011, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/18/larry-summers-china-recovery\\_n\\_837657.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/18/larry-summers-china-recovery_n_837657.html) (20.12.2011).

<sup>68</sup> D. Shambaugh, *US–Chinese Relations Take a New Direction? – Part I*, YaleGlobal Online, 24 January 2011, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-chinese-relations-new-direction-part-i> (20.12.2011).

Chinese economy is the second strongest in the world. The power of China is systematically rising. Beijing and Washington have to seriously co-operate to address not only global economic challenges and nuclear proliferation concerns related to Iran and North Korea, but also such issues as security in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

US–China economic ties have expanded robustly over the past three decades. Total US–China trade rose from \$2 billion in 1979 to \$457 billion in 2010. China is currently the second–largest US trading partner, its third–largest export market, and its biggest source of import.<sup>69</sup> The rapid pace of economic integration between China and the US (benefiting both sides) has made the trade relationship increasingly complex.

As Friedberg says, in foreign affairs most Americans are liberals. Regarding the future of the US–China relations, liberal optimists believe in three causal mechanisms: economic independence, international institutions, and democratization.<sup>70</sup> Since the mid-1990s the presumed links between trade, growth, democracy and peace have been features of the official US rhetoric regarding the relations with China. American realists note that, first of all, the power of China is rising. Secondly, throughout history, rising powers have tended to be troublemakers. Most American realists would be content to conclude that China, like all previous potential hegemon (e.g. Hitler’s Germany, USSR), will be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon<sup>71</sup> and, in result, threaten the US position.

Obviously, it is easy to find some argumentations of discord in the American–Chinese relations. For the US, it’s Chinese reluctance to condemn a series of North Korean provocations or its expansive claims to disputed territory in the South China Sea, among others. For China, points of friction included US arms sales to Taiwan, Obama’s meeting with Dalai Lama, US joint military exercises with South Korea in the Yellow Sea.<sup>72</sup> Europe should not fear that China will take its place in relations with the US. China remains and will remain more a competitor than an ally of the US.

#### 10.4.2 Any Serious Cooperation Alternatives for the EU?

What alliances should be strengthened (or even created) by the EU and with whom? As a general observation, the position of Europe in international

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<sup>69</sup> W.M. Morrison, *China–U.S. Trade Issues*, CRS Report RL33536, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf> (20.12.2011).

<sup>70</sup> See more: A.L. Friedberg, *op.cit.*, pp. 12–16.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 20.

<sup>72</sup> S.V. Lawrence, T. Lum, *U.S.–China Relations: Policy Issues*, CRS Report R41108, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41108.pdf> (20.12.2011).

relations is steadily weakening. The role of Europe as a hegemonic power has passed forever. However, Europe must take action to remain among the most powerful states, because of its strong economic position and for its own safety. Alliance with the US (especially within the NATO) is particularly important for Europe and under no circumstances shall it be lessened. However, given the fact that the US continues to be a hegemon jealously guarding its strong position, Washington is looking for other alliances (not only from Europe) because it also has its own upheld interests in other parts of the world.

Should Europe look for other reliable allies? First of all, we ought to answer if common interests of the EU–US still exist? It seems that conflicts of interests dominate in the EU–US relations currently. Only a few European states (such as UK) share the common interests with the US. There is a clear division within the EU. Germany will try to rebuild its power in international relations, like France. Rebuilding the US influence in Europe is rather doubtful; in fact the US presence in Europe is now unnecessary. We are dealing with slow but systematic withdrawal of the US from Europe. American presence was necessary until the end of the 1980s. It lost its *raison d'être* as a result of geopolitical changes. Instead, Europe is doomed to the alliance with the US. Reintegration of American power is likely over next several years. The US has enormous potential to maintain its hegemony (the charismatic leader can help). Predicting the emergence of China as a hegemon is rather exaggerated. China is struggling with its own problems, especially demographic ones.

In spite of many differences between Europe and the US (and geopolitical changes) transatlantic alliance will remain strong. Actually, Europe has no other alternative. Europe will not create alliance with China,<sup>73</sup> because – unlike the US – it treats human rights very seriously. Besides, China would not be interested in such alliance, because it would not find the recipient. China could create alliances with single, powerful European states (like Germany, France, Italy), but not with the EU itself.

Theoretically, Europe could turn to the alliance with emerging powers – Brazil<sup>74</sup> (having quite similar culture to European one) and India.<sup>75</sup> However, it is an unrealistic project, at least for the next decade or even two. Brazil is so far interested in realizing its own interests in South America and actually does not go beyond this area. India, in turn, continues to struggle with a serious

<sup>73</sup> See more: J. Meng, *EU–China Relations: Problems and Promises*, <http://aei.pitt.edu/9060/1/MenEUChinaLong08edi.pdf> (12.01.2012).

<sup>74</sup> See more: S.F. Chrystenses, *Argentina and Brasil's Relations to the EU*, [http://vbn.aau.dk/files/35942861/Steen\\_Fryba\\_Christensen.pdf](http://vbn.aau.dk/files/35942861/Steen_Fryba_Christensen.pdf) (12.01.2012).

<sup>75</sup> G. Grevi, A. de Vasconcelos, *Partnership for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brasil, China, India and Russia*, Paris 2008.

conflict with Pakistan and all its energy is consumed by this conflict. For now, India has neither time, nor aim of opening to the world.

## 10.5 Conclusions

First of all, considering the fact that the EU will not be able to react effectively beyond the territory enclosed by its borders for a long time, it seems that strengthening its defense capacities as a part of the transatlantic alliance and remaining the US ally will be the most appropriate solution for Europe.

Second, global problems force both Europe and the US to maintain their further cooperation since their long-range goals are shared and since the US – so far – remains the only credible partner for the EU. Moreover, an important factor is that the EU, thanks to CFSP, is the only real organization, besides NATO and the UN, that can effectively engage in conflict management operations on its own. Should security challenges arise but the US decline to participate on its own, or participate through NATO, or where NATO engagement might be less acceptable to local actors, the EU could play a useful role.<sup>76</sup>

The EU is aware of its economic advantage, as its Member States are becoming an equivalent the US partner due to their gross domestic product. In terms of its economic interests, the EU is searching for ways to develop its capacity to compete with the US. This strategy means amassing enough economic power to move out from under the shadow of the US, or at least become a capable partner.<sup>77</sup> The US, on the other hand, believes that its assistance is of a symbolic and political rather than of an operational character due to its enormous military advantage over the allies. That is why America acted independently in its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>78</sup>

However, the reason for concern could be the US drifting apart from its European origins (meant as cultural and civilization origins) to the regions being the source of immigrant inflow – Latin America and Southeast Asia. America is predicted to take an interest in Europe to a smaller and smaller extent. How long will the values that Europe and America share survive?

The US is interested in a closer cooperation with China (perhaps even at the expense of Europe). The US and China share economic issues. Americans realize that without rejuvenating its economy, the US cannot remain a global leader.

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<sup>76</sup> [www.globeurope.com/standpoint/hillary-s-offer](http://www.globeurope.com/standpoint/hillary-s-offer) (20.10.2011).

<sup>77</sup> M.R. Brawley, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

<sup>78</sup> S. Bielen, *op.cit.*, p. 403.

Currently, Europe is trying to cope with economic crisis and stabilize the euro. America is trying to get out of its own economic crisis. To conclude, transatlantic partnership is still holding a key importance for global scale activities. Neither the EU nor the US is powerful enough to achieve their goals on their own. Both European and US power are diminishing in the third or fourth decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – these are India and especially China that will be exercising their growing power as well as other serious actors appearing on a global stage. Faced with a rising China, the Obama administration emphasized that it “welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs”.<sup>79</sup> It seems that only by tightening mutual relations on both sides of the Atlantic and by developing the real partnership, the Western World could be united in order to defend and achieve its shared interests and values.

The problem is more complex, however, as it applies to the essence of the values. In a socio-cultural sphere, persisting religious beliefs and ideas seems to be one of the most spectacular attitudes in America whereas European societies are becoming more and more secular. Despite the differences, it is commonly believed that consensus and tightening the cooperation in transatlantic relations are necessary to let the Western World develop and survive in the new globalized and polycentric world. In April 2010 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed the American point of view: „We do not see the EU as a competitor of NATO, but we see a strong Europe as an essential partner with NATO and with the United States”.<sup>80</sup> Meanwhile, American Treasury Secretary Geithner has made clear that only if China makes progress on US priorities (such as the reduction of trade and investment barriers, protection of intellectual property rights and currency revaluation), will the US make progress on Chinese priorities, like export of high-tech products and market economy status.<sup>81</sup> Europe should remember about the dream of a robust US–China partnership to lead the world. For the US good relations with China seem to be very important. If tensions between the two Pacific powers worsen, the whole Eastern Eurasia could become divided in a new cold war. On the other hand, a deepening US–China partnership could bring increased possibilities for economic growth and the successful management of pressing global problems, such as terrorism and the proliferation of mass destruction weapon.

The EU should take care of strong transatlantic partnership. Such a partnership is not just political or military but also economic and include the

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<sup>79</sup> S.V. Lawrence, T. Lum, *op.cit.*

<sup>80</sup> <http://www.globeurope.com/standpoint/hillary-s-offer> (20.10.2011).

<sup>81</sup> E.C. Economy, *Reality in U.S.–China Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations 14 January 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/china/reality-us-china-relations/p23803> (20.12.2011).

realm of nation building in all its aspects. This is a natural partnership, given the fact that the transatlantic nations are all democracies, all dispose of much of the economic product of the world, and all have an interest and concern in what happens in so-called developing world.