TERRORISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FORCES OF (DIS) ORDER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Introduction

We live in a troubled and tumultuous era. September 11 and its aftermath, the financial meltdown of 2008 and its aftermath, have littered the landscape with new obstacles that must be identified and surmounted. As of this writing, the events in Central Asia and the Middle East are cause for the devil himself to dance. The catastrophic impacts of global warming and of general environmental degradation seem to be on our doorstep, and it does appear as if the world may be heading into a depression, measured both in spirit and in hard currency. Achieving success and security, peace and justice in life remains a great challenge, and the bar has been raised of late due to recent events that are seemingly careening out of control. While the basic principles of progress and success remain the same, their operational application now needs to be adjusted so as to properly respond to the unique dynamics of the new and ever changing social, political, and economic environments in which we function. The valiant among us remain undaunted by the new challenges and move forward relentlessly, implacably, perseveringly and unyielding in heart and in mind. This trek of discipline carries a hefty tuition but offers much to those who pay the price.

This paper seeks to outline a series of inter-related socio-political, economic factors and forces, catalysts and causes if you will, that are impacting the state of order and disorder in our world, and suggests a course of action that we must undertake to mitigate the turmoil that is swirling around us all.

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**Terrorism and Islam**

There is a significant measure of animosity held toward the West in general, and the United States in particular on the part of many in the Muslim faith; a feeling reflected not just by the Islamic fringe, but also by a large proportion of those who are in the Islamic mainstream. There is also a significant militant Islamic presence in Europe, Euro–jihadists as they have become known, that are both a by–product of and contributor to communal, national and global disorder. This troublesome situation continues to fester, and while there are some signs of decompression, the conflict appears as if it will boil for many decades to come.

It is not so much established terrorist organizations that loom on the horizon, but rather flexible, fluid cells, diverse and obscure entities that are inspired by, not directed by Al Qaeda. They are motivated more by an ideal rather than a leader. The United States and Europe are not up against a unified enemy, but rather a mutating virus of anti-American/anti-Western hatred; self–taught terrorists, organized in groups with no central structure per se, united only by their obsession with a jihad against America, against the West. This is the new face of terrorism – dozens of groups around the world connected by a global ideology, and a common enemy; the United States in particular, and the West in general.

**Contemporary Flash Points**

Historically, there are obvious and deep sentiments of cultural suspicion and mistrust between East and West that can be traced back to the inane policies and perspectives of Pope Urban II (1042-1099) and the Crusades. In a more recent context, however, there have been a number of contemporary flash–points that have contributed to the present crisis:

1. U.S. support of Israel – The United States is perceived by Muslims to have unfairly provided years of unwavering support for Israel, and for good reason. The over–the–top willingness of the U.S. to supply Israel with military hardware for example, coupled with our collateral willingness to turn a blind eye when that equipment is misused by the Israeli military, is particularly troublesome and strikes a sensitive cord throughout the Muslim world, even in countries far from the Middle East.

2. U.S. troops on Muslim soil – Salafists consider it a sacrilege for infidel military forces to occupy Muslim soil. The case of Saudi Arabia is of particular concern. Placed there just before the 1st Gulf War with Saudi Arabia’s blessing to protect that nation and to serve as a staging point for taking back Kuwait, the U.S. stayed for ten years. The presence of these
infidels inflamed extremists and troubled even moderate Muslims. The continued presence of our troops in the region, on sacred soil, is an ongoing concern to the faithful.

3. Uneven U.S. economic sanctions – American economic sanctions, aimed at countries the United States says have sponsored or harbored terrorists, have centered almost entirely on Muslim countries. To the average Muslim in the street, it appears that the U.S. is targeting them.

4. U.S. support of repressive Middle East regimes – for fear of alienating strategic allies and disrupting the flow of oil, the United States (the alleged champion of justice and liberty) generally ignores serious abuses of civil rights by Arabic rulers friendly to it. The reality is that the United States supports corrupt regimes in the Middle East so that the oil will continue to flow. Interestingly, in many ways, the United States is contributing to the perpetuation of the socio-economic squalor in the Islamic world upon which terrorism thrives.

5. George W. Bush – The egregiously inept policy decisions of George W. Bush and his administration served only to inflame matters. His unilateral and ill-planned invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, his belligerent intolerance, his dogmatic orientations and condescending airs, his pursuit of policies that ran counter to the rule of law, have all served to alienated even Islamic moderates. There was already an image among many in the Islamic world that the United States was an evil empire. That perspective was aggravated by the Bush administration. The world was a dangerous place when he came into office, and he made it more so.

Globalization: The Cultural Cyclotron

In addition, there are a handful of related and more unremitting factors that are fueling the conflict. One of the more enduring and far reaching is the cultural imprint of globalization. Globalization is the quintessential cultural cyclotron, slamming and melding East and West, Latino and Asian, Hindu and Buddhist. Its impacts are infiltrating virtually every society, clime, and culture worldwide. On the positive side of the ledger, transnational markets have allowed consumers worldwide to enjoy access to a broader array of goods and services than ever before, scholarly exchanges are increasing, infrastructure is improving, and cross national exchanges and interactions are increasing in every sector and at all levels. Today, for the first time in human history, there is truly a global economy and an emerging global community.
All of this, however, does come with a cost, a cultural melding cost, and that inevitable collateral consequence is totally unacceptable, particularly to many in the Islamic community. In this sense, globalization serves as an aggravating factor. One of the core factors propelling the current Islamic jihad is the deep resentment regarding the cultural impacts of globalization in general, and more particularly, the impacts of globalizations’ Western cultural orientation on Islam. There is a cultural osmosis, a cross-cultural melding, a cross-pollination, a cross-fertilization as an inevitable artifact of globalization, and many in the Islamic world (as well as the fundamentalists in the Christian world) are horrified with this prospect. The impact of this multi-lateral assimilation is a creeping erosion of the traditional Islamic culture, a pollution of the pure, and an eventual marginalization of that way of life.

Even moderate Muslims view America and the West as a cultural hyperpower that dominates the world, crushing Eastern religious and cultural institutions that have existed for more than a thousand years. American influence in particular has been culturally extended in six ways:

1. Finance (commerce, trade, foreign aid)
2. Entertainment industry (television, music, movies)
3. Pervading and pervasive military presence
4. Political and business orientations (contracts, rule of law, freedom of speech)
5. News media
6. Magazines of every ilk (news, fashion, sports, entertainment)

This influence, thanks to globalization, has become rather firmly embedded into the global culture and will likely stay there for centuries to come, both the good and the bad. The Muslim Fundamentalists, reel at the latter. There are aspects of American/Western culture that are definitively and categorically at odds with Islam, that utterly dilute and pollute Islamic culture and conscience – abortions, blasphemous books, secular materialism, sexual perversion and hellish music. The concern is that Western culture tends to capture and corrupt young Arabic minds. The Islamic clerics certainly preach against it, but Western culture is most intoxicating. The clerics are losing the culture war, they are mad, and wish to send the devil back to hell. Even the moderate Islamic community is in general agreement with the pax Americana theme, and that broad theme plays well across the Islamic world.

Western culture does steamroller alternative cultures, sometimes with an iron fist, sometimes with the velvet glove of seduction. And this is what bin Laden and many in the Islamic community are really fighting, the erosion of Islamic culture as a result of its exposure to America and to the West in general, arising from the insidious creep of the globalization market culture. Yet, at the same time, many in the Islamic world seek to participate in that global economy, wish to have access to
the world’s markets and goods, wish to gain access to the rest of the world and all it has to offer. The situation has left the Muslim world in disarray and has kindled a measure of cultural dissonance within the Islamic community, a matter which will be addressed in more detail later in this paper.

In this context, Mr. bin Laden is not the enemy per se. Rather he is an emissary with a message that resonates well in the Muslim community. The real enemy is a fluid, illusive, and yet very real anti-Western/anti-American or in other words, anti–globalization sentiment, that has been built up to effervescent proportions. The problem is compounded due to the fact that negotiation is just not a part of the formula at present for many in the Islamic world, particularly the fundamentalists who do not want the West to change, but rather they want Western culture in general and globalization in particular to die. There is no dialogue, no demand list, no suggestions of how the West should change, what the West should do. They simply want the West to go away, possessing somewhat of a neo–nihilistic perspective. They want to destroy all that there is in the West, for God, for Allah, who is standing by even at the gates, to start a new world with the scraps of the old, very much like the classical phoenix of Greek mythology. Mohammed Atta, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, wrote in letters back home that he, burned with desire to restore the old glories of Islam.

An Alternative Explanation

There is another source of contemporary Islamic terrorism that is not based in religion, nor cultural conflict, nor in the flash–points of concern outlined previously. The root source of the bulk of Islamic terrorism is anomie; a reaction to the hopelessness bred within the backward nature of contemporary Islamic societies, where endemic poverty reigns, where there is insufficient infrastructure, ineffectual civic and corporate institutions, inferior educational systems, and where there are limited opportunities for economic, scholarly, scientific and artistic pursuits. The source of this anomie is the lack of modernization, political and economic, in much of the Islamic world – the offspring of the debauched relationship between centuries of poor governance and insignificant economic development.

As the rest of the world moved forward in the last 50 years, the bulk of the Islamic world failed to keep pace, with a few exceptions (Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates). The primary reason is rooted deep in Islamic religious dogma. Many in the Islamic world cling to the vision of a cherubic Islamic nation–state. Little importance or social value is given within Islamic culture to the temporal matters of good governance and its offspring –
infrastructure improvement, economic growth, education enhancement, multi–sector civic development, etc.

This prevailing view of Islamic law as hallowed and unalterable has resulted in a confiscation of the political. As a result of centuries of blunted socio–political progress and development, and parallel inept civic governance, the Islamic world now finds itself decidedly behind the rest of the world in virtually every arena. The problem is that a new socio–economic order has been thrust upon them, and they are not ready to participate.

Unfortunately, rather than embarking on fast–track modernization and joining the globalized world, many Arabic political leaders are aggravating the situation by retreating into fundamentalism themselves. Many are abandoning their civic duties, and thus condemning their communities and their people to fall even further behind. Faced with a situation where there are few viable opportunity structures, the Islamic body– politic suffers from a significant level of aggregate anomie, and many have chosen religious extremism as the alternative.

Samuel Huntington first wrote of this phenomenon in the context of Islam some 40 years ago. When the Islamic rank and file feel the crush of disorder, when they struggle with the dynamics of the multi–sector change that globalization in particular is yielding, they tend to default to a more enduring sources of stability and protection – fundamentalism, which, with its simplistic dogma, yields the craved inner psychic comfort missing from the tumultuous world. That psychic retrenchment is also often accompanied by a social and physical retreat into extended family/ethnic/ tribal enclaves, to meet tangible/physical security needs. This phenomenon is all the more pronounced among the transitional and developing Islamic nations, where there is weak government and insufficient economic opportunity structures. This is the core principle behind his “Clash of Civilizations” perspective – a xenophobic response to the cultural melding brought on by globalization. Globalization by nature disrupts, and when there is weak government providing little physical safety and insufficient economic opportunity structures, people will resort to fundamentalism.

Huntington presses the idea that the countries that are struggling the most in this globalized world, are those with weak and ineffective governmental structures. They cannot exercise viable control over their people or their lands, they have limited viable economic opportunity structures, and the result is an infestation of fundamentalism. In other words, it is the pressure of globalization in the presence of weak governments with their ineffective security delivery capabilities and insufficient economic opportunity structures, that is causing the growth of fundamentalism. Fundamentalism will not flourish in the presence of globalization if strong governments who can deliver security and sufficient economic opportunity structures are in place.
The empirical evidence supports this 2nd thesis. While globalization is thriving in the West, with its strong government and civic entities and broad opportunity structures, the body–politic in the Islamic weak states, where government and civic based institutions are ineffectual and economic opportunities are collaterally stunted, have in point of fact looked to religious–based extended family/tribal/ethnic entitie for emotional and physical protection. These entities have taken the form of militias and insurgency groups in the Middle East, and tribes in Central Asia. They will not go away until these governments can provide real security and tangible, long–term economic opportunity. Even then, since the tribes and militias have so firmly embedded themselves within the socio–political culture, it will likely take decades, perhaps generations to dismantle them, and the dismantling will come via the velvet glove of evolution rather than the external iron fist of authority. If the government can provide real security and tangible opportunity, they will fade away, but only after their continued presence becomes a meaningless redundance and the culture value of their residual presence likewise fades into the dust–heap of history. The West has experienced this same phenomenon, with its tribes and militias headed by squabbling dukes and barons and kings and popes. At the outset of the 21st century, we in the West are still dealing with the residual impacts of our ancient regional and tribal animosities. Consider for example the negative attitudes of most in the West regarding immigration. Consider the ever–present national and regional animosities that are very much alive in modern Europe. Why would we expect anything different from Islam?

Returning to the theme of governance, economic opportunity structures, and fundamentalism, the underlying question that emerges is one of causality. Has it been poor governance that has yielded insignificant economic development in the Islamic Ummah, or has it been insignificant economic development that failed to motivate the growth of good governance. Huntington suggests the former. In fact, his proposition is that if the citizenry become economically, politically and socially active (ie., if they embrace the tenets of globalization), but the basic institutions of governance are not in place (no established political parties, no viable justice systems, regulatory agencies with no efficacy, insufficient educational systems, fragile civic and business infrastructure), the result will be instability and a resultant retreat into religious fundamentalism/extremism within the extended family/ethnic/tribal enclaves. Economic development, he argues, requires pre–existing conditions – established institutions of public order and a government that is able to exercise viable power and exert its authority over its lands and its people. Pressing for enhanced economic growth and participatory government in the absence of a wide array of established institutions of public order, he proposes, merely aggravates the security and stability problem. The type of government, he posits by the way, is not important. Civic stability and communal security is based on the extent and
degree of governance that is present; the ability of government entities to exercise viable power and authority within their borders. If that power is there and security is present, economic growth and development will be forthcoming. The antecedents of economic development, he argues, is good governance. This does not appear, however, to have been the case in either the United States at the outset of the 19th century, nor in India at the close of the 20th century. Both of these rather diverse nations suffered from a significant degree of poor governance, but both managed to develop economically, with good governance arising thereafter in the case of the United States as a result of pressure from the economic sector. It is my proposition, from a myopic American viewpoint, that economic development is the key. There are certainly other forces and factors driving the matter (ie, the cultural collision of globalized commerce and exchange, and the subtle Islamic religious aversion to the value of civic governance perhaps being the most powerful), and things do need to change in a variety of arenas, but my proposition is that economic development is the cornerstone to peace stability in the Islamic world. As business and finance begins to emerge, it will push for the greater levels of stability and security that is found in good governance. The populous does not have the political efficacy to achieve this end. They may cry out for it, but good governance will emerge from the efforts of the business elite, but only when they see it would be to their benefit. Once headed down this road, development of the business and public sectors will be a compounding relationship, each benefiting from the growth and development of the other.

*Imprinting Democracy*

Many in the United States view democracy as the antidote to the Militant Islamic virus. This is based in part on a truism; historically, liberal democracies foster peace and security, and they have generally not gone to war against one another. The Bush administration also operated under a second hypothesis; that self–governance and liberal democracy are universally coveted entities, and in the context of the current environment, if given the chance, the Arabic nations would promptly adopt them, peace and tranquility would readily emerge thereafter, and the current Jihad against the West will become passe. What Bush failed to grasp, is that hatred of despotism and autocracy does not necessarily translate into a love of democracy and all its various organs. Bush also failed to grasp the fundamental concept that “democracy” is a fluid entity and not some static phenomenon. What exactly is American–style/ Western democracy, and, more importantly, who is to say that this is the ultimate standard? At some point in time, it will become obsolete and outmoded as societies and the collective body politic evolve to new and different forms of governance.
Furthermore, and of greater concern, there are cultural prerequisites for democratic self-governance and those antecedents are lacking in the Arabic Ummah. The notion of transplanting Western-style democracy into the Islamic world is simply naive. Contemporary Western democratic republics did not spring fully grown from the womb of Western culture. Western democracy has evolved and morphed into many different strains over the centuries, in a millennial shuffle, with occasional revolutionary and civil wars, stops and starts, ebbs and flows. The result of this multi-century caustic dialogue in the West has been democracy, true, but a very different mode of democracy depending upon the very diverse social, economic, political and historical dynamics unique to each region and nation-state. Each strain of Western democratic governance reflects the necessities of the times and the settings in which it was planted and nourished, and Western democracy continues to evolve in unique ways in unique locales. To press the present form of American liberal democracy on Iraq, on Afghanistan, on traditional Arabic society in general, to press a model of governance that has taken centuries to evolve, that has definitive socio-cultural pre-requisites, that takes on different forms in different environments, is utterly absurd, and obviously doomed to failure.

Western-style democracy is not the antidote to Islamic fundamentalism. Western efforts to impress and imprint it in the Moslem world will ironically result in an increase in fundamentalistic fervor. In much of the Islamic world, the very thought of liberal, social democracy, with its emphasis on communal input and popular sovereignty, is a repulsive notion, running counter to a millennia of Muslim socio-political culture. The social, political culture of the Middle East is patriarchal, tribal, and ethnic. It is not psychologically geared to popular democracy and central governance any more than was Western Europe 500 years ago. The wish of even the contemporary Islamic moderates is not for a Western style social democracy, but rather some functional theocracy that will maintain some elements of traditional Islamic culture and also improve the socio-economic opportunity structures. China, for example, has certainly not adopted democracy. There is little interest in Constitutional liberalism, but great interest in the freedom to make money. They have rather successfully melded neo-communism with global capitalism, maintained a strong sense of identity, and have become dominant players in the market. At this juncture, a Chinese eclipse of American dominance seems to be on the near horizon, and many progressives within Islam are looking to China as an example in this regard.

A counter-point needs to be raised at this juncture. The argument that democracy and Islam do not mix, at least in the present sense, does not seem to be confirmed when reviewing the results of recent polls. Some surveys suggest that as many as 80 to 85 percent of the Arabic community want democracy. However, a more careful analysis of the data reveals that the Arabic body politic defines democracy
in a very narrow construct; self–determinism. Democracy in the Arabic world is not a desire for Constitutional liberalisms, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, checks and balances, etc. Democracy in the Arabic East is a singular dimensioned entity – the opportunity to decide for themselves how to be governed. Interestingly, current polls suggest that if given the choice, most in the Arabic world would choose a restrictive theocracy; somewhat of a paradox, that the democratic apparatus of self–determinism would be used to establish what in the West would be viewed as a non–democratic form of governance.

The bottom line is that democracy in the Arabic context is a very different entity than democracy from a Western orientation, and surveys that suggest a strong support for democracy in the Arabic East need to be viewed within a cultural context to obtain a proper understanding. Again I stress, democracy in the Arabic community is a univariate notion; self–determinism – a chance to choose the type of government that they want, and in an ancillary sense, to be free from America and its imperial influences.

Americans as a whole suffer from a significant degree of monomania when it comes to democracy, feeling that history (and even the gods) favors its inevitable triumph. The fact that there are problems with democracy is universally overlooked by them. There are, for example, very real and pronounced despotic propensities inherent in electoral democracy (i.e., Chavez in Venezuela, Marcos in the Philippines, Hamas in Lebanon) that may become, and given the history of the Arabic region, likely would become manifest were democracy to be force–fed in Islam. One person, one vote, one time is the battle cry of many would–be autocratic rulers who see popular elections as a way to obtain power legitimately, but once seated, to never let go.

There are also pragmatic limitations with respect to the notion of implanting democracy. Only nine countries have successful made the transition from poor dictatorships to modern democracies in the post-War era, and five of those (Cyprus, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) did so due to powerful incentives put in place by the European Union (the others are South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, and Argentina). Furthermore, recent history has shown that the more infamous totalitarian governments of the 20th century arose, not from authoritarian regimes, but from weak and fledgling democracies that were in the early stages of development (i.e., Russia in 1917, German in 1933, Italy in 1922). The same course of events could and likely would transpire in Islam were there any ill–advised attempt to graft Western democracy onto the current Arabic body–politic. Despite these concerns (or perhaps due to an ignorance factor), the previous American presidential administration, with blinders securely fashioned, ran about the globe, full of religious certitude, chanting democracies omnipotent virtues in a mindless mantra. There is something
Quite arrogant, condescending, and woefully naïve with such demonstrative efforts to imprint America’s particular brand of social democracy on the world.

Interestingly, and somewhat ironically, the same Americans who so champion the notion of liberal democracy, have a difficult time even defining what it is, and generally resort to definitional joinder. Western social democracy is an amalgamation of representative governance and various constitutionalisms involving the rule of law and the protection of human rights, guardianship of private property, freedom of speech and transparent due process, as well as socially valued and professionally managed institutions of public order. But to assume that these various independent aspects and elements of Western democratic governance can be grafted into the Islamic body–politic overnight is utter fantasy. They certainly were not adopted en masse in the West with a singular swing of the revolutionary axe. Why would the East, with little or no cultural propensity for such notions, take them on? It will take decades, centuries, and even then, many of these components will never be incorporated into the Islamic socio–political world. Even if they are, they will be adjusted, adapted and coopted in such a way that they may not even be recognizable to the West.

The Bush thesis that democracy destroys terrorism is utterly sophomoric. In fact, most terrorist attacks take place within democracies.

Terrorist attacks are easier to “pull off” in open societies. Based on the premise that the purpose of terrorist attacks is to create mass panic and thus influence government policy, terrorist attacks are more effective in open democratic societies that have responsive government officials. Where better to strike than a highly responsive political system.

There was no democracy but also no terrorism in Communist China or Soviet Russia, but democratically–based India and Ireland have suffered from terrorist attacks for years. The latter are both open, diverse countries with many different groups feeling very strongly about their identity and autonomy. The origins of terrorism are unique to the customs, cultures and histories of each region, and are far more complex that a simple presence or absence of democracy. Contemporary Pakistani terrorism bred due to the fact that it was the conduit and recruiting ground for the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Of late, Pakistani terrorism has been exacerbated by the collapse of the state, its inability to provide basic infrastructure resources and education, a neglect of the tribal regions, and the unwanted and dominating presence of the U.S. in the region. It has nothing to do with the presence or absence of democracy. Having said that, in the end, the presence of a mature democracy may have some mitigating influence on terrorism due to the greater access to power structures, willingness to compromise, an open
press policy, etc. But democracy is surely no vaccine, especially in the early stages of its development.

**The Role of Economics**

Recent surveys undertaken in Russia reveal a latent interest in democracy, but a far greater interest among the Russian citizens in seeing the government improve conditions that will let them lead peaceful and economically secure lives. Armed with this information, former President Putin, when awakening the Russian bear from its recent economic slumber, found himself able to move away from Western democratic ideals with a significant measure of political impunity. The same can be said of China, as previously suggested, where, with local elections as the exception, there is little interest among the body–politic in implementing democratic liberalisms, but there is great interest in seeing the government promote policies that will enhance economic growth and development. Rather than Western democracy and all its constitutiona liberalisms, the body politic of this world wants its collective governments to support conditions that will allow them to maintain their sense of identity, lead to increased social peace, and enhance macro socio–economic opportunity structures – let me be me (with my religion and my identity in place), let me make money, and let me live in a safe and secure environment. The form of governance that should be put in place to achieve these ends is irrelevant. Contrary to American orientation, democracy is not omnipotent, nor does it need be omnipresent.

Rather than force feeding the East on Western democracy and its various components, it is a broad–based, multi–sector economic progress that needs to be championed and supported in the Islamic East. In this sense, I echo the sentiments of Adam Smith who suggested that more than the export of democracy, it is commerce, trade and multi–sector economic progress that will produce civil peace. The war against Militant Islam will not be won with bombs and bullets. Kinetic military action will only accentuate rather than mitigate the problem. Rather, as the Islamic nations become increasingly integrated economically, and as tangible economic progress is realized in every sector, as the boats are raised in every social class, as anomie is replaced with opportunity, fundamentalist/militant orientations will vanish. In this context, there are two competing forces in this world – economic integration, globalization and all which that entails (including cultural osmosis verse retreatest, fundamentalist orientations. Economic interests will trump belligerence, but, it is going to take some time for this to play out as measured in generations, if not centuries, and the Muslim world will not experience a seamless transition in the interim. Fundamentalism of all kinds needs to be overcome, for it is the antithesis of civilization. Civilization requires consensus, compromise, cooperation, dialogue,
understanding, and humility – not pious monologue and dogmatic, unilateral certitude.

There will be social strife and disruptions to tradition and culture, false starts and steep learning curves. The end, though, is inevitable – connectivity and commerce will mitigate religious and cultural differences. The Islamic world will join the global economy in time. Some in the Arabic states are pressing to join the rest of the socio-economic world sooner rather than later. But how to do it, and how much of the Islamic core is to be maintained in the transition, remains to be seen.

A Brief History of Secular Islam

This somewhat pedantic cause or consequence debate aside, there is no disputing the fact that for centuries now, the Islamic political leadership has let its people down. By the same token, the people also bare some of the responsibility for they have stood by and allowed the leadership to default. The classical age of Islam peaked during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1490-1566). He pressed for all manner of social and economic reforms, modified the institution of slavery, organized schools for the young and universities for the old, developed libraries, encouraged and supported scientific inquiry, encouraged intellectual exchange. It was a glorious era. Islamic literature was fully developed, their medical advances far surpassed the West, and they advanced architecture to the point that the Western world did not catch up until the era of Michelangelo. The great western library in St. Gall, Switzerland had 600 books, while the contemporary Islamic library in Cordoba, Spain had 400,000 volumes.

Science, math, engineering, medicine, literature – there was no match. The West was, in point of fact, populated by large numbers of barbarians during this time. The Muslim world’s error was that when the West began to progress, the Islamic predisposition of viewing with contempt anything West, kept them from recognizing the fundamental shifts. The Islamic community continued to limit their interactions, stayed isolated, fell behind, and eventually imploded.

At the death of Suleiman in 1566, the surviving generals fought for control of the empire, and divided the kingdom. The Islamic world has largely been in a socio-economic/geo-political free-fall ever since. It now finds itself decidedly behind the rest of the world in virtually every arena, unable to participate in the global economy with little progress being made, and a continually shrinking aggregate opportunity structure coefficient. The region is falling further and further behind.

It is this sense of defeatism and hopelessness that drives the current Islamic jihad; 50 percent plus unemployment, non-existent and/or ineffectual civic and
corporate institutions, insufficient medical delivery systems, second–rate schools propagating multi–generational illiteracy/multi–generational resignation, inadequate and in many locales non–existent infrastructure, limited access to external media outlets, subsistence living in barren housing projects. This is not the good life, and jihadists will be continually conceived within this womb. These conditions have yielded a large pool of poor, deprived young people who are susceptible to the argument that they can best spend their lives by serving Allah, literally donating their lives to the cause. Jihads appeal to those who have been left behind, who have been economically and culturally uprooted by the whirlwinds of globalization. Fundamentalist Islam gives hope to the hopeless. Until someone can offer these people something better than a martyr’s death, then the bin Ladens’ of this world will always find a home. In the end, economic development is the key. There are certainly other variables driving matters, and things need to change in a variety of arenas, but I believe that economic development is the cornerstone.

In sum, Militant Islam tends to attract two types of individuals:

1. Young Islam (ie., typical Palestinian terrorists) – They are unmarried, under–educated, unemployed and unemployable, disenfranchised, locked out of the global economy (particularly in Europe). They are anomic driven, with concerns of cultural corrosion emerging as a secondary issue, if at all. With no stake in society, they are ready to give their lives for the cause. If they were socio–economically engaged, they would not be as concerned about the imperial U.S. presence in the world, and the tainting influences of globalization. These are the “accidental terrorists,” and this is the demographic profile of the bulk of the Islamic militants.

2. Older Islam (ie., the 9/11 bombers) – These are the Fundamentalists, the Salafists. They are concerned of the cultural osmosis of globalization (sexual perversion and secular materialism), the pollution of the pure. They wish to restore the dominance of/realize the global ascendance of, the theological state of Islam. Economic success is an independent and unrelated factor. They are concerned with the United States as the infidel occupiers of the land and seek freedom from America and its imperial presence, but that is a secondary factor, for these are the religious zealots who wish to destroy all there is in the West for Allah, who is standing by, even at the gates, to start a new world, an Islamic world, with the scraps of the old.

**The Religious Co-Variate, Again**

There is, of course, a definitive marriage between politics, economics and religion in the Muslim mind and heart. Religion dominates culture in the Islamic
world, and to eke out a subsistence living with a keen awareness of bounties of the Western world is galling and strikes at the very heart of their being. It is a pride issue, combined with a dogmatic religious fervor, and American/Western prosperity is indirectly but openly confronting them. Mainstream Islam is totally convinced of the superiority of their religion and culture, and are now obsessed with the inferiority of their power and influence in the global context. The Islamic community still remembers their time of dominance. Again, Mohammed Atta burned with desire to restore the old glories of Islam.

Along the way, as the Islamic secular world fell behind intellectually, economically, and socially, the Muslim faith suffered as well, being diluted and altered as the Arabic people came in contact with different tastes and traditions and cultures. It must be stressed that the Islamic Ummah, or the Islamic “world” if you would, stretches from Africa to Southeast Asia and is a proverbial polyglot of history, customs, culture, and religion. There have been periodic reactionary responses to the religious diversity that has emerged within the Muslim faith over the centuries – desires to purify Islam. The pedigree of contemporary Militant/Fundamentalist Islam can be traced back to the 13th century Syrian cleric Ibn Taymiyya. He was a member of the relatively strict Hanbali school of Islam. After the destruction of the Abassid caliphate by Mongol invaders in 1258, he took a more dogmatic view of the Sharia and combined it with vigorous enforcement. Although the movement died out, Abd al-Wahhab resurrected the Taymiyya idea in the 1700s. Today, most Jihadists are Wahhabists, but, not all. Neither the Taliban nor the Egyptian–based Muslim Brotherhood are Wahhabists for example, and then there are secular terrorists, such as the PKK, Hamas, and Hizbullah. They possess a religious flavor of course, but have more of a national liberation focus, ala the IRA and the Tamil Tigers. The future of terrorism in this region however, will likely come primarily from the fundamentalist driven Islamic–based entities (Taliban, Lashkar–e–Taiba, al-Queda), and the militant Salafists.

To the militant Salafists, the only way to now turn the world Islamic green, is to engage in a campaign of mutually assured destruction; an apocalyptic, nihilistic obliteration campaign, with the Islamic state emerging from the ashes. Islam does carry within its religious roots, a moral justification for violence (Jihads), particularly against an infidel army of occupation. As an aside, it must be noted that the Islamic faith is obviously not the sole owner of the doctrine of righteous war. Review, for example, the history of Ireland and Europe in general, as well as the Spanish conquests of Latin America as demonstrative examples of the horrific consequence of sanctimonious Christian certitude. Certitude within any context decimates and destroys.
Salafists (which can be translated roughly as “righteous predecessors”) seek a pure, uncorrupted Islam. They believe that Islam had been perfected in the days of Muhammad and the three generations thereafter. Salafists are not Wahhabists per se, though both tend to be Sunni, both seek an Islamic reformation or revival, and both look to Muhammad ibn Abd-al–Wahhab for inspiration. Salafists tend to cling quite closely to the writings of Ibn Taymiya and his two students (Ing al-Qayyim and Ibn Kathir) and would be considered a broader movement than Wahhabism. The Salafists tend to reject science and have great emphasis on ritual, including how to eat and drink. They believe that jihad is permissible against foreign, non-Muslim occupiers, and they adhere to a strict constructionist view of Sharia law. The Sharia is the body of Islamic law based on the Qur’an, the Hadith (teachings of Mohammad and his companions), community consensus, reasoning by analogy, and centuries of discussion and interpretation. In Arabic, it means way or path. It is the legal framework in which life is regulated for those living in an Islamic legal system. It is not a codified law per se but rather a series of common laws, cultural precedents, and historic interpretations that vary from sect to sect, from region to region, from family to family. One of the great contemporary debates in Islam focuses on the nature of Sharia. Some view it as a changeable body while others view it in a more fundamental, un-alterable context (the true Sharia, the true body of law being established by the 18th century). Even then, there are differing interpretations of Sharia, with Sunni’s embracing a number of orientations including the Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi`i perspectives, while most Shiites cling to the Jaafari view. While it is difficult to make generalizations (there are 72 recognized Islamic sects), in short, the Sunni’s permit individual reading and interpretation, while the Shia tend to limit personal interpretation and rather look to clerics and Imams for clarification and explanation. There is an obviously interesting parallel in this context between the Catholics and the Shia on one hand, and the Protestants and Sunni on the other.

The influence of Muhammad ibn Abd-al–Wahhab and ibn Taymiyya has certainly waxed and waned over the years. In a more contemporary sense, the current concerns regarding the disintegration of pure Islam motivated intellectuals at al-Azhar University in Cairo in the mid–1850s to call for a revival, and to make fundamentalist Islam more attractive as a political, social and legal force. That cry was taken up in the 20th century by Sayyid Qutb (pronounced Koteb), an author and an intellectual who is considered the godfather of contemporary jihadist terrorism. He was a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood who wrote of social justice and righteous jihads. His work basically shaped Al-Qaeda philosophy. He was executed by the Egyptian government in 1966 and is consequently viewed as a martyr by the Militant Islamic community.

It appears that much of the contemporary Fundamentalist Islamic anger is based in an anomie–type frustration over the fact that it appears that Allah has let
them down; that since they are not enjoying the bounties of life as is the West, that Allah has reneged, or even worse, is wrong. The religious element aside, the Islamic perception of Western culture winning/dominating is correct, when cast in terms of scientific and intellectual contributions, economic growth, social stability, etc, etc. The end result of this current confrontation, is inevitable. There will be more body bags, and more property damaged, but in the end, Islamic extremism is going to loose to the global economy.

Qatar, Malaysia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, for example, are moving forward toward economic openness and efficiency. Egypt seems to be coming out of it slumber as are Morocco and Lebanon. A decade ago, Algeria, Turkey, and Egypt all were poised to move toward a Fundamentalist Islamic state, but no longer. Many Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey, for example, have proven to be even more pragmatic at times than many of their secular cousins. Once in power, they have compromised with Kurds, softened their stance on Cyprus, and have aggressively pushed for social and economic reforms designed to gain Turkish membership into the European Union. Many in the Arabic world have stopped looking to Islam perfor their temporal salvation. The greatest potency Islamic fundamentalism holds is that it is an alternative to the wretched reality that most people live under in the Middle East. But, whenever Muslim fundamentalists have been forced to leave their philosophic rhetoric and become involved in the grind of actual governance, in day to day politics, in the mundane delivery of government goods and services, their luster has worn off and the people quickly weary of their charms.

The Middle Eastern body politic have realized that streets and sewers have to be built and maintained, government finances have to be managed, education and public health matters attended to. The clerics can preach and excite, but they cannot govern. The Taliban in the end held no allure, and the people are beginning to realize that fundamentalism has no real answers to the problems of the modern world – it has only fantasies and is the antithesis of civilization. A future of contact, culture, commerce, trade and tourism looks more likely than one of war, rhetoric and politics, but there is much to be done, for there will be conflict between globalization and fundamentalism in all of their various forms and format, for centuries to come.

**Islamic Reformation**

Contrary to mythology, history rarely if ever repeats itself. It does, however, have a tendency to replay very similar chords and in that context there is a profound parallel between contemporary Islam and medieval Europe. Europe spent the midmillennial centuries spilling much blood addressing the issues of sovereignty, religion, ethnicity, and governance. Initially the battles focused on breaking power
and sovereignty from the church. That achieved, Europe spent the rest of the millennium warring, as it experimented with various kinds of governance – left and right wing dictatorships, communist regimes, republics, social democracies. The Western states that emerged from that conflict generally possess a much diminished role for religion, are ethnically tolerant, are post-war in their orientation, and have adopted diverse and assorted models of governance, that now, at the beginning of the 21st century, generally lean in the direction of social democracies. The evolutions of governance continue in the West of course, but now seem to be taking on more of a peaceful format.

The Middle East and Central Asian Islamic states appear to be in the midst of this same kind of dynamic, possibly shifting power away from the clerics and examining alternative forms of governance. Islam, in this context, is at an early state of evolution, in the beginning stages of a growing and inevitable conflict between fundamentalists and the more secular oriented populists, very much akin to the effervescent, tumultuous and evolving Europe of 500 years ago. They are in the midst of a reformation. There is, however, one major religious difference that needs to be articulated. The Pope was a singular, titular head, and consequently could be and was the target of relatively unified and focused, and in the end, successful attacks. For many years, the Moslem faith had such a leader, a Caliph, though the position possessed decreasing de-facto relevance once the Ottomans conquered Egypt and appropriated the title in 1517. The Turks formally abolished the Caliphate in 1924. As a result, Islam currently lacks a singular human leader nor a central command structure.

Power is spread among a cacophony of imams and clerics and is based on the ephemeral notions of personal aura and charisma. Such a decentralized and diverse power base will be hard to supplant. Yet, there are many Muslim voices ready to take on that challenge, and who wish to integrate Islam into the global economy and to deal with/accept the collateral religious costs and the cultural erosion impacts. Indeed, many in the Moslem community have now begun to reject the fundamentalist vision of jihad. The growing Islamic middle classes for example, are no longer willing to accept Bin Laden’s celestial nihilistic vision, for it has led to destruction and chaos. They have a growing stake in the society of now, and seek instead for peace and stability and opportunity in this life. Even many Saudi leaders, who have historically tolerated radicalism, have come to realize that their own stability depends on moderation. A group of Islamic scholars based in Ankara will soon be publishing a new edition of the Hadith, bringing a more contemporary perspective to the 170,000 teachings and sayings of Muhammad. Progressive Muslim thinkers have pressed for similar action in the past, but have been viewed as outsiders, operating on the fringe. That is no longer the case, and momentum is building within the Muslim world to review and re-interpret their faith in the
context of the modern world. This is nowhere more evident than in the case of Amr Khaled, the conciliatory and growingly popular Egyptian Muslim televangelist, now working out of the UK. Time Magazine recently ranked him as the 13th most influential person on the planet.

Others, of course, are not so enamored with these “progressive” movements, and wish to instead retreat into the pure form of Islam. Many Sunni fundamentalists, for example, wish to re-establish the Caliphate and to see Sharia law reign supreme. Moderate Muslims cringe at such a prospect – the battle-lines have been drawn.

The Islamic world has experienced centuries of bloody, internal conflict, and in reaction to the contemporary influence of globalization and the concomitant crush of Western culture, have now moved into a new period of social and political upheaval. The great question is whether the West can absorb the same level of chaos and destruction from Islam that it (the West) wrought upon the world this past 500 years as it tumultuously evolved to its present socio-political state. It is an unsettling prospect.

**The End of the 20th Century**

The 20th century was ushered in, I would suggest, on June 28, 1914 when Gavrilo Princip assassinated Arch Duke Francis Ferdinand. That act set in motion a series of events that led to World War I, and the end of Western aristocracies. The 21st century was ushered in on September 11, 2001. That act has set in motion a series of events that has and will continue to change our world. World War I was inevitable. The Ferdinand assassination simply sparked the unavoidable. A September 11 type episode was equally unavoidable, an inescapable, an inevitable artifact of the crush of globalization acting in concert with the other factors that have been outlined in this paper (poor governance, insufficient economic opportunity structures, rise of fundamentalism, etc.).

Globalization, and its twin, social and economic convergence theory, has worked very well from a Western–world context. It is a simple plan; open up markets, encourage consumption, promote trade and scholarly exchange, build highways and byways, promote interaction at all levels, allow a middle class to develop, their interests will converge with ours, war will be averted and civic peace will reign. It worked well with respect to the Soviet Union and helped bring it down. It has worked well in China and has transformed that nation, as it has India, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and many countries in South America.

The Islamic nations are another story. The 20th century message of peace through social and economic convergence, with a few previously noted exceptions, did not
infiltrate the Arabic world. They have not been equal partners in the globalization movement due to a combination of inability and reluctance, particularly a reluctance on the part of the fundamentalists. They cling to a vision of an Islamic nation–state that rules the world. The problem is that Western civilization, through the vehicles of technology and socio–economic globalization, is clearly dominating, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Like the Phoenix of Greek mythology, many Islamic fundamentalists actively seek this destruction, with the Islamic state emerging from the ashes. It is an ethos of enmity that has the potential of unimaginable destructive capacity.

Rudyard Kipling coined the axiom many years ago; East is East and West is West and never the two shall meet. The challenge of our time is to prove otherwise; to convey the message of social and economic convergence within the Islamic East. It can be conveyed and will be embraced in time, but it is going to take some significant effort, and there will be a cost. The Muslim world will not experience a seamless transition. There will be social strife and disruptions to tradition and culture, false starts and steep learning curves. The end, though, is inevitable and the Islamic world, simply by osmosis, will join the global economy. But for now, both East and West face a most difficult future of uncertainty and anxiety, particularly due to another factor that now enters into this mix – the fact that global concentric power may be on the wane.

**Communist Challenge Comparison**

A generation or two ago, the great monolithic threat to the West was Soviet–style communism, just as the West was the great monolithic threat to the Soviets. It was a bi–lateral intimidation; each challenging the other. Capitalism and communism competed around the globe for the hearts and minds of humanity. The communists promoted a political, social and economic model to the world, and it was most enticing. A number of countries bought into it. The West realized early on that one of its chief missions was to discredit communism, lessen its appeal around the world, and promote the message of Western style freedom, social democracy and economic affluence instead. The Soviets, of course, engaged in the same tactics – discrediting the message of the West, and promoting theirs.

Both at times used a certain measure of belligerence (ie., military action) to get the message across. It also can historically be said that both also used a number of what might be called softer methods in this Cold War era. Militarily, the Cold War was a standoff, but because of the cost of maintaining military equilibrium, and the effective soft efforts to discredit the Soviet message and promote Western ideals, the Soviet Union and its message failed.
In this current Islam vs. the West scenario, the political/philosophic threat is unilateral and unidirectional. The fundamentalist Islamic message is not a threat to the Western World. The West is not going to adopt the quasi–feudal model of fundamentalist Islamic theocracy. Rather it is Western influence, its agenda, its political, social, economic model that is a threat to Islam. There is, however, an attempt being made to export the radical Islamic message to the mainstream Islamic world. So unlike the days of the Communist threat, the issue is not so much to make sure that radical Islam is not exported to the West, but to make sure that radical Islam is not expanded in the East. The role of the West in this, however, needs to be passive and indirect. In the final analysis, the religious portion of this war is an internal matter, within Islam. Moderate Islam needs to take the lead in shutting down its fundamentalists cousins, and this will take some time.

With respect to the other dimensions, the West needs to assure the Islamic world that it respects the Muslim religion and culture, wishes to see them develop and prosper, and will help economically without expecting them to abandon core beliefs and traditions. That is the party line anyway. There are many in the West who do not respect the Islamic religion and culture, and in fact wish to see immediate and sweeping changes in the Islamic social fabric. But even among those whose heart–felt intentions are not to yield change but to simply engage in trade and commerce and exchange, the very impact of that interaction will be cultural osmosis, a creeping erosion of the traditional Islamic culture, and an eventual marginalization of that way of life, which, as noted previously, is a core concern of the Islamic faithful.

### Other Potent Forces

There are a host of other inter–related forces and factors on the present and/or near horizon that will also drive crime and security matters in this context for decades to come. My laundry list includes the following.

### Youth Bulges and Bare Branches

Youth is an aggravating factor in this mix. Countries with youth bulges (where youth make up 40 percent or more of the population) were roughly two and a half times more likely than those countries without this demographic anomaly to experience a civil war in the 1990s. There is also a markedly increased violent crime propensity for such nations. The matter is accentuated when there is also a low female–to–male ratio among the young (the bare branches syndrome). Virtually every Islamic nation in the world is currently in the midst of or will soon be in
a demographic youth bulge, and, all are currently experiencing a collateral bare
branch quandary as well.

The strain Arabic youth are currently experiencing compounds the problems
even further. Up–rooted, under–educated, under–employed, disenfranchised, broken
families, no fathers, looking for an identity, raised on anger and fear, ripe for revenge.

The traumatized youth of the Middle East will speak the language they know,
the language of force and violence, for years to come. They are ready targets for
recruiters from militias and insurgent groups who, among other things, can provide
a substitute for family cohesion and even more importantly, give a purpose to life.
But instead of preparing the youth to rebuild their countries, the militias feed on the
rancor, on the Armageddon–like orientation innate in fundamentalist Islam, and are
training youth to use the weapons and means necessary to destroy their nation and
all that is in it.

It should be noted that the bare branch/youth bulge problem is not limited to
just the Arabic region, nor to the 57 nations with Islamic majorities. Indeed, there is
a generation of Muslim youth around the world who both feel and see the injustices
being wrought on Islam by the West. These youth are angry and all too readily
recruited into the ranks of the jihad. The jihad culture has become a fad among
the youth in the Islamic communities worldwide. It is full of adventure, intrigue,
excitement, and perhaps more importantly, purpose. Osama bin Laden has become
the Che Guevara of the rising Muslim generation all across the globe, and the
Islamic community is now increasingly all across the globe. One hundred years ago,
the frontier between East and West ran through Istanbul, but today it runs through
most European cities.

The Arabic world is not alone when it comes to these demographic peculiarities.
India and China for example are also experiencing youth bulges and bare branches,
though the sense of enmity and anomie there is nowhere near as acute as it is in
Arabic Islam. How to best deal with this matter, in both Asia and Islam, is obviously
of great importance, and obviously surfaces as the subject of another paper. Suffice
it to say that these two demographic forces which are now coming to play within the
Arabic nations, if left unaddressed, will not only serve to prolong the Jihad against
the West, but will also accentuate the communal violence and instability coefficients
at home, within the Arabic nations, for decades to come. Against this background,
a September 11–type episode, and others like it, was, is, and will continue to be,
inevitable, and the West must surely prepare itself for a protracted struggle.
American Decline

The American “brand-name” has indeed been tarnished, economically, diplomatically, morally, and militarily in the past decade. It has suffered from a disastrous foreign policy, poor government and private sector fiscal management which has resulted in a weakened dollar, colossal national and personal debt, and the frightening financial times we are now experiencing. Its international moral and political leadership has been in a freefall ever since 9/11. So, what is the state of the United States in the aftermath of Iraq, Guantanamo, George Bush, and the greed-based economic meltdown? In that light, I would like to highlight six points:

1. The United States is still the military superpower in the world and will be for decades to come. There is no military on earth that can match America’s military technology or firepower, and in light of the fact that armed American troops are currently stationed in some 150 countries, none can come even close to its reach, its “imperial” reach as critics would say. The scale and scope of this kind of military expenditure and deployment is out of the realm of possibility for all but a handful of countries, and those nations are choosing to spend their time, money and expertise on industrial growth and domestic development. Consider the fact that in 2007, the United States defense budget was nearly $550 Billion. The second largest defense budget was the UK at $60 Billion, nearly ten times less. China was third at $58 Billion, the bulk of which covered not research and development but rather domestic maintenance of its army, which by manpower count, is the largest in the world. The United States spends more money on defense than the rest of the world combined, and will do so for years to come. Consequently, the United States will remain the world’s sole military superpower for at least another 50 years. However, the 21st century will see violence between sovereign states diminish and violence within states escalate in the form of regional and civil conflicts. The American military is prepared to fight a large-scale international war, a World War III if you would, and it is not oriented toward regional, asymmetric civil wars. Consequently, its massive military might in a 21st century context, may prove to be irrelevant. One of the many lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, and Vietnam, is that there are limits to raw military might.

2. The United States is in debt, and needs a constant infusion of external funding to cover its obligations. The United States is, at present, fiscally irresponsible, gaining what amounts to a short-term economic free ride, expecting external entities to grant it virtually unlimited credit. This obviously cannot and will not go on indefinitely, and has catastrophic long-term implications. Were it not for external investment, the United States would currently be bankrupt and its economic system in even greater turmoil than it is at present. While officially stated as being $10.6 trillion (as of March 2009), a more accurate accounting that examines future social
welfare responsibilities puts the U.S. national debt somewhere between $50 to $59 Trillion (roughly $200,000 per U.S. citizen). An incommunicable, inconceivable debt that will burden generations of taxpayers, and one that is even now seriously compromising our geo–political power base. As of December 31, 2008, China held $696 billion of American debt, Japan held $578, OPEC nearly $197 billion, and Russia held $87 billion. The United States is going to have to be nice to these entities, and to our other international creditors, no matter what they do or say. The war on terrorism, in combination with other contemporary fiscal circumstances, is breaking the United States, and it cannot go on in the same fashion. It just does not have the resources. Former President Bush farcically threw down the gauntlet against the enemies of freedom in his 2nd Inaugural Address, but there was no fist in the glove. The United States is fighting the war in Iraq and Afghanistan on the installment plan, and clearly cannot afford another conflict of this nature. And the rhetoric that the U.S. will stand by those who stand for liberty... pure hyperbole. The United States is mired in debt, and consequently at the mercy of many of its future challengers. In addition to escalating military costs, domestic spending is out of control, with future medical and social security demands seemingly destined to bankrupt the country. Indeed, the welfare state, created in the aftermath of World War II, is now obsolete and on the brink of being unsustainable. In the financial context, the U.S. needs to export more, consume less, raise taxes, cut government spending, and increase interest rates, none of which are politically palatable in the foreseeable future. Without a significant turnabout in these and other areas, historians will note that the zenith of American power was realized at the beginning of the 21st century, perhaps anecdotally, on September 10, 2001.

3. The role of the United States as the moral leader of the world has eroded. The wanton disregard of the rule of law by its alleged patron saint at the Guantanamo, Bagram and Abu Ghraib prison facilities has been most unsettling, and has alienated much of the world. American actions in these contexts have not simply been strategically irrational, but have established a catastrophic international precedent. The woefully misdirected decisions of the Bush administration to side–step the rule of law has corroded American ability to influence, persuade and lead on the global stage. Criticism came not just from Damascus and Tehran, but also from Bonn and Dublin and the BBC. America’s long–time friends and supporters asked hard questions, raised legitimate concerns, and shook their heads in disbelief. The dissonance between Bush’s message of democracy and his cavalier attitude toward civil liberties discredited him as a moral messenger. While ironically pressing for divinely ordained liberty in the Middle East, he kept Guantanamo open, engaged in extralegal/extraordinary renditioning, allowed torture, eavesdropped on U.S. citizens without a warrant, started two wars…all under a might makes right, executive privilege, unilateral American deistic manifest destiny pretentious, narcissistic
pomposity. The audacity, the arrogance, and the hypocrisy of it all, was utterly nauseating. The Bush administration was a government of zealots and extremists who, filled with certitude, were not inclined to weigh alternative views nor consider the possibility of error. The spirit of civilization involves a shunning of monologue and certitude; its foremost threat, a surplus of both. The greatest asset the U.S possessed in the post World War II era was its good example. That is now largely gone, replaced with the nauseating stench of hypocrisy, arrogance and condescending superiority. There was a cavernous disconnect between what we allegedly stood for and how we behaved in the last decade. We can scarcely lay claim to the rule of law when we break it ourselves at our own, unilateral convenience. We claim to hold justice and liberty as guiding principles, but scrapped them quickly when it suited our interests. The Bush administration imagined that it had a grand historic mandate, a deistic manifest destiny to rule. It reeked of arrogance and disdain, and was thoroughly contemptuous of the public. Bush felt that all people, all entities, all other nations, by some divine mandate, should subvert their interests to his, to those of the U.S., and was belligerently intolerant of those with even the slightest divergence of opinion. He pushed American creditability into the basement. It was a shameful decade indeed. Hopefully President Obama and those that follow him will be able to restore a sense of decency and propriety.

4. America is slipping in other spheres, particularly in the industrial and technological realms, two of the cornerstones of its 20th century ascendance. America’s decline will not be the catastrophic collapse of the Soviet Union, but more like the British Empire’s long ride into the sunset that began at the end of the previous century. Its collapse, like ours, was also precipitated by an unwarranted military conflict (the Second Boar War) in which the UK lost not merely the war, but also its moral authority due to its brutal treatment of both civilians and soldiers, and a subsequent financial collapse – a literal mirror image of the U.S. today. Though our influence is waning, American influence, like the Brits, will be felt for decades, if not centuries, somewhat akin to the Roman Empire. Historians of the future may refer to the last two centuries as the Anglo-American era, for in some ways, the U.S. merely extended the influence of the Brits. We pushed similar perceptions and orientations that have now been rather firmly embedded into virtually every aspect and arena of global culture and commerce, and will likely stay there for years to come.

5. One area where the United States excelled in the post-WWII era was in developing and strengthening and participating in international institutions of order. There is a literal alphabet soup of such institutions today (WTO, IMF, NATO, UN, WHO). Tragically, the Bush administration, with its unilateralist orientation, completely reversed that half–century trend. More than mere disengagement, Bush all but abandoned these international institutions this past decade, and has left
them largely fragmented and toothless. The arrogance must be replaced by a policy of mutual participation in and support for these international structures. Such an approach would enhance the international status of the United States, and more importantly boost the level of peace and stability in this world.

6. America’s decline is best viewed not in an absolute sense, but rather in a relative one. The issue is not so much that the U.S. power has subsided, but rather that there are many other nations rising... other nations are catching up. I turn to my own anecdotal experience. I lived in the Philippines in the early 1970s. I returned 30 years later and was shocked by the progress. The 30 year time frame from 1940 to 1970 saw little or no socio–economic development, but the 30 year time period from 1970 to 2000 saw massive growth, and the Philippines are not even a good example for they are still a developing nations. Better examples of “the rise of the rest” (as Fareed Zakaria calls it), would be Turkey, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, India, Thailand, Taiwan, China, Russia, Chile, Argentina, many of the former Soviet states that are now in the EU. There are a host of decidedly modern, peaceful, industrialized states who have risen into the developed, industrialized ranks, who are producing top scholars and involved in cutting edge research, who are culturally absorbing the notion of the rule of law, who have clearly moved to a post–war orientation, who now have a stake in and rightfully wish to influence world affairs, and who are ready and totally capable of taking their place at the table.

7. There is a changing geo–political environment out there, and it entails a diminished role for the United States. The world is growing without it, and it is certainly no longer possible for us to unilaterally control our own economic destiny. The fact that America has had it both ways for so long; the global maker and enforcer of law that does not play by the rules when it suits it, is going to be hard to give up. America merged haughtiness and impunity with hypocrisy for so long, and got away with it due to its might. How Americans will collectively deal with this now more attenuated position will be most interesting.

What is so ironic about America’s current state of smug sanctimoniousness is that it is accompanied by a colossal ignorance of the world. Americans are at home watching re–runs of its past while the rest of the world is out there working and building, and Americans don’t even know it. There are new rules and Americans don’t even realize it. America is stuck in its own echo chamber and barely notices the ground shifting under its feet. The bulk of the American citizenry are smugly aloof from and totally indifferent to the ideas and trends shaping the world and suffer from an extreme and perhaps inoperable case of self–satisfied truculence. Self–admiring narcissists, Americans are genetically incapable of looking beyond their own naval. The United States still sees itself imbued with a deistic universal message and is totally convinced of its national and cultural superiority, yet its
citizens and the vast majority of its political leaders are absolutely clueless as to the events and circumstances of the world. America pushed the world to open upon their economies, to liberalize their politics, to embrace free trade, in short to globalize, but along the way it forgot to globalize itself. Humorous really, and a situation that obviously must change if America is to avoid an even steeper decline into an economic abyss and political irrelevance.

It should again be stressed that American has been the rule maker and the enforcer for the past 50 years, but has not always played by those rules. This must end. This will all be very hard to do for a nation with a proud sense of deistic manifest destiny, but America’s time of unilateral dominance is over. The latest chapter of its manifest destiny has been realized, and the world is now entering a new phase of diffused/shared/collective global power and influence, a context where the U.S. will no longer be dominant… a major player, but no longer ascendant. It is the end of American post–war exceptionalism. It is increasingly marginalized around the world. Its military power is increasingly irrelevant. Its financial house is out of order. Its moral creditability is in the basement. It is slipping in the industrial and technological arenas. It has disengaged ourselves from the international community. It cannot keep preaching to the world while its own backyard is in such disarray, and particularly in light of the “rise of the rest.” It is more than arrogance and sanctimony. It is literal comic delusion bordering on collective national senility. It needs to come to grips with these changes in the international landscape and move away from the model of insolent, clueless diplomatic buffoonery that was so prominent in the Bush years. Such an orientation was never called for, and is certainly now passé. The United States needs to now wake up and smell the roses, come out of its stupor and grasp what has happened around the world, and engage in a diplomacy of equals with an emphasis of cooperative dialogue, with its overriding egalitarian orientation.

The nations of the world tolerated American smug, sanctimonious certitude for the past 50 years in part because, yes, there was some measure of benevolence within America and Americans. Full of bluff and blunder, brazen and audacious, often uniformed, generally ill–informed, culturally blind, oblivious to local socio–ethnic reality, Americas woefully ignorant diplomats stood with hands on the bulldozer’s throttle ready to carve the American way deep into the hearts and souls of the world’s body politic whether they wanted it or not, but… America had some sense of right and wrong about us at times, which tempered the American onslaught to a significant degree. Unfortunately, that good example is now gone in the aftermath of the hypocrisies of Guantanamo, its extra–legal renditionings, its tortures, its domestic wiretapping, its pre–emptive invasions and occupations. America is now viewed, for good reason, as the international bully, the evil empire, particularly by the young who know only of our recent malfeasance and misconducts. The older body politic of the world, those who remember the more benevolent America, are
disheartened and disillusioned, but perhaps have not divorced us yet. I was recently
given a personal tour of the Nuremberg Courthouse (the site of the WWII war crime
trials) by the then Minister of Justice of the German state of Bavaria. As we talked
about those trials and the principles of the rule of law, he turned to me at one point
and he said, “America once stood for something. We wanted to emulate you. We do
not wish to emulate you any more and we so hope that you change from your current
disastrous course.”

That is the legacy that Americans, at the outset of the 21st century, must now live
with and must now live down. The problem is that any discussion of foreign policy
is so tainted by politics in America that it is virtually impossible to craft and carry
it out in any kind of rational fashion. American must transcend this contemporary
polemic discourse of dissonance and discontent that so dominates and pollutes
discussions of foreign policy. If America fails to do so, it is at its most dire peril.

Global Power, and the Lack Thereof

The current status of the United States as the world’s sole superpower, the
hyperpower, is clearly coming to an end, and may actually already be over. What
is of concern regarding the present state of affairs is that once that power becomes
diminished, the world currently seems poised to move, not towards a balance of
power, but one where there is an absence of power...a power vacuum, for there is no
other entity in place at present to take the lead.

A power vacuum would be truly calamitous; religious fanaticism, economic
stagnation, waning social cohesion, the retreat of civilization as we know it into a few
fortified enclaves, de–globalization, fear and xenophobia reigning supreme. These
are the Dark Age experiences that such a world would experience, and it is sobering
notion. The disconcerting element is that at present, no country or institution is in
place to fill the void as the United States now retreats from its superpower status.
The only possible exception would be China, though they are clearly not ready to
take on this role for some years. China has a very small internal economic engine, its
listless domestic market fueled by a paltry $2,010 per year per capital income (96th
in the world as of 2006). Its economy depends almost entirely on exports, which is
an unsustainable long–term paragon. There is a huge conflict brewing between the
needs of the free market (rule of law, private property, transparency) and communist
idealis that will hinder its aspirations of international influence. China also has
significant poverty and public health issues with which to deal, and has yet to bring
its infrastructure up to par. China also has an aging population with a very skimpy
social safety net. There is minimal health insurance and out–of–pocket spending
covers about 50 percent of all medical costs. No universal social security, less than
20 percent of all workers have a pension program, and less than 15 percent are covered by unemployment insurance.

But put in historic context, China is literally on steroids. Over the past century, China has experienced the collapse of the monarchy, warring states, the Japanese invasion, civil war, the communist takeover, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, massive famine. Chaos, upheaval, and destruction have been the norm. But, in the last 30 years, China has enjoyed stability, and one of the fastest growing economies any country has ever experienced in the history of the world. The country has a sparkling international image, and is moving with a definitive forward leaning orientation economically, and of late, even in foreign affairs. But it is also internally motivated by its history. Chinese save at an astonishingly high level, in large part because they are scared of emergencies, and rightfully so. Their behavior is akin to our great–grandparents who experienced poverty and bank failures and hid money under their mattresses until the day they died.

It is a driven nation with a powerful sense of success springing and sprouting for every sector, and is making a rapid transition from the timid to the robust. Its leadership is clearly adopting a careful and calibrated, nuanced, long–term approach destined, they believe, to propel them to the position of superpower in the historically speaking, relatively near future. They seem poised to adopt what many observers call an asymmetric socio–economic convergence strategy, as follows:

1. Expand economic ties and become deeply integrated into the world economy through aggressive foreign investment and multi–lateral trade agreements;
2. Embrace the general principles of free trade;
3. Adopt responsible fiscal policies (ie., operate with a surplus, not a debt);
4. Enlarge political spheres of influence with a no question diplomacy model and a focus on world concerns such as public health, poverty, infrastructure development, and environmental issues by ramping up foreign aid, supporting professional exchanges in every sector, sponsoring grants and conferences;
5. Focus on the development of science and technology within its human capital.

Only time will tell if this strategy will prove successful, but it appears to be well founded. What is also clear is that China is not yet ready to take on the mantle of hyperpower, nor is anyone else. Consider the following:

1. Europe is inward oriented, is still expending massive amounts of time and money developing a suitable model of sovereignty, is aging, has no military of consequence, has a declining population, and has unsustainable social welfare obligations that will financially burden governments for generations to come.

Interestingly, one of the great debate in Europe at present is whether they should open their borders to immigration (the result being an inevitable cultural osmosis),
or transfers their new Union into a fortified retirement community. To a great extent, this is ironically much the same issue that is currently facing Islam with its concern regarding the creeping, insidious influence of Western culture.

There is no interest in Europe in achieving uni–polar status or even multi–polar status, and there is no sense of the world domination/manifest destiny that drives the United States and China. As one columnist recently noted, without the elixir of ambition, there will be an inevitable and inexorable decline. Add in high taxes and the cost of over–regulation, and we see an area of the world that will become what many observers are calling a sideshow in the future, its economic muscle and political influence increasingly irrelevant. At the beginning of the 21st century, the train came and went, and Europe choose not to get on board.

2. India, clearly another economic giant, but one that is still slumbering. Unlike China, with its centralized form of economic development, India is the quintessential model of decentralized, bottom up capitalism. It faces significant internal language and cultural barriers (akin to the Europeans), chronically weak infrastructure, and is saddled with endemic poverty and public health problems. Their focus, like Europe, will be internal, and will be for decades to come. Less than two percent of Indians have a bank account, fewer than 1 million have $50,000 in liquid assets, and current estimates are that even with a sustained six percent annual growth rate over the next twenty years, 60 percent of Indians will still be living in extreme poverty. But perhaps most significantly is the fact that there is a growing sense of destiny emanating from the elite and from the growing middle class. This, more than anything else, may make India a player in time. India does have the potential to become a world player, but like China, has a significant number of barriers to overcome before achieving that status and is probably further behind than its neighbor to the northeast.

3. Japan and the rest of Asia also suffer from externally driven economic engines, and lack the internal consumption necessary to fuel movement toward superpower status. All of Asia, and particularly China, needs to curb its export dependence and ramp up its internal economic capabilities.

Islam is much too diverse, lacks resources, lacks infrastructure, has poor governance and educational systems, and is likely at least a century from even modernizing, let alone leading.

South America is a continent with vast and deeply rooted political, cultural and economic differences, preferences, and needs. They are almost theologically in opposition to the idea of international cooperation and lean more toward isolation. Many of the institutions and alliances that have helped manage peace and prosperity for the past half–century are coming apart, which will further inhibit any international leadership role.
In sum, Europe, China, Asia, India, Latin America and Islam all contain within them significant impediments to succession, with China perhaps rising as the long-term favorite to emerge from the pack as the next world regent. That is many years away, however, and the world as we know it, will not and cannot be sustained during a power vacuum. The mitigating factors in all of this could be the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the various World Courts, and the World Trade Organization, to name a few; supra-national bodies which in various ways represent the international communities whose global governance are fundamentally different from the splintered spirit of the Dark Ages. Might these bodies be enough to counter the coming power vacuum? As these entities inevitably expand their powers and influence in this globalized world, they will face significant challenges from the political right who will look to such bodies and bemoan the erosion of sovereignty. But in a world where labor, capital, goods and services move freely across what are becoming little more than virtual borders, such arguments are moot. At present, however, the harsh reality is that these entities are splintered and more representative of an adolescent in puberty than a mature statesman capable of mitigating international crises. The American decline and the coming power vacuum will clear center stage in this world. It will be most interesting to see who, if anyone, can step up and hold center ground.

Winds of changes are easier to feel than forecast, but at this point it would appear that unless significant political and economic changes are made within the United States and made rather quickly, a global power vacuum is in the offing. On the other hand, the American populous possesses more than a tincture of ambition, and as a nation, has proven to be remarkably resilient to challenge in the past. The great ones do adjust, yet, the obstacles at this point are quite formidable. Even more disconcerting is that even with an attitude shift, macro socio-politico-economic engineering is quite difficult. Trade deficits and surpluses, spending and savings patterns, political attitudes and social norms... these are not just averages and statistics, but artifacts of regional tastes and temperaments, national and local politics, aggregate and individual perspectives, and wildly divergent psychologies. They are not easily molded. It must again be stressed that the United States needs to recognize these changes in the international landscape and move away from the arrogant, sanctimonious, monologue–based diplomacy model that became so prominent in the Bush years. Civilization requires a shunning of monologue and certitude; its foremost threat, a surplus of both. We need to now engage in a diplomacy of cooperative dialogue. This will be hard to do for a nation with a proud sense of deistic manifest destiny, but America’s time is over. As has been repeatedly stressed, its manifest destiny has been realized, and the world is now entering a new phase of global power and influence, a phase where the U.S. will no longer be dominant...a major player, but no longer ascendant.
The Impact of Oil

The fact that the Arabic world controls the world’s energy supplies is one of the great conundrums of our time. How does the West deal with countries that to a great extent it does not trust, and that does not trust them, but that can dictate the fate of its economy, its very lifeblood, through the control of oil. How ironic that American global preeminence depends on some of the world’s most anti-American nations. For more than sixty years, the West has veered between confrontation and cajolery as it has sought a steady flow of oil at a stable price out of the Middle East. The United States in particular has jumped from country to country in search of reliable friends, only to find that with the single exception of Saudi Arabia, reliable friends have not been that reliable. In return, the United States has consistently given Saudi Arabia a bye when it comes to human rights violations, and have never publicly exposed their internal affairs as long as they met the basic requirement of providing the West with cheap energy. This, in retrospect, has been horrifically short–sided, and must now change. But even beyond the United States, the stability of the oil producing countries has become of global concern.

Arabic oil wealth is obviously a great blessing, but it has emerged as a great curse as well. With oil, the Arabic nations have no need to tax their citizens. With no taxation, the state both asks little of its people, and gives little in return. When taking from its people, the citizenry generally demand something in return, like more open, honest, transparent, accountable government. There has been little if any incentive within the Arabic ruling elite to create transparent governmental infrastructure, functional legal mechanisms, nor to establish policies that will lead to ubiquitous economic growth (and the eventual emergence of a middle class). In sum, there is little incentive to modernize socially, legally, politically, economically. Oil wealth has lead to the development of a culture of irresponsible and civically unresponsive political leadership in the entire region (reinforced by the perceived absence for the support of such development with the pages of the Qur’an). It has yielded social and political stagnation in the Arabic world and will lead to increased frustration and animosity in the Middle Eastern body politic in the coming years. Particularly when coupled with the growing fundamentalist Islamic movement, this will result in increased intolerance for, and an escalation in, acts of terrorism perpetrated upon the West. This is not to say that the United States, and more particularly the inept policies of the Bush administration, did not contribute to the problem. The United States obviously needs to turn on its hearing aid and change its policies and practices, on many fronts, but oil wealth emerges as a core issue of concern with respect to the generally dysfunctional and civically unresponsive Arabic states at present.
Migration

There will be massive migration of individuals across nations and across continents in this next century, both legal and illegal, and the world will experience a significant measure of disruption because of it. This will come about due to a variety of reasons:

1. Globalization – Human capital markets will become increasingly fluid in a geographic context due to constantly shifting employment supply and demand needs. Better markets (and better hunting grounds) have always driven the human race to move, and the globalized economic system feeds directly into and off of that basic element of human nature. As an aside, I must mention that globalization and its closely related cousin, the internet, have and will continue to spawn new kinds of white collar and economic crimes in this next century.

2. Persistent poverty – One of the dark aspects of globalization, and of capitalism in general, is the problem of persistent poverty. The current economic downturn is a case in point. A March 2009 World Bank report indicated that 94 of the 116 developing nations are now in a recession, and that 46 million more people will move into poverty in the year 2009. Those at the lower end of the economic scale will, in this globalized world, seek job security and job enrichment in response to their present state of unemployment/underemployment, and will move accordingly. Migration of the poor and disenfranchised from transitional nations into developed ones is already a political hot button item the world over, and a most profitable market for organized crime. Human smuggling will become a huge concern for law enforcement in this next century.

3. Re–occurring business cycles/economic crises – Capitalism by nature experiences business cycles. But business cycles, as antiseptically described in the textbooks, means re–occurring recessions and depressions, real–life unemployment, and real–life instability and volatility. In the migration context, the newly unemployed and underemployed will move to seek out better jobs and enhanced living conditions, yielding continued cyclical patterns of socio–economic and geopolitical instability and volatility. Economic instability played a major role in the whirlwind of events leading up to World War II, and we are not immune to such a calamitous turn of events in this century. In myopic attempts to shield themselves during this present economic downtown/business cycle, a number of nations are currently edging toward the charlatan of economic nationalism/protectionism. This is a most disturbing turn of events for we know that if protectionism raises its ugly head, it will result in a deterioration of the world’s economic system. Those who continue to move down this path will in the end ironically produce greater socio–
4. Rising energy costs/decreased energy access – Individuals will gravitate to regions where energy costs are lower and access is greater out of a pure survival instinct.

5. Environmental degradation and the accompanying famine and overall health concerns – As agricultural productivity declines and food and water supplies diminish, masses will flock to regions where basic food, nutrition and health needs can be met. A 50 percent increase in food production is needed by 2030, and we are not likely going to see that in the increasingly erratic and volatile agricultural environment. Consider the strife and turmoil surrounding the African continent scenarios of the last 25 years; multiply that by several fold, and the magnitude of the problem becomes most overwhelming.

6. Population growth – As implied, population growth in the developing and transitional nation–states is rising at what now appears to be unsustainable rates. As food, water, and energy supplies become taxed, social peace and basic security will become undeliverable in those already tenuous settings, and those populations will stream into the developed world.

Human movement and migration, for whatever reason and with all of the accompanying trial and travail, has been the headline story of our species for the past 50,000 years. It will hardly stop now. The yin and yang to this story is that power in the 21st century will rest with those nations who can successfully train and retain its own indigenous work force (minimize emigration), and simultaneously attract capable, employable foreigners (maximize immigration). Human capital will be the most valuable of all commodities in the 21st century, and those nations who can retain their own best and brightest, and simultaneously steal the best and brightest from other nations, will be the most successful. The dynamics of migration and immigration will have, in the end, perhaps the greatest impact of all upon geo–political events of this century².

**Religious and Ethnic Tensions**

Ethnic and religious divisions, rooted in fundamentalism, xenophobia and intolerance, are becoming increasingly pronounced in some quarters, and as a result, the notion of a cooperative and peaceful international community is increasingly threatened. The power and influence of fundamentalists of every ilk (Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh) must be surmounted. Fundamentalism by nature advances monologues and mantras, retreatism, de–globalization, tribal/local/regional
autonomy, the creation of social and cultural enclaves with an extreme focus on the preservation of identity, independence manifested in the form of isolation, an irrational demand for absolute sovereignty, culminating in outbreaks of xenophobia with all its destructive manifestations. By the same token there is a countervailing force in the world today, one that is seeking collective governance and cross-national commerce, trade and social/cultural intercourse. There is tension now, and there will be tension for centuries to come, between socio-economic integration and all which that entails (including cultural osmosis), and socio-economic retreatism/protectionism, between free trade and economic nationalism, between cross-cultural engagement and geo-political retraction, between collective governance and local sovereignty, between dialogue and monologue, between curiosity and certitude, between tolerance and intolerance, between acceptance and shunning, between globalization and fundamentalism. The struggle simply continues, with new verses and new faces.

The Rise in Nationalism

The world is beginning to see a rise in nationalism, which has been a sleeping phenomenon for the last half-century. Pride, an interest in attaining international recognition and respect, frustrated over having been forced to accept an American narrative of world events for so long, aggravated with having been cast as bit players for so long and accompanied by the concurrent drive to now have a viable seat at the table, a desire to right historic wrongs; these are all factors that will aggravate the issue in this new century. Newly arising nations are going to be strongly assertive of their ideals and interests.

How are we going to get so many actors to work together? As mentioned a moment ago, the traditional mechanisms of international cooperation are fraying, and are nearly all out of step with the times; the G8 does not include China, India or Brazil, the IMF is always headed by a European, the World Bank by an American. These country club ideals are passé, but finding a way, finding mechanisms that can include more countries and more NGOs as viable and empowered players with a seat at the table will be hard, but it does need to be done. If China, India, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. all have a contributing stake in the world order, there will be less chance of war, depression, and general social unrest, and less chance of unbridled nationalism raising its ugly head. But, that is not the only answer, for some may have a seat at the table and still want more power. Then of course there are those nations that will feel left out, cheated, betrayed, and the negative aspects of nationalism will be easily fanned into flames by opportunistic politicians in such settings. Heaven forbid that another Hitler arrive on the scene, vomiting such rhetoric on the world, especially in this nuclear age.
We are seeing some of the negative elements of nationalism emerge in several countries. North Korea is certainly one example, where nationalism is being driven by an internal engine of propaganda, isolation, and hero worship. With nuclear warheads on the table, this nationally driven state cannot be taken lightly. Then there are several nations (Russia, Venezuela, Iran), all empowered and emboldened by oil wealth, that are rattling the saber of forward-leaning, self-serving nationalism, to the current and potential further detriment to communal peace and prosperity of their neighbors. Note that all of these nations are currently headed by a propaganda spouting sole ruler who is plucking at the nationalistic heartstrings of his body politic as a means of staying in power. Whatever the factors, and there will be unique justifications and motives based on contingencies of the moment, customs, and cultures, the 21st century will see the re-emergence of the negative side of nationalism, and the world community will need to contend with its potentially destructive ramifications.

The Rise of Organizational Crime

I must add to this list of forces of global disorder, the usual suspect of organized crime with all its offerings – drugs, arms, prostitution, money laundering, human trafficking, production and distribution of counterfeit goods, and organized crime’s Siamese twin, government corruption. There is strong evidence that organized crime entities around the globe are beginning to build partnerships in a classic division of labor context. Globalization’s impact on illegitimate trade and commerce is just as vibrant and dynamic as it is in the legitimate. The heroin trade and its presence in the very fabric of the Afghan society is certainly one example. Law enforcement’s fragmented, kinetic responses to organizational crime are now and will continue to be not only of no value, but counterproductive, which is the topic of another paper.

Globalization’s Ascendance

Taken in tandem, these are powerful and frightening forces, but longitudinally, I tend to put my faith in the eventual emergence of collective governance, in enhanced trade and cross-national social and culture intercourse, in economic integration. I put my trust in the decidedly positive, long-term, multi-sector impacts of globalization. In the end, economic interests will trump belligerence. Economic vibrancy will yield domestic tranquility. As evidence I offer the past ten years. Over the past decade, political turmoil has swept the world. There have been the 9/11 attacks, bombings in Bali, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, Mumbai, and London. There have been two major American-lead wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which have been protracted and
horribly destabilizing. Add to this the war between Israel and Lebanon and Hamas, Iran’s bid for regional supremacy, North Korea’s nuclear saber-rattling, the Chinese-Tibet crisis, Russia’s continuing clashes with its neighbors (Georgia, Chechnya), the continued destabilization in many African states (Nigeria, Somalia, the Congo, the Sudan). Yet, during this same period, the world economy has experienced unprecedented growth. We are experiencing today something that has not happened in recorded history – simultaneous growth worldwide. We are in the midst of an economic downturn, but in an historic sense, the United States, Europe and Japan are all doing well and that would be expected, but so is China, and India and Brazil and Argentina and Chile and Turkey and Thailand and Vietnam and Malaysia. It is the rise of these latter nations that is powering the new global order. There will be some bumps along the way, but the globalization genie is out of the bottle.

Globalization is more powerful, widespread and resilient than even the economists realized. It is amazingly elastic, but, we should probably not be so surprised, for globalization in micro appeals to the individual interests of the world’s body politic who see it as a way out; a way for them, and a way for their families to move forward. There are currently massive numbers of persons, entire nations visualizing hope for the first time in human history. That power will trump fundamentalism, civic strife and social turmoil in the end. There will be more body bags, too many more, but the spirit of globalization has reached the four corners of the globe. It has been universally embraced, and as previously noted, that genie will not be put back into the bottle. While globalization has some decidedly negative impacts that have admittedly not been adequately explored in this paper, in sum total, it will serve in aggregate as a mitigating factor to the global crime problems of the 21st century.

I have an additional thought on this matter. One particular family of collateral demands of globalization is the entire notion of civic stability and order; the establishment of a genuine rule of law, creation, growth and development of equitable and efficient institutions of public order and dispute resolution, conformity to international trade norms, rational governance, and political transparency. These will simply be demanded by the body politic, as without them, a nation will be decidedly handicapped as it attempts to compete in the global economy. This is again the Eskridge thesis if you would. Economic opportunity will lead to good governance, both of which will then lead to the evaporation of fundamentalism in Islam, as well as evaporation of fundamentalism of any ilk. By giving the body politic a stake, giving them a seat at the table, they will have a vested interest in maintaining, not overthrowing, the established order.
What Should Be Done?

The Militant Islamic challenge requires a sustained, multi–generational, multi–sector response. On the religious front, the moderate Islamic clerics and scholars need to assert themselves and get out the message that the fundamentalist version of Islam is an aberration. Moderate Islam, with not even a taint of Western influence, must internally make militant Islam a fringe element. There has been some success in this sphere of late. Operationally, Al-Qaeda for example has been somewhat quiet, it is being ideologically challenged by numerous Imams, and polls show a diminished support for Al-Qaeda in particular and fundamentalism in general among the Arabic body politic. Whenever Muslim fundamentalists have been forced to leave their rhetoric and become involved in actual governance, their luster has worn off, and I speak to fundamentalism of every ilk, from bin Laden to Bush. Civilization requires consensus and dialogue, not pious certitude.

Secular, public educational systems need to be enhanced. Inadequate public–education systems not only encourage poor families to send their children to extremist Madrassas schools, but do not prepare the rising generation to function in the globalized world. The West needs to immediately open its universities to both the established and the aspiring Arabic scientists, artists and scholars of every kind. The establishment of an Arabic oriented Fulbright program would achieve wonders. Arabic political leadership must deliver economic progress in every sector by developing a broad–based, non–oil dependent economy. While the U.S. does need to withdraw its military (as will be discussed later), in the long run, poverty is more dangerous than occupation. In addition, institutions of public order need to be strengthened. Regulatory agencies and coherent, professional, transparent civil and criminal justice systems need to be shored up with particular emphasis on the further development of rational, lucid judicial systems. Trade pacts need to be developed and tariffs removed. Infrastructure and health care delivery systems must be modernized. Extensive, multi–sector cultural and educational exchanges need to be aggressively pursued. Transnational institutions of every kind between the West and Islam need to be established. Killing bin Laden and dismantling Al Qaeda is not the long–term answer. The conditions that produced Al Qaeda – endemic poverty, abysmal public health facilities, insufficient infrastructure, poor quality schools that leave young people unprepared and globally isolated. These problems must be addressed aggressively by Arabic leaders, and not by the West.

The expansion of economic liberty will have definitive spillover effects. Economic reform will mean re–building and enhancing infrastructure and the beginnings of a genuine rule of law, initially within the business sector. Capitalism needs contracts, openness to the world, conformity to international trade norms,
access to information, fair and transparent justice systems/civil courts. As day to day stability is realized, the region will see the development of a business class.

Business has a stake in openness, in rules, in order. Instead of the romance of ideology, they seek tangible reality and stability. A genuine entrepreneurial business class would be a most powerful force for change in the Middle East. As the Middle East moves further down such a path of prosperity, the tumultuous energies of that region will be diverted into peaceful venues. Economic vibrancy will yield domestic tranquility. In addition, as economic order and stability are realized and the rule of law begins to emerge in the business context, constitutional liberalisms will also emerge – individual rights, freedom of the press, private property protections, independent courts, a free flow of information.

What is not needed is a pro-active, longitudinal military campaign. Destroying villages, capturing and incarcerating enemy combatants, killing even large numbers of individuals will have little impact upon the ability of terrorist organizations, upon populist social movements, to survive. Consider the American experience in Vietnam, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, the British experience with the American colonies. How odd that we still tend to engage in head counts (counting the number of terrorists killed or captured) to measure success. This is not only utterly meaningless, but completely counterproductive. Killing more creates more martyrs, more heroes, and two will rise for every one that is killed, like the Hydra of Greek mythology. There are tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands willing to die for the Islam. Islam is the majority religion in 57 countries and currently counts some 1.3 billion adherents. The well will not run dry. Kinetic military campaigns will aggravate the body politic, and harden the resolve of the core players and must be shunned literally like the plague, for such actions are indeed a plague on social peace, justice, and global security.

What is not needed is a continuation of the failed policy of economic sanctions. They bring misery to the people and power to the dictators. Consider the cases of Cuba, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. Pakistan, in the context of this paper, is of particular concern. We placed sanctions on Pakistan in the early 1990s. As a result, there are now two generations of Pakistani military leaders who have had no interaction with American/Western military personnel at a time now when the West desperately needs contacts and networks within the Pakistani military community. Economic sanctions are a nice, knee-jerk, feel good, easy sell, politically popular policy. One gains a great deal of political capital on the home-front for airing such proposals. In impact, however, economic sanctions are more than counterproductive; they are disastrous and need to be abandoned immediately.

What is not needed is an Islamic photocopy of Western style social democracy. The West should not try to implant democracy in the Middle East now or anytime in
the future. Democracy is not an antidote to Middle East terrorism, and besides, the antecedents to democracy are not in place in the Middle East. The socio-political culture of the Middle East is religious, tribal, and family. That area of the world is not psychologically geared to central governance and the Constitutional liberalisms of contemporary Western democracies. The wishes of the body politic of the Arabic world, of the people of the world in general are, let me be me, let me make money, and let me live in a safe environment. The form of governance that should be put in place to achieve these ends is totally irrelevant as long as it can exercise actual authority and bring some measure of equity and stability to the region.

Likewise, lack of Western-style political freedoms is also not a factor, and I would present the cases of Russia, China and Singapore to support this position. In the end, more than freedom of speech and the opportunity to vote, people in all countries and climes seek environments where they can be themselves, where they may enjoy daily communal peace, and have the opportunity to make money. The citizenry crave social and economic order and stability, not freedom of the press. Economic opportunity and stability are the key to stability and security. As economic opportunity is enhanced and communal peace and stability realized, the fundamentalist threat will wither away. Western style liberty and freedom and democracy can come later, if at all. This era of cultural conflict, this cultural war, will only be mitigated as aggregate economic opportunities at all levels and in every sector are forthcoming within the Arabic world. This present conflict will be won or lost on economic grounds. The best way to inoculate the Islamic youth against the jihads now and in the future, is to provide broad-based economic opportunities. The path to peace is paved with such bricks. Lasting peace is built upon aggregate socio-economic opportunity and the aggregate sense of justice and equity that will flow from that, and not just on quiet guns.

The Arabic world also needs a success story, a model to motivate. It needs to see a major country embrace modernity and yet maintain its identity to inspire the region, much as Japan did in Eastern Asia a generation ago. Having said that, I recognize full well that Japan, and Germany, were obviously able to rebuild so quickly after WWII due in large part to the influx of U.S. dollars emanating from the Marshal Plan, a model that clearly will not be adopted by the United States with respect to the Arabic Ummah at this time. But in addition to funding, there was (and still is) a very high level of social cohesion and communal trust embedded deep within the cultures of both Japan and Germany; trust in friends and family yes, but more importantly, trust in central government institutions. On the negative side, Hitler and the Emperor Hirohito, were able to abuse their powers in part because of that innate cultural communal trust in government institutions. On the positive side of this yin and yang matter, Germany and Japan were also able to rebuild quickly after the war because that centralized communal trust was still present in their social fabric, even at the
end of the war. Unfortunately, a communal trust in government institutions is most definitely not a part of contemporary Arabic culture. Allegiance is to the tribe and the extended patriarchal family. Developing communal trust in government institutions will take generations; time for the old ones to forget and for the young to institute for the first time in centuries, a track record of successes. Yet despite these odds and obstacles, to a great extent, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Qatar, Malaysia, and Bahrain are succeeding right now. Hopefully their collective models of success can be emulated across the region. The best deterrence to terrorism is multi-sector economic prosperity, good governance, and an embedded culture of success. As David Landes notes, the most significant distinguishing factor between the struggling/developing/transitional nations and the progressive industrialized ones, is a culture of success. A culture of success needs to be more deeply embedded into the Islamic social fabric.

While an embedded culture of success is a powerful antidote to terrorism, that is a long-term proposition, as are the other notions mentioned above. There is an obvious need for some immediate response. At times and in rare circumstances, direct law enforcement/military intervention is required. But in the shorter term context, perhaps the most effective way of dealing with terrorism is to break down their financial capabilities. It takes money to run a terrorist organization. It cost Al Qaeda roughly $530,000 to carry out the September 11 attacks for example. Today’s major terrorist entities have established substantial financial support networks to enable them to continue to conduct business. Aum Shinrikyo in fact amassed nearly $2 billion in assets before it was finally shut down by the Japanese government. As of this writing, international law enforcement agencies have publicly announced the seizure of $121 million in assets in 166 countries since the attacks of September 11. Impressive on the one hand, but little more than a drop in the bucket when compared to the amount of illicit funds that flow in the daily dishevel of global trade and commerce. Perhaps the most important short-term law enforcement undertaking in response to contemporary Islamic terrorism, is to follow the money. More vigorous law enforcement efforts should be undertaken in this arena.

I would like to add as a footnote, the strategic counterterrorism plan currently being utilized by the New York City Police Department. Their “Terrorism Czar,” David Cohen, noted that in 2002, only 6 persons in the entire United States obtained undergraduate degrees in Arabic. He has begun to move NYPD in the opposite way. Some 40 percent of New York City residents were born outside the U.S., so finding large numbers of people with indigenous language skills was not that difficult, but he began to hire and train officers to speak foreign languages. At present, officers of the NYPD speak 45 different languages. This is extraordinarily beneficial in both a kinetic policing as well as a problem solving context. In addition, he has adopte a focused intolerance model, where the police look for reasons to corner suspects,
speak to them in their own language, and then let them go. It has hard to say if this has worked per se (there have been no more attacks on NYC), but anecdotal evidences shows diminished terrorist “chatter” and a lowered general antipathy coefficient in the Islamic community.

Lastly, the United States need to withdraw from the Middle East/Central Asian region, physically and politically. Its imperial presence is accentuating the crisis and fanning the flames of an already brewing internal conflict. Obviously it is neither practical nor reasonable to expect a complete economic and social withdrawal given our oil dependency and the ubiquitous state of the communication and media/entertainment industries. Culture osmosis is a reality that the Islamic East will need to come to terms with internally, but U.S. troops need to return home and U.S. meddling in Arabic internal affairs, with all its declarations and threats and certitudes, needs to cease immediately.

A word on each of these two notions – the withdrawal of the U.S. military and U.S. meddling. I recently sent some material to the head of the Research and Development Unit of the Peshawar Province, Pakistan police force. He thanked me kindly and subsequently indicated that he would now rewrite the material because it cannot be seen as coming from the U.S. We have no standing, no creditability in the Islamic world, and rightfully so. Growth in this region will have to ultimately percolate internally. There cannot be even a hint of American involvement. If we do wish to be involved, it must be of a soft and clandestine nature.

Secondly, while there does seem to be a timetable for our military withdrawal in Iraq, Afghanistan is emerging as a different story, and the war seems to be intensifying as of this writing, but, therein lies the crux of the matter – the “war” on terrorism. As Huntington pointed out years ago, that is the wrong metaphor. Wars are fought at full intensity and have beginnings and endings. The “Jihad” challenge, the militant Islamic challenge, is not a war. It a “long, twilight struggle,” it is a clash of civilizations. The core component of this conflict should not be, should never have been, a military campaign. Military interventions aggravate. They never, ever mitigate. Bush blundered in treating the 9/11 episode as if it were the first salvo in a war. It was not. It was a criminal episode, perpetrated by a small gang of men, and should have been treated as such. We should have worked within the international community and tracked down those responsible for that criminal act and punished them and them alone. Instead, he started a war that has escalated and morphed into something that is barely even related to the 9/11 attacks.

By escalating, Bush gave credence to this small, and up until then, rather insignificant group. By overreacting, Bush made Bin Laden a hero and collaterally brought visibility and creditability to his message of fundamentalism. It was not a war, and in historical contexts it is not a war, but Bush made it one, to the detriment
of the world. As an aside, we now know that he purposefully overestimated the militant Islamic threat for political purposes, making his over–reaction all the more egregious. Unfortunately no one taught Bush that a latent military force has a far more positive impact than a deployed one.

Though Bush is gone now, Obama seems to be tragically falling into the same trap. As many are pointing out, Afghanistan may well end up being Obama’s Vietnam. It could supersede his grand domestic vision, just as Vietnam did to President Lyndon Johnson a generation ago, and leave the region and the world in a less secure context. President Johnson thought that he could bomb Vietnam into submission just as Obama apparently now feels about Afghanistan. We will never bomb Afghanistan into submission, just as Johnson was never able to bomb Vietnam into submission. It is a flawed perspective, coming initially from the World War I Italian military officer Julio Drue. It was an interesting idea developed at the dawn of aviation, but time has shown it to be wrong (Battle of London, allied bombing of Germany, American bombing of Vietnam), and if Obama goes down this route, he is doomed to failure and the sequences of events that will flow from it, will be catastrophic.

Returning again to the Afghan matter, there is an interesting, and obvious parallel here – several hundred years ago America, with its farmers and shopkeepers, took on the mightiest military on the earth, and won. It won by utilizing asymmetric military tactics and drawing upon the most core of human emotions – freedom, family, homeland, and independence. The same holds true in Afghanistan on every score (and that is particular true with respect to the “nation” of the Pashtun3 who are spread across Afghanistan and western Pakistan). There is no military solution here. It is a one of politics and culture and, at the core, economics. The sooner we recognize that and withdraw our troops and our tangible presence, the better off the world will be.

The Role of Criminology on the Global Stage

As I look over this list, I think of myself for a moment, not as a criminologist, but rather as a physician, and instead of addressing crime problems, addressing medical problems, and not of the 21st century, but rather of the 19th century. And the reason I draw this analogy is that I believe that the field of criminology today is very much like the field of medicine 200 years ago. There were seemingly insurmountable health issues then, as there are seemingly insurmountable crime problems today small pox, bubonic plague, malaria, infections, consumption, scurvy. There was a lot of guesswork in medicine in 1800, a very limited epistemological understanding, no body of knowledge of consequence, no consistently proven treatment modalities.
What did medicine do to move from where it was then, when life, as Thomas Hobbes wrote, was nasty, brutish and short (short indeed as life expectancy at the time was roughly 40 years of age) to the situation of today. Death has not been eliminated, and yes, there is still some guesswork in medicine, but there is a body of knowledge today, there is epistemological understanding, there are hundreds and hundreds of proven, successful treatment modalities, many of life’s serious diseases have been eliminated and the severity of the nature of disease in the aggregate has been significantly mitigated. Life expectancy has been extended to nearly 80 years of age in the developed nations, and it is a markedly improved quality of life in the health context. What has happened?

What accounts for this progress? What can we in criminology learn? The field of medicine did four things:

1. It moved toward a ubiquitous, cross-national educational model. Schools of medicine have sprouted up in quality institutions of higher education the world over in the last 200 years and there is an extensive amount of professional cooperation, interaction and exchange.

2. It embraced an inter-disciplinary perspective and sought intellectual concilience, combining different types, levels, and areas of exploration in an attempt to etiologically explain and understand. It is not unusual today to see an article in a medical journal authored by half-a-dozen researchers from half-a-dozen different disciplines (and from half-a-dozen different institutions, per point #1).

3. It adopted the principle of experimental design and evidence-based evaluation.

4. It integrated scientific inquiry with the political. Medicine realized that it needed to get its message out to the masses to realize real preventative and curative progress.

I wish to return to the theme that there are great parallels between medicine and criminology. We in criminology cannot eliminate crime anymore than physicians can eliminate death, but we can, like medicine, reduce the severity of the nature of crime through preventative and curative mechanisms, just as medicine can reduce the severity of disease through preventative and curative means.

There was little understanding in 1800 that different diseases needed different treatments, and that different people with the same diseases sometimes needed different treatments. There was no understanding as to what today is basic medical knowledge – ie, the difference between a bacteria based and a viral based disease. But, once the four basic premises were implemented (cross national education, experimental design, interdisciplinary orientation, political medicine), and once Louis Pasteur came along, the field of medicine exploded. No, it cannot nor ever will
eliminate death, we cannot eliminate crime, but we both can reduce the severity of the nature of crime and disease, and we can do so by embracing the four principles—cross national education, experimental design, interdisciplinary orientation, political criminology. Improvements in crime and punishment matters and the reduction of corruption throughout the world in the 21st century, depend upon criminology moving in this same strategic direction. As the American writer Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote, for every 100 people hacking at the leaves, there is only one digging at the root of the problem. We cannot address the crime problems by hacking at the leaves in a piecemeal fashion. We need to come at this from a fundamental, etiological, epistemological, systemic orientation and adopt the same procedural model as did medicine. I wish to briefly address all four procedural methodologies which medicine embraced, and apply them to criminology.

A Cross National Academic Model

We need to embrace a cross national academic model, and seek to enhance the level of growth and development of criminology in universities throughout the world. I see three major benefits to this, as follows:

1. Over time, graduates from university justice education programs will gradually begin to fill justice system positions within their respective countries, which will help to further professionalize justice operations within each country.

2. Most who take university classes in criminology will not seek employment in the justice system per se, but they become the body politic, and their exposure to the principles and concepts outlined in their criminology classes will have increased their understanding as to the proper role and function of the justice system and its personnel. Subsequently this more attuned and aware general populous will hold justice system personnel to a higher standard. The synergy of this proposal is that the justice system personnel who are going to be held more accountable by the more attuned public, will have had the academic background to draw upon which will give them more tools to be able to respond positively.

3. Justice officials will also be able to respond more positively to increased public demand due to perhaps the most important aspect of all—research. The faculty and students of the criminology programs will engage in research activities that will produce a more complete knowledge base and shed further light on ways and means of improving justice system practices, programs and policies.

In sum, criminology research helps develop and improve justice–based institutional structures, the classroom course content helps prepares the individuals
who work in them and ingrains the concept of the justice and the rule of law into the body politic. I defer to the thoughts of H.G. Wells in this matter – “human history is a race between education and catastrophe.” Under that premise, it is crucial that the educational model be adopted, and particularly in the area of criminology as nations seek to enhance the level of collective communal peace and equality, and overall social justice.

I would add that developing and transitional nations in particular need to establish justice education programs. These nations typically have weak rule of law traditions and publically disparaged legal infrastructures. Justice education programs will help overcome these deep-seated problems, and in addition, it will help these nations professionalize and stabilize their justice systems so that they will be more likely to attract investment dollars and participate more fully in the global economy.

**An Interdisciplinary Academic Model**

The hard sciences and medicine were two of the great success stories of the 20th Century. Conspicuously absent in this great leap, however, were the social and behavioral sciences. Some twenty years ago, Allan Bloom criticized the academic social and behavioral sciences for being scholastically stagnant. He argued that there have been no new ground-breaking perspectives, no new paradigms, no theories of value or impact proffered for decades. Compared with the hard sciences and medicine, the traditional disciplines of sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics, history, political science are comatose, if not altogether dead. The primary reason he argues, is intellectual incest; an unwillingness to engage in cross-disciplinary and cross-national fertilization and exchange.

Much of the reason behind the rather rapid rise of justice education as a field of study in the United States has been its cross-disciplinary diversity. A marginal field of study in the 1960s and 1970s, it exploded onto the academic scene in the 1980s and 1990s. This was due in part to the emergence of crime as a fundamental topic of interest to the American body politic, but also in large part due to its academic diversity and multi-disciplinary character. It is not unusual to see American university criminal justice program faculty members with degrees in history, psychology, sociology, public administration, law, political science, urban studies, as well as criminology and criminal justice.

There is a need to continue to cling to the multi-disciplinary model, and to extend the reach to include colleagues from all nations. We must emulate the progressive hard science research centers and reach out to all fields and disciplines, and to colleagues from all nations, and in this interdisciplinary, cross-national context, collectively seek to address crime and justice issues.
Evidence Based Criminology

What do we know about reducing the severity of crime? How do we go about systemically reducing the severity of crime? A comprehensive United States Congress sponsored study undertaken about ten years ago concluded that we simply do not know. What we do know and where we have made great strides, is in enhancing the efficiency and the professionalism of our justice agencies. American law enforcement in particular has seen a light year of improvement in the last 40 years. This has been due, in large part, to the presence of criminology/criminal justice programs in the U.S. higher educational system – there are now better prepared recruits, a heightened sense of awareness and demand for proper performance coming from the educated body politic, and a growing body of research–based knowledge that has examined police (and other) justice agency operations and procedures.

What we don’t know is how to systemically reduce the severity of crime and deviance overall in society at large. Some programs and policies seem successful, others are clearly dismal failures, but we are not sure why, on either count. We have not been able to crack the cause and effect barrier with any degree of surety. The knowledge base in the field of criminology is somewhat thin as compared with the hard sciences.

As a consequence, justice policies and programs that are adopted are generally implemented due more to political consideration rather than scientific merit. In the final analysis, academic criminology is generally polluted by political criminology, for in the absence of sound knowledge, public policy tends to be a pinch of science (and often bad science at that), and a pound of ideology.

Scientific Versus Political Criminology

This then brings me to the 4th and final, and yes, somewhat cynical point, scientific versus political criminology. Let me address that idea and tie it in with the other notions presented today, with two stories. In 1799, the former president of the United States, George Washington, lay in bed with a bad case of strep throat. The finest physicians of the day concluded that he needed to be bled, a common treatment modality of the day that was used for virtually every ailment. Bleeding, among other impacts, contributes to dehydration. Ironically in the end, Washington died not due to the strep throat infection per se, but primarily due to the complications brought on by the bleeding induced dehydration. We know today that when a patient contracts a case of strep throat, they need to be hydrated, not de-hydrated. Yet ironically, the well–meaning physicians of the day, using the popular mode of treatment, did...
exactly the opposite of what they needed to do and of course made the situation worse.

There is, in this story, a stunning analogy with respect to the use of prisons in an American context. Just as bleeding was used as the response to virtually all ailments of the early 19th century and just as it made things worse, prison is used as the response to virtually all crimes in the 21st century, and is making things worse; strep throat, consumption, the plague bleed them – drug user, burglar, robber imprison them. Just as medicine in that day had no concept of inter and intra disease specificity and the need for individualized treatment modalities, we in criminology also suffer today with an inability to deal with inter and intra crime variation. Had George Washington’s health improved (and there was a chance it could have for he was a man of large stature), the physicians likely would have suggested it was due to the bleeding, and perhaps touted his case as yet another example of the value of that treatment modality. But of course, such treatment is de-habilitating, and any improvement in Washington’s health subsequent to the bleeding would have been despite, not because of the treatment received. A systematic analysis would have revealed this to be the case of course, but, there were few systematic analyses undertaken within the field of medicine prior to the 1800s.

By and large, the crime prevention programs that we utilize in the United States have not been systematically evaluated, which is, of course, quite an interesting state of affairs. Imagine a pharmaceutical firm introducing a new drug into the market that has not been adequately tested and approved by the Food and Drug Administration. We need a criminological FDA. No crime response or prevention program should be implemented until it has been adequately tested, until it has been subjected to repeated, thorough, systematic quantitative evaluation. One way to begin to facilitate this is to develop justice education programs in universities all around the world.

We should also consider the fact that there are programs that have been shown via systematic evaluation to be viable, but are not politically palatable. This situation is not limited to criminology. Consider, for example, the case of Dr. Joseph Goldberger who was sent by the United States government to the southern American states in 1913 in an attempt to discover the cause and cure for pellagra, a disease that was ravaging that area of our nation. He discovered that the disease was due to a lack of niacin in the diet. Dr. Goldberger, a Jew from the northern United States, then began to relay his findings to the southern community populous and leadership. His work was summarily rejected, due in part to the fact that he was a Jew, in part due to the fact that he was from the North, and in part because of a general fear of change, a xenophobia amongst the populous. He was eventually recalled by the United States federal government due to the animosity spreading throughout the American South on this matter. He died, definitively knowing he had found the
cause and cure of pellagra, but infinitely frustrated in that he had been unable to reach the body politic with the findings.

This account highlights the need for scientific criminologists to recognize that there are actually two fields that need to be surmounted if impact is to be achieved: scientific criminology and political criminology. As quantitatively sound as it is, removing handguns from the American public is just not going to happen, despite the fact that a successfully implemented policy of this nature would result in fewer murders. As quantitatively sounds as it is, the horribly unbalanced social inequality quotient is not going to be addressed in America, despite the fact that this is clearly a precipitating factor when it comes to crime issues. There is no political capital for seriously addressing either notion in the United States. They are not politically palatable themes. There are political truths and there are scientific truths, and political “leaders,” by their very nature, tend to cling to the political truths to survive, and consequently often (by default) operate in literal information free zones. Political leaders cling to political truths and tend to ignore the quantitative truths – that is the nature of the beast. They have to, to survive. That is just the way it is and always will be. They may order studies done, but if those studies don’t say what the political leaders want said, if the zeitgeist, the timing is not right, then forget it. Scientific criminology is polluted by politics and power, and thus often renders the quantitative studies, the carefully crafted studies that start to reveal the causal explanations of crime as utterly useless (ie., Andrew Lang’s famous comment, politicians use statistics (studies) as a drunken man uses a lamppost – for support (of what they want) rather than illumination).

But rather than criticize these political leaders, we need to recognize that that is simply the nature of job, and we need to adjust to that (the great ones adjust). Consequently, our role as criminologists and justice professionals is to not only uncover scientific truths, but to also be alert as to when the best time would be to bring results forward, to be attuned to the zeitgeist and seek to bring about change when the timing is right. We must also, I propose, do what we can to make that timing right and engage in activities that create an environment where truths can be aired and implemented.

Criminology today, like medicine 200 years ago, is faced with a literal plethora of concerns, and only if it adopts the same procedural model as medicine (cross national education, experimental design, interdisciplinary orientation, a focus on the political as well as the scientific), will we see progress. I do call upon you to markedly increase the presence of criminology in the colleges and universities in your country as a first step. If you are serious about enhancing justice, about heightening the sense of peace and improving socio-economic stability, about obtaining more external investment, about reducing corruption, you need to bring justice education programs
to your universities. It may take a generation to have the desired impact, but this will
work.

Conclusions

As has been outlined, there is a wide array of powerful, interactive forces and
factors at work, pushing and pulling at the boundaries and borders of peace and
civility. The West, and the United States in particular, needs to get its own house in
order (ethically and financially), and will also need to be patient as the East sorts
itself out. As has been emphasized repeatedly, the religious, ethnic, and secular
conflict in the Middle East today are virtually identical to the religious, ethnic,
and secular conflict that plagued Europe in the Middle Ages. We are in the midst
of an Islamic reformation, aggravated by globalization and imperial U.S. military
presence. What took literally hundreds of years to emerge in the West (who had
the advantage of no external meddling) will certainly not materialize overnight in
the Islamic East. It took centuries of major upheavals and catastrophic conflicts for
the West to evolve to its current state, and it is still evolving, as evidenced by the
recent and on–going conflict within the European Union. That process has gone
faster however, since that path has been pioneered. Eighty years ago for example, it
was the Japanese who loomed as the great threat in the East. Their plans for high–
speed modernization stalled with the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
What followed was very similar to the current Islamic reaction – authoritarian rule,
an obsession with cultural purity, a hatred of the West. Many Japanese leaders at
the time spoke of overcoming Western civilization, as does bin Laden today. It took
a war, all such notions dissipated, and Japan now finds itself a world power, and
yet also clearly retains its sense of cultural identity. Others in the region learned
from the experience, and have subsequently chosen to peaceably follow the trail to
prosperity and security that was so painfully hewn by Japan.

God forbid that it should take a cataclysmic event such as World War II to
break the Middle Eastern societies out of their current state of resignation and
hostility. Some in the Muslim world are making the move to modernization more
or less successfully, as previously noted (ie., Turkey, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Bahrain). It has not taken a world war to move them. Hopefully
the same will be able to be said of all Islamic nations, of all nations, in time.

The great question again, is whether we, in the West, can afford to absorb from
the Islamic East, the same level of chaos and destruction the West wrought upon the
world the past 500 years as we evolved to our present socio–political state. Given
the incalculable devastation precipitated by the West during our religious, ethnic and
political reformations, the prospects and outcomes of the emerging Islamic unrest, with its multi-sector and multi-causal origins, are quite unsettling.

Great challenges lay ahead for you and for me as we respond to the inequities and injustices in the world around us. There are people to be fed, reefs and forests to be protected, life in all forms to be preserved, and wrongs to be righted in many spheres. As we work, we must remember that a lasting peace in Islam, a lasting peace in this world, can only be built upon an aggregate sense of justice, equity, and opportunity; not just on quiet guns. In your contemporary quest of that which is great and good, as you pursue knowledge and truth, more will be asked of you than has perhaps ever been asked of you before. You must seek out and contribute, you must plant the seeds for a culture of long-term thinking within your neighborhoods and your nation, and you must do so with an eternal tenacity that is in defiance of the hopelessness. I wish you well in your endeavors as you extend the limits of your abilities through collective innovation and creativity, and will watch with excitement as you reach out and take a more active role in your region, and in the world.

Footnotes

1. America’s siren song has been played before, but its vibrant citizens have always refused to listen. Some twenty years ago, it also appeared as if the U.S. was past its prime due to a combination of imperial overreach, excessive debt, and a rather significant financial bust (see Kennedy, 1987). Instead, it emerged from that period as the world’s sole superpower, operating at the hub of the globalized world. While there are real and pressing contemporary concerns, there are those who suggest that our best days are still ahead (see Friedman, 2009; Gross, 2009), and point out that the American model is not as tarnished as it would appear at first glance. Even our most vocal young critics point out, those who ostensibly hate us the most, wear American university T-shirts.

This is not to ignore the challenges before us. They must be confronted, or our best days will not be in front of us, and the current economic meltdown in particular should focus our collective attentions. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States functioned with an internally driven economic engine built on cheap and easy credit. But, when cheap and easy credit vanishes (like now), that engine slows. The current slowdown is the most listless in some 75+ years. If we can find the political will, we, as do all other nations in the industrialized world, need to:

Trim entitlements by adjusting the size of the payouts and raising the age of qualification. The looming incalculable pension debts/underfunded social welfare commitments have the potential to bring America down, truly down, within the next 15 years.
Aggressively promote tariff and subsidy–free trade. Bush’s in your face, macho, belligerent, arrogant unilateralism may be gone, but it may be replaced by disastrous trade protectionism which in some sense could be a worse option for the U.S. and the world in the long run. The U.S. has a thin social safety net and a winner take all distribution of riches which means that the less educated lower–level workers have less to gain from free trade. President Obama is no “dummy”. He recognizes the inherent, macro value of free trade, but much of his political power–base came from those who are more protectionist in their orientation. Trade protectionism definitively protects in the short–run, but is devastating in the long run and must be resisted at all costs. Time will tell if he has the courage to do the right thing for our nation, and concomitantly, for the world in this supremely important arena.

Become more immigrant friendly. The United States has a brain–dead immigration system, and as a result, it is losing momentum with respect to the development of science and technology. These fields have been dominated by foreign students for decades, many of whom found employment in the United States and subsequently helped fuel the American economic engine. The Bush administration closed the doors to many international students subsequent to 9/11 who wanted to live and work here. These students are now either not coming, or, graduating and being forced to go home. They will now fuel the engines of their own or other nations (ie Canada). Science, as well as global economic survival, is enhanced with exchange and is stunted with isolation. Without them, the U.S. will begin (as it is already) to experience a decline in the fundamental human resource components upon which a modern industrialized economy and the contemporary global market are based. We must not only increase the number of work visas and green cards issued, but also re–write our byzantine green card and study visa application process so as to encourage rather than discourage. We must maintain legal immigration standards, but also set out a clear pathway to citizenship. National power in the 21st century will rest with those nations who are able to adequately train and retain their indigenous workers, and simultaneously attract capable, employable immigrants.

Significantly increase our foreign exchange activities. We need to ramp up foreign exchange programs at the secondary and higher education levels, and particularly revitalize the Fulbright Program which was seriously undermined by the Bush Administration.

Boost research and development spending, particularly in the area of alternate fuels/energy. Our entire economy is dependent upon nations who do not like us very well, and yet, due to our oil addiction, we are transferring billions and billions of dollars to them every year; we must wean ourselves of foreign oil.
Boost infrastructure spending, especially in the area of mass transit. These are investments not consumptions and will have profoundly positive and dramatic far-reaching, multi-sector impacts.

Return to a rationally regulated society. Unbridled, unregulated capitalism is an invitation to disaster as evident in the recent financial meltdown.

Produce more than we consume, and save the difference; American households need to become net savers, not debtors. Since 1980, we have consumed more than we have produced and we have made up the difference by borrowing; that simply and obviously cannot go on indefinitely.

Start paying down the national debt, for a variety of reasons, perhaps the most glaring being that we are becoming subservient to a host of foreign powers. At this point, we simply cannot put much pressure on Russia or China or OPEC one day and expect them to keep buying our T-bills and service our debt, our gluttony, the next.

Become environmental conscious, in word and deed. The United States now stands virtually alone among the developed nations in its denials and inactions in this arena; this is a matter of great concern to the body politic of the world and is an arena where the nations of the world are looking for a leader; we can certainly begin to restore our luster, our international reputation, if we abandon our irrational recalcitrance in this arena and begin showing some leadership here; interestingly, no one else has stepped up on this issue, so this does emerge as a leadership opportunity for the U.S.

2. From an American context, this bodes well for us. America is still the most open, most flexible society in the world. It absorbs other people, cultures, ideas, goods and services which gives it a remarkable ability to adapt and adjust to new technologies and new challenges. The country has historically thrived on the passion and raw energy of immigrants. This singular characteristic has set it apart from other superpower nations that have gone before, and may allow it, despite a host of rather potent contemporary socio-economic ailments, to yet retain some position of power and prominence into the future.

3. The Pashtun, more than perhaps any other group, hold the key to order and stability in the Golden Crescent at present, and perhaps in the world as a whole, for so much rides on the need to bring order and stability in that area of the world. The Pashtun are an ethno-linguistic group with its roots in the Eastern Iranian region. Current populations are now primarily in Afghanistan and Western Pakistan. The Pashtun are typically characterized by their use of the Pashto language and the practice of Pashtunwali (a traditional code of conduct and honor). Pashtun society consists of many tribes and clans which were rarely politically united, until the rise of the Durrani Empire in 1747. Pashtun played a vital role during “The Great Game”
of the 19th century as they were caught between the imperialist designs of the British Empire and Russian empires. For over 250 years, they reigned as the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan. More recently, the Pashtun gained worldwide attention after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and with the rise and fall of the Taliban (since they were/are the main ethnic contingent in the Taliban movement). Pashtun have a dominant presence in Pakistan, where they are prominently represented in the military. The total population of the group is estimated to be around 42 million, but an accurate count remains elusive due to the lack of an official census in Afghanistan since 1979. There are an estimated 60 major Pashtun tribes and more than 400 sub-clans. The Pashtun remain a predominantly tribal people, but globalization and urbanization has begun to alter Pashtun society. Another prominent Pashtun institution is the Jirga or ‘Senate’ of elected older men. Most decisions in tribal life are made by members of the Jirga, which is the main institution of authority that the largely egalitarian Pashtun willingly acknowledge as a viable governing body. Most Pashtuns follow Sunni Islam, generally the Hanafi school. A minority of Twelver Shi’a Pashtun exist in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many Pashtun are prominent Ulema, or Islamic scholars, such as Muhammad Muhsin Khan, who translated the Qur’an and other sacred texts into English. Again, this group, this tribal nation, which by and large does not accept or recognize lines in the sand “national” borders, holds the keys to peace in this unsettled region, and concomitantly, peace in the world.
TERRORYZM, GLOBALIZACJA ORAZ SIŁY (DE)STABILIZUJĄCE W ŚWIECIE ISLAMU

Znacząca niechęć wobec Zachodu, a w szczególności wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych, jest zauważalna wśród wielu wyznawców wiary muzułmańskiej. Uczucie to uwidacznia nie tylko islamski ekstremizm, ale także spora grupa przedstawicieli islamskiego mainstream’u.

Ta problematyczna sytuacja się zaognia. Widoczne są co prawda oznaki dekompresji, ale konflikt będzie się rozwijał jeszcze przez lata z wielu powodów, z których najważniejsze to: kulturowa infiltracja globalizacji, brak struktur możliwości ekonomicznych, wchłanianie politycznego przywództwa islamskiego oraz współczesny ruch Islamskiej Reformacji.

Jednym z pomysłów na pokonanie przeszkód jest zaszczepienie demokracji zachodniej do islamskiego rdzenia. To nierozsądne przedsięwzięcie w kontekście historycznym i w kontekście koniecznych ruchów socjologiczno-kulturowych poprzedzających takie rozwiązanie. Istnieje jednak nadrzędna potrzeba natychmiastowego zapewnienia prawidłowych struktur ekonomicznych i promocji międzynarodowej wymiany.

Ten kulturowy konflikt zostanie załagodzony jedynie w sytuacji, w której połączone możliwości ekonomiczne zostaną wprowadzone na wszystkich poziomach i w każdym sektorze islamskiego świata.

Zachód musi być jednak cierpliwy, ponieważ islam jest obecnie w środku reformacji, okresu istotnych socjologiczno-politycznych przemian, podobnych do tych, z którymi mierzył się sam Zachód jakieś 500 lat temu.

Miejmy nadzieję, że spustoszenia, jakie przyniósł światu Zachód w ciągu ostatniego pół-tysiąclecia, nie powtórzy islamski Wschód i że będzie on potrafił przyjąć kulturę sukcesu i podążyć śladem pokoju i dobrobytu, które w bólu wykuli już inni.

Key words:
Terrorism, globalization, Islamic reformation, disorder, American decline