ADAM WEYDE AND THE MODERNIZATION PROCESSES IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY DURING THE REIGN OF PETER I

DISSERTATIONES
39

KAROL ŁOPATECKI, PAWEŁ KROKOSZ

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PREFACE

The reign of Tsar Peter I (1682–1725)[1] constitutes one of the most significant chapters in Russian history. The state reforms undertaken by the ruler, including the crucial and complete modernization of the armed forces, continue to fascinate scholars. In this very grain, the authors of this study address an understudied aspect of Russian military affairs during the reign of the reformer-tsar. Their first joint work dedicated to Russian military legislation was the 2016 translation and publication of the seminal Russian legal document of the eighteenth century, i.e., Peter I's *Military Code of 1716*.[2] Their subsequent joint papers, published in both Polish and international (Russian) peer-reviewed journals and collective volumes, dealt with, among other topics, the functioning of military camps in eighteenth-century Russia;[3] selected aspects of the passing and implementation of Peter I's *Military Articles*, i.e., the military penal

[1] In order to standardize the chronology of the events described, this study uses dating according to the Julian calendar, in effect in Russia since January 1, 1700. Whenever double dating is used, dates according to the Gregorian calendar are provided in parentheses.

[2] KWPI.

[3] [P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki] П. Крокош, К. Лопатецки, *Военные обозы в Российской империи, Австрии и Французском королевстве в середине XVIII в. в свете трактата Антония Леопольда Эльсница*, [in:] *Россия и Франция. Культурный диалог в панораме веков. Материалы X Международного петровского конгресса*. Санкт-Петербург, 9–10 июня 2017 года, сост. Д.Ю. Гузевич, А.В. Кобак, М.В. Петрова, Санкт-Петербург 2018, pp. 466–481.

code adopted in the tsarist army in the first decade of the eighteenth century;[4] a novel discussion of Peter I's military reform;[5] and finally, General Adam Weyde, the subject of their latest research.[6] In the recent years, the authors also published two elaborate, complementary and comprehensive scientific studies dedicated to one of Peter I's major associates, *Adam Weyde and the Modernization Processes in the Russian army at the Turn of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*[7] and *Adam Weyde. The Military Regulations of 1698*.[8] The wealth of sources concerning the life and work of Adam Weyde led the authors to divide it into two separate publications, of which one constitutes the general's biography, whereas the other regards his *Military Regulations*. However, the substantive value of these two complementary studies made it necessary to merge them into a single cohesive scholarly publication, divided into two parts. The first part offers a description of Adam Weyde's personal life and professional career, while the second contains a translation of his *Military Regulations of 1698*. Thanks to this approach, the new book, published in 2025 as

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[4] P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Przestępstwo fałszowania monet w świetle artykułów wojskowych Piotra I*, [in:] *Forum Numizmatyczne. Studia i Materiały*, No. 2, ed. K. Filipow, Białystok 2018, pp. 206–217; eidem, *Okoliczności uchwalenia rosyjskich Artykułów wojskowych z krótkimi komentarzami*, [in:] *Verus amicus rara avis est. Studia poświęcone pamięci Wojciecha Organiściaka*, ed. A. Lityński et al., Katowice 2020, pp. 367–398.

[5] [P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki] П. Крокош, К. Лопатецки, *Военная революция Петра I: количественное измерение*, "Вестник Волгу," серия 4: История, Регионоведение, Международные отношения, т. 27, 3 (2022), pp. 208–221.

[6] Eidem, *Адам Вейде – полководец, кодификатор, государственный делятель при Петре I*, [in:] *Военно-исторические аспекты жизни Юга России XVII–XXI вв.: вопросы изучения и музеефикации. Материалы III Международной научно-практической конференции, приуроченной к 80-летию начала Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 годов*, Волгоград, 1–2 октября 2021 г., ред. С.А. Иванюк, Т.А. Приказчикова, И.А. Скорченко, П.В. Смолянский, Волгоград 2021, pp. 258–262.

[7] P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Adam Weyde a procesy modernizacyjne armii rosyjskiej na przełomie XVII i XVIII w.*, Białystok 2021.

[8] *Adam Weyde. Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 roku*, compiled and edited by K. Łopatecki and P. Krokosz, translated by P. Krokosz, Białystok 2022.

Adam Weyde and the Modernization Processes in the Russian Army during the Reign of Peter I, binds the two hitherto fragmented issues and supplements them with an extensive and valuable illustrations, including drawings depicting weapon grips performed by soldiers and reconstructed military drill diagrams (the originals have yet to be found). Translated into English, the monograph offers an excellent opportunity to introduce a wider audience, particularly in the English-speaking world, to the backdrop of present-day Russian militarism, whose foundations were laid by Tsar Peter I at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

INTRODUCTION

Adam Adamovich Weyde (1667–1720) is a name familiar to a narrow circle of historians studying both the general and Russian military history of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Weyde has been mentioned mostly in the context of the drafting of the first Russian military regulations (1698), his command of one of the Russian divisions at the Battle of Narva (1700), and his participation in the Russo-Swedish naval clash at Gangut (1714). Peter I's other close associates—Franz Lefort, Patrick Gordon, Boris Sheremetev and Alexander Menshikov—have enjoyed comparatively far greater recognition. Therefore, does the figure of Adam Weyde—a friend and confidant of the tsar, a front-line commander, and gifted military theorist of the modern era—warrant a separate biography by virtue of his public or private activities, or his overall uniqueness?[1]

[1] The most recent contribution to the discussion concerning the protagonist of this biography came from Tomasz Ciesielski. He noted the gap between the body of source texts and the actual achievements of the individual whose life and work we study in this book. In other words, if a simple account of a person's life, no matter how detailed, fails to offer a positive answer as to the purpose of such a monograph, it should make one wonder about its academic relevance; see T. Ciesielski, *Nie każdy nosił w plecaku buławę... hetmańską. Kilka uwag o karierze wojskowej i politycznej Aleksandra Hilarego Połubińskiego w związku z pracą Andrzeja Adama Majewskiego*, "Kwartalnik Historyczny" 127 (2020), 4, pp. 935–953.

To answer this question, one must first clarify the circumstances in which this book came to be. Back in 2016, we first signaled our work on a monograph detailing the codification of Russian military law, completed in 1716.[2] In studying this issue, we paid attention to the interconnections between legislation, state structures, institutions, and, most importantly, those responsible for the changes implemented.[3] However, the phenomenon in question is highly complex and does not lend itself to the simple narrative description typically offered in historical studies. In view of the above, by drawing on actor-network theory we have reconstructed the relationships and interdependencies of those involved in the modernization of the Russian armed forces and the attendant state institutions during the reign of Peter I.[4]

The popularity of actor-network theory is not reflected by a clear delineation of its basic tenets and research methodology. Besides, Bruno Latour and the continuators of his thought have recurrently reinterpreted certain aspects of actor-network theory, emphasizing the primacy of practice over rigid procedural precepts. Consequently, what one is dealing with here is an original research perspective and methodology rather than a formalized theory with precise conceptual apparatus. From our point of view, however, this is an advantage as it allows us to

[2] P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Wstęp*, [in:] KWPI, p. 80.

[3] For preliminary findings on the subject, see eidem, *Okoliczności uchwalenia…*, p. 367–398.

[4] B. Latour, *Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*, Oxford–New York 2005; B. Latour, *Splatając na nowo to, co społeczne. Wprowadzenie do teorii aktora sieci*, transl. A. Derra, K. Abriszewski, Kraków 2010. Studies invoking actor-network theory initially dealt with the formation of scientific knowledge and development of new technologies. Departing from the traditional perspective on such phenomena, which focused on great inventors and the discovery of objective truth, a new, much more complex approach was adopted in which the heretofore protagonists of a narrative became only some among the many actors participating in the described process, and the outcomes of their work were no longer hallowed as indisputable truths, but were rather debunked as mere intellectual constructs. Researchers in other fields quickly recognized the attractiveness of such a perspective, which resulted in numerous studies invoking or engaging actor-network theory.

draw inspiration from selected concepts and notions without having to rigidly adhere to the theory in its full version. Thus, everything and anything concerning actor-network theory in this study is not intended as its exposition but rather a description of certain tropes that we have found interesting and worth employing in military, political, and legal history research and, above all, in biographical studies.

Bruno Latour rejects the homocentric view. He believes that everyone and everything interacts with one another. His focus is on the relationships that occur between subjects (actors/actants). The latter are not restricted to humans and may include objects, institutions, ideas, collectivities of people, regulations, theories, etc., each of which is of equal importance.[5] Studying the history of Russia, for instance, it is possible to notice that scholars tend to focus overly on the tsar doing/issuing/ordering something, etc.[6] However, the ruler's decisions were, after all, a product not only of his will, but also of the advice of those with whom he corresponded and whom he trusted.[7] Such a perspective also stems from the

[5] K. Abriszewski, *Teoria aktora-sieci Bruno Latoura*, "Teksty drugie" 1–2 (2007), pp. 113–126; idem, *Teoria Aktora-Sieci i filozofia kultury*, Toruń 2010. In this study, we apply the term "actor" to persons, whereas "actant" is employed to describe institutions, phenomena, objects, etc.

[6] The use of such simplifications is facilitated by the prevalence of the term "tsarist autocracy" (Rus. *tsarskoye samoderzhaviye*), understood as an system of government vested in an individual. See, e.g., B. Zientara, *Dawna Rosja: despotyzm i demokracja*, Warszawa 1995, p. 78ff; K. Chojnicka, *Samodzierżawie*, "Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem" 39 (2017), 1, pp. 141–161. Actor-network theory reveals the world's complexity and teaches one humility when formulating theories and generalizing conclusions in the form of research theses; see A.W. Nowak, *Ontologia a aksjologia – co możemy zyskać, a co stracić, używając teorii aktora sieci? Diagnoza wstępna*, "Prace Kulturoznawcze" 18 (2015), pp. 68–69.

[7] Tellingly, the two-volume study by Russian historian Dmitry Bantysh-Kamenskiy, published at the beginning of the second decade of the nineteenth century, overlooks Adam Weyde in a list of biographical entries devoted to Peter I's closest associates; see Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Деяния знаменитых полководцев и министров, служивших в царствование Государя Императора Петра Великого*, ч. 1–2, Москва 1812–1813. Almost the same Russian commanders and ministers are also listed, in a similar order, in a subsequent anonymous publication; see *Петр Великий. Его полководцы и министры. 23 портрета с присовокуплением кратких о жизни их описаний*, Москва 1848. More recently, Russian historian Nikolai Pavlenko did the same (i.e., disregarded

books read, the sermons heard, and the travel experiences garnered by the tsar (along with the objects he saw and the people he encountered). Thus, whenever one states that the tsar decided on something, one conceals in that narrative the network that had formed in the course of complex interactions and that led to the decision. Moreover, the decision itself would subsequently be translated into the substance of an order or normative act, expressed through certain terms that were not always unambiguous themselves and that not always fully conveyed the will of the reformer-tsar. Drafted by third parties, such an order or code thus became a new actant, influencing the conduct of still other actors and producing its own network of relationships. Also, each time it was read, the document was subjected to more or less conscious interpretations. In a similar vein, technologies became actants, enabling or enforcing some action(s) involving both entire units and individual soldiers, who readily agreed to perform some actions, resented others, and found themselves unable to carry out still others.

Many historians have tried to address the causes for (and possibly the costs of) Russia's success in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. In recent decades, scholars have begun to portray this phenomenon using the paradigm of military revolution.[8] This perspective advances

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Adam Weyde) when describing the closest associates of the reformer-tsar: military commander Boris Sheremetev, diplomat Pyotr Tolstoy and Peter I's secretary Alexei Makarov; see Н.И. Павленко, *Птенцы гнезда Петрова*, Москва 1988. Seemingly missing from this group was Peter I's foremost favorite, Alexander Menshikov, to whom Pavlenko devoted several separate studies; see idem, *Александр Данилович Меншиков*, Москва 1989; idem, *Меншиков. Полудержавный властелин*, Москва 1999; idem, *Был ли А.Д. Меншиков грамотным?*, "Наука и жизнь" 3 (2005), pp. 69–75. See also Ю.Н. Беспятых, *Александр Данилович Меншиков: мифы и реальность*, Санкт-Петербург 2008.

[8] See, e.g., N.S. Smith, C. Dunning, *Moving beyond Absolutism: Was Early Modern Russia a "Fiscal-military" State?*, "Russian History" 33 (2006), 1, pp. 19–44; B. Davies, *Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth Century*, London–New York 2011; G. Ágoston, *Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800*, "Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History", 12 (2011), 2, pp. 281–319.

the analysis of the phenomenon in an unprecedented way. Above all, it demonstrates that the consequences of the military transition were far-reaching and essentially affected every sphere of life and state structures.[9] Nevertheless, most researchers emphasize the genius of Russia's first emperor as a ruler well-versed in all domains: an outstanding modernizer of military structures, a brilliant codifier of law, a fine linguist who reformed the alphabet, and, not least of all, a competent turner and shipbuilder.[10] While it is not our aim to negate the greatness of Peter I, we do seek to signal that all of the above was possible thanks to the people he surrounded himself with and whose advice he sought.

[9] Interesting in this regard is B. Latour's caution for utmost care in employing the now-fashionable paradigms of academic or ideological frameworks in one's research. This is because analyzing a phenomenon with the help of preliminary assumptions leads to the emergence of a "superactor." In adopting preliminary assumptions, historians use them to interpret the events analyzed and more or less consciously model them for their own needs. For example, in military revolution theory, every manifestation of the centralization and fiscalization of the state, along with the attendant social and economic changes, are interpreted as naturally resulting from the introduction of gunpowder in warfare. However, as evidenced by studies of non-European civilizations (including China, India, Japan, Korea, Madagascar), the emergence of firearms did not necessarily produce effects analogous to those on the Old Continent; see B. Latour, *The Politics of Explanation: an Alternative*, [in:] *Knowledge and reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. S.E. Woolgar, London 1988, pp. 171–173.

[10] This is how Peter's contemporaries perceived such self-aggrandizement, with the subsequent historiography only strengthening this message. One among the many examples worth mentioning is the account written by Stanisław Chomętowski during his 1720 legation to Russia. See M. Puzyna, *Petersburg w roku 1720 według opisu Polaka*, wyd. W. Kętrzyński, "Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki" 5 (1877), 7, p. 604. Chomętowski recounted the breadth of Peter I's interests with astonishment and admiration: "Golovkin always strolls around with a gold compass, encrusted with precious stones, as a testament to his craftsmanship; yet he does it solely for the sake of ceremony, it is not merely him but the tsar himself who has an understanding of these matters." In another passage, Chomętowski remarked that, "Inside the church, His Majesty the Tsar also showcased an intricate ivory mirror for nine candles, placed before the great altar, and adorned with his own hand. Everyone recognized the exquisite craftsmanship, not only of the mirror, but also of the ships and naval vessels of the new invention (...). This lord knows to instruct any craftsman, and it is precisely that which makes for the finest architect. Everything is contained in this monarch." Ibid., p. 614.

In actor-network theory, a person who embodies state structures can be referred to as a major actor.[11] Their will and decisions are the result of stabilized relations between actors and actants. Moreover, during the formation of a new regiment, the promulgation of legal regulations, the establishment of central institutions, and the development of structures related to, e.g., the recruitment system, complex entities are formed, which one can also refer to as actants. For they, too, influence—whether as a set of subjects (such as administrative bodies or military headquarters) or actants (such as a treaty, regulations or normative act)—other persons or entities or institutions. What renders this notion all the more applicable is the fact that Peter I was the central figure in Russia of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

The investigative premise adopted by the authors of this study is to follow the "actors in events" that influenced the decision-maker.[12] While there was no dearth of such individuals, if we narrowed our search to the persons with sufficiently broad intellectual predispositions to inspire Peter I with reform ideas, while also being competent, diligent, well-organized and trustworthy enough to be commissioned to conduct such

[11] As a rule, actor-network theory does not grade or hierarchize actors (actants). It does, however, accept the importance of major individuals, corporations, states, etc., while emphasizing that major actors are the product of stabilized relations between minor actors; see K. Abriszewski, *Teoria aktora-sieci Bruno Latoura…*, pp. 120–121.

[12] Historical works drawing on actor-network theory are few and far between. The term "actor" has recently been used, albeit in a completely different, transformed sense, as the main actor initiating change, by Polish historian Aleksander Bołdyrew; see A. Bołdyrew, *Przemiany uzbrojenia wojska polskiego na przełomie średniowiecza i nowożytności (1454–1572) jako przejaw (r)ewolucji militarnej*, "Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych" 80 (2019), pp. 128–129. See J. *Łotman, Klio na rozdrożu*, [in:] idem, *Kultura, historia, literatura*, ed. B. Żyłko, Gdańsk 2017, pp. 177–180. Such a state of affairs seems puzzling, since this method is coherent with the research conducted by historians. The assumption is that an actant without traces does not exist. In historical research, one can translate this rule of thumb into the dictum "follow the sources," without formulating any preconceptions. Thus, the actor-network methodology is particularly useful for historians reluctant to abide by the rigidly structured framework of paradigms and concepts. See K. Abriszewski, *Teoria aktora-sieci Bruno Latoura…*, pp. 121–122.



Chart 1. The role of the actor (secondary character) in the modernization of the state.
The actant inspires the ruler with novel solutions, which are subsequently transformed into an institutional framework. The latter, in turn, must be realized by various actors, frequently resulting in the emergence of a new actant. One should bear in mind that Peter I also influences Adam Weyde, and both are influenced by other actors, thereby forming a complex and dynamic structure.
Source: own analysis based on actor-network theory.

reforms on the ruler's behalf, then our selection would contract to a dozen or so individuals. We refer to them as "secondary characters" (see Chart 1). Among the various candidates from Peter I's entourage who meet such criteria, it is Adam Weyde who stands out in this capacity. He was an intelligent, well-read man, fluent in several languages and valued for his organizational skills. In the course of his military and public service, he received ample opportunities for action, executed the designed modernization plan, and was keenly aware of the goal he intended to achieve.

This study outlines a broad spectrum of Adam Weyde's activities. As we have already indicated, it was not our intention to write

a conventional biography. Instead, we present Weyde's military activity, including the various political, religious, educational, familial, and economic threads, insofar as they affect the main subject of the study, i.e., the process of modernization of the Russian army and the attendant state institutions.[13] All of this plays out in the arrangement depicted in Chart 1, with Peter I constantly present, and it is in the context of such connections that we try to cast the events unfolding at the time. Peter I harnessed and fully appreciated the lack of political ambitions of his associate, as he did his diligence and modesty, and a desire to implement innovative solutions across military and state structures. Consequently, this study contains two parallel narratives. The first portrays the fate of Weyde as an officer of the elite Preobrazhensky Regiment (as the rank of major, from 1693 onwards), subsequently promoted to general and senator, while the second characterizes the changes unfolding in the Russian army at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, known as the military revolution. At the intersection of these two strands, a key issue arises, namely the depth of Adam Weyde's influence on the reforms of the army and the associated state institutions. Thus, this book examines the figure of one of the actual initiators and executors behind the transformation of Peter's military, a man of secondary importance, yet no less important than the monarch himself. It was precisely these types of persons who established new structures and laid the institutional and organizational foundations that enabled outstanding commanders and rulers to realize their potential in the subsequent wars.

Another added value in analyzing Adam Weyde's life is the opportunity to scrutinize the mechanism of reception of foreign standards and their implementation in Russia. In metaphorical terms, Weyde was a hybrid

[13] In doing so, we eagerly invoke the factors that significantly influenced Weyde's public decisions in accordance with actor-network theory (see, e.g., Chapter 14).

of two worlds of the time—the Western European and Russian—for he was a foreigner who grew up in Moscow. For Peter I, Weyde was simply invaluable; a perfect combination of military experience and theoretical knowledge drawn from specialist literature published in the West. Complementing this mix was Weyde's command of foreign languages, above all German, which was the lingua franca of the military treatises published at the time (both those written by native authors and those published as translations). The above qualities predestined Weyde to be frequently entrusted with major tasks such as foreign diplomatic missions. Naturally, he also participated in Russian military campaigns outside of the country, which spelled regular encounters with culturally and politically diverse countries of the Old Continent. Weyde visited England, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Crown, Courland, the principalities of the Reich (primarily Prussia, Mecklenburg and Saxony), the Holy Roman Empire, Denmark, Turkey (including the Sea of Azov and Moldavia), and Sweden (proper and its overseas provinces). He even came to spend ten years in Swedish captivity (1700–1710), and the insights he made while imprisoned there paid great dividends in the modernization of both military and administrative affairs in Russia.

In view of the above, this study offers a multifaceted assessment of Weyde's output as a practitioner and theorist in the military field. In addition, we seek to elucidate the mechanisms of an officer's career in Russia at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as exemplified by the various ties linking soldiers to their commander-in-chief. We also highlight the role of Protestant piety, imbued with the idea of reverence, which guided Weyde throughout his life and which he cultivated among his troops.[14]

[14] Pietists fostered piety in accordance with the ideas of the early Church, emphasizing the need for education, rigorous discipline, and modern ways of teaching. Pietism combined two phenomena: theolog-

Military historiography tends to emphasize the deeds of commanders-in-chief and great victors while criticizing the losers of armed conflicts. Historians also pay attention to new strategic and tactical concepts or innovative solutions to operational problems. On the other hand, a number of studies, not only historical-legal, highlight the structure of the army and the state institutions responsible for its organization. The idea of this book is to combine these two strands in a balanced way, while also underscoring the modern, functional, and efficient military system implemented by an empowered individual.

To date, no biography of Adam Weyde has been written. Any and all information published so far on the general's life and his *Military Regulations* has taken the form of concise, general biographical notes[15] and encyclopedic entries.[16] One exception to this rule is a short (thirty-one-pages long), yet critically important work by an eminent nineteenth century Russian lawyer and military historian, infantry general Pavel Bobrovsky, entitled *Weyde Adam Adamovich: Peter the Great's Close Associate and His Military Regulations of 1698. (A Historical and Legal Treatise)*. It contains the most detailed information concerning Weyde's life and military service, while also (and above all) constituting the first and only attempt to date to comprehensively profile his *Regulations*.[17] Given

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ical and social conservatism, on the one hand, and "early enlightenment" (Ger. *Frühaufklärung*), on the other; cf. F. Bottin, M. Longo, *The History of Philosophy from Eclecticism to Pietism*, [in:] *Models of the History of Philosophy*, eds. G. Santinello, G. Piaia, Dordrecht 2010, pp. 301–385.

[15] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей русской земли*, ч. 1, Москва 1836, pp. 253–257; С.А. Венгеров, *Критико-биографический словарь писателей и ученых (от начала русской образованности до наших дней)*, т. 5, Санкт-Петербург 1897, pp. 260–265; СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV: *Военные министры и главноуправляющие военною частью в России с 1701 по 1910 год,* гл. ред. Д.А. Скалон, Н.М. Затворницкий, Санкт-Петербург 1911, pp. 43–44.

[16] ВЭЛ, т. 3, Санкт-Петербург 1853, pp. 168–169; ВЭ, т. 3, Санкт-Петербург 1911, pp. 274–275; ЭВМН, сост. под гл. ред. Г.А. Леера, т. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1885, p. 57.

[17] П.О. *Бобровский, Вейде Адам Адамович. Один из главных сотрудников Петра Великого и его военный устав 1698 года. (Историко-юридическое исследование),* Казань 1887.

the broad thematic scope of our study—from the Azov expeditions of 1695–1696 to the Protestant community in Russia and the Pietist movement in Europe—we provide detailed accounts of our analytical inquiry in the subsequent chapters.

The modest state of research on the life and work of Adam Weyde is attributable to a highly fragmented body of source texts. He also left behind no journal or diary, nor did he engage in the foundational and propagandist activities of work of his family; additionally, the lack of a male descendant and the premature death of Weyde's two daughters were hardly conducive to the preservation of his memory. It is emblematic that no portrait, engraving or even a mere description of his appearance has survived;[18] nor has any material item directly associated with his person. His tombstone, family house, and the standard bearing his likeness no longer exist. Paradoxically, the most enduring artifacts of his life and work proved to be the letters, fortification drawings and military treatises he penned. Weyde features more extensively in the engravings depicting the Battle of Narva and in poems celebrating Charles XII, published after the clash.

Undoubtedly, Weyde's single most important work are his *Military Regulations*, written in 1698,[19] the English translation of which is given in the *Annex* to this book. Our goal is to demonstrate that this is not the only valuable work he authored. In addition to the *Regulations*, quite a few letters have survived of which Weyde was the addressee or sender,

[18] Chapter 7 contains a miniature reportedly depicting Adam Weyde during his days in Swedish captivity. (1700–1710).

[19] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов). Воинский устав, сочиненный генералом Адамом Вейде и посвященный Петру I (1698 г.), БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. I Б, № 5 (Петр. гал. № 3). In 1841, the text was published without an accompanying critical study or without even citing the source of the manuscript; see А.А. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный и посвященный Петру Великому генералом Вейде, в 1698 году*, Санкт-Петербург 1841.

as have a host of documents referencing his deeds. Crucial in this regard were the normative acts and documents issued by Peter I and the Russian state authorities. Some of them were authored or inspired by the tsar's associate himself, while others concerned his person by virtue of the public positions he held as a commander, senator, second president of the College of War. Finally, another important source for studying the fate of the tsar's confidant are the diaries and memoirs written down by the people who knew Weyde and were tied to him in various capacities.[20] One special group of source texts that we use for statistical purposes and that forms the basis for the ultimate assessment of Adam Weyde's influence on the tsar's army and its senior officers are the "officer questionnaires" and "military record transcripts" drawn up between 1720 and 1721. A total of 2,695 such officer résumés have survived, providing the basis for a quantitative analysis illustrating Adam Weyde's influence on the formation of the military leadership.[21]

We avoid overusing quotations, believing that the author(s) should strive to present the reader with an interpretation of the events described. However, whenever we resort to quotes, we translate all of them into English, following the very rules we outlined when translating Peter I's

[20] At this point, we should cite two crucial source texts, whose authors provided a very realistic characterization of both Adam Weyde and the events unfolding at the time. The author of the first text is a Russian army officer, Colonel Alexander Gordon; see A. Gordon, *The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia. To which is Prefixed, a Short General History of the Country, from the Rise of that Monarchy: and an Account of the Author's Life*, vol. 1, Aberdeen–London–Edinburgh–Glasgow 1755. The second was penned by Peter Henry Bruce, adjutant (Generals-Adjutant) to General Weyde following the latter's return from Swedish captivity in 1711; see P.H. Bruce, *Memoirs. Containing an Account of his Travels in German, Russia, Tatary, Turkey, the West Indies, etc. As also Several Very Interesting Private Anecdotes of the Czar, Peter I. of Russia*, London 1782 (almost immediately thereafter, the work was also published in Ger. *Nachrichten von seinen Reisen in Deutschland, Rußland, die Tartarey, Türkey, Westindien*, Leipzig 1784).

[21] *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века. Полевая армия. Сборник документов в 2-х томах*, сост., вступ. ст., оформл. К.В. Татарникова, т. 1, Москва 2015.

Military Code of 1716.[22] It is common for us to make personal interjections for greater clarity of the quoted passages. Such insertions are made in square brackets, but are not initialed "P.K." and "K.Ł." (which was the case with the aforementioned *Military Code*).

We use separate numeration for illustrations in each chapter. We also include large-scale plans, mostly of fortifications. We distinguish between medium- and small-scale maps, using continuous numeration throughout the book, as we do with tables and charts. An index of all these figures can be found at the end of the book.

Given the wealth of material at our disposal, we have divided this study into two main parts: the first, entitled *Adam Weyde's life and work*, in which we describe the course of his military career and family affairs, and the second, constituting the *Annex* and containing a translation of the *Military Regulations* originally drafted by Weyde in Russian in 1698. Thus, the reader receives an easy-to-read publication that unpacks the multifaceted modernization of the Russian army during the reign of Peter I and the combat activities it undertook, with the career progression of one of its key commanders as a backdrop. Highlighting these issues is the intimately related source material, on display in the *Annex*, even more so given the fact that it constitutes the first translation of Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698* into English in general historiography.

The first part of the book consists of fifteen chapters, organized thematically and—to the extent possible—chronologically. This means that, as a rule, we present the fate of Adam Weyde in a continuous fashion; however, some of the processes that occurred simultaneously are covered over the course of two, three or even more chapters. We avoid a continuous narrative consisting of a month-by-month report of events, instead focusing (as a rule) on a single key element in each chapter. In lieu

[22] KWPI, pp. 82–87.



Chart 2. Timeline of events discussed in the respective chapters.
The horizontal axis marks the years, with the vertical axis indicating the chapters. Source: own study.

of a typical summary, we evaluate Adam Weyde's body of work in the final two chapters. To facilitate the readers of our monograph, below is a chart with a timeline of events discussed in the respective chapters.

The following is a brief overview of the successive chapters of the first part of the book, including their main research hypotheses.

Chapter 1 concerns Adam Weyde's ancestry. We confirm the existing findings (sometimes disputed by researchers), according to which he descended from a Dutch family that subsequently split into Danish and Eastern European bloodlines. The family's military tradition had a major

influence on Weyde's life (his father served as an officer in the Russian army). Not without significance was the strong attachment of his kin to the Lutheran faith and the memory of their progenitor (manifested in the naming of male descendants Adam). We also emphasize Weyde's excellent linguistic competence: as well as German and Russian, he also spoke Flemish, French and, likely, Swedish, a result of his many years spent in captivity. These qualities enabled him to serve as a kind of "conveyor belt" in the transfer of diverse Western European cultural patterns to Russia.

Chapter 2 engages the key event of the Russo-Turkish War of 1686–1700, i.e., the two expeditions of the Russian army from 1695–1696 to capture the Azov fortress located on the Don Estuary. Weyde participated in both campaigns with the rank of major of the Preobrazhensky regiment. Appointed as the head of siege works during the first expedition, Weyde's incompetence or inexperience resulted in the explosion of a tunnel being laid under the fortress, causing the loss of 100-150 soldiers and posing a threat of riots in the Russian detachments. In the operations undertaken in 1696, Weyde was no longer entrusted with any key command functions. The renewed siege of Azov by the Russians was highly successful, with the fortress falling into their possession, alongside the territories at the mouth of the Don. Moreover, Peter I secured an outlet to the Sea of Azov for his naval fleet, with prospective access to the Black Sea.

The events of 1695–1696 also revealed the power struggle between the experienced senior officers and the tsar's up-and-coming friends. The attempt to replace the main military actors ended with a painful yet valuable lesson for the young officers. The transition in the actor-network arrangement had to wait for the more natural generational turnover, which did not take place until 1699. Adam Weyde's subsequent conduct indicates that the Azov expeditions taught him patience, and it was through diligence and dedication that he regained his standing in Peter's

entourage. The experience moreover taught him to take meticulous care for his soldiers, also enabling him to compare the combat value of the old formations of the Russian army—the rifle regiments and the so-called units of the "new military organization" (infantry and cavalry units that had been in operation since the 1630s)—with the supreme quality of the two infantry regiments formed by Peter I in the Western European mold, i.e., the Preobrazhensky and the Semyonovsky (future regiments of the Guard).[23]

One of the factors behind the modernization of the tsar's army were the conclusions and observations made during his first great tour of the countries of Western Europe, covered in Chapter 3. The tour took place in 1697–1698, with Peter I travelling incognito (save for certain situations, where he acted in his official capacity as the tsar) alongside a Russian diplomatic delegation bound for the West, which became known as the Grand Embassy. Weyde participated in the venture, travelling with the rank of a major of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. Weyde was tasked with notifying European rulers of the arrival of the tsar's envoys and, on certain occasions, with making arrangements for their stay. It was also then that Weyde headed to the camp of the Holy Roman Empire's army, commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy, which advanced against the Turks. This afforded the major of the Preobrazhensky Regiment an opportunity to observe the workings of one of Europe's finest armies from up close. He also came to participate as an observer in the Battle of Zenta on September 1 (11), 1697, where the Habsburg army beat the Sultan's forces. As well as the above, Chapter 3 also outlines the itinerary of the

[23] For more on Peter I's guard; see Е.М. Болтунова, *Гвардия Петра Великого как военная корпорация*, Москва 2011. On a par with tsar's troops were also two of the best units of the "foreign contingent," formed back in the first half of the seventeenth century: the First and Second Moscow Select Infantry Regiments, i.e. the future infantry regiments of Peter I's army: Lefortovsky and Butyrsky. The former would subsequently be entrusted to Weyde's command.

tsar's journeys and the maps presenting the successive stages of Peter I's and Weyde's movement throughout the duration of the Grand Embassy.

Chapter 4 profiles the third reason (following the Azov expeditions and the Grand Embassy) driving the tsar's decision to launch military reforms, namely the *Military Regulations* governing the functioning of the new army, drafted by Weyde in October 1698. The unsuccessful riflemen's mutiny that occurred while Peter I was abroad only confirmed the need for change. Thus, we identify the sources of inspiration for the author of the new regulations, both with respect to Western European armies and particular military treatises. Weyde's *Regulations* addressed numerous issues: the author characterized the military ranks and types of troops, specified the principles of soldier drills and the evolutions of entire units, along with the principles of continuous fire and guard duty. When compared to European military regulations, the document was by all means innovative, surpassing other theoretical concepts of the time, which duplicated the antiquated solutions of Jacob de Gheyn and Johann Jacob von Wallhausen, dating back to the early seventeenth century.[24] Among other things, it explicated how to use flintlock rifles, bayonets (spades were abandoned) and grenades, while also demonstrating the superiority of "reloading while kneeling" and "platoon firing" over conventional countermarch. The introduction of commands in Russian was also significant, which spurred the russification of officer ranks in the tsar's army.

Thus, the tsar's friend and associate became the precursor or driving force (actor) that set the entire military legislative machinery in motion. The Russian army received ready-made training materials

[24] The discussion of these issues is limited to Adam Weyde's *Regulations*. The authors of this study are currently working on synthetic studies on the art of infantry warfare. Karol Łopatecki has been studying this issue in seventeenth-century Europe through the lens of military treaties, while Paweł Krokosz has been investigating military legislation in eighteenth-century Russia.

regarding the principles of training, continuous fire drills and basic commands for unit turns. Added to these was the proposal to form infantry squares (*bataillon carré*), innovative in Russia at the time. We show that, despite the fact that the *Regulations* were not published in print, they nonetheless played an important role in the reforms of the Russian army. The document was in force, along with other instructions, virtually throughout the duration of Russia's wars with Sweden (1700–1721), with the solutions adopted therein serving as a blueprint for the countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, which were somewhat sidelined by the ongoing military revolution.[25] Thus, the *Regulations* emerged as an independent actant with a tangible impact on the development of the Russian military, in particular during Weyde's stay in Swedish custody. Furthermore, his steadily employed legacy solidified the general's mythical status and enabled his swift return to service upon his release from captivity.

In order to ensure that soldiers could be trained in line with the *Regulations*, a new army was to be formed. Adam Weyde saw the military as a machine, or rather a clockwork mechanism, and attempted to organize it accordingly. Victory was predicated on organization, training, and discipline, rather than the sheer the size of the army. Therefore, soldiers, officers assigned with unified duties, and the respective tactical units were to act like cogs, complementing one another and executing orders in exact accordance with the will of their commander-in-chief. The newly promoted General Adam Weyde was therefore a proponent of a standing army that relied on conscription of recruits. It would enable continuous

[25] One such example was the Ottoman Porte; see G. Ágoston, *Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500–1800*, "Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History" 12 (2011), 2, pp. 281–319. Peter I's military reforms were also extensively discussed in eighteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as can be seen, for example, in the translation of Russian military articles into Polish or French; see KWPI, pp. 74–78.

training, guarantee the existence of a large pool of veterans teaching their craft to inexperienced soldiers, and safeguard proper discipline. To realize this vision, Weyde drafted a military budget, translated foreign military articles (including the provisions of criminal law intended to uphold military discipline in the army), and indicated the need to reform the rules of conscription. With regard to the latter point, the proposed model was not introduced until 1705; however, the key move was made in 1699–1700, when the first—and still mixed (volunteer and mandatory)—conscription was implemented across Peter's military. The much-coveted command and training of one of the three divisions of new tactical units in Russia fell precisely to the author of the *Regulations*. To this end, Weyde drafted two further documents: *Forming Ranks* and *Instructions for Captains*, both essential in the army training process. The general created a system streamlining the introduction of newly recruited soldiers into military discipline, instituting as many as four types of punishment depending on the degree of recidivism.

It is our opinion that it was Weyde who laid the foundation for the introduction of a standing army and, moreover, a national army in Russia. We also venture a quantitative assessment of the combat quality of his division heading to Narva. Unfortunately, the extent of personnel losses during the march was as high as 17.7%, with significant variations among the divisions. We emphasize that illnesses and random factors were only one variable, with desertion playing a key role (see Chapter 5).

The first stage of modernization of the Russian army failed, as vividly demonstrated by the Russian defeat at the Battle of Narva in 1700. In Chapter 6, we outline the factors behind the defeat. Firstly, one should mention Sweden's excellent strategy and its extremely efficient operations that enabled the elimination of Denmark (one of the three anti-Swedish coalition partners, along with Russia and Saxony) from the successive warfare. Charles XII then rapidly redeployed his troops by sea to

relieve Narva, besieged by the Russians. Equally effective were the tactics adopted by the Swedes when attacking the enemy, who was more numerous and shielded by fortifications: striking in two fierce columns at the weakest points of the Russian defenses, coupled with a dashing attack by the grenadiers. We discuss how the use of grenades in the battle helped offset the advantage offered by field fortifications. The outcome of the battle was also affected by the conservative stance of the Russian command (including General Weyde) and the adoption of a defensive strategy, as well as the inadequate training of the soldiers. Some of them lacked proper firing training, exhibited poor discipline (which translated into a high rate of desertion), and distrusted the foreign officers. The language barrier was also crucial, as the Russian recruits did not follow the commands delivered in a foreign language (German), while the commanders did not understand their subordinates. For these reasons, the army was completely unable to repel the superbly organized Swedish troops. At the same time, we emphasize that, in principle, the fate of the battle was not decided until the end, that is, until the surrender of Adam Weyde's division, and the tide could have easily swung in favor of the Russians. Indeed, the general's tactical compound remained almost intact in combat and was ready to continue fighting. Unfortunately, the general failed to take advantage of this opportunity. It is our opinion that, while not an outstanding field commander, he was in fact a brilliant organizer and a great supporting actor. Notably, the actions taken by the tsar's associate in 1699-1700 laid the foundation for the subsequent professionalization of Peter's army. The regiments created or commanded by Adam Weyde survived unscathed and would only gain more experience in subsequent years, with the entire tactical compound still customarily named after its first commander. Hence, one should disregard the argument about a failed military experiment and the need to rebuild the entire Russian army from scratch.

The next section (Chapter 7) covers Adam Weyde's fate as a prisoner of war. We note that the Swedish authorities followed a consistent strategy of delaying the exchange of prisoners. They were keenly aware of the value the imprisoned generals posed to the tsar and the army reforms he had undertaken. Upon verifying the existing biographical data in the literature, we argue that the general's stay in captivity was longer than assumed, extending from December 1, 1700, to January 17, 1711. The chapter details the conditions under which Adam Weyde was held prisoner, above all highlighting his financial and residential struggles, the inspection of his correspondence, the extent of personal freedom afforded (and the months-long isolation suffered), and the painful separation from his family. The circumstances of Weyde's captivity seem to have had a sinusoidal nature, with periods of more liberal conditions intertwined with months of repression. This was due to factors of an external nature (the policy of the Swedish authorities and the principle of reciprocity in foreign relations), as well as internal one (the actions of the Russian state). We believe that the Great Northern War should be duly acknowledged as a time that saw major transformations and the constitution of conventions in humanitarian law regulating the detention of prisoners of war.

While in Swedish captivity, Weyde was a keen observer of the local state structures. He would later apply the knowledge acquired to the modernization of Russia (for more on this, see Chapter 12), and at times his secret correspondence contained latest news. To this end, he benefitted primarily from the opportunities to leave his place of seclusion for the duration of church services, his knowledge of European languages and culture, and his wide circle of acquaintances, most of whom were fellow Pietists. As a prisoner of war, Weyde even corresponded with Charles XII; he most certainly met with Charles's sister and future Queen of Sweden, Ulrika Eleonora. However, the Lutheran denomination did

not always offer a conduit to Charles XII's subjects. Particularly in small towns, local clergy and residents saw Weyde as a Protestant in the service of the Russian tsar, and therefore a "traitor" to his religion. Also detailed in the chapter is the general's unsuccessful attempt to escape (1703), as well as the efforts to exchange prisoners of war, undertaken by Peter I and Menshikov. It was only the defeat suffered at Poltava (1709) and the subsequent loss of the eastern Baltic provinces, including Riga (1710), that forced the Swedes to seek compromise. We hypothesize that Adam Weyde himself played an important role in the prisoner exchange process. What is more, even after his release, until his very death, he sought to improve the fate of Swedish captives held in Russia upon requests filed by Lutheran (Pietist) clergymen. We also highlight Peter I's refusal to exchange his friend for General Adam Löwenhaupt (1710), whom he considered a superior commander. For the general, this signaled the need to restore his position upon release from captivity.

Upon his return to Russia, Adam Weyde was almost immediately posted to the front, participating in the dramatic Danube campaign (1711) against Turkey (Chapter 8, part a). He instantly regained the commanding position he had once held, along with Peter's trust, thus disrupting the existing arrangement among the tsar's closest associates. This was first manifested in the fact that he took over his former division, which had hitherto been commanded by the all-powerful Alexander Menshikov. Not only did Weyde have to mend relations with the tsar's favorite but he also came into conflict with Major General Alexei Golovin. The balance of actors operating around the tsar was upset, putting General Weyde in a vulnerable position. This resulted, among others, in Weyde aligning himself, against his better judgment, with those Russian generals who pushed for a swift and decisive entry into Turkish lands. At the same time, his letters indicate that he recognized the problems that led to defeat when confronted with enemy forces, more numerous and better

prepared for combat operations. As we demonstrate in Chapter 8, during the siege of the Stănileşti encampment, the combat value of the Russian army did not decline, despite losing between around 6.2% and 7.56% of its manpower (2,874 men, including 49% wounded) at that time. General Weyde's division suffered some of the fewest losses, which suggests that he was not yet entrusted with the more demanding combat assignments. However, in the course of the campaign, he fully revealed his organizational mastery. Without Weyde, the route traversed would have been considerably more difficult, since he was the one who modernized the logistics of the Russian army, drafting the relevant regulations and tabulations of equipment. Still, he did not succeed in implementing all his ideas. Above all, despite his indignation, he was unable to eliminate the presence of women accompanying the army.

Upon Weyde's return to Russia, Peter I put his trademark skills to use (Chapter 8, part b). Weyde was sidelined from principal military operations, instead being stationed in Ukraine to shield the country from the Ottoman Porte, the sparse troops of Charles XII, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This was where a peculiar strategic "game of chess" ensued between Charles XII and Peter I. The unpredictable military intentions of the Swedish monarch, anxious to finally leave Turkish territory, in which he was stuck in the wake of his defeat at Poltava (1709), caused the tsar's troops to be continually on the move. Among the "pawns" in this game were the regiments of General Weyde's division, who in 1711 alone covered a total distance of 3,150 km. While the following year was somewhat quieter, the army did remain on the move the whole time, with its divisions traversing some 1,350 km. In 1713, the troops marched from Smolensk to Kyiv and then back to St. Petersburg, covering another 2,160 km. Over the course of three years, the soldiers traveled

a total of 6,660 km.[26] In the meantime, the general and his subordinates were also deployed to fortify the area around Kyiv. Weyde exchanged correspondence with Peter I on the erection of fortresses, carried out the tsar's designs, imported books from abroad, and recommended some publications for printing, etc. At the tsar's behest, he analyzed the feasibility of and drafted designs for four-, five- and six-bastion fortresses based on the "Rimpler Angle." It was during this period that the general showcased his capabilities as a supporting actor to the fullest.

Weyde eventually came to succeed on the battlefield during the Finnish campaign (Chapter 9). He exhibited bravado and courage during the naval Battle of Gangut, off the Hanko Penninsula (1714), where he commanded the galleys that made up the assault party. Off the rocky coast, Weyde made the best of the calm weather, which enabled the Russian galleys to evade the main Swedish forces and take Nils Ehrenschiöld's grouping by surprise. At the time of the clash, Weyde led the soldiers of the boarding party, and his personal bravery contributed to the ultimate success of the Russian fleet. Of course, it was still his organizational and logistical efforts that remained his main asset, as he readied his division for the campaign in 1713 in exemplary fashion.

Chapter 10 profiles a very intense period of Weyde's life, falling between 1715 and 1719. At that time, he participated in a number of military missions in Central and Eastern Europe (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Livonia, Northern Reich, Denmark).[27] It was then that he

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[26] It is worth remembering that the division left Mecklenburg-Schwerin in 1717–1718, reaching St. Petersburg via the Commonwealth, traversing some 2,100 km. The ability to travel such distances, often in a short time, emerged as an intriguing feature of the early eighteenth-century Russian army.

[27] The expression "Central and Eastern Europe," as used in this study, is not a geographical concept, but rather a meta-geographical formula, devised for ideological and political purposes. The category was popularized by Oskar Halecki, who first used it in 1952 to denote culturally Western states that fell under Soviet influence after World War II. The area comprised the territories between the

helped locate Peter I's son, Tsarevich Alexei, following his defection from Russia. Two of Weyde's actions were particularly significant. First, after arriving in Denmark, he dissuaded the tsar from the virtually imminent invasion of Scania by the allied troops in September 1716. It was his report on the state of the Danish army, in which he emphasized its weaknesses (outdated structures, low soldier morale) and dubbed it a mercenary force, not a national one, that proved to be the decisive factor. This finding is extremely interesting, as it confirms the validity of the efforts Weyde had undertaken back in the late seventeenth century to create a robust, conscription-based Russian national army. It is also a testament to the dynamic and effective modernization of Russian military structures.

The second major event recounted in Chapter 10 was Weyde's 1716-1717 stay in Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Weyde's aptitude, which stemmed from his background, religion, cultural traditions, and linguistic competence, predestined him to command the Russian troops stationed there (his division and, over time, the entire Russian corps). The ruler of Mecklenburg, Karl Leopold, sought to take advantage of the Russian presence in the duchy, imposing absolute rule on his subjects, with the hope that any civil unrest would be suppressed by the tsar's soldiers. As before, Weyde established himself as a competent commander, ensuring proper housing and sustenance for his soldiers. At the same time, however, he was unable to control and put a stop to the food requisitions and abuses committed by the Russians posted to the duchy. The latter actions caused the Mecklenburg nobility to submit numerous protests to the general, whom they likely saw as a co-religionist and thus an advocate of their cause.

Black Sea and the Baltic; see O. Halecki, *The Borderlands of Western Civilization. A History of East Central Europe*, New York 1952, pp. 4–5, 13; W. Wilczyński, *Geografia i metageografia ziem dawnej Sarmacji*, "Przegląd Geopolityczny" 9 (2014), pp. 9–30. With respect to eighteenth-century historiography, we use this notion to refer to the territories affected by Peter I's clout, including Livonia, Finland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Northern Reich (Mecklenburg) and Denmark.

Chapter 11 highlights the participation and achievements of Adam Weyde in the codification of Russian military law. We argue that it was he who, in 1698, initiated the efforts to draft a comprehensive legal act regulating the functioning of the Russian army, both in organizational and criminal and legal terms. A comparative analysis leads us to conclude that Weyde was a co-author (if not the sole author) of at least Books I and III of *The Military Code of Peter I (1716)*. The chapter discusses the various stages of the code's development, which began in 1698 and ended in 1719, with the joint publication of all three books of Peter's *Code*. It was Adam Weyde's intention that every soldier should be familiar with the provisions of this normative act, with a printed copy of the regulation constituting a mandatory possession of every officer in the Russian army.

Accompanying the introduction of the new army regulations were changes in the organization of the central administrative authorities. Adam Weyde was actively involved in these operations, too, as we note in Chapter 12. Starting in 1718, the old *prikazy* were to be gradually supplanted by modern collegiums more akin to those in Western European countries. The tsar's confidant was to seek out and attract suitably qualified people to Russia to teach in those institutions. A year earlier, by order of the tsar, Weyde became a member of the Governing Senate, the supreme body managing the day-to-day affairs of the state. At the same time, as the second president of the Military Commission, he organized and assumed de facto leadership in the College of War, to which all matters related to the functioning of the land forces were subjected (formally, Menshikov continued to chair the institution). Furthermore, the tsar appointed Weyde president of the provost court in charge of state criminal trials pursuant to the Military Articles of 1714, which constituted Book II of *The Military Code of Peter I.*

Chapter 13 takes a closer look at the religiosity of Adam Weyde, who from an early age was intimately tied with the Pietist center in Halle.

Over time, the tsar's associate became the custodian of this movement throughout Russia, largely thanks to the friendships and acquaintances made. It was through him that Lutheran clergymen flocked there, bringing spiritual service to the faithful, both in individual cities and in the ranks of the reforming Russian army. With that in mind, we have compiled a catalog of Protestant clergy associated with Adam Weyde. At the same time, we describe the emerging structure of military chaplains, in which Lutheran pastors occupied a prominent position. The general's fervent religiosity also translated into specific provisions of the military code introduced at the time. They mandated attendance at prayers and services for all soldiers of the Russian army, regardless of their denomination.

Given the adoption of the actor-network concept in the study, we have dispensed with a classic conclusion, instead opting for a summary in the form of the two closing chapters (14 and 15) of the book. Chapter 14 recounts the last year of Adam Weyde's life. Therein, we relate the circumstances of the death of his youngest daughter (1719), which we use as a pretext to assess the general's matrimonial and family plans. In the absence of male descendants and the untimely death of his brother Franc, Weyde pinned his hopes for the continuation of his lineage on the marriages of his two daughters. The selection of candidates for husbands was marked by marital endogamy, with the father-in-law picking the grooms within his own social class members: expatriates, Protestants and high-ranking officers of the Russian army. Weyde acted with the hopes of founding a powerful house, consisting of three families: the Weydes, the Leforts and the Bohns (the latter being the actant). Tragic circumstances (the death of his younger daughter Maria) undermined Weyde's health, and the general died soon thereafter. An indisputable part in destroying the general's legacy fell to the tsar's favorite, guard major Pyotr Rumyantsev, a former candidate for Maria's hand in marriage but rejected by her father. The state treasury subsequently seized nearly the entire estate,

with Weyde's sole surviving granddaughter (the daughter of Pyotr Lefort and the general's elder daughter Justine) was disinherited *de iure* (she was awarded about 10% of the entire estate). The above circumstances give rise to our assessment of the general's legacy. In terms of family continuity, Weyde's was an unsuccessful career. However, taking into account the actor-network theory, Adam Weyde formed some notable actants who spurred the development of Russia for the coming decades. In this respect, we analyze Weyde's career drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's field theory.

The final chapter of the first part of the study evaluates Adam Weyde as an officer and commander. In order to formulate an objective conclusion, we undertake a quantitative analysis, taking into account officers' reports from the years 1720–1721. Based on 2,695 "officer questionnaires," we argue that the tsar's associate exerted a varying influence on the command staff, which, as it turns out, was nonetheless significant. As many as 20.3% of all officers mentioned the general at least once in their respective reports. Weyde's impact on his subordinates was most pronounced in infantry regiments (24.8%) and grenadier units (31.4%). While there were some units whose officers were almost entirely molded by Adam Weyde, in other regiments his influence on the leadership was negligible. That said, standing at 20% of the entire officer corps, the ratio of Weyde's impact is nothing short of excellent. We have ventured a comparison of Weyde's influence to that of other top commanders. Using it as a benchmark, one can safely identify a group of seven commanders who wielded influence over the structure of the Russian army, including Boris Sheremetev, Fyodor Apraksin, Anikita Repnin, Alexander Menshikov, Mikhail Golitsyn, Rodion Christianovitch Baur and Adam Weyde.

As already noted, the second part of the book, i.e., the *Annex*, contains seventeenth-century source materials translated into English. There is no doubt that the *Military Regulations* drafted by Adam Weyde in 1698 constituted a breakthrough in Russian military legislation, as it

represented the first native (Russian) and highly innovative document governing the functioning of the army, which was undergoing a major modernization under Peter I. The substantive value of the *Regulations* was greatly bolstered by the copious illustrative materials in the form of drawings depicting the grasp of flintlock weapons, both with and without a bayonet. Also valuable were drawings portraying the actions performed by grenadiers when throwing a grenade. The work compiled by the general was groundbreaking, as it served as a kind of model for the subsequent codification or military regulations, as exemplified by the successive instruction on soldier drills, implemented in 1700 (*A Concise Common Instruction with a Comprehensive and Improved Explanation (Concerning Infantry Regiment Drills), Regarding their Conduct, Including What the Captain, His Commanding Fellows and Non-commissioned Officers Ought to Bear in Mind*). Intended for commanders of the Russian army, the instruction grew to become a fundamental regulation in force in the Russian army in the early eighteenth century.[28] Preceding the translation of Weyde's *Military Regulations* is a pertinent commentary thereon.

[28] *Краткое обыкновенное учение с крепчайшим и лучшим растолкованием (в строении пеших полков), как при том поступати и во осмотрении надлежит господам капитанам, прочим начальным и урядником*, [Москва] 1699. This regulation is attributed to General Avtamon Golovin and Peter I (the tsar was said to have made his own amendments) and was also published by the Moscow-based (state-owned) printing house in 1702 and 1704 in a compact format (fitting comfortably in the pocket of an officer's jacket); see *Краткое обыкновенное учение…*, [Москва] 1702; *Краткое обыкновенное учение…*, [Москва] 1704. In 1946, the regulation was reissued in print with a commentary by Pyotr Yepifanov, see *Краткое обыкновенное учение с крепчайшим и лучшим растолкованием (в строении пеших полков), как при том поступати и во осмотрении надлежит господам капитанам, прочим начальным и урядником*, примеч. П.П. Епифанова, [in:] *Воинские уставы Петра Великого*, под ред. Н.Л. Рубинштейна, Москва 1946, pp. 45–52. 2022 saw the release of its first-ever historiographic translation from Russian into Polish, accompanied by a relevant discussion, courtesy of the authors of this study, see *Adam Weyde. Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 roku…*, pp. 48–69, 269–284.

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1. FAMILY

Opinions on the origin of Adam Adamovich Weyde vary in historiography. Historians consistently report that he was the son of a foreign officer, most likely of German,[29] possibly Dutch background.[30] The finding of Vitaly Penskoi has been vital for the existing hypotheses. Pienskoi states that Adam's father was reportedly the aristocratic colonel Timofey Andreyev von der Weyde, who served in a "regiment of foreign provenance."[31] However, this claim runs counter to the official patronymic used by the general (Adamovich). In fact, these two bits of information may be compatible, since in Russia at the time it was very common for foreigners

[29] According to P. Bobrovsky, Adam Weyde hailed from Prussia; see П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий как военный законодатель*, Санкт-Петербург 1887, p. 19.

[30] R. Wittram, *Peter I. Czar und Kaiser. Zur Geschichte Peters des Grossen in sejner Zeit*, Bd. 2, Göttingen 1964, p. 7. Sergei Kozlov reports that Weyde came from Flanders, while Sergei Chernikov argues that he was Dutch; see С.А. Козлов, *Русские пленные Великой Северной войны 1700–1721*, Санкт-Петербург 2011, p. 133; С.В. Черников, *Эволюция высшего командования российской армии и флота в первой четверти XVIII века. К вопросу о роли европейского влияния при проведении петровских военных реформ*, "Cahiers du Monde russe" 50 (2009), 2–3, p. 707. See F. Otten, *Zu Russ. Конверт*, "Zeitschrift Für Slavische Philologie" 56 (1997), 1, p. 130; P. Bushkovitch, *The Politics of Command in the Army of Peter the Great*, [in:] *Reforming the Tsar's Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution*, eds. B.W. Menning, D.S. van der Oye, Cambridge–Washington 2004, p. 263.

[31] В.В. Пенской, *Граф Карл Вреде – отцу, 24 ноября 1700 года из Нарвы*, "Научный Результат. Сетевой научно-практический журнал", серия: Социальные и гуманитарные исследования, т. 1 (2015), вып. 1 (3), p. 59.

settling in the country to adopt (or be referred to by) new names and patronymics.[32]

It is also not entirely out of the realm of possibility that the Weyde family had ties with Prussia, and thus was at least temporarily connected with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to Russian genealogist Alexander Bobrinsky, the progenitor of the family was Major "Weyda," who was in the service of the Polish king. He was reportedly ennobled at the Sejm of 1662.[33] The three estates of the Sejm did indeed consent to the ennoblement of a certain Zachariasz Weyda (Figure 1.1).[34] Polish historian Mirosław Nagielski noted that Zachariasz was a major of the dragoon guard, serving under the command of Jan Henryk von Alten-Bockum at the time.[35] On the other hand, according to A. Bobrinski, the said major was the owner of the Predberzhe (Rus. Предберже) estate located in the Wiłkomierz County, which was passed to his successors and eventually sold in 1783 by Ivan Weyde.[36] However, the existence of kinship between Adam Adamovich and Zachariasz is mere conjecture. In his diary, the Voivode of Minsk, Krzysztof Zawisza, who was well versed in ancestral colligations, describes General Adam

[32] Examples include Peter I's second wife Marta Skavronskaya, who upon converting to Orthodox took the name Catherina Mikhailova Alexeevna. Similarly (according to other sources, found in a German-speaking country), the Dutch-born military engineer Georg Wilhelm de Hennin was known in Russia as Wilhelm Ivanovich de Hennin (Gennin).

[33] А. Бобринской, *Дворянские роды, внесенные в общий гербовник Всероссийской Империи*, ч. 2: *(от начала XVII стол. до 1885 года)*, Санкт-Петербург 1890, p. 262.

[34] AGAD, MK, 364, sheets 151–152v.; AGAD, MK, Sigillaty 5, sheet 66; *Album armorum nobilium Regni Poloniae XV–XVIII saec. Herby nobilitacji i indygenatów XV–XVIII w.*, ed. B. Trelińska, Lublin 2001, p. 370, item 1006.

[35] M. Nagielski, *Społeczny i narodowy skład gwardii królewskiej za dwóch ostatnich Wazów (1632–1668)*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 30 (1988), p. 100. See M. Wagner, *Korpus oficerski wojska polskiego w drugiej połowie XVII wieku*, Oświęcim 2015, p. 327; M. Nagielski, *Żołnierz koronny w XVII wieku. Wybawca i bohater czy ciemiężyciel – w świetle zachowanych rejestrów szkód w księgach grodzkich i ziemskich Rzeczypospolitej*, "Społeczeństwo Staropolskie" 4 (2015), p. 140.

[36] А. Бобринской, op. cit., p. 262.



Figure 1.1. Opening of the ennoblement document of Zachariasz Weyde
Source: AGAD, MK, 364, sheet 151.

Weyde as a foreigner and makes no mention of his ties to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[37]

The solution to the ancestry mystery can be found in Danish sources, or rather in the genealogy of the Weyde family compiled by Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry Hans Elias von der Weyde (1691–1759). This Danish officer and landowner conducted a genealogical inquiry into his family in Løngholm, dated October 29, 1746.[38] The inquiry mentions

[37] Characteristically, Zawisza often mentions Courlanders, also identifying Swedes and Russians; see K. Zawisza, *Pamiętniki Krzysztofa Zawiszy, wojewody mińskiego (1666–1721)*, edited and footnoted by J. Bartoszewicz, Warszawa 1862, p. 388.

[38] H.E von der Weyde, [*Adam von der Weyde*], [in:] *Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift. Udgivet af Samfundet for Dansk-Norsk Genealogi og Personalhistorie*, Bd. 6, ved G.L. Wad, Kjøbenhavn 1885, pp. 192–194; H.W. Harbou, *Oberstløjtnant Hans Elias von der Weydes Selvbiografi*, [in:] *Personalhistorisk Tidsskrift. Udgivet af Samfundet for Dansk-Norsk Genealogi og Personalhistorie*, Bd. 1, ved H.W. Harbou, Kjøbenhavn 1892, pp. 71-131, 201-269. See also H.W. Harbou, *Hans Elias von der Weyde*, [in:] DBL, Bd. 18, udgivet C.F. Bricka, København 1904, pp. 474–475.

the Weyde and the comments made attest to the veracity of the records drawn up by the author.[39] The intelligence was soundly verified, as Hans Elias von der Weyde considered himself the heir to the late general's estate. To this end, he consulted an expert in Russian affairs, Rasmus Ærebore, a private secretary to Just Juel from 1709 onwards, who had spent several years in Russia participating in the Danube and Finnish campaigns, among others. Upon his return to Denmark, Æreboe became a notary in 1715, helping Hans Elias contact the Danish embassy. As a result, in 1730, Hans Elias succeeded in acquiring more detailed information from Moscow.[40] This is how we know that the noble house of Weyde originated in Flanders, and its subsequent fate was tied to the borderlands of the Netherlands, the northern principalities of the Reich (including Hanover), and the Kingdom of Denmark. One of the lines travelled eastward, first to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and then to the Russian Empire.

The progenitor of the family was Adam von der Weyde, a native of Flanders, born in 1498 and ennobled in 1547 by Emperor Charles V. He died twenty-four years later, and among his eleven children was Marcus von der Weyde (1557–1628). The latter had one daughter and three sons, one of whom was Adam Weyde's father, Adam von Weyde. Born in 1608, he lived in Denmark, which he left in 1627. He settled in the Commonwealth, married a Polish noblewoman and served in the Polish army with the rank of major. He lived in the Smolensk region, and moved to Russia following the capture of these lands in 1654. In his new homeland, he had three sons (according to the testimony of Hans Elias Weyde, he had two), including Adam Adamovich Weyde.[41] Given that Adam von Weyde was said to have lived in the Commonwealth for about three decades and

[39] Despite the fact that, from the author's perspective, this was a minor branch of the family, Weyde does recount Adam Weyde and his children in a rather detailed manner.
[40] H.E von der Weyde, op. cit., p. 194; H.W. Harbou, *Oberstløjtnant...*, p. 84.
[41] H.E von der Weyde, op. cit., p. 194.

had a Polish wife of noble descent, it is not inconceivable to entertain the possibility of Zachariasz being Adam Adamovich's half-brother.[42] This is also mentioned by Peter Henry Bruce, who noted that both of Weyde's parents were German.[43] While Adam's mother's name remains unknown, she was most certainly still alive in 1704.[44]

In simplistic terms, one can assert that the Weyde family split into a Danish and a Polish-Russian line. Marcus's sons—Erasmus and Adam—opted for military careers, which is how they molded their sons, too, also having their daughters married to officers. Did the eastern line remember its roots? Such is our opinion, as symbolically evidenced by the frequent use of the name Adam, referencing the founder of the family, ennobled in 1547. This family tradition was especially cultivated by the Polish-Russian line, where each generation included one such-named man (see Figure 1.4).[45]

Perhaps this overrepresentation of the name Adam is also tied to the Weyde family coat of arms. The emblem of the Polish-Russian line was that of a tree, also featured on the family crest (see Figure 1.2).[46] The rather inaccurate signet seals of Adam Weyde prevent clear identification

[42] According to this hypothesis, Zachariasz would have been Adam's older brother, born approximately thirty-five to forty years before him. Therefore, it is impossible that he and Adam had a common mother. In 1642, Zachariasz commenced his service as a court dragoon of the Polish king Ladislaus IV; see M. Nagielski, *Liczebność i organizacja gwardii przybocznej i komputowej za ostatniego Wazy, 1648–1668*, Warszawa 1989, p. 193.

[43] P.H. Bruce, *Memoirs. Containing an Account…*, p. 204.

[44] A.A. Weyde to E.J. Weyde, [Stockholm], 17 X 1704, RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t –1800t, M 1521, unpag. [sheet 160].

[45] For more on naming and its function (including evoking the genesis of names of a particular cultural or regional background), see E. Rudnicka-Fira, *Imiennictwo krakowian od XVI do XVIII wieku na tle historii i kultury*, Kraków 2013.

[46] The Danish line boasted a different coat of arms; their call was "Nothing Without God." H.W. Harbou, *Oberstløjtnant...*, p. 82.



Figure 1.2. Adam Weyde's signature and seal. Excerpt from the surety issued by the general at the exchange for Colonel Alexander Gordon, Stockholm February 2, 1708.
Source: RA, Defensionskommissionen 1700, Inkomna handlingar, Skrivelser från myndigheter och enskilda, call no. 165, unpag.

of the heraldic badge.[47] It likely featured an apple tree, with the fruit referring to the biblical story of the trees of life and the knowledge of good and evil.[48] The surviving material objects do not lend confidence to the validity of the interpretation. Fortunately, heraldic supporters generally appeared in a slightly altered form of the family emblem. They, in turn, clearly indicate that we are dealing with a fruit tree (presumably an apple tree).[49]

The German origin of the family also meant that the spelling of the surname Weyde itself had many variants in Russian sources. Adam Adamovich was often referred to as: Weid, Weide or Weyda, Weyd, Weyt

[47] RA, Defensionskommissionen 1700, Inkomna handlingar, Skrivelser från myndigheter och enskilda, call no. 165.

[48] One of the more evocative heraldic forms pertaining to events associated with the biblical story of Eden was the Polish coat of arms Raj [Paradise], depicting an apple tree in a field, with a serpent crawling over it. See J. Szymański, *Herbarz średniowiecznego rycerstwa polskiego*, Warszawa 1993, p. 247.

[49] Some of the alternatives may include the Polish coat of arms Godziemba, adopted by Lithuanian boyars in 1413. Unfortunately, we have no knowledge of Zachariasz's coat of arms (Figure 1.1), which could help determine the ancestral affiliation of those using the Weyde surname.

or Weit, not infrequently with the prefix von or van, denoting his noble descent.[50] Weyde's contemporary and fellow general in Russian service, Scottish-born General Patrick Gordon, who was Peter I's friend and military tutor, "gave" him the surname White.[51] Weyde himself signed his correspondence using different spelling variants, including A. Weyde, A. Weÿde, and Adamco Weijde. His signature was characterized by meticulous care and elaborate form (see Figures 1.3, 7.4, 13.1).[52] This would suggest that he took a course in calligraphy and that he may have received

[50] Е. Вейде-Вялова, *В поисках корней рода фон-дер Вейде*, [in:] *Найти свои корни. Сборник статей*, Москва 2018, p. 45. In his letters to Adam Weyde, Peter I likewise addressed him in various ways, often spelling his surname "Weyt" or "Weit." On the other hand, Johann Korb, secretary of the Austrian diplomatic mission to Moscow in 1698–1699, who had the opportunity to meet the general in person, transcribed his family name "Weyd;" see Н.Г. Устрялов, *История царствования Петра Великого*, Санкт-Петербург 1858, т. 3, приложения, № I: 18, p. 429; П. и Б., ред. А.Ф. Бычков, т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1887, p. VIII; [Korb J.], *Diary of an Austrian secretary of legation at the court of Czar Peter the Great,* translated from the original Latin and edited by the Count Mac Donnell, vol. 1, London 1863, pp. 189–190, 214, 245, 209; vol. 2, pp. 234–236.

[51] P. Gordon, *Tagebuch des Generals Patrick Gordon, während seiner Kriegsdienste unter den Schweden und Polen von Jahre 1655 bis 1661 und seine Aufenthaltes in Russland von Jahre 1661 bis* 1699, zum ersten Male vollständig veröffentlicht durch M.C. Posselt, Bd. 2, St. Petersburg 1851, p. 562. See also idem, Bd. 3, St. Petersburg 1853, p. 113.

[52] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., приложения, № VII: 27, 31, 32, pp. 494, 496, 497; П. и Б., т. 1, pp. 767, 771, 777, 781, 832; document selection: RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521. Adam Weyde frequently signed his letters using the so-called humble form, adopted in Russia at the time ("Adamco Weyde"). The custom was adopted by foreigners (officers) living in Russia, e.g., George Famenrin spelled his name "Yushka," while Ivan Iniekhov signed himself "Ivashka;" see *Дворянские титулы, гербы и мундиры*, http://militera.lib.ru/research/shepelev1/01.html (accessed September 10, 2018). In addition, Weyde complemented his signature with the word "rab," which denoted a slave, servant, but also laborer, worker or serf. This was the customary humble form, used at the time by those (including the nobility and magnates) corresponding with the ruler. According to Peter I's decree of 1702, the term "rab" became obligatory next to the pettitioner's name when filing any written document with the tsar; thus, "rab" supplanted the previously used forms, such as "your serf," "your orphan" or "your devout subject;" see СРЯ X–XVII, вып. 21, Москва 1995, pp. 107–108; Д.Г. Полонский, *Самоидентификация русского дворянства и Петровская реформа эпистолярного этикета (конец XVII–начало XVIII в.)*, [in:] *Правящие элиты и дворянство России во время и после петровских реформ (1682–1750)*, отв. сост. Н.Н. Петрухинцев, Л. Эррен, Москва 2013, pp. 234–255.

formal education.[53] Unfortunately, Adam Weyde's education is a largely obscure subject. His native tongue was German, and it was in that language that he penned his letters. He also spoke fluent Russian, which he used on a daily basis, and in which he drafted the *Regulations* and some of his correspondence, though he rarely used Cyrillic when signing his letters (see Figures 1.2, 4.2, 7.3).[54] He would even serve as a translator of complex legal and administrative documents from German to Russian.[55] From an early age onwards, he showed a strong command of the Dutch language, which supports the claims of his family's Flemish ancestry.[56] He was familiar with at least the rudiments of French, in which he often addressed his letters,[57] and he must have also learned Swedish during his ten-year captivity.

[53] See J. van den Velde, *Thresor litteraire, contenant plusieurs diverses escritures, les plus usitees es escoles francoises des Provinces unies du Pays-Bas*, Haarlem 1621.

[54] Adam Weyde's letters written in Russian are distinctive in that he would write the heading, as well as the date and place of dispatch, in German.

[55] Н.А. Воскресенский, *Законодательные акты Петра I. Редакции и проекты законов, заметки, доклады, доношения, челобитья и иностранные источники*, т. 1, Москва–Ленинград 1945, № 266, p. 221; C. Peterson, *Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish Antecedents and the Process of Reception*, Lund 1979, pp. 89–90.

[56] In a 1694 letter to the tsar, in which he discussed economic matters in Russian, Adam Weyde insetrted a note containing several words in Dutch: "Ick bid, min Herr Schiper, die Herr captein, die Herr leitenant, die Herr schersant en ock alle gar soldaten te gruten, frindlick." In another letter, he stated: "Ick bid, min herr schiper, die Herr Captein (Lefort), die Herr Leitenant, die Herrscher santen ock alle gar saldaten begrüten frindlück," see M. Posselt, *Der General und Admiral Franz Lefort. Sein Leben und seine Zeit*, Bd. 2, Frankfurt am Main 1866, p. 70; V. Ronin, *Van Dankuwel naar U-kunt-er-van-op-aan. Een Russische ontdekkingstocht naar het Nederlands*, [in:] *De taal van Peter de Grote: Russisch-Nederlandse contacten en contrasten*, ed. E. Waegemans, Leuven 2006, p. 13; R. van der Meulen, *Peter de Groote en het Hollandsch*, "Onze Eeuw" 13 (1913), p. 133.

[57] See, e.g., A.A. Weyde to F. Weyde, Stockholm 1704, https://ru.bidspirit.com/ui/lotPage/source/catalog/auction/7344/lot/19419/Письмо-генерала-А-А-Вейде-из?lang=en (accessed July 20, 2020). It is worth noting that he would purchase books from across Europe, written in German or French; see G. Mühlpfordt, *Europa in der frühen Neuzeit: Aufbruch zur Moderne*, Köln–Weimar–Wien 1997, p. 17.



Figure 1.3. Adam Weyde's signature, 1710. (Stockholm, July 12, 1710).
Source: RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag. [sheet 180].

Like all newcomers from Western Europe, Adam Adamovich's father, Adam von der Weyde, settled in the capital's expatriot district, known as Nemetskaya Sloboda. According to family accounts, this must have happened after the occupation of Smolensk in 1654; however, it was not until 1665 that he first purchased a home in the settlement.[58] The exact date of Adam Adamovich's birth is unknown, with a number of

[58] *Переписная книга Новой Немецкой слободы. 1665 года*, [in:] *Переписные книги города Москвы 1665–1676 гг.*, Москва 1886, col. 231–238.

highly divergent dates listed in different sources: 1657,[59] 1661,[60] 1667,[61] 1671[62] or 1677.[63] Given his subsequent life story, the first and last of the above dates seem extremely unlikely, and it seems Weyde was most plausibly born in 1667.[64]

Originally, Adam Adamovich did not seem destined for a military career. He grew up in Nemetskaya Sloboda and was to be an apothecary[65] or physician,[66] as per his father's will. It may have been for this reason that he was married off to Justine (Justina, Ustina) Gudbier, daughter of the foreign pharmacist Johan Caspar Gudbier, who worked at the central authority for all matters concerning the production of pharmaceuticals and state medicine, the Aptekarskiy Prikaz.[67] According to Johann Korb's

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[59] ИПС, т. 5 (дополнительный), Санкт-Петербург 1911, p. 117.

[60] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, p. 253; *Рождение империи. Неизвестный автор. Иоганн Корб. Иван Желябужский. Андрей Матвеев. (История России и Дома Романовых в мемуарах современников. XVII–XX вв.),* сост. А. Либерман, С. Шокарев, Москва 1997, p. 436.

[61] С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 262; ВЭ, т. 3, pp. 274–275; *Лавры Полтавы. Ю.Юль. Оттон Плейер. История России и Дома Романовых в мемуарах современников XVII–XVIII вв.*, отв. за выпуск М. Федотова, ред. В. Плющ, сост., послесл., указ. имен, глосс. В. Наумов, Москва 2001, p. 435; В.В. Пенской, op. cit., p. 59.

[62] СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, pp. 43–44.

[63] ЭВМН, т. 2, p. 57.

[64] The literature most commonly lists 1667 as Adam Adamovich's birth date. This would mean that his father was fifty-five years old at the time, while Adam Adamovich's daughter, in turn, was born when he was seventeen (both of these are plausible), see, e.g., M. Liedke, *Rodzina magnacka w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim. Studium demograficzno-społeczne*, Białystok 2016, p. 103); however, one cannot dismiss the possibility of the future senator being born earlier, i.e., in 1661.

[65] И.Г. Корб, *Дневник путешествия в Московское государство Игнатия Христофора Гварента, посла императора Леопольда I к царю и великому князю Петру Алексеевичу в 1698 г., веденный секретарем посольства Иоганном Георгом Корбом*, [in:] *Рождение империи…*, p. 256; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1858, p. 127; Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, p. 253; ВЭЛ, т. 3, отд. IV, pp. 168–169; СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, p. 44.

[66] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, p. 5; idem, *История Лейб-гвардии Преображенского полка*, т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1900, p. 198–199; С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 262; И.Г. Корб, op. cit., p. 236.

[67] See S. Dumschat, *Ausländische Mediziner im Moskauer Russland*, Stuttgart 2006, p. 97; В. Карташов, *Ионанн Грегори*, https://aptekarjournal.ru/archive/2010/107/3847.html (accessed August 9, 2018).

Travel Diary, Adam Weyde's wedding took place in 1690.[68] According to all indications, however, this was his second marriage, as corroborated by a brief biographical article published in 2017 in the periodical "Kovcheg," penned by Yelena Weyde-Vialova, who was investigating her family's roots. According to her findings, Adam Weyde was married twice and had two daughters, whom he reportedly survived.[69] His second wife was Ustina Ivanovna, or Justine Marie Elizabeth (circa 1672–1720), née Gregorii. Her father was Johann Gottfried Gregorii (1631–1675), a Lutheran pastor of St. Michael's Church in Moscow (1662–1669) and then of St. Peter and Paul's Church (1669–1675). It was at these churches that he founded a school for Lutheran and Orthodox children. Reverend Gregorii became famous primarily as a director and organizer of the first court theater in Russia; once Tsar Alexei learned of this, he ordered him to establish just such a theater company at his own court (1672).[70]

His first daughter from his first marriage, Elizabeth Justine (also known as Justina Justine), was born to Adam Adamovich Weyde in 1684. On January 27, 1713, at the age of twenty-nine, she married Pyotr Bogdanovich Lefort (1676–1754).[71] The latter had joined the Russian army in 1694, urged by his uncle and Peter I's friend and advisor for military affairs, Franz Jakob Lefort.[72] The marriage elevated the Weyde family, as

[68] И.Г. Корб, op. cit., p. 99.

[69] Е. Вейде-Вялова, *Первопроходец раскопок на Тамани: мой предок – выходец из Голландии*, "Ковчег" 7 (2017), http://журнальныймир.рф/sites/zhurmir/files/pdf/kovcheg_2017-7_277.pdf (accessed June 1, 2020).

[70] П.А. Керзум, *Иоганн-Готфрид Грегори*, [in:] *Протестанты на службе России. Биографические очерки*, ред. С.П. Заикин, Санкт-Петербург 2012, pp. 9–25.

[71] В.А. Нащокин, *Записки Василия Александровича Нащокина*, Санкт-Петербург 1842, приложения, № VI, p. 194; J.A. Galiffe, *Notices généalogiques sur les familles Genevoises depuis les premiers temps jusqu'à nos jours*, Geneve 1829, p. 66; *Genealogisches Handbuch der baltischen Ritterschaften, herausgegeben von den Verbänden des livländischen, estländischen und kurlandischen Stammadels*, Bd. 3, bearb. O.M. von Stackelberg, Görlitz [1930], p. 290.

[72] Е. Вейде-Вялова, *В поисках корней рода…*, p. 47. Colonel Pyotr Lefort commanded one of the newly formed Russian infantry regiments. In 1700, after the defeat at the Battle of Narva, he was

Pyotr Lefort was heir to a vast fortune, including numerous properties in St. Petersburg.[73] This union produced a daughter, Justine Elisabeth Catherine (1715–1770), Adam Weyde's granddaughter.[74] Sadly, the mother died in labor or immediately after childbirth, which took place on November 30, 1715.[75] Pyotr Lefort remarried on May 23, 1717, wedding Sophie Amélie (née von Barner), while Adam Weyde's granddaughter Justine Elisabeth married Franz-Heinrich de Holstein (1716–1799) in 1747.

His daughter Maria (b. 1699) was born out of General Weyde's second marriage. In 1719, she was to marry Herman Jensen Bohn,[76] a Danish officer who began his long-standing service in the Russian army in 1708, with the rank of colonel and quartermaster general (Figure 14.2). Such a choice of the prospective bridegroom was very characteristic, given the Weydes' strong family ties to Denmark. However, the marriage did not materialize, as Maria died on the eve of the wedding (allegedly committing suicide).[77] This came as a huge blow to her father, who had placed high hopes in the union. At Maria's funeral service, Heinrich

captured by the Swedes, who remanded him in custody until until 1706. He was subsequently promoted to the rank of lieutenant general (in 1729, he was knighted with the newly established Order of St. Alexander Nevsky) and served as the Governor General of Livonia and Estonia until 1733; see J.A. Galiffe, op. cit., p. 66; *Genealogisches Handbuch der baltischen Ritterschaften…*, p. 290.

[73] *Die heutige Historie oder der gegenwärtige Staat von Russland*, ins Deutsche übersetzt T. Salomon, T. von Goch, E.C. Reichard, Altona–Leipzig 1752, p. 497.

[74] Studies list the year 1716, which is impossible given our knowledge of the exact date of her mother's death. *Peter von Le Fort*, https://gw.geneanet.org/lefortcarl?lang=fr&pz=veronica&nz=usandivaras+le+fort&ocz=0&p=peter&n=von+le+fort&oc=1 (Accessed July 21, 2020). According to J.A. Galiffe (op. cit., p. 67), Justine Elisabeth Catherine was born in 1714 in St. Petersburg.

[75] *Genealogisches Handbuch der baltischen Ritterschaften…*, p. 290.

[76] DBL, Bd. 2, Kjøbenhavn 1888, pp. 468–469. Notably, General (general-anchef) Herman Jensen Bohn, who settled in the Russian Empire (in Reval, which had been taken from Sweden), devoted himself to religious issues towards the end of his life, maintaining close contacts with the Pietist center in Halle, and corresponding with the likes of theologian Gotthilf August Francke, who continued the work of his father, August Hermann Francke; see Brief von Hermann Jensen Bohnan Gotthilf August Francke, Reval, 7 VIII 1727, AFSt./HC 796: 29, Bl. 1–2.

[77] Е. Вейде-Вялова, *Первопроходец раскопок…*; eadem, *В поисках корней рода…*, p. 47.

Gottlieb Nazzius, the first pastor of the Lutheran religious community in St. Petersburg, delivered the eulogy[78] for the deceased.

Adam Weyde left no male descendants, although Russian studies have occasionally reported otherwise. For instance, based on existing sources,[79] Major General Otto von Freymann noted that Adam Weyde, son of General Adam Weyde, was made a page in 1727, and three years later, 1730, he became a page de la chambre.[80] However, according to Y. Weyde-Vialova, this page was the son of one of Adam's brothers (she did not specifically mention any brother in particular).[81] In fact, the person in question was Adam Alexander von Weyde, who died in 1734.[82] According to our findings, Adam Alexander was the son of Adam's brother, Franc (Francis) Adamovich Weyde, of whom more information

[78] The eulogy was subsequently printed in Reval; see H.G. Nazzius, *Die wundervolle und verborgene Wege Gottes mit den Nenschen wolte beym Absterben der weyland hoch wohlgebohrnen Fräulein Fräul. Maria von Weyde, Sr. Hochwolgeb. Excellence des Herrn Generals Adam von Weyde…*, Reval [1719].

[79] *Общий архив Министерства Императорского двора*, т. 1: *1723–1730. Описание дел и бумаг*, Санкт-Петербург 1888, p. 96.

[80] О.Р. фон Фрейман, *Пажи за 183 года (1711–1894). Биографии бывших пажей, с портретами*, вып. 1, Фридрихсгамн 1894, p. 14. Initially, the age and term of service for the youghts serving in the Page Corps established by Peter I in 1711 was not clearly defined. When appointing young pages, the tsar was not guided by their ties to prominent Russian houses or noble families, and hence the ranks of pages included persons of foreign origin (German, Swedish) and the sons of officers of the guard. Assigned to perform a variety of tasks at the tsar's court, they were divided into two categories: (lower-ranking) pages and (high-ranking) *pages de la chambre*. Service in the first category usually spanned six years, with the newly admitted boys starting as early as the age of eight. The second tier of service lasted four years and involved young men between aged between fifteen and eighteen.

[81] He was most likely the son of Johann (Ivan) Weyde, although apart from some biographical premises, no source materials exist that would support the claim.

[82] The funeral eulogy forAdam Alexander was delivered by Eckhard Philipp von Freyhold (1685-1738, died in Moscow), a German pastor who had come to Russia and became the first pastor of the German (Lutheran) St. Michael's Church in Moscow in 1718. Freyhold's eulogy was printed shortly after the funeral. See E.P. Freyhold, *Das Leben der geistlichen Pilgrim auf Erden bey dem Absterben des weyland wohlgebohrnen Herrn Lieutenents Adam Alexander von Weyde als derselbe am 22. Januar 1734…*, St. Petersburg [1734].

is provided below. It was reportedly Major General William von Delden, Adam Weyde's acquaintance and subordinate (he commanded one of the regiments forming part of Weyde's division, which fought in the Battle of Narva in 1700) and a fellow prisoner of war in Sweden for many years, who reportedly strove to improve the "poor boy's" welfare as early as March 1721.[83]

As we have mentioned, Adam Weyde also had two brothers, Johann (Ivan)[84] and Franc, about whom certain rudimentary information has survived. The first served as an official (dyak) in the central state administration and as a page of the Grand Ambassador Fyodor Golovin, who participated in the Russian diplomatic mission known as the Grand Embassy, which in traveled the countries of Western Europe between 1697 and 1698.[85] Johann Weyde's service with the Grand Embassy lasted until July 23 (August 2) 1698, when he and his companions were dispatched from Vienna to Berlin to learn German and mathematics, and further their knowledge of artillery.[86] His stay abroad did not last very long. As early as 1700—by then a "student of engineering affairs" with an annual pay of ninety-six rubles—he was transferred from the Posolsky

[83] Е. Вейде-Вялова, *В поисках корней рода…*, p. 47.

[84] In Russian historiography, the name of the general's brother is transcribed "Ivan," rather than "Johann." In the present study, we have opted for the notation adopted by Professor Iskra Schwarcz of Austria; see И. Шварц, *Участие иностранных инженеров во взятии Азова и строительстве Таганрога*, [in:] *Объекты культурного наследия Петровской эпохи на юге России: проблемы изучения, сохранения и музеефикации. Сборник материалов*, редкол. А.Ю. Баженов и др., Волгоград 2020, p. 196.

[85] Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, *Великое посольство. Рубеж эпох, или Начало пути 1697–1698*, Санкт-Петербург 2008, pp. 373, 379, 594; М.М. Богословский, *Петр I. Материалы для биографии*, т. 2, Ленинград 1941, p. 359.

[86] И.И. Голиков, *Деяния Петра Великого, мудрого преобразителя России, собранные из достоверных источников и расположенные по годам*, т. 1, Москва 1837, p. 527; П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, p. 310; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., p. 177.

Prikaz to the palace-based Novgorod Prikaz.[87] As early as 1701, Peter I delegated Dyak Johann Weyde, who was most likely still based in Moscow, to handle organizational matters in the tsar's service.[88]

The second of the brothers, Franc (Francis) Adamovich, was a major in the Ingermanlandsky Infantry Regiment commanded by Alexander Menshikov. Like his brother, Franc was educated abroad, in Switzerland and probably in the Reich. Historian Nikolai Pavlenko reports that in February 1695 the previously cited Franz Lefort sent his minor son Andrey to his relatives in Geneva in order to study a range of subjects, including military science. Accompanying the young Lefort in his travels and education was Franc Adamovich, who spoke excellent German.[89] Franc's stay in Geneva probably extended until 1696 and proved fruitful because later that year, he participated in the second expedition of the Russian army at the Turkish fortress of Azov (for a detailed account of the campaign, see Chapter 2) in the rank of lieutenant.[90] There is every indication that Adam's brother spent more time in the West in the wake of the hostilities, most likely in one of the Reich countries.[91] His subsequent education was decided by his brother as the eldest male in the family. In accordance with his wishes, Franc travelled to the Pietist center in Halle, where he was to study under August Hermann Francke.[92]

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[87] Н.Е. Бранденбург, *Материалы для истории артиллерийского управления в России. Приказ артиллерии (1700–1720),* Санкт-Петербург 1876, приложения, № XIV, p. 462.
[88] П. и Б., т. 1, p. 864.
[89] Н.И. Павленко, *Лефорт*, Москва 2009, pp. 35–36, https://avidreaders.ru/read-book/lefort.html?p=35 (accessed July 20, 2020). Andrey Lefort's voyage was not an ordinary Grand Tour. The youth was entrusted with official documents from his father and the tsar, addressed to, among others, the authorities of Geneva, as well as the Mayor of Amsterdam, Nicholas Witsen (Lefort's peregrination was to extend over the territory of the United Provinces of the Netherlands).
[90] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., p. 258.
[91] H.W. Ludolf do G.H. Neubauer, Halle, 5 XII 1697, AFSt/HD 88, Bl. 133.
[92] H.W. Ludolf do G.H. Neubauer, Halle, 29 I 1698, AFSt/HD 88, Bl. 150.

The knowledge and military experience gained abroad helped Franc's promotion to the rank of major in the early years of the war with Sweden. It was in this rank that he commanded the Russian soldiers storming the enemy fortress of Marienburg in 1702.[93] Despite the fact that he was an infantry officer and served in the Ingermanlandsky Regiment, he was no stranger (much like his brother Adam) to the operation of dragoon units, the backbone of the Russian cavalry. It is known that, as of 1704, he commanded one of the dragoon regiments, which was disbanded shortly thereafter.[94] A year later, while in Smolensk, he took part in replenishing the army's regiments with recruits (he drafted 500 soldiers from among the Ukrainian population).[95] In 1706, he took command of another dragoon regiment, formed of new recruits. That same year, operating in the vicinity of Minsk and Lyakhavichy, the major and his dragoons took part in the operation to lead the Russian army out of Swedish encirclement in Grodno.[96] Subsequently, the unit was disbanded by order of Alexander Menshikov, with its soldiers joining nine other

[93] К.В. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века. Офицерские сказки 1-й четверти XVIII века*, nr 2040, https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=stdforum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020). That Franc Weyde held the rank of major is confirmed by a letter he sent to his brother Adam in 1704; see *Письмо генерала А.А. Вейде из Стокгольма (где он был в плену 1700–1710 гг.) своему брату Францу Вейде (майору, погибшему под Ригой в 1709 г.) в Москву. 1704*, https://ru.bidspirit.com/ui/lotPage/source/catalog/auction/7344/lot/19419/Письмо-генерала-А-А-Вейде-из?lang=en (accessed July 20, 2020).

[94] К.В. Татарников, op. cit., № 317.

[95] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском театрах в 1708–1714 гг. (Документы Государственного Архива)*, [in:] *Сборник военно-исторических материалов*, предисл. А.З. Мышлаевский, т. 5, Санкт-Петербург 1893, приложения, № I, p. 310.

[96] *Письма маеора, Марка Богдановича фон-Кирхена к канцлеру Гаврилу Ивановичу Головкину (1706 г.)*, сообщ. И. Забелиным, [in:] *Временник императорского Московского общества истории и древностей российских*, кн. 1, Москва 1849, смесь, № 2, p. 18; № 5, p. 21; № 7, p. 23.

dragoon regiments.[97] In 1709, Franc Weyde fought in the Battle of Poltava,[98] before pushing for Riga with the Russian army commanded by Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev. He fell during the siege of the city.[99] He left behind his wife Alena, who, presumably due to her declining financial situation, applied to the Governing Senate for adequate financial support in 1712. Alena recalled that her husband had spent many years in the tsar's army, serving with the rank of colonel, and despite three years having passed since his death, her name was still missing from the list of soldier widows.[100]

Adam Weyde survived both his daughters (see Chapter 14), whose deaths dealt him terrible blows. Another painful experience was his ten-year captivity in Sweden, when it seemed highly unlikely that he would ever return to Russia. He recounted the hardships of separation from his family and the great longing for his loved ones in a letter to his daughter Elizabeth Justine.[101] Weyde compensated for the hardships of war, life in captivity, and family setbacks by persisting in his religiosity and deep faith in God. As a Lutheran, he belonged to a group of active European Pietists (as discussed extensively in Chapter 13).

What role did family play in Adam Weyde's career development? Undoubtedly, it granted him initial capital (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu's field theory, see Chapter 14 for more details), which included his

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[97] Н.П. Волынской, (Н.П. Волынский), *Постепенное развитие русской регулярной конницы в эпоху Великого Петра с самым подробным описанием участия ея в Великой Северной войне*, вып. 1: *1698–1706 гг.*, кн. 4: *Приложения (XLIII–XCI)*, Санкт-Петербург 1912, приложения, № LXXXIII, pp. 526–527.

[98] K.B. Татарников, op. cit., № 32.

[99] Е. Вейде-Вялова, *Первопроходец раскопок...*; eadem, *В поисках корней...*, p. 47.

[100] *Доклады и приговоры состоявшиеся в Правительствующем Сенате в царствование Петра Великого, изданные императорской Академией наук*, ред. Н.В. Калачов, т. 2, кн. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1882, p. 37.

[101] A. Weyde to E.J. Weyde, e.g., October 17, 1704, RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag. [col. 155].



Figure 1.4. Family tree of the von der Weyde family
Source: own study based on sources and literature cited in Chapter 1.

Maria Weyde
(1699-1719)
Johann (Ivan) Weyde d. after
1701
Franc Weyde, d. 1710, wife
Alena
Adam Alexander Weyde, d.
1734.
Albrecht Christian von der
Weyde
(1721-?)
Adam von der Weyde
(1729-?)
Daughter, Wife of Daniel Dorte
(navy lieutenant in Russia)

multilingual competences, military knowledge, and connections with fellow soldiers. Conversely, the advantages provided by Weyde's family home were scarce, since his father, born in 1608, did not play a prominent role in his professional growth. Adam owed his achievements overwhelmingly to his personal qualities, and the fact that the times of Peter I afforded such individuals unique opportunities. He quickly took over as head of the family, extending support to his brothers. One can discern his attempt to establish the Weyde household as an independent entity (actant) in the Russian military and political structures. Unfortunately, his efforts ended up in a spectacular defeat (as detailed in the concluding chapters of this study).

2. EARLY MILITARY CAREER

Although he initially planned otherwise, Adam Weyde embarked on a military career. His father's connections gave him a head start. He was named captain in one of the two elite "infantry regiments of foreign provenance," known as the Moscow Select Infantry Regiments.[102] Little is known about the early years of his military service. In all probability, he was promoted to the rank of major as early as 1692 and transferred to the Preobrazhensky Regiment.[103] This occurred through the intercession of Franz Lefort, the then commander of the First Moscow Select Infantry Regiment.[104]

Peter I's circle of friends and companions was formed through the games he played in his early years. Among those with direct access to the tsarevich were some of his peers, about ten years of age, hailing from the wealthy and noble families from the entourage of his mother, Natalia Naryshkina (the second wife of Tsar Alexei Romanov), serving as pantlers

[102] For more on these units, see А.В. Малов, *Московские выборные полки солдатского строя в начальный период своей истории. 1656–1671 гг.*, Москва 2006. The regiment in question was most likely the Second Moscow Select Infantry Regiment, known as the Butyrsky Regiment, commanded between 1686 and 1699 by Patrick Gordon.

[103] He was first listed as a major in the regiment's officer roll for the first half of 1693; see П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, pp. 195, 198–199; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, p. 560; приложения, № XVII: 3, p. 560; В.А. Нащокин, op. cit., приложения, № VI, p. 192.

[104] СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, p. 43.

(and performing duties assigned to pages). As representatives of decorated Russian families, they formed the inner circle of childhood friends and companions, joining the tsarevich in "playing army." In addition to these, the ranks of the so-called *potieshny*, or the soldiers of the young Peter I, consisted of ordinary court servants or their children, as well as individual soldiers of the rifle and select infantry regiments, with whom, however, he did not form lasting relationships. The group of Peter's closest associates then expanded to include foreign generals and officers living in Nemetskaya Sloboda, whom the tsar would visit in the late 1680s and early 1690s, accompanied by his Russian friends Fyodor Apraksin, Gavril Golovkin, Avtamon Golovin, Ivan Buturlin the Younger, and the Princes Anikita Repnin and Ivan Trubetskoy. Among them were the senior and experienced commanders of foreign regiments, including Patrick Gordon and Franz Lefort, as well as young, capable officers, including Jacob Bruce and Adam Weyde. Soon thereafter, they all ended up in the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky guard regiments formed by the tsar, which became the nucleus and forge of the future officer staff in the modernized Russian army. They, too, held major military positions and rose to the highest public offices.[105]

Peter I instantly took to the young Adam Weyde. This is corroborated by correspondence between the major and the tsar. Military issues dominated the letters, although they also included a number of personal reflections on receptions attended, during which the guests consumed copious amounts of alcohol.[106] Some of the surviving correspondence includes letters from Peter I's 1694 trip to Arkhangelsk and the Solovetsky Transfiguration Monastery.[107] The monarch reported in quite some detail

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[105] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, pp. 78–197, 353.
[106] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, приложения, № VII: 31, p. 496; M.C. Posselt, op. cit., p. 70.
[107] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, pp. 168–170.

on his escapade, to which Adam Weyde responded wishing him health and a safe passage.[108] The main substance of their correspondence, however, remained military matters. Among others, the tsar informed his subordinate of the arrival in Arkhangelsk of a forty-four-canon warship purchased in the United Provinces of the Netherlands. In his own letters, in turn, Major Weyde, briefed the ruler on the training of soldiers (as a major, he was responsible for soldier drills and trainings).[109] Thus, in a letter dated May 30, 1694, Weyde reported that the entire regiment was practicing "shooting", while on August 7 he informed Peter of the standards of officer training, stressing that they eagerly participated in the instruction and showed vigilance when on guard duty. He also stated that the entire regiment would soon be put in good order and become combat-ready.[110]

In September and October 1694, following Peter I's return from his expedition to the White Sea, the Kozhukhovo hamlet near Moscow was host to large-scale maneuvers of select army detachments (totaling more than 14,000 men), which involved the Major Weyde and the Preobrazhensky men he trained.[111] At one end of the training ground was the "army of the Polish king," consisting mostly of rifle regiments and government officials. Posted to the opposite end was the "Russian army," whose core consisted of the four most valuable infantry regiments: both Moscow select units, as well as the Preobrazhensky and the Semyonovsky (the second of the tsar's guard regiments). Unsurprisingly, the maneuvers concluded successfully for the "Russians," who launched a dashing attack on the fortress and the camp defended by the "Poles."[112]

[108] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии*..., p. 238.
[109] Ibidem, p. 195.
[110] Ibidem, pp. 239–240.
[111] Ibidem, p. 205.
[112] А. Корнилович, *Известия о первых маневрах при Петре I-м, и особенно о Кожуховском походе*, „Северный архив" 5 (1824), pp. 237–267; С.М. Соловьев, *История России с древнейших*

These maneuvers were the last exercises before the actual military campaign. "As in the fall," wrote Peter I in his April 16, 1695 letter to Fyodor Apraksin (future admiral general), "we toiled during the martial game at Kozhukhovo, with nothing but enjoyment on our minds; however, that game foreshadowed our present cause."[113] The above excerpt from the tsar's letter heralded the resumption of hostilities by the Holy League, which, in addition to Russia, included the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, Poland and the Papal States. Previous anti-Turkish campaigns, conducted in 1687 and 1689, targeted the Porte's vassal Khanate of Crimea, ending in the defeat of the tsar's vast army.[114] In the mid-1690s, Peter favored a different course of attack. Its target was to be Azov, situated at the mouth of the Don, the capture of which would provide the Russian navy with an outlet to the Sea of Azov (along with the possibility of founding its own port there), consequently helping Russia gain access to the Black Sea[115] The army of over 30,000 men departing for Azov was divided into three independent groups under the command of generals Patrick Gordon,

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времен, кн. 7, т. 14, Москва 1991, p. 456; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, pp. 188–189; П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, № XI: 5, p. 143.

[113] П. и Б., т. 1, p. 28–29.

[114] For a more detailed account, see Г.К. Бабушкина, *Международное значение Крымских походов 1687 и 1689 гг.*, "Исторические записки" 33 (1950), pp. 158–172; А.П. Богданов, *«Истинное и верное сказание о Крымском походе 1687 г.» – памятник публицистики Посольского приказа*, [in:] *Проблемы изучения нарративных источников по истории русского средневековья. Сборник статей*, отв. ред. В.Т. Пашуто, Москва 1982, pp. 57–84; K. Kwiatkowski, *Informowanie o wyprawie wojennej w końcu XVII w. – przypadek Jahanna Reynera i kampanii krymskiej 1689 r.*, "Klio. Czasopismo poświęcone dziejom Polski i powszechnym" 59 (2021), 3, pp. 81-113.

[115] The goal of the expedition was in keeping with Russia's imperial policy, which sought to control the Black Sea coast; see P. Krokosz, *Morze Czarne w strategicznych planach Piotra I*, [in:] *REGIONES EUXINUM SPECTANTES. Stosunki kulturowe, etniczne i religijne na przestrzeni dziejów*, eds. Ł. Gędłek, T. Krzyżowski, M. Michalski, Kraków 2012, pp. 289–305; idem, *„Zdobyte bez przelania krwi kwietnia 9, 1783 roku". Imperialna polityka Rosji wobec Chanatu Krymskiego w XVI–XVIII w.*, [in:] *Крим від античності до сьогодення: Історичні студії, відп.* ред. В. Смолій, Київ 2014, pp. 302–322.

Franz Lefort and Avtamon Golovin, with the final say on all command matters resting with the tsar.[116]

It is worth noting that in the final quarter of the seventeenth century the Turks significantly bolstered the Azov fortress, so that on the eve of the two Russian army expeditions of 1695–1696 it constituted a potent point of resistance. This is confirmed by the documents and drawings of the fortress from the 1690s (Figure 2.1). Around the stone walls of the old fortification (still internally divided into three parts), a bulwark system was constructed along a bastion outline, coupled with a dry ditch, which substantially strengthened Azov's defenses.[117] The fortress, boasting a prime location on the delta of the Don River, with its numerous branches and islands, was integrated with other nearby fortifications, thus forming a unified defense system. In the upper reaches of the Don River, about 3.2 km off Azov, two stone towers (*kalancha*) were erected on both banks, each equipped with artillery. Stretching between them was an iron chain preventing downstream navigation (Map 1, letter A). In turn, the left bank of the Mertvy Donets, a northern tributary of the Don in its delta, in the immediate vicinity of Azov, was host to the Lutik stronghold (a stone castle with bastion-like fortifications), protecting a second outlet, which led to the Sea of Azov (map 1, letter N).[118] For these reasons, the

[116] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, pp. 223–224. It is worth noting that Peter I took steps to conceal the true purpose of the expedition and headed directly toward the borders of the Crimean Khanate with a formidable army of 120,000 men commanded by Boris Sheremetev. The goal of the Russian commander was to confuse the enemy, but also to prevent the merger of the Tatar forces with Turkish forces stationed in Azov.

[117] П.А. Аваков, И.Р. Гусач, А.В. Дедюлькин, *На границе империй: османские и российские укрепления Северо-Восточного Приазовья по данным археологии*, [in:] *От Смуты к Империи. Новые открытия в области археологии и истории России XVI–XVIII вв. Материалы научной конференции (Москва, 20–22 ноября 2013 г.)*, отв. ред. Л.А. Беляев, А.В. Юрасов, Москва–Вологда 2016, pp. 381–382. For more on the subject, see Азовская крепость 1695–1696, БАН, ф. 266, т. 2, л. 87; KA, Utländska stads- och fästningsplaner 1550–1989, Ryssland. Azov, No. 5.

[118] A detailed description of the fortifications of the Lutik stronghold can be found in the diary kept by General Patrick Gordon; see P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 3, pp. 58–59. For more on the Azov

Figure 2.1. Fortification of the Azov stronghold, 1695–1696.
Source: БАН, ф. 266, т. 2, л. 87.

operations of the Russian army could not be limited to a single objective, as it was of paramount importance to neutralize as many as four points of enemy resistance, which could additionally receive aid from the sea. Moreover, in order to successfully besiege Azov, the army had to cross to the southern bank of the Don, which would further extend its lines of communications and supplies, leaving them vulnerable to the Tatar cavalry attacks.

The map of the Don Estuary along the coast of the Sea of Azov, drafted by the Swedes in 1711 best illustrates the operational difficulties facing the Russian army. The Swedish officers showed the map to Devlet II Giray as they were planning to reclaim the lands lost in 1698. In order to analyze the 1695–1696 campaign, it is necessary to bypass the so-called "gorod Petrovsky" fortress,[119] erected as a subsidiary stronghold on the right bank of the Don, just opposite Azov, as well as the fortress, city and port of Taganrog, situated on the sea coast (see Map 1).[120]

In view of the serious operational and tactical challenges, an engineering staff was formed, consisting of Francis Timmerman (*Ober-inginieur*), Patrick Gordon, Jacob Bruce,[121] Adam Weyde and engineers

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expeditions of 1695-1696, see С.А. Фейгина, *Азовские походы и внешняя политика 1695–1699 гг.,* [in:] *Очерки истории СССР. Период феодализма. Россия в первой четверти XVIII в. Преобразования Петра I,* ред. Б.Б. Кафенгауз, Н.И. Павленко, Москва 1954, p. 437; А.Г. Чепухин, *К истории Азовских походов Петра I: «Сергиев город, что на Дону у каланчинских башен»*, "История военного дела: исследования и источники" 2019, специальный выпуск X: *Азовские походы 1695 и 1697 гг.*, ч. 1, pp. 24–68, http://www.reenactor.ru/ARH/PDF/Chepuxin_03.pdf (accessed November 10, 2020).

[119] For a more extensive discussion of the entire Azov fortifications system during the reign of Peter I, including the "Gorod Petrovsky," see П.А. Аваков, *Азовский поход Булавинцев 1708 г.,* [in:] *Меншиковские чтения – 2015. Научный альманах*, гл. науч. ред. П. Кротов, вып. 6, Санкт-Петербург 2015, pp. 184–194.

[120] KA, Utländska kartor 1632–1931, Ryssland, floder och kanaler, nr 32; H. Köhlin, *Some Remarks on Maps of the Crimea and the Sea of Azov,* "Imago Mundi" 15 (1960), pp. 84–88.

[121] Jacob Bruce (actually James Daniel Bruce) was a Russian officer of Scottish descent. From 1704 onwards, he served in the rank of general feldzeugmeister, in charge of the entire artillery forces in the Russian army. He made an indisputable contribution to the entire process of modernization of

Albert Mourlot and Ruel (Rowehl?).[122] Of this group, only the latter two were adequately trained to conduct siege work. Patrick Gordon, who participated in the siege and heroic defense of the captured Chyhyryn in 1677–1678, had some first-hand experience as well.[123] The others were appointed to the council mostly based on their position as high commanders and close friends and associates of the tsar.[124] Their first order of business was to conduct cartographic reconnaissance of the surrounding area, draw up plans of the fortress, establish military camps, build bridges, determine the placement of batteries and ensure the due fortification of the Russian positions.[125]

The overstretched lines of communication and the resulting difficulties of provisions and supplies of all sorts (primarily gunpowder and bullets) for an army of more than 30,000 men, combined with the threat of Turkish-Tatar relief for the Azov garrison, rendered a prolonged siege of the fortress problematic (see Map 1). The batteries set up and the siege

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Peter I's armed forces. He also collaborated with Adam Weyde. For an extensive account of Bruce's activity in the fields of martial affairs (including issues of military legislation), diplomacy, science and culture, see М.Д. Хмыров, *Главные начальники русской артиллерии. Второй генерал-фельдцейхмейстер граф Яков Вилимович Брюс (1704–1726),* "Артиллерийский журнал" 2 (1866), pp. 81–136; 3 (1866), pp. 153–194; 4 (1866) pp. 249–291; С.В. Ефимов, Л.К. Маковская, А.Н. Филимон, *Потомок шотландских и ирландских королей во главе российской артиллерии: Яков Брюс и его архив,* [in:] *Архив генерал-фельдцейхмейстра Якова Вилимовича Брюса, т. 1: Письма Я.В. Брюса (1704–1705 гг.),* подгот. С.В. Ефимов, Л.К. Маковская, Санкт-Петербург–Шелково 2004, pp. 6–23; S.W. Jefimow, *Генерал-фельдцйхмейстер Яаков Брюс: потомок шотландских королей во главе российской артиллерии (материалы к биографии),* [in:] *W służbie obcych monarchów i państw. Mechanizmy karier obcokrajowców w armiach oraz administracji państwowej*, ed. T. Ciesielski, Warszawa 2015, pp. 95–130.

[122] Ф.Ф. Ласковский, *Материалы для истории инженерного искусства в России*, ч. 3: *Опыт исследования инженерного искусства в царствование императора Петра Великого*, Санкт-Петербург 1861, p. 32. The first name of the latter commander has not been established; nor does General Patrick Gordon mention it in his diary.

[123] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 1, pp. 434–558.

[124] P. Krokosz, *„Ludzie reform,"* "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego:" Prace Historyczne, 129 (2002), pp. 111–122.

[125] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 564–572.

Map 1. The Don Estuary (1711).
Legend: A – Two Towers (*Kalancha*); B – Azov; C – "Gorod Petrovsky;" D – Bulwarks; E – Mouth of the Don on the Sea of Azov; F – Tatar territory; G – Kalancha River (arm of the Don); H – Kuterma River (arm of the Don); I – Mouth of the Kuterma; N – Lutik stronghold; P – Mertvy Donets; S – Taganrog fortress and port.
Source: KA, Utländska kartor 1632–1931, Ryssland, floder och kanaler, No. 32.

work conducted provided no indication of the fortress's fall (see Figure 2.2). The tactical premise was to take the stronghold by storm, which was to be accomplished by digging a tunnel and planting mines. This key undertaking was overseen by Adam Weyde. The prospective success would mean the acceleration of his military career. Unfortunately, his theoretical knowledge was insufficient, and his lack of skill resulted in a disastrous outcome. As put by Johann Korb, "[b]y his own industry he learnt the art of constructing mines so well from books that he became known and esteemed by his sovereign. But all his sedulous labor in constructing mines at the siege of Azow, with the consent of his prince, turned out so unfortunately, that instead of hurting the enemy, against whom they were directed, they only proved damaging to the Czar's soldiers, blowing some hundreds of them that were on guard in the sapping into the air."[126]

The consequences of the major's miscalculation were indeed dramatic, but it was not his mistakes that caused the break of the siege, as recounted by two of Weyde's fellow combatants. On September 6 (16), 1695, the general staff, including Adam Weyde as superintendent, decided to detonate nearly 1,360 kilograms of gunpowder accumulated in a mine chamber projected to stretch all the way to the Azov defense rampart (see Figure 2.2). Upon breaching the rampart, the Russian soldiers gathered in tranches were to launch an attack. In his memoirs, Russian officer Alexander Gordon noted that as a result of miscalculations made while digging the tunnel, which ultimately did not reach the Azov fortifications, three hundred of his own soldiers were killed, spurring unrest in the Russian army. The Scottish-born general noted that at the time of detonation, "the trenches being full of armed men ready for the assault, which was put

[126] И.Г. Корб, op. cit., p. 256. See [J. Korb], op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 234–235; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, p. 127.

off for this time, the army being like to mutiny, and Major Weid obliged to abscond for some days, till they were pacified."[127]

The events in question were assessed without such great emotion by Alexander's father-in-law, General Patrick Gordon, who documented the siege in his diary. It should be noted that throughout the expedition and the crucial siege operations, Gordon remained in permanent contact with Peter I, Franz Lefort and Avtamon Golovin, as well as the engineering staff, of which Adam Weyde was a member. Analyzing the entries in Gordon's diary, one cannot help but notice a high degree of reserve towards the measures taken by the tsar's engineers. On almost every occasion, he emphasized that he should be personally responsible for any siege works carried out in the section occupied by his forces. Moreover, Gordon expressed resentment over their conduct. This is exemplified by the situation that occurred on June 26 (July 5), when, after the evening inspection of the positions of Gordon's troops, the engineers refused to immediately undertake the construction of a counter-battery line to protect his soldiers from Turkish and Tatar attacks. His indignation over the refusal of chief engineer Franz Timmerman, who noted his inability to accurately draw the lines of fortifications at night, was all the greater because he had offered his assistance in conducting said overnight earthworks. As a result, Gordon was forced to man his trenches with additional guards, as he feared an enemy onslaught. The threat was real, as counter-attacks by Tatar-Turkish troops on Russian positions were incessant.[128] Losses in the engineering staff likewise did not escape Patrick

[127] A. Gordon, *The History of Peter the Great...*, p. 101. Alexander Gordon was the son-in-law of General Patrick Gordon (second husband to his daughter, whom he married in 1699 or 1700). In the Battle of Narva, lost by the Russians in 1700, while holding the rank of lieutenant colonel, he was taken prisoner by the Swedes, returning from captivity in 1708. Three years later, he left the Russian armed forces with the rank of major general.

[128] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 557–570. Cf. П. Гордон, *Дневник. 1690–1695*, пер., ст., примеч. Д.Г. Федосова, отв. ред. М.Р. Рыженков, Москва 2014, p. 373.

Gordon's attention. On August 5 (15), he reported that Albert Mourlot, who had leaned out from behind a gabion to get a clearer view of Azov's fortifications, had been fatally shot. Three days later, another of the tsar's engineers was wounded, although the Scotsman did not mention him by name.[129]

Regarding the event of September 6 (16), which saw the decision to detonate the mine supposedly placed under the Azov fortifications, Patrick Gordon took an intransigent stance, believing that the operation should be postponed. During the war council, he argued that the ditches in front of the Azov fortifications had not been sufficiently covered up. However, the other members of the general staff insisted on blowing it up as soon as possible, claiming that any delay could cause the Turks to discover and destroy the charge. "Not even my words were of any avail," Gordon noted, "cautioning that they [i.e., the Russian command] may will lose both the work accomplished and the gunpowder laid, let alone the men that may die in the process."[130] More importantly, Gordon directly blamed the person responsible for the placement of the charge, i.e., Adam Weyde, for the resulting situation: "I have always suspected that the young engineer was incapable of measuring the distance correctly, and that therefore he knows not where and in what location he set up the mine chamber, despite his assuring with great conviction that it extended beneath the wall of the bastion and part of the curtain wall."[131] As noted by Patrick Gordon, the explosion of a misplaced mine cost the lives of thirty of his own soldiers. He estimated the number of wounded and injured at over a hundred, including two colonels and one lieutenant colonel. The event also triggered understandable discontent in the ranks of the army

[129] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 591. Cf. П. Гордон, op. cit., p. 389.
[130] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 603. Cf. П. Гордон, op. cit., p. 399.
[131] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 603. Cf. П. Гордон, op. cit., p. 399.

and hostile reactions among Russian soldiers towards foreign engineers and officers. In spite of the above, the siege was not broken, with tunnel works (the Turks conducted their own engineering operations against the Russians in the form of counter-mines), shelling, and direct attacks on the fortress continuing until nearly the end of September 1695, when the tsar ordered a retreat.[132]

Assessing the consequences of the misplaced mine, one can notice the large discrepancies in the number of casualties reported, ranging from thirty to 300. However, taking into account that some of the wounded died or became unfit for subsequent service, and still others simply disappeared (their bodies were not retrieved), a conservative estimate should be made that the losses ranged between 100–150 soldiers, of whom no more than half died.[133]

Peter I's first attempt to gain access to the Sea of Azov resulted in failure, largely for lack of a navy capable of supporting his land armies. Adam Weyde had no fond memories of the event either, falling out of favor with the tsar on account of his blatant mistakes, and which caused his removal from the engineering staff of the successive Azov campaign in 1696. What is more, despite his rank of major, he was relegated to commanding the fifth *rota* (company) of the Preobrazhensky Regiment (amounting to 158 men) as if he were a captain. Along with his soldiers,

[132] P. Gordon, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 603–616. Cf. П. Гордон, op. cit., pp. 399–409.

[133] Our own conservative estimate is based on a comparison of the impact of other mine or gunpowder trap detonations. One of the largest explosions of this kind was the planting of gunpowder following the looting of the Sandomierz Castle. The deliberate detonation, carried out by the Swedes in 1656 resulted in 500 deaths (with some reports stating that the number of casualties was four times higher); see K. Łopatecki, *„Szwedzkie napoje", czyli rzecz o wysadzeniu zamku w Sandomierzu w świetle grafiki Gesta ad Sandomiriam Erika Dahlbergha*, [in:] *Stan badań nad wielokulturowym dziedzictwem dawnej Rzeczypospolitej*, eds. W. Walczak, K. Łopatecki, Białystok 2017, t. 7, pp. 157–158, 172.

Moscowitische Belägerung und Eroberung der Haubt Stadt Asoff, im D
oder Don. Anno 1696
Munition
Grand dit une Bomb.

Figure 2.2. Siege of Azov in 1696.
Nos. 3 and 4 mark the fortification works conducted in 1695.
Source: C. Merian, *Moscowitische belagerung und Eroberung der Haubt-Stadt Asoff, im Tartarischen Königreich Nagaja am Fluss Tanais oder Don, Anno 1696*, Frankfurt am Main [1700], https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-33948 (accessed October 20, 2020).

he mustered the naval units advancing down the Don towards the Turkish fortress.[134]

The second Azov expedition was prepared better in all respects. This time, the tsar's army amounted to 75,000 men, and, unlike in the 1695 campaign, its leader was a single commander, boyar Alexei Shein. Proper support from navy units was not overlooked either, with the accompanying fleet consisting of one ship, twenty-three galleys and four fireships (Figure 2.3). The skillfully conducted combined land and sea operation, during which the Russian field army managed to effectively blockade the fortress on land while the tsar's fleet vessels anchoring in the Sea of Azov cut off the defenders from the naval relief that rushed to their aid, resulted in full success. The Brandenburg and Prussian engineers and artillerymen dispatched to the tsar by Elector Frederick III (Figure 2.2) were vital in the shelling of the Azov fortifications.[135] The siege operations proved successful, as the Russian forces seized the fortress on July 18. The Lutika garrison capitulated three days later. The success of Peter I's army was undeniable, with Azov and its adjacent lands coming under Russian control. Disregarding the ongoing war with Turkey, the tsar almost immediately set out to consolidate his position in the region. Soon after the victory, the Russians launched the construction of a modern fortress,

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[134] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 284; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 2, p. 69; С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 262.

[135] *Поход боярина и большого полку воеводы Алексея Семеновича Шеина к Азову, взятие сего и Лютика города и торжественное оттуда с победоносным воинством возвращение в Москву: С подробным описанием всех военнных и торжественных происшествий и с имянным списком бывших при том: сухопутных и морских, великороссийских и малороссийских, вышних и нижних военачальников числе всех войск и учиненным оным наград*, изд. В. Рубан, Санкт-Петербург 1773; П. и Б., т. 1, pp. 77–88, 93–95. For more on the engineers involved in the capture of Azov, see И. Шварц, op. cit., pp. 187–202.

city and port near Azov, intended as a base for the Russian navy, which sought an opportunity to break through to the Black Sea.[136]

Adam Weyde rehabilitated himself during the second campaign, regaining the tsar's trust. Trusting his theoretical military knowledge, linguistic competence, and the skills and experience gained in the Azov campaigns, Peter I dispatched Weyde on a diplomatic mission to the Holy Roman Empire later that year. The major of the Preobrazhensky Regiment was tasked with informing Emperor Leopold I of the heroism of the tsar's army at Azov, emphasizing Moscow's contributions to the anti-Turkish coalition to date.[137] In the course of his international mission, Weyde also visited Halle (Saale), which was part of the Electorate of Brandenburg at the time, and established close contacts with the Pietists and scholars working there.[138]

Summarizing the events discussed in this chapter, it is worth highlighting the conflict between the old, experienced officers and their young counterparts, on friendly terms with Peter I. Weyde belonged to the latter group and, as an actor, he already exerted considerable influence on the tsar at the time. His actions were strongly criticized by Patrick Gordon,

[136] К.И. Крейс, *Экстракт из журнала, держанного от господина вице-адмирала Крейса на пути из Москвы на Воронеж, с Воронежа в Азов, на Таганрог и в Керч, а оттуда назад к Азову. 1699 года*, перев. П. Ларинова, "Записки гидрографического департамента Морского министерства" 8 (1850), pp. 367–394; Л. Бодик и др., *Таганрог. Историко-краеведческий очерк*, Ростов-на-Дону 1971, pp. 15–28; М.Б. Михайлова, *Петр I и новые градостроительные начала*, [in:] *Петр Великий – реформатор России*, редкол. Р.М. Байбурова и др., Москва 2001, pp. 117–121; P. Krokosz, *„Zdobyte bez przelania krwi kwietnia 9, 1783 roku"...*, p. 309.

[137] С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 262.

[138] O.V. Rusakovskiy, *Der „Ustav voinskij" von Adam Weide (1699): ein Deutsch-Lutherisches militarrecht im petrinischen Russland?*, [in:] *Aus Sibirien – 2017. Научно-информационный сборник: [материалы IX Всероссийской научно-практической конференции с международным участием «Стеллеровские чтения» (26 октября 2017 г., Тюмень), Международной научной конференции «22. Deutsch-Russische Begegnungen» (6–9 октября 2016 г., Галле, Германия), Международной научной конференции «23. Deutsch-Russische Begegnungen» (11–15 октября 2017 г., Галле, Германия)]*, гл. ред. А.П. Ярков, Тюмень 2017, pp. 164–165.

Города Азова спѣшнѣ шѣзятьѧ Какъ. Великій Царь Црь и Великій Князь. Петръ Алексѣевичь Всеѧ Велія
Exp̃gnationi Urbis Tanais, ab INVIC
thonorum dc Imperatorc obsessa XVI Mai

Figure 2.3. Siege of Azov in 1696. The print depicts the victory of modern military thought (siege operations, fleet operations, use of cartography in operational and tactical planning). Northern perspective.
Source: A. Schoonebeeck, *The Capture of Azov in 1696.*, 1699 print, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3055863 (accessed November 11, 2020).

and their dire consequences derailed his prospects for replacing key military experts. Weyde's next major move around the main actant was only made possible by the naturally occurring generational changes in 1699 (see Chapter 5). However, Weyde made the most of this interval, using his patience, diligence and dedication to build an increasingly close relationship with the tsar, as recounted in the next two chapters.

3. GRAND EMBASSY

Adam Weyde returned from Vienna in the early winter months of 1697, followed by his near-immediate posting to a much more demanding diplomatic assignment. After his victory in the Azov campaign, Peter I resolved to accelerate the modernization of his armed forces, and in fact the entire Russian state. This goal was to be achieved by dispatching a large diplomatic mission to Western European countries, whose main official goal was to strengthen the existing anti-Turkish alliance.[139] Peter's departure also served as political preparation for a possible war with Sweden.[140] The conflict with Russia's northern neighbor was inevitable, as gaining access to the Baltic Sea was a key determinant of the country's imperial policy.[141] These plans were aided by the international

[139] For more on the subject, see Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., passim.

[140] Some measures regarding the future war were undertaken during the tsar's return journey to Moscow. In August 1698, he met with the newly elected Polish king August II the Strong (in his native Saxony, the ruler acted as Prince Elector Frederick August I, ruling the Electorate between 1694 and 1733) in Rawa Ruska, where the two signaled their aggressive intentions toward Sweden. These first discussions evolved into the Treaty of Preobrazhenskoye (1699); see C.M. Соловьев, op. cit., p. 583; [W. Konopczyński], *Karl XII och Polen.* (Särtyck up Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok 1924), Stockholm 1925, p. 57.

[141] Ю.С. Савельев, *Подготовка Петром I Великого посольства в Европу*, [in:] *Петр Великий – реформатор России...*, pp. 217–226; В.М. Матвеев, *«Дипломатия в верхах» в XVII веке: Петр I и Вилгельм III в Утрехте и в Лондоне (1697–1698)*, [in:] ibidem, pp. 227–246; И.В. Козловский, *Петр I в Дептфорде*, [in:] ibidem, pp. 247–254; А.В. Манько, *Великое посольство и строительство морского коммерческого флота России*, [in:] ibidem, pp. 267–271;



Map 2. Main stages of Peter I's travels in Europe, 1697–1698.
(According to the Gregorian calendar). 1697: March 17 – Veliky Novgorod, March 21 – Pskov, April 10 – Riga, April 20 – Mitau, May 2 – Lippau, May 17 – Königsberg, July 14 – Kolber, July 30 – Berlin, August 2 – Magdeburg, August 6 – Coppenbrügge (Coppenbrügge Castle), August 17 – Amsterdam, August 29 – Zaandam, September 10 – Utrecht, September 26 – The Hague. 1698: January 21 – London, February 9 – Deptford, April 27/28 – Leiden, May 25 – Kleve, June 10 – Leipzig, June 11 – Dresden, June 15 – Prague, June 26 – Vienna, July 16 – Pressburg (Bratislava), August 3 – Wieliczka (near Cracow), August 13 – Rawa Ruska, August 18 – Brześć Litewski, August 30 – Smolensk, September 4 – Moscow.
Source: own study based on sources and studies cited in Chapter 3.

Novgorod
Riga
Moscow
Königsberg
Smolensk
Minsk
Dresden
Prague
Cracow
Rawa Ruska
Vienna
800 km
20°E
30°E
40°E

situation, with Sweden's perennial enemy, Denmark, gearing for a showdown with Stockholm, followed shortly thereafter by the Elector of Saxony and King of Poland (since June 1697), Augustus II the Strong.[142]

Owing to its sizable composition, as well as its political stature, the mission became known as the Grand Embassy. Heading the retinue were three grand ambassadors: Franz Lefort, Fyodor Golovin, and Prokopy Voznitsyn, as well as the tsar himself, traveling incognito under the guise of a simple soldier of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, Peter Mikhailov.[143] The route of Peter I's party spanned those European countries deemed the most relevant to Russia's political and economic interests (see Map 2).[144] The trip began in February/March 1697, concluding in October of

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В.М. Соловьев, *Петровская модернизация России в контексте Великого посольства*, [in:] ibidem, pp. 272–277; Е.И. Кобзарева, *От первой Северной войны 1655–1661 гг. к Великой Северной Войне 1700–1721 гг. и Полтаве: Россия и ее потенциальные союзники в борьбе против Швеции*, [in:] *Полтава. К 300-летию Полтавского сражения. Сборник статей*, редкол. О.Г. Агеева и др., Москва 2009, p. 29.

[142] *J.A.* Gierowski, *Władca w dwóch państwach. Unia personalna z perspektywy monarchów*, [in:] idem, *Na szlakach Rzeczypospolitej w nowożytnej Europie*, ed. A.K. Link-Lenczowski, Kraków 2008, pp. 319–341.

[143] The exact number of people participating in the Grand Embassy is difficult to determine due to personnel rotations. There were also separate groups traveling along different routes, assigned with different tasks. According to a study by Dmitry and Irina Guzevich, between 250 and 300 people left Moscow (no less than 244), with the "nucleus" of the mission, standing at 200, traveling around Europe from July 1697 onwards; see Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., pp. 63–64, приложения, № IV, pp. 369–374.

[144] According to the original plan, the Grand Embassy was to call on the following cities: Riga-Mitau-Königsberg-Vienna-Rome-Venice, before touring the Netherlands, England, Denmark and Brandenburg; see ПДС, т. 8: *Сношения Царей и Великих Князей Иоанна и Петра Алексеевичей с римским императором Леопольдом в 1695–1697 годах*, Санкт-Петербург 1867, col. 661–662. In June 1697, the route was revised and the Grand Ambassadors skipped Vienna, heading directly to the Netherlands. This decision was most likely dictated by the start of a peace congress in Rijswijk, near The Hague, intended to end the ongoing war between France and the countries of the Augsburg League; see Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, p. 18; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., pp. 54–56.

the following year.[145] The majority of the passage took place overland, with only some sections traversed aboard ships and vessels.[146]

In carrying out his political plans, the Russian ruler met with the likes of Duke Frederick Casimir Kettler of Courland (Mitau), the Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, Frederick III (Königsberg), the Electress of Hanover Sophia Dorothea Wittelsbach and her daughter, Electress of Brandenburg Sophia Charlotte of Hanover (Coppenbrügge), Emperor Leopold I (Vienna), as well as the Polish King and Elector of Saxony, Augustus II the Strong (Rawa Ruska). He repeatedly held talks with the Stadtholder of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and King of England and Scotland, William of Orange (Utrecht, The Hague, London).[147] (see Map 2).

The idea was for the participants of the Grand Embassy to study the political and economic system of the various countries, in order to adapt the solutions observed to Russian reality. This role was entrusted to, among others, Adam Weyde, who formally held no high office. His participation in the mission was twofold. First, he was expected to travel ahead of the ambassadors and present the rulers of the successive capitals with the tsar's *gramotas*, notifying them of the imminent arrival of Russian diplomats, and to fulfill all sorts of orders of a diplomatic and organizational nature (including finding and arranging quarters for the

[145] The Grand Embassy formally ended on June 18, 1699, with the return of the Grand Ambassador Prokopy Voznitsyn, who arrived in Moscow after the other two envoys. Voznitsyn had been dispatched to Karlowitz to participate in the negotiations between representatives of the Holy League states and Turkey regarding the end of the war that had been going on since 1683.

[146] For example, Peter I sailed from Libau to Pillau on the Lübeck-owned ship Saint George, then to Königsberg (and back) aboard a Brandenburg and Prussian ship, and from Pillau to Kolberg on a Dutch vessel. He then set sail for London, where he cruised down the Thames aboard the *Royal Transport*.

[147] В.А. Артамонов, *От царства к империи. Изменение державной мощи России при Петре Великом*, [in:] *Петр Великий – реформатор России…*, pp. 34–39; В.М. Матвеев, *«Дипломатия в верхах» в XVII веке…*, pp. 227–246; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., pp. 38–39.

grand ambassadors).[148] Secondly, the tsar ordered him to study the overall functioning of the army of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the Saxon, Dutch, French and English military forces.[149] According to all indications, Weyde convinced Peter I to allow him to participate in the German campaign against Turkey on Hungarian territory, as confirmed by the relevant passage from his 1698 *Regulations*.[150] In light of the theory discussed in the introduction to this study, one can conclude that Peter I sought to establish actors able to advance the development of the Russian state based on European standards. Sometimes, however, it was the people from the tsar's inner circle who inspired him to entrust them with certain functions or commands (see Chart 1).

The official decree naming Adam Weyde a special emissary of Peter I was issued as early as December 26, 1696. A month later, the major received a tsarist *gramota* written in Latin and addressed to Emperor Leopold I. It contained information regarding the departure of the Russian diplomatic mission to western Europe and the arrival of the grand ambassadors in Vienna. Later in the document, the tsar requested the emperor to allow his envoy to travel to Saxony and Brandenburg to announce the Russian visit there as well, and then to Hungary, where he was to join the imperial army and familiarize himself with its organization. A similar document was also addressed to the Elector of Saxony,

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[148] ПДС, т. 8, col. 1307–1327; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Aktywność Rosji po rozdwojonej elekcji – czerwiec–sierpień 1697 r.*, "Kwartalnik Historyczny" 115 (2008),1, pp. 22–23; V. Barth, *Inkognito: Geschichte eines Zeremoniells*, München 2013, pp. 110–111.

[149] П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий...*, p. 19; B. Davies, op. cit., p. 63; СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, p. 43; ВЭ, т. 3, pp. 274–275; ВЭЛ, т. 3, pp. 168–169.

[150] "In particular, when Your Most Gracious Imperial Majesty dispatched me to the various European courts two years prior to the Grand Embassy, you ordered me, at my request, to journey to Hungarian territories, where I was to accompany the German army for the sake of studying and testing anything deemed befitting and most necessary in both preparing the army and in readying it for grand battles, a duty I have fulfilled with great zeal;" see Адам Вейде. Воинский устав, БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. I Б, № 5, л. 18об. (See Figure 4.2).

Frederick Augustus I (who was soon to be elected the King of Poland, too), whom Peter I requested to allow Weyde to accompany his army during its Hungarian campaign against Turkey. Relevant letters heralding the imminent arrival of the grand ambassadors were also delivered to Duke Frederick Casimir Kettler of Courland and the Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, Frederick III.[151] However, the main destination of the tsar's friend and associate was Vienna, where he was to join the grand ambassadors.[152]

Following his departure from Moscow on January 25 or 26, 1697, the route of Adam Weyde's mission first led to Veliky Novgorod and Pskov. As early as February 10 (20), he reached Swedish-ruled Riga, from where he continued westward. He was about to call on many European courts. The first such visit fell on February 13 (23) in Mitau, the seat of the Duke of Courland. The next meeting took place on March 20 (30) in Königsberg, where Weyde was received by the Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia. However, the most important meetings were held in Vienna. There, Weyde delivered the tsar's letters to Emperor Leopold I and the Elector of Saxony, who was in the city at the time. According to the Russian historian Nikolai Bantysh-Kamensky, Weyde's audience with both rulers took place on May 5 (15). He then remained in Vienna for a whole month, where he familiarized himself with the workings of the imperial administration and military. The next leg of his travels was to be

[151] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, p. 18; ПДС, т. 8, col. 469–498. In the above source text, the rank of "brigadier general of the Preobrazhensky select infantry regiment" is attributed to Adam Weyde. In fact, the promotion to that rank only occurred later. In addition, Major Weyde and Mikhail Volkov, who accompanied him on the Posolsky Prikaz, were issued a letter from the tsar requesting permission for their free movement in the countries specified; see Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Обзор внешних сношений России (по 1800 год)*, ч. 1: *(Австрия, Англия, Венгрия, Голландия, Дания, Испания)*, Москва 1894, p. 37; idem, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, p. 253.

[152] In fact, the general's meeting with the grand deputies and the tsar took place at the end of 1697 in the Netherlands, since the Grand Embassy arrived in the United Provinces of the Netherlands ahead of schedule.

the United Provinces of the Netherlands, from where he was to report on his journey so far to Peter I, who was in the Netherlands himself, and to the grand ambassadors.[153] The information provided by Kamensky is not fully accurate, as it fails to account for the tsar's envoy's participation in the military campaign against Turkey.

The fact that Adam Weyde was staying in Vienna in the spring of 1697 is confirmed in the diary records of the tsar's pantler Pyotr Tolstoy, who was stationed in the imperial capital at the time. According to an entry in Tolstoy's diary, the meeting between the two Russian diplomats took place on May 24: "At that time the Muscovite envoy, foreigner Adam Adamovich, Wejt's son [i.e. Adam Weyde], visited me for lunch, after which we went for a stroll at the imperial garden. Adam rode in his carriage, while I rented one for the duration of the day."[154]

Weyde's presence in Vienna at the time is also confirmed by the reports of the Polish "Sejm" journal of May 25 (June 4) 1697. It reported on foreign affairs, such as the preparations of Prince Eugene of Savoy's army for the upcoming military campaign against Turkey. It also mentioned that Peter I had dispatched his envoys to the West, with assurances addressed to the existing allies regarding the continuation of military operations conducted as part of the anti-Turkish coalition.[155]

Interestingly, while in Vienna, in addition to carrying out tasks related to the expected arrival of the grand ambassadors, the major of the Preobrazhensky Regiment also catered to the tsar's subjects arriving in

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[153] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, pp. 253–254.

[154] *Путешествие стольника П.А. Толстого по Европе 1697–1699*, изд. подгот. Л.А. Ольшевская, С.Н. Травников, Москва 1992, p. 40.

[155] [Dyáriusz Seimu Electionis pod Wàrszáwą], Z Wárszáwy, 4. Junij 1697, p. 4.

the city. He used this time primarily to learn more about the regulations of the imperial army and the works of military theorists.[156]

Still more valuable was the practical side of Weyde's mission, as he had the opportunity to accompany the Imperial troops in the campaign against the Turks in the Balkans. This enabled him to shadow the commanders, the operations of the general staff, and the organization and training of the troops, all from up-close. Originally, it was Elector Frederick August I of Saxony who was to serve as the commander-in-chief of the expedition, and to this end he appeared in Vienna in the spring of 1697. However, the dynamically changing international situation and the increasing chances of the elector securing the Polish crown forced him to relinquish command of the campaign.[157] Also not without impact was the controversy over his command of the combined Imperial-Saxon forces in the anti-Turkish campaign in Hungary (1695-1696). Ultimately, the function was entrusted to Prince Eugene of Savoy.[158] Participating in

[156] For more on imperial military law at the time, see J. Kostka, *Observationes Militares Theoretico-Practicae, über den kayserlichen Articuls-Brief Leopoldi Primi…*, Wien 1738. Kostka's study offers a jurisprudential analysis of Leopold I's military articles of 1668. Adam Weyde likely had the opportunity to study various printed regulations of the era, not only those in force in the Holy Roman Empire. One of them was the treatise by Pierre Giffart, cited in the introduction, and its translation into German by Johann S. Gruber (for more details, see Chapter 4).

[157] The negotiations related to the Elector's ascension to the Polish throne took place in complete secrecy in Vienna. His resignation from command of the army to fight the Turks was by no means a foregone conclusion. As per reports of the Brunswick newspaper *Post Zeitung*, the elector, who left for Dresden in June 1697, was expected to rejoin the army operating in Hungary before long; see J. Staszewski, *August II Mocny*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1998, p. 56; J.A. Gierowski, *August II Mocny w świetle brunszwickiego „Post Zeitung"*, [in:] idem, *Na szlakach Rzeczypospolitej…*, p. 365.

[158] For more on the subject, see *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen. Nach den Feld-Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen, herausgegeben von der Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte des k.k. Kriegs-Archives*, Serie I, Bd. 2: *Feldzüge gegen die Türken 1697–1698 und der Karlowitzer Fride*, bearbeitet von M. E. von Angeli, Wien 1876, pp. 9–25.



Map 3. Operational activities (route and locations of military camps) from July 12 to September 31, 1697.
Source: *Campementen und Marchen kays. Haubt-Armée in Hungarn und Bossnien zwischen den Donau, Teiss, Sau, und Bossnien Flus anno 1697,* Vojenský historický ústav Praha, call no. IIR F 1444 [in the manuscript, map 1 – excerpt].

Darta
Mohats
Wukow ar
DANAV
Petz
MATIASCH marast
Somb
PARTS REGNI HVNG ARIA
Brovion
Beteha
SENTA
Battalia
Figur der
Sant
Lager
BONADVS : TEMESWARI.
ENSIS.
Klein kanitza
Segetin

the hostilities and the key battle fought against the Turks at Zenta[159] on September 1 (11) (see Map 3) was Major Weyde.[160]

An opportunity to partake in the most glorious campaigns of the seventeenth century (both operationally and tactically) could not be overestimated. The Viennese court was keenly aware of a counteroffensive being mounted by the Turkish side. The war was still unresolved, and at stake was Belgrade, captured by the German forces in 1688 and reclaimed by the Turks two years later.[161] On April 8 (18), 1697, the 100,000-strong army of Sultan Mustafa II, commanded by Grand Vizier Elmas Mehmed Pasha, set out from Edirne (former Adrianople) to capture Hungary. Turkish troops did not reach Belgrade until August 8 (18), whereupon they headed northwest toward Szeged (see Map 3 – "Szeget").[162] Prince Eugene of Savoy took official command of the allied army, stretched over the Sava River near a tributary of the Drina (now on the border of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina - Map 3, Camp 1), on July 2 (12). Since his forces were half the size of his opponent's, Eugene decided to go on the defensive and concentrated on defending the Tisza and Danube rivers, building fortifications at Zemun near Belgrade (map 3 - Semblin) as a step towards the capture of the latter the following year. Having learned of the Turkish army's intention to cross the Tisza near Zenta, the imperial staff, whose reconnaissance was far superior to the enemy's, both on land and along the rivers, chose to move in that direction. Using as many as six marching columns at a time, the Duke of Savoy's army reached the vicinity of Zenta

[159] Now the town of Senta, Serbia (coordinates: 45°56'N 20°05'E).
[160] W. Oppenheimer, *Eugeniusz książę Sabaudzki*, transl. A. Marcinek, Warszawa 1997, p. 59; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, op. cit., pp. 23–24; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, pp. 77–78; Ł. Pabich, *Zenta 11 IX 1697*, Zabrze–Tarnowskie Góry 2012.
[161] For more on the subject, see V. Abramović, *Један војнички дневник из времена аустријске опсаде Београда (1688),* "Vojnoistorijski glsanik" 2 (2013), pp. 237–252.
[162] Thus, the core of the Turkish forces only covered an average of 6.1 km per day, which shows the enormity of the logistical difficulties they encountered.

in no time and, forcing their way through marshy and swampy terrain, emerged at the rear of the heavily fortified Turkish encampment, where most of the infantry, artillery and some cavalry units were located. The remainder of the Turkish force—part of the cavalry and heavy artillery—had already crossed to the east bank of the Tisza. Eugene pounced on the opportunity thus presented, with Sultan Mehmed II's forces split and inconveniently dislocated. September 1 (11), 1697 saw a frontal attack by the Imperial troops, who breached the field fortifications and forced the enemy to flee. The bridge on the Tisza, which had been shelled and overcrowded with men, collapsed, causing total panic in the Turkish army (Figure 3.1). The victors' spoils included eighty-seven cannons, 423 banners, thousands of carts, camels, and oxen. Also falling into the prince's hands was the Grand Vizier's treasury and state seal. Noteworthy is the disparity in casualties, seldom seen in Europe at the time: the imperial army lost up to 2,000 soldiers (including only 429 killed), while the enemy casualties amounted to between 20,000 and 30,000 men, with the demoralized Janissaries strangling the vizier during the retreat.[163] The victory of the imperial troops was determined by superior terrestrial reconnaissance and greater operability. The battle itself demonstrated the tactical and technological superiority of infantry and artillery (see Figure 3.1).[164]

The Hungarian campaign made Adam Weyde keenly aware of the need to reform the Russian army along the line of the Austrian standards, with Eugene of Savoy emerging as an undisputed role model for the major

[163] J. Nouzille, *La campagne décisive du prince Eugène en Hongrie (1697)*, "Dix-septième siècle" 4 (2005), pp. 627–639; J. Bahlcke, *Die Schlacht bei Zenta und die Eroberung Sarajevos 1697*, "Ostdeutsche Gedenktage. Persönlichkeiten und historische Ereignisse" 33 (1997), pp. 287–293; Ł. Pabich, op. cit., passim; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., p. 187. For a log book containing a map of operational activities, imperial army camps, and the Battle of Zenta, see *Campementen und Marchen kays. Haubt-Armée in Hungarn und Bossnien zwischen den Donau, Teiss, Sau, und Bossnien Flus anno 1697*, Vojenský historický ústav Praha, call no. IIR F 1444 (see Map 3).

[164] For more on the subject, see *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen…*, pp. 145–160.

Figure 3.1. Attack and capture of the Turkish encampment by imperial troops at Zenta on September 1 (11), 1697.
Source: *Attaque, et prise du Retranchement Turque faite par les Trouppes Imperiales sous la conduite, et commendement de son altesse Serenissime Monsegneur le Prince Eugen de Sauoye le 11. sept. 1697* (no publisher information available).

rque faite par les Trouppes Imperiales sous
mendement de
EUR le PRINCE EUGENE de SAVOYE
e 1697.
Explication.
A. Nostre magazin
B. Retranchement de l'
C. Autre Retranchement de l'
D. Pont de l'ennemy sur la Tibisque.
E. Tête du Pont du côté du
F. Batterie de l'ennemy de trois pieces.
G. Camp de l'ennemy
H. Lenta
Ordre de Bataille des Trouppes Imperiales
1. Savoya drag.
2. Salm.
3. Caprara.
4. Mothernik
5. Gondola
6. Heister
7. Cronsfeld
8. Brandembourg
9. Anhalt
10. St Galy Saxe
11. Brandembourg
12. Solari
13. Zollern
14. Corbelli
15. Guido
16. Pfeer
17. Nigrelli
18. Neuburg
19. Mansfeldt
20. Stirum drag.
1e Ligne
21. Sereny
22. Darmbstat
23. Kackleberg
24. Heister
25. Vitri
26. Herbenstein
27. Rehm
28. St Galy Saxe
29. Brandembourg
30. Thüffi
31. Nieiburg
32. Marsigli
33. Liechtenstein
34. Saxe cuir.
35. Saxe drag.
36. Dietrichstein
2e Ligne
Flanc droit
37. Rabutin
38. Baden
39. Truchsaxe
40. Bagni
Flanc gauche
41. Sauerstein
42. Staudemont
43. Alt Stahrmberg
44. Schlick
45. Chariots à munition
46. Chemin couvert
47. Chemin
Seghedin
Marais
Marais
Marais
H
H
G

of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. Weyde held the leadership quality of Eugene of Savoy in the highest regard and "was proud of the fact that, when preparing to engage the enemy, his majesty Prince Eugene, with his inbred benevolence and courtesy, also sought advice with him, Weyde."[165].

For the tsar's envoy, the experience gained during the expedition proved invaluable, significantly impacting the substance of his Military Regulations, wherein he noted that achieving military success depended not so much on the number of one's troops, but on their "proper organization."[166] Weyde informed Peter I of the clash he witnessed first-hand in a letter sent in its aftermath. The document also contained an interesting piece of information, since a captured Turkish pasha testified before the Imperial General Staff, mentioning a Turkish prophecy of the Russians conquering Tsargorod (Constantinople) in 1699.[167]

While participation in the hostilities on the Turkish front was of paramount importance to the tsar's emissary, his main task was to help navigate the entourage of the grand ambassadors around Europe. Source materials indicate that Major Weyde appeared in Amsterdam on October 25 (November 4), where he handed over to the grand ambassadors his envoy's dossier (*statiejnye spisky*), as well as the "tsar's *gramota* and the letter from the Duke of Courland."[168] The documents were annotated with the place and date of their issuance: Vienna, May 26 (June 5), and Mitava, February 17 (27), 1697, respectively.[169] The above fact confirms

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[165] И.Г. Корб, op. cit., p. 237. The idea of the commander-in-chief seeking advice from the other members of the staff instead of authoritatively deciding the course of the battle impressed Adam Weyde profoundly, so much so that he incorporated it into his own *Military Regulations*.

[166] For a detailed description, see Chapter 2 of this study.

[167] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, приложения, № I: 18, p. 429. It was not until October 5 (15), 1697 that this correspondence did not reach Peter I, who was visiting Amsterdam at the time.

[168] ПДС, т. 8, col. 1064; А.Г. Гуськов, *Великое посольство Петра I. Источниковедеческое исследование*, Москва 2005, p. 63.

[169] ПДС, т. 8, col. 1065–1067.

that Weyde remained within the borders of the Holy Roman Empire until the autumn of 1697, initially staying in Vienna before following the German troops to Zenta, where the aforementioned battle with the Turks took place in September.

It was not until he arrived in the Netherlands on October 27 (November 6) that the Grand Ambassadors, acting on the tsar's instructions, ordered Major Weyde to meet with the Swedish envoy to the Hague, Nils Lillieroth. Weyde was to invite him to a meeting concerning Swedish-Russian relations. Lillieroth appeared in Amsterdam, where the Russians received him in a most favorable manner. During the talks, the need to maintain peace was raised, alongside the various problems of European politics, including France, Turkey and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[170]

As a participant in the Grand Embassy, Major Weyde manifested his interest in naval affairs. He had several opportunities to do so when visiting the Netherlands and England.[171] On November 28 (December 8), 1697, when a triumphal reception was held at the headquarters of the Grand Deputies in Amsterdam in honor of the Russian troops who had been victorious on the Turkish front, Weyde was dispatched on a special mission. Later that same day, Peter I ordered Major Weyde to London, to present King William III of England with a detailed account of the recent victories over the Turks and Crimean Tartars. He also received a letter from Grand Ambassador Lefort to Rear Admiral Peregrine Osoborne Carmarthen, in which the former thanked the latter for the information concerning the "ship or frigate" built as a gift for the tsar. Adam Weyde was instructed to inspect the ship and inquire as to whose gift it

[170] ПДС, т. 8, col. 1070–1075.

[171] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 354; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, pp. 89–90; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., pp. 184, 187; СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, p. 43.

was—the King's or Parliament's—and when its transfer would take place. The major of the Preobrazhensky Regiment was also ordered to thoroughly reconnoiter the operation and organization of the English state while on English soil.[172]

On November 29 (December 8), Adam Weyde left Amsterdam for the British Isles, beginning the first leg of his "English" journey, which lasted until December 26, 1696 (January 5, 1697). On the day of his return, he reported on his nearly month-long stay there to the Grand Ambassadors, informing them that the English King had sent three ships and two yachts for those members of the Grand Embassy who would like to visit England.[173] Soon, as early as January 7 (17), 1698, Peter I, with an entourage of nineteen, including Weyde, boarded the ships bound for England, sent by William III.[174] Once there, the tsar had the opportunity to behold the royal gift: the *Royal Transport*, a state-of-the-art yacht (in the words of Adam Weyde, a frigate)[175] of the English fleet, seventy-four feet long (keel length) and armed with twenty six-pound cannons.[176] On April 21-25 (May 1-4), Peter I had the opportunity to test the yacht in question on a cruise down the Thames.[177] He learned to steer the vessel from

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[172] F. Lefort to P.O. Carmarthen, Amsterdam, November 28, 1697, [in:] *Britain and Russia in the Age of Peter the Great: Historical Documents*, transl., ed. by S. Dixon et al., London 1998, p. 10; С.И. Елагин, *История русского флота. Период Азовский. Приложения*, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1864, приложения, № X: 2, p. 478; А.Г. Гуськов, op. cit., p. 61.

[173] ПДС, т. 8, col. 1115–1120, 1153; Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, p. 254. His mission was well rewarded, for as early as December 31, 1697, the Grand Ambassador sent an order to Moscow to issue half of Major Weyde's annual salary to his wife; see ПДС, т. 8 col. 1153.

[174] Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., p. 184.

[175] С.И. Елагин, op. cit., приложения, № X:3, p. 479.

[176] Idem, op. cit., p. 94. Szerzej zob. А.В. Иванов, *Истоки русской кораблестроительной школы: английская яхта «The Royal Transport»*, [in:] *Меншиковские чтения 2011*, отв. ред. П.А. Кротов, вып. 9, Санкт-Петербург 2012, pp. 39–56.

[177] С.И. Елагин, op. cit., приложения, № X: 1, pp. 476–478; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., p. 376. In 1698, the *Royal Transport*, along with her crew hired in England, was sent back to Arkhangelsk, where she supplied the tsar's navy operating in the White Sea.

Rear Admiral Carmarthen himself, who accompanied the tsar throughout his stay in England. The monarch appreciated his services, granting the admiral monopoly in tobacco trade with Russia.[178] While in London, Weyde, along with Peter I, Jacob Bruce and Cornelius Cruys, met with members of the Royal Society, among whom were Isaac Newton and Edmund Halley.[179]

Adam Weyde's tour of Europe as part of the Grand Embassy culminated in July 1698 in Vienna, where the grand ambassadors and the tsar had been staying since June. The major's work was appreciated, as he became one of Peter I's closest confidants. The ruler took his friend to a masquerade to play the so-called game of *Wirtschaft* (homestead).[180] The festivities took place on July 11 (21), with the tsar accompanied by seven Muscovite cavaliers (including Adam Weyde).[181]

The Austrian capital was initially intended as the next stage of the tsar's tour before visiting Venice and Rome. As early as July 15 (25), Emperor Leopold I briefly met with Peter I, who was planning to leave for Southern Europe. However, his plans were thwarted by the deeply disturbing letter sent from Moscow by Prince Fyodor Romodanovsky, who reported the discovery of Tsarevna Sophia's plot against the tsar,[182]

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[178] W.A. Serczyk, *Piotr I Wielki*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1973, p. 69; W.F. Ryan, *Peter the Great's English Yacht: Admiral Lord Carmarthen and the Russian Tobacco Monopoly*, "The Mariner's Mirror" 1 (1983), pp. 65–87.

[179] K.J. Whitmer, *The Halle Orphanage as Scientific Community. Observation, Eclecticism, and Pietism in the Early Enlightenment*, Chicago–London 2015, pp. 89, 156.

[180] *Wirtschaft* was an elite game in which participants dressed up and played various assigned or drawn roles (usually professional, social, national); see K. Łopatecki, *Nowożytna zabawa w Gospodarstwo a współczesne gry fabularne*, "Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne" 26 (2015), p. 115–130.

[181] The major thus joined the elite group of the grand ambassadors and Secretary Pyotr Lefort. Each of those selected had to purchase a costume representing the selected character, at the expense of the Russian authorities. Е. Погосян, *Первые маскарады Петра Великого (1698 г.)*, https://www.ruthenia.ru/document/539858.html (accessed November 10, 2020).

[182] Starting in 1682, Peter I shared power with his half-brother Ivan V, who, due to his mental disability, played no significant role in state affairs. Due to the minority of both rulers, between 1682

concurrent with riflemen's mutiny. The letter was dated June 17 (27), and took nearly a month to reach Vienna.

Cognizant of the gravity of the situation, Peter left Vienna on July 19 (29) and set out for Moscow, accompanied by a small retinue. Among his entourage was Adam Weyde. The ride was almost non-stop, and the return journey led directly via the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[183] It was not until July 23 (August 2) that their traveling speed decreased, when, in the vicinity of Krakow, the tsar received news that the situation in the capital had been contained. Peter I decided not to stay in the Polish capital, but went to nearby Wieliczka to visit the salt mine there on July 24 (August 3). A day later, the ruler and his retinue were already near Bochnia, where he had the first opportunity to observe the exercises of the Polish and Saxon armies encamped there. The subsequent return route led through Dębica, Sędziszów, Rzeszów, Łańcut, Przeworsk, Jarosław, Rawa Ruska (where the aforementioned meeting with Augustus II took place), Zamość, Chełm, Brest-Litovsk, Pruzhany, Slonim, Mir, Minsk, Bobr, Shklov and Smolensk, where the tsar arrived on August 20 (30). Five days later, in the evening hours, Peter I and his entourage reached Moscow (see Maps 2 and 4).[184]

At this point it is necessary to discuss in more detail the several-day meeting of the two monarchs in Rawa Ruska, which had a significant impact on the Russian military reforms, undertaken soon thereafter.

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and 1689 it was Tsarevna Sophia Alexeyevna who exercised the regency over the brothers, with the support of Prince Vasily Golitsyn, with whom she had a romantic relationship. Like Ivan, Sophia descended from Tsar Alexei Romanov's first union with Maria Miloslavskaya, while Peter was the son of the ruler's second wife, Natalya Naryshkina. In 1689, Peter I removed the regent from power and, with the help of the Naryshkinites, took independent rule (the official co-regency of Peter I and Ivan V came to an end in 1696, following the latter's passing).

[183] For the first four days, the party traveled on horseback, covering an impressive average distance of 98.25 km a day.

[184] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, pp. 135–151; W.A. Serczyk, op. cit., pp. 76–79.

On August 1–3 (11–13), 1698, Augustus II, Peter I and his companions, including, of course, Adam Weyde, received permission to take a closer look at the Saxon army advancing against the Tatars in the region of Kamieniec Podolski. On August 1 (11), the tsar and the king observed the maneuvers of the Saxon cavalry, and the following day Peter witnessed the exercises of the infantry units. On August 3 (13), the rulers traveled to nearby Tomaszów Lubelski, where Peter was once again able to scrutinize the Saxon regiments in detail, also studying the arrangement of their encampment.[185] The military information gained at that time proved valuable to both the tsar himself and Major Weyde. As noted by Pavel Bobrovsky, a personal meeting with the electoral commander and military theorist General Johann (Hans) Friedrich von Flemming (Fleming), who was present on site, was equally valuable.[186]

Adam Weyde's journeys around Europe—from his departure from Moscow in 1697 until his arrival to meet the tsar in Vienna the following year—are shown on Map 4, with a detailed itinerary outlined in Table 1.

[185] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, p. 337. The tsar had already had a chance to learn more about military issues related to the Saxon army. On June 2 (12), 1698, he toured the Main Arsenal in Dresden for three hours with great interest. Two days later, on June 4 (14), he keenly examined the arsenal of the Königstein fortress; see Д. Гузевич, *И.* Гузевич, op. cit., p. 194; A. Querengässer, *Das kursächsische Militär im Großen Nordischen Krieg 1700–1717*, Paderborn 2019, p. 32.

[186] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, p. 339. It was not until 1726 (a year after Peter I's death) that Flemming published his opus magnum in Leipzig (standing at over 800 pages and divided into six parts) devoted to the overall functioning of infantry forces after the reforms involving the abolition of the pikemen and the introduction of the bayonet, rifles and grenadier units; see H.F. Fleming, *Der vollkommene Teutsche Soldat, welcher die gantze Kriegs-Wissenschafft, insonderheit was bey der Infanterie vorkommt*, Leipzig 1726.

Table 1. Adam Weyde's journeys during the Grand Embassy (1697–1698)

Date	City	Event(s)	Average traveling speed
January 25 or 26 / February 4 or 5, 1697	Moscow	Departure	–
February 1/11, 1697	Veliky Novgorod	Arrival	75.7–88.3 km/day
February 3 / February 13, 1697	Pskov	Arrival; Erik Dahlberg's briefing on Weyde's European mission.	105 km/day
February 4/14, 1697	Pskov	Departure for Riga (briefing from the Voivode of Pskov).	–
February 9/19, 1697	Riga	Reception of Adam Weyde in Riga.	55.6 km/day
February 12/22,1697	Riga	Departure for Courland.	
February 13/23, 1697	Mitau	Meeting with Prince Frederick Casimir Kettler.	42.4 km/day
February 17/27, 1697	Mitau	Presentation of the letter from the Duke of Courland to Adam Weyde.	–
March 5/15, 1697		Adam Weyde's letter reporting on his reception by the Duke of Courland.	–
March 20/30, 1697	Königsberg	Meeting with the Duke of Prussia and Elector of Brandenburg Frederick III Hohenzollern.	–
May 5/15, 1697	Vienna	Meeting with Emperor Leopold I and Saxon Elector Frederick I August.	55.3 km/day
May 26 / June 5, 1697	Vienna	Adam Weyde receives letter from Emperor Leopold addressed to Peter I.	–

Date	City	Event(s)	Average traveling speed
June 30 / July 10, 1697	Vienna	Adam Weyde's letter to the Grand Ambassadors informing them of his arrival in Austria [the Grand Deputies received this letter on August 16/26, 1697].	–
After June 30 / July 10, 1697		Adam Weyde joins the imperial army and takes part in the campaign against Turkey.	–
September 1/11, 1697	Zenta	Adam Weyde participates in the Battle of Zenta; has a conversation with Prince Eugene of Savoy.	–
October 10 / 20, 1697	Vienna	Adam Weyde's letter to Franz Lefort reporting on his mission and the latest developments in the war.	–
October 25 / November 4, 1697	Amsterdam	Adam Weyde reaches the Russian Grand Ambassadors, meets with the tsar and reports on his mission.	–
October 27 / November 6, 1697	The Hague	Meeting with Swedish envoy to The Hague, Nils Lillieroth.	58.4 km/day
No later than November 28 / December 8, 1697 - until at least December 10/20, 1697	London	Adam Weyde delivers the tsar's *gramota* to England, stays in London.	–
January 1698	The Netherlands, Amsterdam	Return to the Netherlands.	–
January 7/17, 1698 – April 25/ May 4, 1698	England	Adam Weyde (likely) visits England with Peter I and his entourage.	–

Date	City	Event(s)	Average traveling speed
Until end of April / early May,1698	The Netherlands	Stay in the Netherlands and return to the Reich; Adam Weyde leaves for Saxony to herald the usher the arrival of the Grand Embassy.	–
May 30 / June 9, 1698	Leipzig	Meeting with the Russian Grand Ambassadors.	–
June 1698	Holy Roman Empire	Adam Weyde passes through Dresden, where he purchases a military book; on June 4/14, he arranges a corrody for the Russian retinue (from the town of Königstein in Bohemia). Between June 11/21 and June 12/22, the Grand Ambassadors arrive in Stockerau near Vienna (with Weyde preceding them by at least two days).	–
June 14 / 24, 1698	Stockerau-Vienna	Inspection of lodgings intended for the Grand Ambassadors	28.2 km/day
July 19, 1698	Vienna	Peter I and Adam Weyde depart for Moscow	–
July 23, 1698	Vicinity of Cracow	The tsar's retinue receives news of the quashing of the riflemen's rebellion	98,25 km/day
August 1-3, 1698	Rawa Ruska	Meeting with Augustus II	
August 20, 1698	Smolensk	Final leg of the journey	55.25 km/day
August 25, 1698	Moscow	End of Adam Weyde's mission	79 km/day

Source: own study based on: РНБ, ф. 444, (Лудольф Г-В), № 3, л. 9(1)–9 об.(1об.); ПДС, т. 8, passim; Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей...*, pp. 253–254; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., passim; А.Г. Гуськов, op. cit., passim.

The surviving sources reveal that Adam Weyde was a highly effective organizer, readily establishing contact with foreigners. His excellent physical condition enabled him to travel exceptionally long distances at an impressive speed, exceeding 100 kilometers a day. If necessary, he was able to travel without a carriage, and ride on horseback. His background, sharp mind and command of several languages allowed him to easily navigate the German and Dutch geographical and cultural realities. Weyde's stay in the Netherlands allowed him to revive relations with the Danish line of his family (see Figure 1.3). During his travels, he renewed old friendships and made new ones, in particular with those who shared a common social code (officers) and cultural code (Protestants, especially Pietists).[187] While this subject is difficult to grasp, it is perhaps best viewed in more detail through the lens of Weyde's friendship with Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf, a Pietist connected to the Halle center.[188]

A German scholar, Ludolf arrived in England in 1692 as secretary to a Dutch envoy, after which he entered the service of Queen Anne Stuart's husband Prince George Oldenburg (of Denmark), younger brother of King Christian V of Denmark (working as his secretary). That same year, he was sent to Russia as an official English envoy. His task was to establish diplomatic and commercial contacts with Moscow, which took place in 1693-1694. The trip proved extremely fruitful, no doubt thanks to Ludolf's knowledge of the Russian language. The uppermost echelon of Russian politicians received the foreigner warmly; he even received opportunities to hold direct talks with the likes of Peter I and Patriarch Adrian. He also enjoyed the favor of other influential people in the tsar's entourage. It was

[187] At that time, Weyde befriended the mayor of Amsterdam, Nicolaes Witsen, among others; see H.W. Ludolf to G.H. Neubauer, Halle, February 22, 1698, AFSt/HD 88, Bl. 151.
[188] E. Winter, *Halle als Ausgangspunkt der deutschen Russlandkunde im 18. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1953, pp. 73, 93–97.



Map 4. Stages of Adam Weyde's journey during the Grand Embassy
Source: own study based on: РНБ, ф. 444, (Лудольф Г-В), № 3, л. 9(1)–9об.(1об.); ПДС, т. 8, passim; Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., passim.


Novgorod
Pskov
Riga
Moscow
Königsberg
Smolensk
pzig
Wieliczka
ienna
Zenta
20°E
30°E
40°E

then that he first met Adam Weyde, who was a close associate of the tsar, and it was the Pietist ideology that brought the two together.[189]

In 1694, Ludolf returned to England, where he set to work on the first grammar of the Russian language (not Orthodox Slavonic, but spoken Russian) ever written in Latin.[190] His study was supplemented by a "treatise: or an overview devoted to the history of Russia: its fauna, flora, mineral wealth and inhabitants." Ludolf dedicated his work to Prince Boris Golitsyn, who had overseen his stay in Russia. In contrast, Peter I received a slightly different, bespoke version of this publication: it was devoid of a section on grammar, but contained dialogues, a proper treatise and an appendix titled *War as a Path to Peace*, which included a list of military terms.[191]

The participation of the tsar's associate in the Grand Embassy did not escape the attention of the Pietists. It provided Ludolf with a convenient opportunity to establish closer ties with Weyde.[192] This is evidenced by Adam Weyde's exchange of correspondence with Ludolf at the time.[193] In a letter dated January 3, 1698 (most likely according to the Gregorian calendar), the major, who was in Amsterdam, informed Ludolf that he

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[189] That the two were on friendly terms in 1693-1694 is corroborated by Ludolf's letter to Justus Samuel Scharschmidt. Ludolf recommended that Scharschmidt, who was leaving for Russia, seek the aid of Protestant friends and patrons, including the Moscow-based Adam Weyde. H.W. Ludolf to J.S. Scharschmidt, London, February 7, 1696, AFSt./HD 144: 1–3, Bl. 1–3.

[190] Ludolf's study was published in Oxford in 1696 as *Grammatica Russica*.

[191] [Г.В. Лудольф], Генрих Вильгельм Лудольф, *Русская грамматика, в которой изложены не только главные основы русского языка, но также и некоторое руководство по славянской грамматике. Присоединены образцы обычной разговорной речи с переводом на латинский и немецкий для тех, кто не знает латыни, а также краткий словарь природоведения. Оксфорд. Издание Шелдонова Театра. 1696 г.*, переизд., пер., вступ. ст. и примеч. Б.А. Ларина, Ленинград 1937; E. Winter, op. cit., pp. 74–77; О.А. Григорьева, *История русского литературного языка (словари и грамматики XV–XIX вв.). Хрестоматия*, Бишкек 2016, pp. 101–106.

[192] J.S. Scharschmidt to H.W. Ludolf, Moscow, July 1, 1697, AFSt/H C 296: 13, Bl. 1.

[193] The exchange of letters had started as early as the end of 1697 at the very least; see H.W. Ludolf to G.H. Neubauer, Halle, December 5, 1697, AFSt./HD 88: 133, Bl. 1–3v.

had just returned from London, which had impressed him greatly, and inquired about his health.[194] The scholar, who was then residing in Halle, where he gave the first-ever lecture on the Russian language at a European university, in the winter semester of 1697/1698, did not leave Weyde's letter unanswered.[195] Their correspondence did not end there. The two men would meet on various occasions, and their friendship, strengthened by their religious and ideological community (both were Pietists), continued. This is evidenced by the letters dating back as early as 1700, when the Swedes captured Weyde after Russia's defeat at the Battle of Narva. In the correspondence sent on August 1 (11), 1702 from London, Ludolf sympathizes with his friend's fate as a prisoner of war, at the same time emphasizing that, given the trying circumstances, he should humble himself and surrender to God's will. He also describes his trip to the Middle East – to Jerusalem and Egypt – which he embarked on shortly after their meeting (the two saw each other in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, where the major travelled as a member of the Grand Embassy. In the letter, Ludolf focused on what mattered most to him, outlining the situation of the Middle Eastern Christian Churches at the time.[196]

[194] A.A. Weyde to H.W. Ludolf, Amsterdam, January 3 (13), 1698, РНБ, ф. 444, (Лудольф Г–В), № 3, л. 9(1)–9об.(1об.).
[195] H.W. Ludolf to A.A. Weyde, Halle, January 1698, РНБ, ф. 444, № 1, л. 1–2об; see С. Менгель, *Неизвестный вариант русского литературного языка доломоносовского периода*, [in:] *Forma formans. Studi in onore di Boris Uspenskij*, a cura di S. Bertolissi, R. Salvatore, vol. 2, Napoli 2010, pp. 45–46.
[196] H.W. Ludolf to A.A. Weyde, London, August 11, 1702, AFSt./HD 23, Bl. 109v.–110v.

4. MILITARY REGULATIONS

Immediately after his return to Russia, Peter I determined to ultimately abandon the old army model still in use in Russia at the time, opting instead for a more modern military, formed in accordance with Western European standards.[197] The comprehensive modernization of all weapons of the land and naval forces could not have taken place without the support of foreign officers.[198]

The reformed army called for the introduction of state-of-the-art military regulations and articles. Entrusted with the task was Adam Weyde, a natural continuation of his duties during the Grand Embassy. While abroad in 1696–1698, he had the opportunity to observe the Austrian, French, Saxon, Dutch and English armies from up-close, both in terms of armaments, numbers, drills used, and operational measures taken. These observations were accompanied by the reading of foreign treaties, articles and military regulations.[199] As a result, Adam Weyde wrote his opus magnum, *Military Regulations, Compiled for and Dedicated to Peter the Great by General Weyde in the Year 1698* (Rus. *Воинский*

[197] P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...*, passim; П.А. Кротов, *Битва под Полтавой. Начало Великой России*, Санкт-Петербург 2014, passim.
[198] С.В. Черников, op. cit., pp. 699–735.
[199] М.О. Акишин, *У истоков юридической профессии в России: военные аудиторы Петра Великого*, "Ленинградский юридический журнал" 2 (2009), p. 118; B. Davies, op. cit., p. 63.

устав, составленный и посвященный Петру Великому генералом Вейде, в 1698 году).[200]

Regrettably, the exact circumstances surrounding the drafting of Weyde's work remain unknown. All we know is that he wrote it in Moscow before the end of 1698. According to Weyde himself, he resolved to draft the *Regulations* on his own (see Figure 4.2).[201] Weyde intended the document as a token of gratitude for the tsar's favor and written with a clear hope for subsequent promotion. The chronology of events leads one to assume that Weyde must have embarked on this work immediately upon his return to the capital on August 25, 1698.[202] In fact, he only had two months, September and October, to complete the *Regulations*,[203] for as early as October 23—together with the tsar and Vice Admiral Cornelius Cruys, newly enlisted in the Netherlands—he left for Voronezh (arriving there on October 31) and then set off for Azov, where Peter oversaw the construction of Russian warships.[204] With the tsar returning to Moscow as late as December 20, it is highly likely that Weyde remained in the south of the country for an extended period of time.[205] Even if they both made it back to the capital by the end of the year, the work could not have

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[200] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., passim.

[201] "I have taken the liberty to write this study and submit it to Your Imperial Majesty to reciprocate the love you have extended to me on numerous occasions. I also hope that Your Imperial Majesty shall regard the contents of this book with benevolent favor, regardless of its minor proportions and for all its faults;" see А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 18v–19.

[202] The traveling speed between Vienna and Moscow made it rather impossible for Weyde to commence his work during the return journey (see Table 1).

[203] As early as October 26, 1698, Adam Weyde and his wife attended a feast hosted by the tsar in Moscow. We can surmise that the sign of Peter I's favor was related to Weyde's work on his *Military Regulations*. И.Г. Корб, op. cit., p. 99.

[204] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 248, приложения, № 49: I, pp. 443–444; И.Г. Корб, op. cit., pp. 101, 104; Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, p. 254.

[205] Veronezh was most likely the scene of some sort of dispute between Adam Weyde and Peter I or an outburst of the monarch's, as noted in J. Korb's account: "He [Adam Weyde], too, came to bear the brunt of the lightning bolts cast by the angered Zeus [Peter I], and so he shall never forget just

been written in the closing days of December, since its publication predated the establishment of the so-called "School of Infantry" (discussed in more detail in the following sections of this chapter). In conclusion, we believe that Weyde must have penned his *Regulations* in September and completed the work in October 1698.

The authors of this present study translated the treatise into Polish and supplemented it with a critical commentary, as it was published back in 2022.[206] It is worthwhile here signaling the sources that inspired Weyde's work. Pavel Bobrovsky believed that the *Regulations* were the result of Weyde's participation in the Hungarian campaign at the side of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Weyde also borrowed from the military standards enforced in the army of Louis XIV.[207] On the other hand, according to literary historian Semyon Vengerov, the tsar's associate was not familiar with Swedish regulations (in particular, the articles of Charles XI). One piece of evidence supporting this hypothesis is the absence of regulations governing the field and regimental staff of the reformed army.[208]

Thanks to the quantitative analysis used, the content of the 1698 *Regulations* gives a clear indication as to the countries whose laws Weyde drew from. When making direct references to the solutions existing in each state, Weyde hints twenty-one times at the army of the Holy Roman Empire, while also mentioning the French, Saxon, and Dutch armies on four, three, and one occasion, respectively. If one considers that the six

how fickle and unsteady his fortunes proved in Voronezh, so as to teach him to face both happiness and adversity with equal resolve;" see *И.Г.* Корб, op. cit., p. 237.

[206] The publication also cites and characterizes other manuscript variants of the *Regulations* held in Russian archives, which, due to significant differences with the rectified version of the *Regulations* held in the collection of the BAN, are not the subject of discussion in this study. For more on the subject, see *Adam Weyde. Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 roku…*, pp. 48–69.

[207] П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий…*, pp. 19, 49–50; idem, Вейде Адам Адамович…, p. 1; ВЭ, т. 3, pp. 274–275; R. Wittram, op. cit., p. 7.

[208] С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 262.



Chart 3. Direct references to military laws of other countries made in Adam Weyde's *Regulations*. Source: own study.

references to the Turkish army were most often linked to the 1697 campaign that culminated in the Battle of Zenta, then a total of 71% of all entries refer directly or indirectly to the imperial army. The small number of references to the Russian army may suggest that Weyde did not strive to effect evolutionary changes and did not account for the customs in force in the tsar's army (see Chart 3).

The above quantitative analysis leaves no doubt that, when drafting his treatise, the future senator drew primarily from the regulations then in force in the Holy Roman Empire's army.[209] In addition, he acquainted

[209] Some of the most prominent imperial regulations in this regard include the following: Kaysers Leopoldi Kriegs-Ordnung vor Dero Miliz (1658); Kaysers Leopoldi Decret, woraus erhellet, dass die Regiments Gelder bei Dero Miliz in Concurlen vor anderen einen Vorzug haben (1663); Kaysers Leopoldi Patent, die Kreiegs-Disciplin bei Dero Miliz betreffend (1677); Kaysers Leopoldi Duell-Edict, vor Dero gesamte Miliz (1682); Verordnung des Königl. Obers-Amts im herszogthum

himself with various military treaties published in Western and Central Europe. In fact, not only did he study them, but he was also involved in the purchase of military books for the tsar's library, which, incidentally, was among his assignments during the Grand Embassy.[210] Much like the tsar's other associates,[211] Adam Weyde relied on his foreign contacts to import specialist literature (codes, regulations, treatises, etc.) of use in implementing state reforms. For example, towards the end of his journeys, on June 9 (19), 1698, while staying in Stockerau near Vienna, he settled

Schlesien, was künsstig bei denen March-Routen der Kayser Miliz zu beobachten (1684); Kaysers Leopoldi Edict, die Beobachtung guter Disciplin und Ordnung bei Dero Miliz betreffend (1684); Kaysers Leopoldi Patent wider aller-hand Gebrechen, und sonderlich die Duell. Balg-Rauf-und Rumor-händel, Mord und Todtschläge (1687); Kaysers Leopoldi Reglement vor Dero Miliz die Oeconomic und Disciplin bei derselben betreffend (1697). See J.Ch. Lünig, *Corpus Iuris Militaris Des Heil. Röm. Reichs sowol Der Röm. Kayserl. Majestät, als auch Desselben Reich und dessen Creisse insgemein, ingleichen Aller Churfürstern…*, Lepzig 1723, unpag. [*Andere Theil oder Pars Specialis…*, nr 204–211].

[210] In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, no institution existed that could be referred to as the Library of Peter I. The books acquired outside the country by the monarch's associates at his behest, using state funds, were shipped to the tsar's court and remained at Peter I's disposal. On the other hand, the titles purchased by Peter's associates constituted their private property. There were also confiscations of private book collections for the benefit of the treasury, such as the 1703 seizure of volumes collected by Andrey Vinius (some of them were subsequently returned to the owner) or those owned by Vice Chancellor Pyotr Shafirov in 1724. Over the years, the first group of books, along with some of those from private collections, as well as some of the "foreign" books acquired before Peter I ascended the throne, ended up in the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, forming the collection known as the "Library of Peter I;" see *Библиотека Петра Великого: Западноевропейские печатные книги. В 2-х т., 3-х кн.*, сост. И.В. Хмелевских, А.Е. Карначев, т. 1, кн. 1, Санкт-Петербург 2016, pp. 3–5, 8–44.

[211] Another participant in the Grand Embassy who, for virtually the entire duration of his service in the Russian army, sought out and imported books on military subjects from abroad for the tsar (while also translating them into Russian), was the Scotsman Jacob Bruce, promoted to the rank of general feldzeugmeister in 1704 and head of artillery of the Russian army. Like Weyde, Bruce was among the foreigners who made an indisputable contribution to the modernization of the armed forces undertaken by Peter I. For a more extensive account of Bruce's activities in the fields of the military (including military legislation, on which he collaborated with Adam Weyde), diplomacy, science and culture, see М.Д. Хмыров, op. cit., 2 (1866), pp. 81–136; 3 (1866), pp. 153–194; 4 (1866), pp. 249–291; E. Winter, op. cit., pp. 82–84; С.В. Ефимов, Л.К. Маковская, А.Н. Филимон, op. cit., pp. 6–23; S.W. Jefimow, op. cit., pp. 95–130.

a bill for the purchase of books acquired for Peter I in Dresden.[212] In July 1699, Weyde participated in the receipt of a voluminous shipment from the United Provinces of the Netherlands to Arkhangelsk. It contained as many as 600 different books, maps, etc., partly translated into Russian and published in the Amsterdam printing house of Jan Thessing.[213] He was also involved in the purchase of military books for the tsar after returning from Swedish captivity in 1710. This was evidenced by Justus Samuel Scharschmid, a representative of the Halle Pietists and a field preacher in the regiments under General Weyde, who noted that his patron had spent about fifty rubles each year on the purchase of books.[214]

Adam Weyde was also able to improve his theoretical qualifications in Moscow, although the list of military treatises available in the capital was not exceedingly long. He must have had access to both the French and German editions of Johann Jacob von Wallhausen's famous work *The Art of War on Foot*, as well as its Russian translation *The Training and Methods of Forming Ranks of Men on Foot*, which the tsar's army (specifically its "regiments of foreign provenance") adopted as an official regulation. He may have also studied the famous ancient treatise *Tactical Theory* by Aelianus (second century A.D.). Published in Venice in 1522, the first modern edition of this Greek text was part owned by Patriarch Matthew II of Constantinople. It subsequently found its way to Moscow in the mid-seventeenth century, where it was kept in the Greek-Latin school founded in 1653, or in the library of the Moscow Printing House.[215]

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[212] Д. Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., p. 278.

[213] Peter I met the publisher during the Grand Embassy in 1698; see П. Пекарский, *Наука и литература в России при Петре Великом*, т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1862, p. 12.

[214] E. Winter, op. cit., p. 94.

[215] И.Я. Вальхаузен, *1647 год. Учение и хитрость ратного строения пехотных людей*, ред. А.З. Мышлаевский, И.В. Парийский, Санкт-Петербург 1904; O.[V.] Rusakovskiy, *The Russian Edition of Johann Jacobi Wallhausen's «Kriegskunst zu Fuß» (1649): The History of A Failure?* "Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift" 1 (2020), pp. 1–25; *Библиотека Петра Великого. Указатель-*

A comparative analysis of Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations* of 1698 with similar European treatises that appeared at the time yields surprising results. The treatise makes extensive references to the solutions adopted by the French army (despite the relatively modest number of direct invocations – see Chart 3). Specifically, Adam Weyde was inspired by the regulations penned by Pierre Giffart and published in 1696 in Paris.[216] Not only are the contents of the two works consistent, but also some of the Russian prints were inspired by the engravings in the French book (see Figure 4.1). The above assessment, however, leaves some doubt, since the author was never dispatched to France during his mission. How, then, would he have purchased said regulations?

It appears that Giffart's book was widely distributed in the Reich thanks to the Augsburg publishing house run by Lorenz Kroniger.[217] The publisher released the book in 1697, adding a list of German names of weapon grips to the original text.[218] At roughly the same time, the Augsburg press also published Johann Sebastian Gruber's monumental military treatise, entitled *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin, Worinnen in drei besondern Theilen gehandelt wird* [The modern military discipline, discussed in three separate parts], which consisted of four parts (somewhat at odds with the book's title). The first three were Gruber's own work, while the fourth was a translation into German of a French text published a year earlier, along with a redesign of eighty-five prints depicting

справочник, сост. Е.И. Боброва, Ленинград 1978, p. 159; *Библиотека Петра Великого: Западноевропейские…*, pp. 52–54.

[216] P. Giffart, *L'art Militaire Françoise, pour l'infanterie. Contenant l'exercice et le maniement des Armes, tant des Officiers que des Soldats, réprésenté par des Figures en taille-douce déssinées d'aprés Nature…*, Paris 1696, passim.

[217] The French editions of the Augsburg publisher bore the inscription "Laurent Kroniger & Heritieurs Goebel," Marchand Libraires, while the German ones were marked "Lorentz Kroniger und Gottlieb Göbels Seel. Erben."

[218] P. Giffart, op. cit., Augsburg 1697.

different weapon grips (see Figure 4.1).[219] *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin* offers yet another holistic perspective on infantry warfare.

The first part includes a description of soldiers' duties and a typology of the military ranks comprising an infantry and dragoon company (Rus. *rota*). Also detailed are the officer ranks in infantry and cavalry units (including their respective food rations), with separate sections devoted to grenadiers, miners, engineers and the commissary office. Artillery is treated as a separate type of weapon, including its distinct personnel composition, a typology of guns in use, and artillery-engineering equipment. Another thorough discussion concerns the charges and functions of the general staff.[220]

The second part of Giffart's regulations contains information on provisions, recruitment and quartering, as well as marching and dismissals from the army.[221] Also included is a twelve-point Dueling Patent in use in the Dutch army at the time. This is followed by a description of courts-martial and a list of eighty-two Dutch military articles.[222] This normative act was supplemented by the Disciplins-Puncten regulations, drafted on May 20, 1695 and promulgated by prominent imperial leader Margrave Lieutenant General Ludwig Wilhelm Baden. This normative act consisted of twenty-five legal regulations, drawn up for

[219] The last part features different pagination and a separate title: *Die heutige Französische Kriegskunst von dem Fuß – Volck*.

[220] J.S. Gruber, *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin, Worinnen in drei besondern Theilen gehandelt wird*, Th. 1: *Von dem Zustand der Soldaten und deren Unterschied; Ingleichem von dem Chargen der Officierer, aller particularen und universalen Corporum*, Augspurg [1697] pp. 1–63.

[221] Ibidem, Th. 2, pp. 1–135 (*Von der Nachricht und Erklärung einiger Militarischen Terminorum und Observantien, wie solche bei den Milizen gemeiniglich pflegen gehalten zu warden. Samt einiger Einverleibten Reglementen*).

[222] Introduced in 1590, the Dutch Military Articles continued to generate considerable interest among military theorists and practitioners; see the Polish translation of the Dutch regulations (incorporating amendments introduced in 1705), *Ustawa stanów holenderskich i niderlandskich z 25 III 1706 r.*, Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności i Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Krakowie, call no. 974, col. 202–221.

Figure 4.1. Ramrod removal in light of various late seventeenth-century military regulations.
Source: P. Giffart, *L'art Militaire Françoise, pour l'infanterie...*, Paris 1696, p. 87 (fig. 44); *Die heutige Französische Kriegskunst*, [in:] J.S. Gruber, *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin, Worinnen in drei besondern Theilen gehandelt wird*, Augspurg 1697, p. 44ff; А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов). Воинский устав, сочиненный генералом Адамом Вейде и посвященный Петру I (1698 г.), БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. и Б., № 5 (Петр. гал. № 3), ил. 38.

the army operating alon the Rhine during the so-called Palatinate War, waged at the time.[223] The remaining chapters in this section are devoted to such issues as the posting of guards and patrols, saluting, the principles of laying sieges to fortresses, the activities of sutlers, and the collection of provender.

The third part of the book featured typical military regulations, including a description of drills (Figure 4.3).[224] It features commands and presentations of weapon grips for fuse muskets, muskets with bayonets, spades, as well as the actions performed by grenadiers when throwing grenades (unaccompanied by illustrations). Also described and provided with appropriate diagrams were the various movements (individual and collective) of soldiers with firearms and spades: countermarching, doubling ranks, forming squares (*bataillon quarre*). The entire treatise concludes with a German translation of the French regulations.

In order to reduce the cost of publication, both editions printed in Augsburg in 1697 featured an identical frontispiece (Figure 4.1), as well as prints depicting the respective drill components; however, the Augsburg prints differ from those used in the Paris edition. The Augsburg publications contain faithful copies of the Paris illustrations (albeit slightly subpar in terms of their craftsmanship), including some that featured certain

[223] Louis William of Baden was a cousin of Prince Eugene of Savoy on the side of his mother Louisa Christina of Savoy, sister of Prince Eugene Maurice of Savoy. He commanded imperial troops in the wars against France and Turkey, achieving significant victories, although he was not accorded the kind of victor's glory that fell to his cousin Eugene. For more details, see K.J. Bauer, *Ludwig Wilhelm Markgraf von Baden "Der Türkenlouis". Ein Lebensbild*, Heidelberg 1904; L. Korth, *Markgraf Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden – der Türkenlouis. Ein Zeit und Lebensbild*, Baden-Baden 1905; U.A. Oster, *Markgraf Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden. Der Türkenlouis. Feldherr im Schatten von Prinz Eugen*, Bergisch Glatbach 2001.

[224] J.S. Gruber, *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin…*, Th. 3, pp. 1–224 (*Von Modern Exercitis, der Musquetirer, Granadiren und Piqueniirer, nebenst einer klärichen Ausslegung aller Command-Worte, wie auch von denen Evolutionibus und mancherlei Formirung der Battaillionen und Regimentermit beigesetzen Figuren*).

corrections.[225] The influence of Giffard's and Gruber's prints is evident in the illustrations inside Adam Weyde's *Regulations*. However, one cannot reduce them to indiscriminate imitations (see Figure 5.1). The two older treatises show muskets with a matchlock, while the Russian one depicts flintlock rifles; also different is the cut of the uniform, as well as certain other details, including the position of the soldier's hands (fingers), legs (feet) and the weapon itself.[226]

We therefore believe that Adam Weyde acquired the German edition of Giffart's and Gruber's treatises in the Reich, and that these subsequently served as the foundation for his own regulations, drafted in Russian.[227] However, any mimicry of these treatises in Weyde's own work is limited. Much of the substance followed from his own observations on the operations of the Holy Roman Empire's army, as well as his personal experience. This can be seen in his description of the drill and the principles of combat featuring brand new weapons, i.e. flintlock rifles with bayonets and grenades, combined with a deliberate departure from profiling the atrophying pikemen formations.[228] Weyde deftly opted for appropri-

[225] For example, in the first edition, the two engravings depicting the use of the bayonet are identical. This has been corrected in the German edition; see P. Giffart, op. cit., (1696), pp. 123, 125 (fig. 62–63); *Die heutige Französische Kriegskunst*, [in:] J.S. Gruber, *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin...*, p. 62ff (fig. 62–63).

[226] The differences in detail are abundant, as clearly demonstrated by the prints juxtaposed in Figure 4.1. In Adam Weyde's *Regulations*, one notices that the Russian soldier rests his rifle on the ground. This was possible because he no longer had to hold the fuse and protect it from being extinguished. Leaning the butt against the ground caused the body alignment to change, thus granting the soldier a little more ease when loading and cleaning the weapon.

[227] Bolstering this hypothesis is the fact that Adam Weyde was familiar with Gruber's treatises, and in 1712 he even recommended them to Peter as the finest books on military affairs. See П. и Б., т. 12, вып. 1, ред. Л.Г. Бескровный, Б.Б. Кафенгауз, Л.А. Никифоров, Москва 1977, p. 373.

[228] There is no denying that Adam Weyde's solutions regarding the abandonment of pikes as the primary armament of the infantry were partially in use at the onset of Russia's war with Sweden. According to Russian historian Alexander Myshlaevsky, throughout the war, soldiers did not use this weapon and were armed with firearms and bayonets; see А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском...*, . XXVI. However, contradicting this claim are the findings of Kirill Ta-

ate simplifications of the provisions derived from Western European treatises (especially von Wallhausen's study),[229] imparting a new and at the same time clearer meaning to these passages. As a result, his *Regulations of 1698* can be classified as an innovative work.

Not only did Weyde's document constitute a manual for the practical study of the art of war but it also became something of a *Biblia Pauperum* and textbook for soldiers, not least on account of its numerous illustrations. The drawings were of considerable help in clarifying how to perform specific actions, aiding officers in training their subordinates (Figure 4.1). Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698* remained in effect, along with other regulations introduced over the years, until Peter I's *Military Code of 1716* came into force.[230]

Consequently, the question arises as to exactly how comprehensive these regulations were, and whether one can consider this work as an independent actant that played a modernizing role, irrespective of Adam Weyde's own fortunes. The work did not appear in print either at the end of the seventeenth or throughout the eighteenth century, and was

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tarnikov, who lists the exact number of pikes in possession of selected units during each year of the war. Moreover, Tatarnikov p. notes that in 1707 pikes were reinstated throughout the entire Russian infantry and that, according to the tsar's order, pikemen were to comprise one-eighth of each regiment. This translated into 144 soldiers, who were "deprived of their weapons and ammunition bags, instead receiving 'pikemen's lances' or so-called 'soldier's pikes,' consisting of an approximately four-meter shaft, an iron thimble, and a proper iron blade." This did not mean that the soldier was entirely dependent on the pole weapon in his possession, for in place of a rifle he was also entitled to a pistol and the attendant accessories; see К.В. Татарников, *Русская полевая армия 1700–1730. Обмундирование и снаряжение*, Москва 2008, pp. 108–109. These weapons could also be used in other ways, most notably for defensive purposes, including the preparation of *chevaux de frise* or the fortification of earthworks.

[229] А.Н. Гребенкин, *Подготовка русского офицерского корпуса в строевых частях во второй половине XVII – первой половине XVIII века*, "Вестник Волгоградского государственного университета," серия 4: История. Регионоведение. Международные отношения, 4 (2017), p. 122.

[230] P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia...*, pp. 367–398. For more on the subject, see *Adam Weyde. Regulamin wojskowy z 1698 roku...*, passim.

only known through manuscript copies, which significantly reduced its potential impact on the evolution of the Russian military.[231] That its printing was planned is evidenced by the production of fifty-six illustrations, transferable to copperplate (Figure 5.1). Perhaps thwarting the publication plans was the Russian defeat at Narva and Adam Weyde's fall into Swedish captivity in 1700. Nonetheless, we believe that Peter I accepted the manuscript of the *Regulations* as the official manual of the art of war on foot, putting it into practice. Our claim rests on four premises.

First, as we demonstrate later in this study, significant portions of Adam Weyde's regulations were replicated in the Russian military code adopted in 1716.[232] This makes for a very strong premise, as it suggests that despite the issuance of successive regulations, the guidelines developed by the tsar's associate at the end of the seventeenth century were still in use and, more importantly, held in high regard.[233]

Second, directly after the promulgation of the Regulations, a military educational institution was established, operating within the Posolsky Prikaz (equivalent to the modern Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Historiographers have referred to it as the School of Infantry. Unfortunately, any information concerning the school is rudimentary; although, it is generally acknowledged that the head of the institution was Adam Weyde (it is

[231] С.Ю. Дутов, *Военное книгоиздание в России в XVIII в. Опыт статистического анализа*, "Библиосфера" 3 (2007), p. 14.

[232] KWPI, passim.

[233] In March 1700, Avtamon Golovin, with the personal participation of Peter I, and based on the previous achievements of Russian military theory, drafted a new instruction for the army titled *Military Articles*, emphasizing the efficient use of firepower and bayonets. The defeat of the Russian army at Narva in November 1700 and the tsar's simultaneous decision to restore its military potential resulted in the passing of a substantially simplified military regulations for the army, known as the *Concise Regulations*. In the following years, Russian soldiers became bound by the provisions of other instructions and regulations, which emerged in respond to the various wartime contingencies; see P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie ustawodawstwo wojskowe doby panowania Piotra I*, [in:] *Organizacja armii w nowożytnej Europie: struktura – urzędy – prawo – finanse*, ed. K. Łopatecki, Zabrze 2011, pp. 404–412.

Figure 4.2. Manuscript cover of Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698*
Source: А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов). Воинский устав, сочиненный генералом Адамом Вейде и посвященный Петру I (1698 г.), БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. I Б, № 5 (Петр. гал. № 3). Photograph from the authors' collection (photo by K. Łopatecki).



also possible that the School of Infantry was established on his initiative) and that it specialized in military training (after completing the course, alumni were awarded the rank of standard-bearer). The School of Infantry most likely functioned for just over a year, as no records of its activities beyond 1699 have survived.[234] On the other hand, Adam Weyde should not be recognized as the organizer and faculty member of a simultaneously established school dealing with "calculations and measurements," i.e., the School of Artillery, which trained future artillery specialists.[235]

Third, shortly after drafting the *Regulations*, Weyde proceeded to train prospective soldiers of the new infantry and dragoon regiments. Appointed major general (immediately after or during his return from the Grand Embassy), he was instructed to instruct the 1699 army conscripts: *stolniks* (pantlers), *striapchy* (palace servants) and *zhyltsy* (representatives of provincial nobility performing temporary military service in the capital), in accordance with the solutions in force in the Holy Roman Empire's army, which he had adopted the year before.[236] In addition, he conducted recruitment among the nobility of the patriarchal estates for the aforementioned dragoon regiments, whom he also taught the military trade.[237] Aiding Weyde in these training activities at the time were the fellow officers of Peter's army. According to the findings of American

[234] Д. Струков, *Московская Пушкарская школа. (Из истории первого военного училища России времен Петра Великого)*, "Военный сборник" 1 (1892), p. 142.

[235] See Ibidem; Е.Г. Сидоренко, *Первая артиллерийско-инженерная школа в России*, [in:] *Сборник исследований и материалов Артиллерийского Исторического музея*, вып. 3, Ленинград 1958, p. 83; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...*, p. 181; В.Н. Бенда, *Вклад военно-специальных артиллерийских и инженерных школ в укрепление обороноспособности России в первой половине XVIII столетия*, "Исторические, философские, политические и юридические науки, культурология и искусствоведение. Вопросы теории и практики" 8 (2012), 2, p. 26.

[236] П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий...*, p. 23.

[237] П. и Б., т. 2, ред. А.Ф. Бычков, Санкт-Петербург, 1889, p. 16. Initially, the training of dragoons most likely proceeded according to the regulations drafted by Adam Weyde, since by that time no separate regulation applicable to soldiers of this formation had existed. Other documents of this

historian Brian Davies, all regiments formed between 1699 and 1700 (a total of twenty-seven infantry and two dragoon units) were to hold daily drills based on Weyde's *Regulations*.[238]

Fourth, handwritten copies of the *Regulations* were made, which seems understandable considering the lessons learned from von Wallhausen's book. Back in 1647, the Muscovite authorities resolved to translate (under the direction of Prince Nikita Odoevsky) Wallhausen's seminal treatise *The Art of War on Foot*, which the German author wrote in 1615.[239] After two years, upon receipt of the prints ordered in the Netherlands, the book went into sale as a binding military regulation.[240] Efforts were made to disseminate the edition, with one copy sold at the price of one ruble. Out of 1,200 copies, as little as thirteen were distributed free of charge, and it took the next eight years to sell another 121.[241] Therefore, in line with the earlier experience, transcribing Adam Weyde's (concise) *Regulations* seemed the preferred option. To date, researchers of Russian military history have failed to determine how many such copies were made in total (nor do they mention that such attempts were made). It should be noted that the *Regulations* drafted by the general are now preserved in one archival copy that can be considered a model version

kind were first adopted only in the early eighteenth century, perhaps as early as 1701. For more details, see *Военные уставы Петра Великого…*, pp. 30–38.

[238] B. Davies, op. cit., p. 64.

[239] J.J. von Wallhausen, *Kriegskunst zu Fuß*, Oppenheim 1615. The treatise was very popular and, as a result, it lived to see translations and subsequent editions in the seventeenth century, for example: idem, *Kriegskunst zu Fuss*, Leuwarden 1630.

[240] И.Я. Вальхаузен, op. cit.; П.О. Бобровский, *История 13-го Лейб-Гренадерского Эриванского Его Величества полка за 250 лет. Часть первая*, Санкт-Петербург 1892, p. 8; A.P. Janco, *Training in the Amusements of Mars: Peter the Great, War Games and the Science of War, 1673–1699*, "Russian History" 30 (2003), 1, p. 66.

[241] И. Починская, *Влияние церковной реформы патриарха Никона на развитие Московского печатного двора*, "Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski" 1 (2019), pp. 18, 26; E. Razin, *Historia sztuki wojennej*, vol. 3: *Sztuka wojenna manufakturowego okresu wojen*, transl. I. Bukowski, Warszawa 1964, p. 262; A.P. Janco, op. cit., pp. 66–67.

(Figure 4.2), and in three other, highly dissimilar copies,[242] whose fragments have been abridged and modified. In addition, considering its size, the manuscript could easily fit into an officer's jacket's pocket. All of the above points to its strictly utilitarian nature (see Figure 4.2).[243] The number of copies must have been considerable, since it was used to drill nearly thirty newly formed regiments of the Russian army.[244]

The regulations in question undoubtedly stood as a significant actant in the development of the Russian military (Chart 1). Even though Adam Weyde remained in Swedish captivity from the end of 1700 until the beginning of 1711 (see Chapter 7), his work continued to exert continuous influence. As such, the general was not forgotten, as continually evidenced by the name of the division he created between 1699 and 1700.

Save for the introduction, the layout of the *Regulations* does not follow individual chapters. However, an analysis of the text in terms of substance allows for five different sections to be distinguished.[245] So what did it contribute that was new and how did it facilitate changes in the

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[242] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 18–109; И.Н. Лебедева, *Библиотека Петра I. Описание рукописных книг*, Санкт-Петербург 2003, p. 132; П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий...*, p. 26; П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович...*, p. 9; *Описание русских и словенских рукописей Румянцовского музеума*, сост. А. Востоков, Санкт-Петербург 1842, pp. 15, 533–534.

[243] K. Łopatecki, *„Disciplina militaris" w wojskach...*, pp. 502–503.

[244] Methodologically, the approach to the preserved copies varies. As a rule, a larger number of surviving objects indicates their greater distribution. At the same time, scholars point to the phenomenon of "wearing out" copies of manuscripts. Consequently, very popular spiritual books addressed to the military are often known from single copies only. One researcher of this phenomenon, Miroslaw Lenart, points out that their uniqueness indicates their intensive use and indirectly proves their popularity. Thus, one may venture a conservative conclusion that for a print or manuscript used by officers during wars to have survived until the present is a rarity (for an interesting exception to this rule, see Figure 11.3). See M. Lenart, *Dwa polskie teksty „ku przyzbrojeniu wojownikowi chrześcijańskiemu" z pierwszej połowy XVII wieku*, "Napis" 12 (2006), p. 291; see M.A. Korzo, *Jeszcze raz w sprawie nieznanego tłumaczenia Jana Kalwina w Polsce*, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce" 56 (2012), pp. 191–192.

[245] The description that follows is based on: А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 18–109. Pavel Bobrovsky distinguished between three main parts in the

structures of the Russian military? First, the *Regulations* helped standardize military ranks and duties, while also introducing a uniform division into troop types. A particularly significant role was played by the *rotas* (fashioned after European companies) and the officers (captains, lieutenants and standard-bearers), non-commissioned officers (sergeants, cadets, captenarmuses, scribes, corporals) and signal officers therein. However, Weyde does not authoritatively define the size of a *rota*, indicating that it should comprise between sixty and 120 men. Within a *rota*, he proposes the use of smaller squads (*kapralstvo*), but does so inconsistently, as on some occasions he divides the rota into between two to four squads, and at other times into three to five such units.

A larger organizational troop was the battalion, consisting of three to five *rotas*; in turn, battalions themselves constituted half or a third of a regiment (between eight and twelve *rotas*). The regiment was commanded by colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors, with the assistance of quartermasters, adjutants, quartermasters, camp commanders provosts. According to Weyde's cautious opinion, larger tactical unions consisting of two to five regiments, which he referred to as brigades, should be formed. In turn, he termed several brigades with a total strength of at least 15,000–20,000 soldiers an army. In doing so, he opposed oversized units, which give rise to provisions and organization problems, suggesting that a perfect military force should stand at around 40,000 soldiers.

In line with the guidelines presented, the army was to be overseen by a *generalissimus* or voivode who would be in charge of infantry and cavalry generals and a field marshal. The army should also have a commissary general, quartermaster general, adjutant general, auditor general and engineer general. Each of these functions is briefly characterized not

Regulations, from which one can extract other subsections by more detailed analysis; see П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий…*, p. 26; idem, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, pp. 9–22.



Figure 4.3. Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698* (excerpt)
Source: А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 18об.–19. Photograph from the authors' collection (photo by K. Łopatecki).



величество наследержаніе сея пінкрицы,
Хотя сіе ималые трѣды. ищитъ небезпорно
сѣть, однакожъ смятивымъ благодареніемъ
вбрите. а особливо, понеже внеи опойнищю,
дѣле пишетъ, ѣзре, вооружихъ вшихъ нестра
ноѣсть, ибо вше Црское величество отого, иже
рѣцтъ имышцы побрани укрѣпляетъ, избранъ
воемати, исилъ непрятелныхъ сопрѣшати, тесо
ради своею высокою особою нипаного страха
наводъ, инасѣхомъ пѣти невстрашалася, но ра
ловъди подданымъ своимъ противъ непрятеля
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жалъ, Потомъ вше величество остася. за
бывъ всѣ Врстят своемъ, имѣющю ѣдо=
бность, Прохлады, ипокои, блиско два лѣтъ,
Гемъ подобного нинашихъ прежнихъ. издревнихъ
бытіяхъ необрѣтаетсяѣ несмотря насвою вслые
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лыхъ ѣпотребляль, но непрестанно вещадилъ
трѣдовъ Вонинанін, инспытанін Полъешен,
мѣре шляхетныхъ, воинныхъ хитростѣ наводъ,
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шшін, онегоже вся сила, инято сдыше нисходитъ,
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мѣдростію. силою. кротостію. дапрестолъ вше

only in terms of their respective rights and obligations, but also in terms of personnel selection. One gets the impression, however, that the duties of those who were to perform them were not specified, which may have provided the grounds for subsequent detailed work on the organization of the army.

The second part of the *Regulations* covers drills. The authors of this study feel that it makes for the most interesting part of Weyde's text. It contains instructions for training the new Russian army. It does not feature divagations, but rather specific rules. Weyde's proposal to introduce Russian (rather than the original German) commands seems to be particularly innovative. Noting the nationalization of the units comprising the reorganized military was Robert Frost, among others.[246] Similar measures were also implemented in other Slavic countries. For example, the adaptation of the language of commands in the regulations to the language used by rank-and-file soldiers also took place in Poland.[247]

One issue on which Adam Weyde dwells at length concerns whether it is better to prepare soldiers in four shallower ranks, or in deeper units with a shorter front, consisting of six ranks. According to Weyde, it was necessary to abandon the countermarch used until then and adopt a different way of firing, which prevented confusion in the ranks. This was due to the fact that instead of the classic countermarch, a different way of shooting was used, preventing disorderly formation. This arrangement allowed for more frequent volleys and secured the flanks.[248]

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[246] Naturally, this applied to lower officer positions only, up to and including the rank of captain. R.I. Frost, *The Northern Wars. War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721*, Harlow 2000, pp. 237–238.

[247] B. Lipowski, *Piechotne ćwiczenie albo woiennosc piesza…*, Kraków 1660; source edition: J. Wimmer, *Błażeja Lipowskiego pierwszy polski regulamin piechoty*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości" 20 (1976), pp. 345–357.

[248] Up until 1702, the Russian infantry was arrayed in six ranks, with subsequent instructions envisioning a formation of four ranks; see B. Davies, op. cit., p. 68.

As for drills, they were to be conducted by a colonel, and in his absence by a lieutenant colonel or major. The drill leader should sit on horseback and, with the help of signal officer, call out successive actions. On the other hand, the soldiers should not talk, so as to avoid unnecessary noise. It seems crucial for the author to have all activities performed "in three tempos." The key issue was the correct combination of weapon grips and actions and carrying them out at the same time. Weyde identifies three actions within a single sequence of moves. The seven sequences described amount to a total of twenty-one weapon grips, which privates were expected to execute in a competent fashion.

Once the soldiers learned to perform the basic drill, they had to train the combined sequence of eight actions: shoulder arms – present arms – order arms – ground arms – take up arms – present arms – reverse arms – shoulder arms – present arms. In addition, the author included two special positions for funerals and rainy weather.

The activities related to the third phase of training, which concern the preparation of soldiers for shooting, turn out to be the most important. Given that Weyde cites the flintlock rifle—devoid of the fuse and rest—as a model weapon, all the loading, aiming and shooting actions he describes are straightforward. He lists a mere sixteen of them, from opening the pan to taking the shot.

Summarizing this section, it is worth contrasting it with the provisions of von Wallhausen's treatise *The Art of War on Foot*, translated into Russian back in 1647. In the case of handguns, the number of grips was as high as 143, with only forty-seven recommended in Weyde's *Regulations*.[249] What the tsar's associate failed to do was to extend the drills performed in "three tempos" so that they extended over all types of activities.

[249] J.J. von Wallhausen, op. cit., Leuwarden 1630, pp. 37–38; see O. Rusakovskiy, *The Russian Edition...*, pp. 1–25.

Weyde glosses over this fact by merely acknowledging the need to draw the soldiers' attention to firing at the same time. Moreover, in the descriptive passage, he clarifies that it is for this very reason that he inserted sixteen relevant commands. He postulates that the procedure should be shortened to only two commands: "load arms" and "at the ready" (and, by implication, two more orders: "aim" and "fire"). However, he emphasizes the need to train soldiers according to a single scheme (regulation). Without it, "one will execute it [the order] more ineptly, the other more efficiently and, in addition, each shall employ his own measures, causing a kind of disorder that is easy to envisage."[250] Ultimately, however, the fourteen grips can be summarized with a single command: "load arms and [hold them] at the ready."

The *Regulations* introduce three commands specific to grenadiers, as well as orders issued to soldiers when inserting a plug bayonet into the barrel of a rifle (nineteen commands). The author does not recommend over-complicating the act of throwing grenades or handling the bayonet. Instead, he suggests assign grenadiers to special (by implication, the heaviest) tasks, such as moving *chevaux-de-frise*, etc. The passage on bayonet use is the most laconic in the entire *Regulations*. The eleven positions exercised with the bayonet rifle are patterned after the old pikemen's grips (unfortunately, Weyde only emphasizes their defensive nature).[251]

The third part deals with whole unit maneuvers. This section, too, is highly relevant, as it provides drill instructions for the newly-formed *rotas* and regiments. In contrast to the second part, which contains some novel solutions, this section of the *Regulations* directly draws on the work of Johann Sebastian Gruber.[252] Thus, what we are actually dealing with

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[250] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 80.
[251] B. Davies, op. cit., p. 68.
[252] J.S. Gruber, op. cit., Th. 3, pp. 140–163.

here is a process of doubling rows and ranks and rotating troops. While the prints of the soldier's grips allude to Giffart's work, the illustrations in this section are more complicated, as Weyde references seven prints absent from the manuscripts of the *Regulations* as we know them. The matter becomes clearer after confronting Weyde's descriptions with Gruber's book. One can notice that the specific descriptions found in the German edition are accompanied by diagrams, which are absent from analogous passages in Adam Weyde's *Regulations* (Figure 4.3).[253] By comparing the two works, we were able to solve the mystery of the missing illustrations and at the same time establish the pattern (source of inspiration) used by Weyde when drafting the *Regulations*.

The *Regulations* provide a detailed description of the *battaillon de quarre* (actually *bataillon carré*).[254] It was a formation used in clashes with cavalry, which could strike infantry units by surprise. This solution was notable for its effectiveness especially against Tatar, Turkish and Polish-Lithuanian armies. From the perspective of the Russian military, it was an invaluable, battle-tested formation, employed successfully, among others, in the last war of the Holy League states against the Ottoman

[253] Weyde must have nonetheless produced illustrations analogous to those in Gruber's work, as he described an arrangement of twenty-four soldiers arrayed in four ranks and six rows, while Gruber's consists of four and eight, respectively (thirty-two soldiers in total). When doubling the rows, in Gruber has sixteen soldiers standing in each of the two lines, while Weyde's variant only featured twelve soldiers (see Figure 4.3).

[254] In the mid-eighteenth century, Denis Diderot defined this type of formation as one that featured two distinct variants: the classical, in which the square was entirely filled with soldiers (Fr. *bataillon quarré à center plein*), and the hollow one, empty in the middle (Fr. *bataillon quarré à center vuide*). According to the author, the first type was completely outdated at the time, as it rendered the entire unit exposed to cannon fire, and prevented the soldiers located in the center of the formation from shooting. Thus, the solution recommended by Adam Weyde proved to be significantly more effective and easier to implement; see D. Diderot, *Encyclopédie: ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, vol. 2, Paris 1751, p. 136.



146 Der heutigen Kriegs-Disciplin

34.

Marchiret.

Die vorigen Glieder tretten wider mit dem lincken Fuß zugleich an / und marchiren in vier Schritten in ihre vorstehende Glieder / und stellen sich an die lincke Seithe ihres vorstehenden Mannes / observiren auch weiter das jenige / was bey vorigem marchiren gesaget ist / folget die Figur:

Oder:

Das andere und vierdte Glied machen lincks umb / und wann sie herauß marchiret sind / machen sie rechts umb / und hängen sich an die zwey Glieder / so stehen bliben / und kommet die Figur also:

Figure 4.4. Diagrams for doubling rows left and right in the work of J.S. Gruber, which A. Weyde adapted in his *Regulations*
Source: J.S. Gruber, *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin, Worinnen in drei besondern Theilen gehandelt wird*, Th. III: *Von Modern Exercitis, der Musquetirer, Granadiren und Piqueniirer, nebenst einer klärichen Ausslegung aller Command-Worte, wie auch von denen Evolutionibus und mancherlei Formirung der Battaillionen und Regimenter mit beigesetzen Figuren*, Augspurg 1697, pp. 146, 143.

Bataillon.

Front.

A. o o o o o o o o o B.
C. o o o o o o o o o D.
E. o o o o o o o o o F.
G. o o o o o o o o o H.

Flanc.

AB. CD. EF. GH. werden Glieder genennet / item die Breite der Bataillon, so allhie 8. Mann breit ist.

AG. aber und BH. sind die Reihen/oder wird die Höhe der Bataillon genennet / so vier Mann hoch stehet. Folget nun die Form vorbesagten Dublirung.

Front.



Oder auff eine andere Manier.



Das

Porte (1683–1699).[255] Weyde recommends forming the ranks by breaking battalions into smaller units, i.e. *rotas*, consisting of three squads standing in four rows each. Assuming six *rotas* per battalion, this means seventy-two rows (six by three by four). Two-thirds of the rows form four sides, and the remaining one-third is divided into four parts to bolster the corners. The corner section consists of six rows and six ranks, so it would extend the length of the side (twelve) by six additional rows on each flank. The result is a square with a width of twenty-four soldiers and a depth of six rows, totaling 432 soldiers. One must admit that this proposal required refinement. Admittedly, the author had already eliminated pikemen from the calculations but had not added the locations of grenadiers and field artillery. While this formation was also described in Gruber, it was Weyde who simplified and shortened its description (at the expense of legibility) and followed distinctly different assumptions based not on the total number of soldiers, but on the *rotas* and squads comprising the battalion.[256]

The fourth part of the *Regulations* concerns the principles of firing. The author ties them to the functioning of the *battaillon de quarre*, but in this case one should treat the description more broadly. The method of continuous firing is another important concept noted by Adam Weyde. He proposed abandoning the use of countermarching, that is, the stepping out of the first rank to fire a volley before retiring to the rear of the unit for reloading. Instead, he opts for two distinct types of firing. The first involved shooting a volley followed by "reloading while kneeling" (*niederfahlen*). This entailed the soldiers kneeling down to reload, with

[255] For more on the potential use of this formation in the Russian army, see L.R. Lewitter, *Jean-Nicole Moreau de Brasey's Letter on the Moldavian Campaign of Peter I (1711): The Text that Puškin Did not Translate: British Library MS 37358ff. 479–485v.*, "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas" 4 (1992), p. 525.

[256] J.S. Gruber, op. cit., Th. 3, pp. 209–218.

the firing rank standing up to shoot its own volley in the meantime. The downside of this solution was the need to reload while kneeling, which was incompatible with grip training (see Figure 4.1). The second method was platoon firing, with all ranks firing simultaneously. However, for this to be possible, the formation had to contract to three ranks (therefore doubling the number of rows in the formation). The number of rows designates a platoon; Weyde indicates that the front should consist of four platoons. This solution was to be popular throughout Europe, especially in France. These two methods of continuous firing had proved their superiority during the Duke of Savoy's Hungarian campaign of 1697.[257]

The last section of the *Regulations* outlines dispatching principles and the various types of guards. It is a typical description devoid of innovative solutions.[258] It discusses the number of sentries around the officers, the need to announce a password, making one's rounds, as well as the main sound signals announcing curfew and wake-up.[259]

In conclusion, at the end of 1698, the Russian army received complete training materials concerning the principles of military drills, continuous fire exercises and basic commands for unit rotations. Added to these was Weyde's proposal on the formation of the *bataillon carré*, which was innovative on Russian soil. Readily applicable solutions also concerned the system of guards and the introduction of a special, more radical nocturnal regime. On the other hand, some of the less systematized

[257] Por. B. Davies, op. cit., p. 68.

[258] Pavel Bobrovsky argued that the provisions of Weyde's *Regulations* did not contribute much to the military code previously enforced in the Russian army, i.e. *The Training and Manners of Forming Ranks of Men on Foot*; see П.О. Бобровский, *Адам Адамович Вейде…*, p. 21; see И.Я. Вальхаузен, op. cit., pp. 264–272.

[259] See K. Łopatecki, *Instytucja wytrębowania hasła w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów*, "Białostockie Teki Historyczne" 3 (2005), pp. 75–100; idem, *Cykl dobowy wojska w Rzeczypospolitej w XVII i XVIII wieku*, [in:] *Człowiek wobec miar i czasu w przeszłości*, eds. P. Guzowski, M. Liedke, Kraków 2007, pp. 116–129.

панїе, потомъ ѡбатаїѡне ѡполкъ Бригадѣ, и бойске ꙋчиненѡ, какъ послѣдуетъ.

ѠРОТЄ ПЄХОТНОЙ.

Пехотою мочно разно слꙋжить, а имянно тако мꙋшкетѣръ, Гранадиръ, такожде и пикенировъ, єже нынѣшнее время єдва невсѣ ѡставлено, и вто мѣсто Ѳꙋзеи сагенетами ꙋпотребляютъ, ради того, дабы болши огнь имѣти рота пехотная єсть часть людей во р. до рк. чѣкъ, как ꙋцесарцовъ ꙋпотребляется, ꙋ Ѳранцꙋзовъ же неболе к. до о. чѣкъ бротꙋ беретсѧ.

ЧИНЫ БРОТЄ ПЕХОТНОЙ СЪТЬ ПОСЛѢДУЮЩІЯ ѦКОЖЕ.

Капитанъ.
Порꙋчикъ.
Прапорщикъ.
в. г. до д. сержантовъ.

Figure 4.5. The 1841 edition of Adam Weyde's *Regulations.*
Source: А.А. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный и посвященный Петру Великому генералом Вейде, в 1698 году,* Санкт-Петербург 1841, pp. 18–19.

кнаивящшей вѣдомости увсякой главы, гдѣ потребно, обыкновенія уцесарцовъ, и саксонцовъ употребляемые попространнѣе описаны; здѣ хощу азъ чины кратчее проити, I будетъ начало окомпаніе, потомъ обаталіонѣ ополку Бригаде, и войске учинено, какъ послѣдуетъ.

О РОТЕ ПЕХОТНОЙ.

Пехотою мочно разно служить, а имянно яко мушкетеръ, Гранадиръ, такожде и пикенеръ, еже вънынѣшнее время едва невсе отставлено, и вто мѣсто Ѳузеи сбагенетами употребляютъ, ради того, дабы болши огня имѣти рота пехотная есть часть людей во 100. до 120. человѣкъ, какъ уцесарцовъ употребляется, у Французовъ же неболе 60. до 70. человѣкъ вроту берется.

ЧИНЫ ВЪРОТЕ ПЕХОТНОЙ СУТЬ

Послѣдующія якоже.

Капитанъ.
Порутчикъ.
Прапорщикъ.
2. 3. до 4. сержантовъ.

*

proposals involved the typology of military ranks and, above all, the typology of units and their structure. This first part of Weyde's work appears to have laid the foundation for the successive, more detailed regulations discussed therein.

5. NEW ARMY

Among the senior advisors to Peter I, the most prominent were his first "military teachers," General Patrick Gordon and General and Admiral Franz Lefort. Adam Weyde, too, played a key role because of his social contacts with the tsar and, above all, his participation in the Grand Embassy and the efficiency he had demonstrated while abroad. His military prestige also resulted from the drafting of the *Regulations*. As a result, Peter I recognized him as an indispensable commander and military theorist. The deaths of the two distinguished generals in 1699—Franz Lefort's in March and Patrick Gordon's in November—triggered a reshuffling of actors exerting considerable influence on the main actor (Chart 1). Consequently, Weyde's position improved considerably.[260] The author of the *Regulations* made no secret of his military ambitions, which was perfectly ordinary for any officer of his stature. Johann Korb noted that Adam Adamovich even aspired to eventually assume supreme command over the tsar's army.[261]

[260] Russian historian Pavel Bobrovsky noted that following the passing of Peter's most important commanders and friends, Franz Lefort and Patrick Gordon, their duties were assigned to two other gifted commanders, Adam Weyde and Prince Anikita Repnin; see П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 353.

[261] И.Г. Корб, op. cit., p. 257.

Thus, it is reasonable to posit whether one can consider Adam Weyde as the creator (or co-creator) of the new army that was under preparation for the war with Sweden. The first historian to link the actant to the reforms underway at the time was Pavel Bobrovsky.[262] Also referencing these findings is contemporary researcher Brian Davies in his book *Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe*, in the chapter "The Weyde Ordinances and the debacle at Narva."[263]

The research conducted to date allows us to isolate the key events that prompted Peter I to radically modernize the Russian armed forces. That the tsar's army of over one hundred thousand was obsolete in almost every respect (organization, provisioning, command) became clear to him after the two expeditions against the Crimean Khanate in 1687 and 1689, which both ended in defeat.[264] The existing army structures—rifle regiments, noble cavalry (*pomyestna* cavalry)—which operated in parallel with the units of the so-called "new military organization" (soldier, reiter, dragoon and hussar regiments), created in the 1630s based on Western European models, offered no guarantee of success.[265] The tsar was able to test the combat qualities of his army first-hand during the 1695-1696 war with Turkey (the Azov expeditions). It was at that time that the soldiers of his two guard regiments, the Preobrazhensky and the Semyonovsky, went into battle. The combat operations conducted at Azov demonstrated the superior preparation of these units[266] and signposted the path towards

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[262] For more on the subject, see П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде, Адам Адамович*..., passim.

[263] B. Davies, op. cit., pp. 63–65. Davies uses the term "ordination" with reference to Adam Weyde's 1698 *Regulations*.

[264] See Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 1, p. 263–243; приложения, № IX–XI, pp. 356–389.

[265] For more on the subject, se А.В. Чернов, Вооруженные силы Русского государства в XV–XVII вв., Москва 1955, pp. 133–154; А.В. Малов, op. cit. During the hostilities, the Russian army was supported by a force comprised of thousands of Don Cossacks and Ukrainian Cossacks, as well as other peoples living in Russia, including the Tatars, the Bashkirs and the Kalmyks.

[266] Equally high combat qualities were displayed by the soldiers of two other infantry units: The First (Lefortovsky) and Second (Butyrskiy Moscow Select Regiments, commanded by the tsar's

the reforms. An excellent opportunity to modernize the army presented itself during the Grand Embassy. Peter I made observations of a military nature at the time, frequently visiting armories and arsenals, vetting fortresses, and studying the drills of Saxon troops, all of which soon led to a tangible result in the comprehensive reform of the Russian army.[267]

All of the aforementioned activities involved the participation of Adam Weyde, as discussed extensively in Chapters 2 and 3. His journeys resulted in the submission of the new military regulations to Peter I in October 1698 (see Chapter 4). However, this was only the first stage of the work undertaken by the Russian commander. In the summer of 1699, Peter instructed Weyde to continue his work. The end result was to be an all-encompassing military code that included drills and the organization of the army (which Weyde had already completed), along with the military articles, i.e., a penal code applicable to soldiers, and another aspect that had not been addressed properly before, namely the army's estates.[268] The latter were essential for budgeting the costs associated with maintaining the individual units. They accounted for the rates of pay assigned to each charge (military rank or function) and the number and composition of the respective troops. The development of these measures had been well advanced, as evidenced by Adam Weyde's letter to the tsar dated July 3, 1699: "The military document on how to maintain oneself [the army's estates], as well as the articles or items concerning the punishments prescribed for all sorts of offenses: all this I have done in full accordance, as is customary with other great rulers."[269]

closest military associates, Franz Lefort and Patrick Gordon.

[267] See Д.Гузевич, И. Гузевич, op. cit., pp. 190–194 (including bibliography references contained therein).

[268] П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий…*, pp. 23–24.

[269] Н.А. Воскресенский, op. cit., № 1, pp. 29.

Weyde considered his work as a draft and suggested that Peter I assess which passages to adopt without corrections, also indicating those that required amendments. At the same time, he stipulated that the work could contain inaccuracies, as he had not had time to "read and collate everything with the originals." He asserted, however, that he would resume his work and make the due compilations "in accordance with the reference."[270] What type of reference the author had in mind remains unknown; it is possible that the references mentioned concerned Johann Sebastian Gruber's treatise, discussed more extensively in Chapter 4 (see Figures 4.1 and 4.3). Unfortunately, for reasons unknown, the draft referenced in Weyde's letter has not survived. As of now, aside from the *Military Regulations of 1698*,[271] only residual materials are known that most likely supplement it (*Military Ranks in an Infantry Company*),[272] as well as brief individual notes concerning military criminal law issues.[273]

Drafted in 1698, the *Military Regulations* constituted a kind of foundation, applicable in the essential work involved in building a modern army and training it into proper operability. Weyde provided specific information as to the army model he postulated in the Regulations:

> It often occurs that a ruler's army of 40,000 men is superior to another's army of 80,000, which follows from a due course of training and the order established therein. It is imperative and essential for a military boasting a high number of armed men to implement sound military drills and legislation. However, their adoption alone is insufficient, as it is necessary to prescribe firmly and resolutely

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[270] Ibidem.

[271] П.О. Бобровский, *Развитие способов и средств для образования юристов военного и морского ведомств в России. Период преобразований Петра Великого. (Учреждение коллегиальных военных судов и возникновение должности аудитора в России),* Санкт-Петербург 1881, p. 97.

[272] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Военные законы и инструкции. (Изданные до 1715 года),* Санкт-Петербург 1894, pp. 46–50.

[273] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде, Адам Адамович…*, pp. 17–22.

their observation and obeyance, with no exceptions for anyone, so that any disorder, lawlessness and dissension may be suppressed and relieved permanently.[274]

According to Adam Weyde, it was not the number of soldiers that ultimately determined an army's strength, but its organization, training and level of discipline. His comparison of an army to a machine is particularly important in this regard: (...) "for, like a clock, which, by means of proper construction and the efficient movement of the cogs and chains inherent in its operations, it is preserved in decent running order."[275] This makes for an extremely modern concept, in which soldiers comprise the cogs of a device called an army, which in turn is programmed and wound up by its commander-in-chief.

It should also be noted that Weyde makes references to standing armies based on the mandatory conscription of recruits, which had learned in Western Europe.[276] We concur with Brian Davies' suggestion that Adam Weyde proved to be an ardent supporter of the introduction of a conscription-based standing army in Russia. This is clear from specific phrases and references, sometimes expressed as deeply veiled comparisons in the introduction to the *Military Regulations of 1698*. In line with the above, the tsar's theorist emphasizes and accentuates the following points, emblematic of standing armies:

[274] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 29; А.А. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный...*, p. 53.
[275] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 17–18; А.А. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный...*, p. 7.
[276] For a more extensive discussion of the necessity and operation of standing armies in the final quarter of the seventeenth century in Europe, see C. Jany, *Historia armii pruskiej do 1740 roku*, transl. B. Lipka, vol. 1, Oświęcim 2020, pp. 269–339. See H. Delbrück, *Nowożytna sztuka wojenna*, transl. M. Młynarz, Oświęcim 2016, pp. 173–203; E. Olzacka, *Wojna a kultura. Nowożytna rewolucja militarna w Europie Zachodniej i Rosji*, Kraków 2016, passim.

- constantly training soldiers and demanding strict observation of army laws;
- appreciating the importance of the "grizzled veteran," well-familiar with the military profession and equal to, if not better than, his commander, thus taking on the role of a teacher to "young troopers;"
- holding soldiers to high training standards and keeping them at arms.[277]

These demands—for this is how one should interpret the provisions contained in the *Regulations*—lived to see their implementation with the army conscription, initiated in 1699. Pavel Bobrovsky noted that the units formed at the time were modeled on the organizational regulations adopted in 1695 by Emperor Leopold I for his army (with whose organization and operations Weyde had become acquainted during the Grand Embassy).[278] The formal framework for their implementation was the tsar's decree promulgated on November 8, 1699, announcing conscription, the first in a succession of many held throughout the reign of Peter I. A peculiar caesura in this respect was the year 1705, which saw an attempt to systematize conscription and establish permanent regions for summoning the population to the army. It was also then that the term "recruit" was used for the first time in official documentation with regard to men drafted into the army.[279] At the outset (in 1699–1700), all "free men" were invited to join the military service, and were guaranteed an annual salary of eleven rubles (paid in advance) and sustenance on equal

[277] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 17–18; А.А. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный...*, pp. 5–7.
[278] П.О. Бобровский, *История 13-го Лейб-гренадерского...*, p. 40.
[279] ПСЗРИ, т. 4, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 2036.

conditions as the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments.[280] On November 17, the tsar reiterated his will, this time replacing invitations to join the ranks of his army with call-up papers handed to serfs assigned to landowner estates (*pomyestyas*). Soldiers were to be fielded by the magnates, nobility and clergy, the urban (burgher) population,[281] as well as the country's largest entrepreneur, Grigory Stroganov.[282] The number of men to be consigned to the army by each stratum was precisely defined, as was the size of the monetary equivalent payable for their conscription.[283] Exempt from conscription were only *chernososhny* (state-owned), Muscovite riflemen, and Tatars.[284] The result was the enlistment of more than 30,000 soldiers to twenty seven new infantry regiments and two cavalry (dragoon) regiments.[285]

The recruitment efforts were greatly influenced by their initiator, who was appointed to the recruitment committees. Together with Fyodor Golovin, Adam Weyde headed the first such committee, established

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[280] И. Желябужский, *Дневные записки*, [in:] *Рождение империи...*, p. 319; В.Н. Автократов, *Военный приказ. (К истории комплектования и формирования войск в России в начале XVIII в.*, [in:] *Полтава. К 250-летию полтавского сражения*. Сборник статей, ред. Л.Г. Бескровный и др., Москва 1959, pp. 228–229; М.В. Бабич, *Государственные учреждения XVIII века: комиссии Петровского времени*, Москва 2003, p. 28.

[281] В.Н. Автократов, op. cit., p. 229.

[282] For more on the Stroganov family of traders and entrepreneurs, who enjoyed a unique social status in Russia before Peter's reign, see P. Krokosz, *Rola rodziny Stroganowów w rozwoju przemysłu solnego w Rosji w XVI–XVIII wieku*, SMDŻ, vol. 28, Wieliczka 2012, pp. 189–242.

[283] Л.Г. Бескровный, *Русская армия и флот в XVIII веке (Очерки),* Москва 1958, pp. 22–23.

[284] *История Северной войны 1700–1721*, отв. ред. *И.И.* Ростунов, Москва 1987, p. 35.

[285] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 3, pp. 346–347; т. 4, ч. 2, приложения № III: 3, pp. 451–452. Nikolai Ustrialov mentions that, when preparing for war, Peter I saw the need to form a robust army of thirty regiments (as per some reports, he strove to field as many as sixty); see ibid, т. 3, p 343. For more on the subject, see А. Баиов, *Курс истории русского военного искусства*, вып. 2: Эпоха Петра Великого, Санкт-Петербург 1909, p. 40–42; О. Леонов, И. Ульянов, *Регулярная Пехота 1698–1801*, Москва 1995, pp. 16–17; Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., pp. 23, 40; С.Л. Марков, *Петр Алексеевич Великий, первый император всероссийский... (Биографический очерк),* [in:] *Российский военный сборник*, вып. 23: *Защита Отечества. Наука побеждать, заветы и уроки Петра Великого,* Москва 2010, p. 60.

by the tsar at the General Court (Military Chancellery) in the village of Preobrazhenskoye.[286] Peter's choice of this place was not accidental, as from the 1680s onwards it had established itself as the center of formation and base of the first of his elite troops: the Preobrazhensky Regiment. It was also there that the monarch and his soldiers held maneuvers and military trainings. In 1699-1702, the General Court morphed into the supreme institution overseeing the conscription of recruits for the new regiments of the Russian army, and the seat of the provost court proceedings.[287]

Weyde proved the acquisition of practical skills by the newly enlisted soldiers on October 7, 1699. At that time, two companies under his command were holding drills in the Izmaylovo hamlet near Moscow (owned by the tsar's family).[288] Peter I must have been quite pleased with his protégé's progress, because as early as October 22, 1699, Adam Weyde was once again promoted, this time to the rank of major general. He also traveled with the tsar to Voronezh and other neighboring cities. At the beginning of 1700, the tsar's commander was tasked with forming combat-ready regiments from the newly conscripted recruits.[289] At the same time, in 1699-1700, together with Avtamon Golovin, at the behest of Peter I, Weyde compiled the aforementioned document *Military Ranks in an Infantry Rota*, which outlined the military and administrative duties of

[286] P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne…*, pp. 58–59.

[287] The General Court was also known as the Chamber of Military Conventions (Rus. *Съезжая изба*) or, more simply, the Military Chamber. In the seventeenth century, such chambers of military conventions (military chancelleries) were located in provincial administration buildings. It was there that persons from a given county who were obliged to render military service would report for review before the commencement of a new military campaign.

[288] *Измайлово, дворцовая усадьба собором Покрова Пресвятой Богородицы и памятником Петру I*, https://petersmonuments.ru/russia/memorials/izmaylovo-dvortsovaya-usadba-soborom-pokrova-presvyatoy-bogoroditsy-i-pamyatnikom-petru-i (accessed December 12, 2020). See also R. Wittram, op. cit., p. 7.

[289] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде, Адам Адамович…*, pp. 23–24.



Chart 4. Estimated number of conscripts and enlistees by 1724.
Source: own study based on: Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., pp. 23–29.

the captain, lieutenant, standard-bearer, sergeant, captenarmus, second standard-bearer, company scribe, corporal and private.[290]

The seed of the idea of a professional, strictly unified, conscription-based army, was planted in 1698–1699, and germinated until 1705, when it evolved into a full-fledged conscription system. In our view, it was this process that stands out as one of the main achievements of General Weyde, one that permanently changed the social, economic and political landscape of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[291] By 1724, nearly half a million people (472,000) had been mobilized into the regular army, demonstrating the scale of the phenomenon started by Adam Weyde (see Chart 4).

[290] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Военные законы…*, p. 46–50; А.Н. Гребенкин, op. cit., p. 122.
[291] For more on the subject, see В.Н. Руденко, *Институт жребия в комплектовании вооруженных сил: опыт Российской империи и СССР*, "Научный ежегодник Института философии и права Уральского отделения Российской академии наук" 9 (2009), pp. 444–473.

In 1699, Adam Weyde was in charge of training a significant portion of the soldiers recruited at the time. As mentioned in Chapter 4, he taught the military trade to newly drafted pantlers, *striapchy* (court servants), *zhyltsy* and persons recruited from the patrimonial estates. He formed them into infantry regiments, with the exception of the latter group, assigned to dragoon units.[292] Weyde saw his soldiers in a comprehensive light and was therefore keenly interested in their equipment and uniforms. He expressed his concern in a letter to the tsar dated July 20, 1699, requesting that new soldiers be issued the same bandoliers as those of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, as well as green jackets.[293] Consequently, a dragoon regiment named Preobrazhensky (after the place where its soldiers were quartered) was formed at the beginning of 1700. In May that year, the unit was briefly renamed the General Adam Adamovich Weyde Dragoon Regiment (it was that year, too, that the tsar's theoretician and organizer was promoted to the rank of brigadier general in recognition of his merits).[294] This was not the last in the sequence of modifications, as in August 1700 foreign colonel Yefim Gulic (Ioachim Gulietz) took command of the regiment, which is why military historians have usually referred to the unit using the name derived from its second commander.[295] Despite the leadership change, General Weyde was instrumental in the formation and operation of this regiment, since it was he who determined which recruits would be counted in its ranks.[296] In turn, the command of each of the newly

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[292] П. и Б., т. 2, p. 16; П.О. *Бобровский, Петр Великий…*, p. 23.

[293] *Собрание писем императора Петра I-го к разным лицам с ответами на оныя*, предисл. П.И. Голенищев-Кутузов, преуведомл. В. Берх, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1829, pp. 6–7.

[294] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 355.

[295] Between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, this oldest cavalry unit of the Russian army underwent numerous name changes. In 1909, it was renamed the First Moscow Leib Dragoon Regiment of Emperor Peter the Great, referring to the initiator of its formation. In 1918, the regiment was disbanded.

[296] The personnel lists of dragoons who obtained the relevant recommendations, signed by Adam Weyde, have survived; see Н.П. Волынской (Н.П. Волынский), op. cit., приложение, № XLVI, pp.

created twenty-seven infantry regiments was given to foreign officers and representatives of the Russian nobility already serving in the tsar's army.[297] Adam Weyde assumed the undeniable honor of commanding the First Moscow Select Infantry Regiment (commonly known as the Lefortovsky Regiment), once led by Franz Lefort himself.[298] The tsar's decision to entrust the command of the newly formed regiments to these individuals rather than others was predicated on their knowledge of the arcane art of war as practiced in Western European countries.

We can trace how the training of newly recruited soldiers proceeded thanks to two documents attached to one of the versions of the *Regulations of 1698*. The first is titled *Forming Ranks*,[299] and the second is *Instructions for Captains*.[300] Both are consistent in substance and were evidently drawn up for the purpose of training soldiers within infantry *rotas*. The first document deals with the fundamental principles used in training. It consists of four articles. The first two provisions define the principles of behavior during exercises. Each soldier was expected to report for exercises without undue delay, and during the exercises or when forming ranks, soldiers were prohibited to put away their weapons and ordered

34–50; П. и Б., т. 2, p. 16.

[297] П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий…*, pp. 21–23. Drills were primarily conducted by sergeants, especially those transferred from the Preobrazhensky Regiment; see idem, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 369. The organization of the new regiments in the Russian army was based on the models commonly used in German-speaking countries. Mirroring the regulations of the imperial army code, Russian authorities established two important positions (offices) responsible for key matters related to the functioning of the army: the commissary general and the provisions master general. However, their official establishment only materialized with the issuance of the corresponding tsar's decree dated February 18, 1700. Promoted to the function of war commissioner general was boyar Yakov Dolgorukov, who was placed at the head of an entirely new central office of state administration, created by the merger of the Ritter and Posolsky prikazes. Meanwhile, the position of master provisioner general was assumed by Okolnichy Semyon Yazykov; see ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 1766; П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий…*, p. 21.

[298] М.Д. Рабинович, *Полки петровской армии 1698–1725. Краткий справочник*, Москва 1977, p. 24.

[299] [Устав А.А. Вейде], РНБ, F. IX. 36, л. 17–20; П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, p. 18.

[300] Ibidem, pp. 19–20; [Устав А.А. Вейде], Российская Национальная Библиотека, F. IX. 36, л. 24–25.

to remain calm (no talking or other noises were allowed). The legislator encourages recruits to maintain a high degree of enthusiasm for learning, and to manifest it by taking due care of the weapons, which should always be clean and in working order.

The sanctions primarily applied in training camps were regulated to the letter. The regulations there were quite different from the typical wartime situations governed by military articles. As a rule, the latter were extremely harsh and mostly based on a deterrent, i.e. the death penalty, which was the predominant type of punishment administered.[301] By contrast, Weyde strove to implement measures that were as educative as possible and relatively non-repressive (see Table 2). He did not resort to capital punishment and envisaged it only for those who committed crimes during wartime (both when marching and during stoppages; see Article 4). Instead, he favored corporal punishments (bull- or horsewhipping),[302] while also enforcing sanctions of a financial nature, which were considered a harsh type of punishment.[303] He also propagated a peculiar type of military sanction, a combination of penalty upon one's honor with corporal punishment and confinement, which consisted of standing guard in an upright position for a full twenty-four hours while holding six muskets simultaneously. The punishment was tailored to the soldier's capabilities in such a way that the two-hour guard duty was punctuated by a rest of equal length. Expulsion from the army was only provisioned in

[301] P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia…*, pp. 383–390 and Tables 1–3.

[302] Bullwhipping involved hitting one with a stick or stake with the diameter of a finger; it was administered as a punishment for minor offenses. A horsewhip was a long, flexible, thick stick made of willow wood, subsequently also a metal rod, used similarly for bullwhips when administering corporal punishment. See W. Organiściak, *Z badań nad karami na ciele w prawie wojskowym Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, [in:] *Z dziejów prawa*, pt. 3, ed. A. Lityński, Katowice 2002, pp. 25–41.

[303] The pay cut amounted to approximately 15%; at the end of the seventeenth century, the nominal pay in the Butyrsky Regiment was twelve rubles and sixty kopecks, and the corresponding pay for recruits was ten rubles and eighty kopecks. See П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 206.

cases of repeated recidivism.[304] This is a distinctive feature of the code, which clearly indicates that the Regulations must have been first applied between 1699 and 1700. Such a sanction could only apply in units partially (or fully) comprised of volunteers. As early as the early eighteenth century, peasants conscripted into the army against their own will could only dream of such corrective measures.[305]

In summary, Adam Weyde provided for as many as four different sanctions depending on the degree of recidivism, an unprecedented phenomenon in military law.[306] What stands out here is the introduction of the recruits to the rules of military discipline. The punishments bear no mark of public vengeance; one can also notice an undeniable presence of overall positive prevention, which was to fulfill educational functions. The gradation of punishments according to the degree of recidivism bears the hallmarks of specific positive prevention, that is, an attempt to rehabilitate the culprit. Only when these measures failed would one face discharge from the ranks or the death penalty, an example of special negative prevention. Another feature is the distinction between new and old conscription. This means that the training measures extended over companies of both newly recruited and trained soldiers. Newly formed troops found themselves at a considerable disadvantage due to the need to undergo intensive training. This may be an indication of the presence of both old (elite) regiments and new ones in training camps. As can be seen from Table 2, soldiers of the old conscription were regarded as privates, who were exempt from guard duty.

[304] See W. Organiściak, *Z badań nad karami na czci w prawie wojskowym Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w XVI–XVIII wieku*, [in:] *Z dziejów prawa*, pt. 2, ed. A. Lityński, Katowice 1999, pp. 62–83.
[305] In the following decades, the conscription system led to numerous pathologies, including self-mutilation to prevent recruitment (e.g., among peasants who severed their fingers to avoid military service). See Sąd Główny w Białymstoku, Archiwum Państwowe w Białymstoku, call no. 12, col. 1–93.
[306] Por. K. Łopatecki, *„Disciplina militaris" w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej...*; С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 263.

Table 2. Sanctions used by Adam Weyde in the training of the Russian army in the late seventeenth century

Offence type	Absenteeism during training		Putting down or negligent care of weapons, making noise during training	
Soldier type	New conscription (recruits)	Old conscription (soldiers)	New conscription (recruits)	Old conscription (soldiers)
1st offence	Round-the-clock penalty guard duty while holding three muskets in three-hour guard and rest intervals		Round-the-clock penalty guard duty while holding six muskets in two-hour guard and rest intervals	Corporal punishment (whipping)
2nd offence	Corporal punishment (whipping)		Discharge from regiment combined with corporal punishment (whipping)	pay cut to recruit rate
3rd offence	Corporal punishment (whipping)	pay cut to recruit rate	×	Discharge from regiment combined with corporal punishment (horsewhip)
4th offence	Discharge from regiment combined with corporal punishment (horsewhip)		×	×

Source: own study based on: [Устав А.А. Вейде], Российская Национальная Библиотека, F. IX. 36, л. 17–20; П.О. Бобровский, Вейде Адам Адамович..., pp. 20–21.

Article 3 introduced general rules of discipline, prohibiting a number of activities that would disrupt order. This provision was related to the housing of soldiers in the homes of their hosts. Complaints about any wrongdoings, as well as drunkenness, gambling and carousals were to be directed to corporals. A service path for reporting irregularities in the

conduct of recruits was introduced: corporal → sergeant → captain → colonel. This meant that recruits were thrust into the structures of regiments, companies, and squads, simultaneous with the process of appointment of officers and non-commissioned officers. Detailed descriptions of these ranks are also included in the *Regulations*.[307] The provision introduced some indefinite punishments, referred to as "severe," also provisioning the possibility of one's discharge from the regiment.

Article 4 pertained to guard duty detailed in the *Regulations*. It is a sort of supplement, containing additional penalties for putting down weapons or handing them over to another person. The regulation mandates a "present arms" posture towards the higher ranks, which implies the use of the grips introduced by General Weyde in 1698.

A counterpart to the rules described could be found in the *Instructions for Captains*. As the company supervisor, the captain was to prevent subordinates from engaging in gambling, drunkenness, and thievery, while also overseeing the posting of guards in detail, who were authorized to kill anyone upon three password calls. Giving up one's weapon while on guard meant corporal punishment or demotion, and in periods of war, the death penalty.[308]

In our opinion, it is rather problematic to claim that these are residual remnants of the draft military code drawn up in 1699. Both documents are self-contained wholes, admittedly lacking an *arenga*, or preamble, yet strictly utilitarian in their nature, i.e. the training of new infantry regiments. What other acts, then, did Weyde draft, which he then submitted to the tsar? We believe that one among them must have been a translation of some version of the military articles in force in a Western

[307] Also featured in Article 4 on guard duty was the rank of private (*gefreiter*), outlined earlier in the *Regulations*.
[308] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, pp. 19–21.

European country.[309] In Central Europe, such situations were typical. For example, in the Kingdom of Poland, military lawyers at the service of hetmans translated military articles that were in operation in Europe, drawing from compendia of laws known as the *Corpus iuris militaris*.[310]

As the tsar's theoretician, Adam Weyde not only translated normative acts but also coordinated the collection and transmission to the tsar of all legal and military reports from Central and Western Europe. While still in England during the Grand Embassy, Jacob Bruce, acting at the tsar's behest, made a short inventory of the norms in force in Scottish, English and French law that pertained to the succession to the throne in those countries. At the same time, he drew up a list of military ranks in the English artillery, applicable during war and peace, along with the pay rates for each charge. Jacob Bruce notified Peter I of the fulfillment of his will and the transfer of the relevant materials to Adam Weyde in a letter

[309] Although Adam Weyde was taken prisoner, the work on Russian military legislation did not cease. In 1701, the relevant translations of foreign military regulations were entrusted to Deacon Andrey Vinius. Around 1702 (most likely before that date), Junior Deacon of the Posolsky Prikaz Averky Leontev drafted military criminal articles in 141 chapters. The document is known by its abbreviated title, *Articles of Military Conduct*, since it began with the very words; its main title is *The Code (or Law) of Military Conduct for Generals and Middle and Lower Ranks and Privates*. The code was to apply indiscriminately to all soldiers in the tsar's army, regardless of their rank; see Артикул воинского поведения, БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. I Б, № 6 (Петр. гал. № 12), л. 15. These draft proposals were to be included in the future military penal code; in fact, they entered into force as early as the beginning of 1702, and were employed in Boris Sheremetev's army, hence another name for the document has been adopted in the literature, i.e. the *Code of Field Marshal Boris Petrovich Sheremetev*. According to Pavel Bobrovsky, it was an unsuccessful translation, with some inadequate abbreviations, of the Danish King Christian V's military articles of 1683; see П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий…*, p. 26; idem, *Военные законы Петра Великого в рукописях и первопечатных изданиях. Историко-юридическое исследование*, Санкт-Петербург 1887, p. 23.

[310] In the Kingdom of Poland, such a compilation was drawn up (either personally or by third party commission) by a prominent Polish auditor, Samuel Brodowski; see T. Ciesielski, *Samuel Brodowski – kodyfikator prawa wojskowego w czasach panowania Augusta III*, [in:] *Historia testis temporum, lux veritatis vita memoriae, nuntia vetustatis. Księga Jubilieuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Włodzimierzowi Kaczorowskiemu*, eds. E. Kozerska, M. Maciejewski, P. Stec, Opole 2015, pp. 399–420. The collection is currently kept by the National Archives in Krakow: ANK, Archiwum Podhoreckie II, call no. 38–39.

dated July 13, 1699 (posted only after July 20, the correspondence reached the addressee on July 30).[311]

In addition to his involvement in the formation of land armies, Adam Weyde was also engaged in the creation of the Azov fleet. One should construe the July 1699 exchange of correspondence between the general and the tsar in this context.[312] A little later, on August 5, the ruler informed his associate that he had sent extraordinary envoys to Istanbul by sea: Duma Deacon Yemelyan Ukraintsev and Deacon Ivan Cheredeev. The voyage took place aboard the forty-six-gun ship *Kriepost'*, meant to symbolize the power of Russia. The envoys were to make overtures of peace with Turkey. This was important, since another war was already being planned in Moscow, this time with Sweden. Adam Weyde replied to this news in the letter dated August 24, in which he curtly stressed his joy at receiving the information "(...) about the anchors being raised to escort the envoy."[313] Far more significant were the constatations of a military nature, made in the very letter, "I was delighted to learn in great detail, by virtue of the map that Your Grace sent me, of the matters regarding the new naval fleet, and I rejoice heartily over the success at the harbor [i.e., the port of Azov] and the departure of ships to the sea."[314]

The above quotation provides evidence of the use of cartography for strategic and operational decisions. The main focus at the time was on the understudied Azov Sea basin. the Depiction of the coastline, which served as a landmark for ship captains is noteworthy, as well as the detailed marking of fortresses, settlements and rivers flowing into the sea. The map presented to Weyde was a handwritten copy analogous to the

[311] П. и Б., т. 1, pp. 776–777; т. 2, pp. 699–700; H.A. Воскресенский, op. cit., № 2, pp. 29–30.
[312] The first letter written by Peter I is dated July 5, 1699, while Adam Weyde's reply is dated July 19, 1699; see П. и Б., т. 1, p. 778.
[313] Ibidem, pp. 581–582.
[314] Ibidem, p. 782.

Map 5. Map of the Sea of Azov, whose reproduction Peter I presented to Adam Weyde.
Source: Карты похода в Азовское море, предпринятого Петром I [1699 г.], БАН, ОР Основное собрание рукописной книги, № 20 (№ 591).

original version now kept at the BAN (see Map 5).[315] In all likelihood, the map that the tsar sent to Weyde in the summer of 1699 was the fruit of this work. Two years later, it was printed by Adriaan Schoonebeek.[316]

Although the preparations for war with Sweden were progressing smoothly, Peter I's army did not enter the conflict at the same time as Augustus II's forces. The tsar could not afford to open a second front. Russia was still officially at war with Turkey at the time when the remaining signatories of the Holy League (the Empire, Poland, Venice, the Papal States) signed a treaty with the Turkish side at Karlowitz in 1699, which ended the hostilities.[317] This prevented Russia from providing assistance to the allied Saxon army as it unsuccessfully besieged Riga in 1700.[318] Denmark swiftly slipped out of the anti-Swedish alliance formed at the end of the seventeenth century. The bold landing campaign undertaken by Swedish monarch Charles XII on Zealand in the summer of 1700 forced King Frederick IV to conclude the Peace of Travendal on August 7 (18) and withdraw from the subsequent war operations.[319]

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[315] Ibidem; Карты похода в Азовское море, предпринятого Петром I в 1699 году, БАН (СПб), ОР, ОСРК, карта № 20 (№ 591), http://papacoma.narod.ru/maps/preshonebek.htm, http://papacoma.narod.ru/maps/azov_sea_1701.htm (accessed November 30, 2020).

[316] Zob. С.В. Свириденко, *Картографические работы А. Шхонебека и П. Пикарта*, "Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Науки о Земле" 2 (2008), pp. 138–144.

[317] ПСЗРИ, т. 3, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 1660; П. и Б., т. 1, pp. 271–273. As agreed, the Holy Roman Empire received Hungary with Transylvania, with Venice obtaining eastern Dalmatia and the Morea (Peloponnese). For the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which regained Podolia, with Kamieniec Podolski and areas of the Bracław Voivodeship it had once lost to the Porta, the Treaty of Karlowitz marked the establishment of a permanent border with Turkey; see J.A. Gierowski, *Rzeczpospolita w dobie złotej wolności (1848–1763)*: *Wieka historia Polski*, vol. 5, Kraków 2001, p. 234.

[318] During the 1700 campaign, Augustus II's only managed to capture the fortress of Neumünde (which he renamed Augustusburg), along with Kobrun and Kokenhauzen, located on the mouth of the Daugava. Riga was unsuccessfully besieged on February 11 (21) - May 6 (16), and July 27 (August 6) - August 30 (September 9), 1700, respectively; see M. Trąbski, *Oblężenie i kapitulacja Twierdzy Kokenhauzen (2–7 X 1700)*, "Zapiski Historyczne" 83 (2018), vol. 3, pp. 59–82.

[319] J.A. Nordberg, *Histoire de Charles XII. roi de Suéde*, vol. 4, La Haye 1748, No. 22, pp. 27–31; *Memoires pour servir a l'histoire du XVIII siecle contenant. Les negociations, traitez, resolutions, et autres documens authentiques concernant les affaires d'etat. Liez par une Narration Historique des princi-*

The protracted peace negotiations with Turkey afforded Peter the time needed to continue the modernization of the Russian army. The recruitment of conscripts continued, as did the enlistment of officers, the purchases of uniforms and armaments and, above all, the constant training of new troops. One of the most important persons involved in almost all of these arrangements was Adam Weyde, promoted to the rank of infantry general on June 11, 1700.[320] As already mentioned, his appointment was also accompanied by a particular military honor, i.e. assuming command of the elite Lefortovsky Regiment.[321] Weyde's adjutant general was Pantler Timofey Savelov, a relative of the penultimate Patriarch of Moscow, Joachim (1674-1690).[322]

Eventually, on August 8, 1700, the tsar received the long-awaited news regarding the conclusion of peace with his southern neighbor. Nothing now stood in the way of the Russian army, which consisted for the most part of the guard regiments and newly-formed infantry and dragoon units, joining the war effort against Sweden. Peter I's first target was

paux Evenemens dont ils out ete précédez ou fuivis et particulierement de qui s'est passe a la Haye qiu a toupours ete comme le centre de tantes ces Négociations, par Mr De Lamberty, vol. 1, Amsterdam 1735, pp. 52–59; Ch. Kelch, *Liefländlische Historia. Continuation 1690 bis 1707*. Nach der Originalhandschrift zum Druck gegeben. Mit Vorwort, Nachweisen und Personenregister versehen von J. Lossius, Bd. 2, Dorpat 1875, p. 96; J.D. Hultman, *O panowaniu Karola XII króla Szwecji*, transl. and ed. W. Krawczuk, Kraków 2015, p. 92.

[320] В.С. Великанов, *К вопросу о состоянии русской армии после нарвского поражения (зима 1700–1701 годов),* [in:] *Война и оружие. Новое исследования и материалы. Труды Седьмой Международной научно-практической конференции 18–20 мая 2016 года*, ред. С.В. Ефимов, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 2016, p. 33.

[321] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 374.

[322] The latter, together with Duma Deacon Avtamon Ivanov, was involved in army reform issues; from 1703 onwards, he was a fliegel adjutant to Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev, before his promotion a colonel (1709). He was also related to Ivan Musin-Pushkin, a senator and close associate of Peter I. See. А.В. Захаров, *Боярин и первый сенатор Иван Алексеевич Мусин-Пушкин на службе и в кругу семьи*, [in:] ТГЭ: *Петровское время в лицах*, науч. ред. И.В. Саверкина, т. 78, Санкт-Петербург 2015, pp. 229–236.

the fortress of Narva,[323] a gateway to the eastern Baltic coast controlled by Sweden.[324] Marching towards Narva was virtually all of Peter's army, estimated at nearly 40,000 men.[325] In accordance with the new Western European organization, it was divided into three divisions, called generalcies,[326] commanded by Generals Avtamon Golovin, Adam Weyde, and Prince Anikita Repnin, respectively. Thus, upon declaration of war against Sweden on August 19, 1700, Adam Weyde was one of the three top-ranking commanders of Russia's entire armed forces.[327]

Golovin's division was the most numerous, amounting to 14,726 men, while Repnin's was the smallest, standing at 11,000 men.[328] General Weyde's division consisted of ten infantry regiments: the Lefortovsky, commanded by Colonel Giorgio (Yuri) Lim, and the units of the new conscription, commanded by Tomas Jungor (Junger), Erik von Werden, Ivan von Delden, William von Delden, William von Schweyden, Nikolai von Balken (Balck), Fyodor von Balken (Balck), and Alexander Gordon, respectively; rounding out the division was its lone dragoon regiment, led by Yefim Gulic (see Table 2).[329] The size of the army was strictly dependent on the

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[323] From 1558 to 1581, during the reign of Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible, Narva remained under Russian control, thus enabling Russia to conduct profitable and direct trade with the countries of Western Europe via the Baltic Sea (so-called Narva shipping route).

[324] It should be noted that the direction of the tsar's attack greatly worried Augustus II the Strong, who himself had planned to capture the Narva fortress. The king's fears were dictated by the fact that, after capturing Narva, Peter I would also seize Revel, Dorpat, Pernau, and consequently also Riga, which had bogged down Augustus's progress, with no effective way to force its garrison to surrender; see С.М. Соловьев, op. cit., p. 595; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1863, p. 149–152.

[325] П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, p. 375.

[326] The breakdown of the Russian army into divisions (generalcies) followed from the provisions of Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations*; see ibid, p. 369.

[327] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 1–2.

[328] А.В. Беспалов, *Северная война. Карл XII и шведская армия. Путь от Копенгагена до Переволочной (1700–1709 гг.)*, Москва 1998, p. 39.

[329] In the following years, all the infantry regiments comprising Adam Weyde's division took an active part in the war effort against Sweden, turning into some of the most veteran and battle-tested

recruitment campaign. Of the planned 60,000 soldiers, only 33,324 were successfully enlisted, of which 1,100 were deployed to the navy. Repnin's commission managed to recruit 10,720 people, while Weyde and Golovin combined for a total of 22,514 soldiers (including as many as 11,787 volunteers).[330] More than 4,500 soldiers served in the old (elite) infantry regiments (12.4%). Weyde only had one such regiment in his division (the Lefortovsky), which accounted for 9.1% of his total manpower.

General Weyde (along with fellow high commanders) participated in inspections of the Russian army, during which officers and junior officers were deemed unfit for further service due to illness and old age. Attempts to avoid conscription intensified, reaching pathological proportions. To prevent this negative tendency, newly formed regiments were to undergo an inspection, held by Weyde in the village of Preobrazhenskoye. Peter I observed these troops on July 9, 1700, with the general reporting to the tsar on a number of pantlers who, instead of reporting for duty in field (line) regiments, registered as sick and elderly. Following the inspection, overseen personally by the tsar, the ailing pantlers were released from service while the malingerers were whipped and clubbed without mercy before being sent to Azov. The convicts' estates (lands and manors) were to be auctioned. [331]

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units of the modernized Russian army. In 1708, the regiments were renamed (except for the Lefortovsky) after individual Russian cities and territories, with the aim of enhancing a sense of patriotism among the soldiers, now serving and identifying themselves with their own homelands, rather than with the commander of a particular regiment. In line with the above, Tomas Jungor's regiment was renamed the Vladimirsky, Erik von Werden's – the Sibirsky, Ivan von Delden's – the Kazansky, William von Werden's – the Kievsky, William von Schweyden's – the Chernihivsky, Nikolai Balken (Balck)'s – the Novgorodsky, Fyodor Balken (Balck)'s – the Voronezhsky, and Alexander Gordon's – the Astrakhansky; see М.Д. Рабинович, *Полки петровской армии*..., pp. 34–37.

[330] B. Davies, op. cit., p. 64.

[331] И.Г. Дуров, *Медицинское освидетельствование военных и морских чинов при увольнении в отставку от военной службы при правлении Петра Великого*, [in:] *Меншиковские чтения 2012. Научный альманах*, гл. ред. П.А. Кротов, вып. 3, Санкт-Петербург 2012, pp. 34–35.

By the time it left Moscow in the final days of August 1700, Weyde's division numbered 11,222 soldiers and officers; however, upon reaching Narva, its numbers drastically decreased. As a result of illnesses and desertions, only 9,061 men (82.3% of the head count; for detailed data, see Chart 5) reported for duty.[332] Even before the battle, the percentage of division losses amounted to 19% for infantry regiments and 16.6% for dragoon regiments (18.8% in total). The differences between the individual regiments were even greater. The old Lefortovsky Regiment arrived at full strength, with only 8.25% of its soldiers missing. At the other end of the spectrum was in Erik von Werden's regiment, which had lost almost 32% of its personnel before engaging in combat. Why such a vast discrepancy? If it were the result of an epidemic, its scope would have extended to a similar degree to all troops stationed together. One can estimate that disease and force majeure accounted for about 5-8% of the losses (see Chart 8); any higher rates indicated desertion.[333] Meanwhile, if one were to consider only the newly formed regiments, the losses ratio would amount to 19.9%. Thus, the main problem besetting the divisions advancing towards Narva was desertion, followed by disease, starvation and

[332] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № IV, pp. 466–467. Pavel Bobrovsky estimates the size of General Weyde's division, presumably after deducting the soldiers who did not turn up at Narva, at 9,774 men; see П.О. Бобровский, *История Лейб-гвардии…*, т. 1, pp. 374, 377.

[333] This is not to downplay the health problems of soldiers. According to a recent study by Pádraig Lenihan, the annual mortality rate in armies in the seventeenth century stood at 20-25%, precisely due to diseases. An epidemic could virtually decimate entire army camps. Such was the case in 1674 at the French outpost of Saint-Jean-Pla-de-Corts in Roussillon, blockaded by Spanish forces for a period of two months. Diseases accounted for the deaths of some 35-39% of soldiers. In addition, mass desertion, particularly among the militia, led to the destruction of the army without any intensive combat. Lenihan also reflects on the mortality rate in individual regiments. During the Siege of Belgrade in 1717, the Austrian beleaguers lost 15% of their force, while the French troops besieging the Austrian garrison of Philippsburg in 1734 suffered losses at the massive rate of 60%. See P. Lenihan, *Fluxes, Fevers and Fighting Men. War and Disease in Ancien Régime Europe 1648–1789*, Warwick 2019, pp. 9, 31–38, 81–109.

unfavorable weather conditions.[334] However, this still fails to account for such a large disparity, as the differences between Nikolai von Balken's regiment (89.4%) and Eric von Werden's regiment (68%) were still enormous. One can attribute this situation to two phenomena. First, a lot depended on the officer staff and the colonel himself. Second, the soldier personnel may have played a significant role, too. About half of the people were enlisted soldiers, while the rest were conscripts. This is not to say that the proportions in each division were necessarily identical.

One can only speculate how low the morale sunk in the newly formed troops. Robert Frost aptly assessed the Russian army as unready for war and still undergoing transformation.[335] Peter I was about to witness this first-hand, as he personally participated in the campaign.

Regiments are named after their respective commanders, with alternative designations used in the subsequent years of the war, added in parentheses.

[334] Personnel losses resulting from the battles fought ranged between 10% and 20% of the total attrition rate in seventeenth-century armies. The rest was attributable to disease, wounds, and desertion. Estimates indicate that the combination of disease and desertion alone resulted in the monthly loss of between two to 14% of the army; see F. Tallet, *War in Context. War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495–1715*, London–New York 2003, p. 106; I. Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652*, Harlow 2007, p. 434.
[335] R.I. Frost, op. cit., pp. 233–238.



Chart 5. Division (generalcy) of Adam Weyde, dispatched to Narva at the end of August 1700.

Source: own study based on: *Журнал, или поденная, записка блаженныя и вечнодостойныя памяти государя императора Петра Великого с 1698 года даже до заключения Нейштатского мира. Напечатан с обретающихся в Кабинетной архиве списков, правленных собственною рукою Его Императорскаго Величества,* ч. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1770, p. 4.[336]

[336] It should be noted that, elsewhere in his study, Nikolai Ustrialov lists a slightly higher number of soldiers of this division before its departure for Narva, estimating it at 11,227 soldiers. This difference of sixty-three men is presumably the officer staff, which was not included in the 1701 extracts; see Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 8.

6. BATTLE OF NARVA (1700)

On August 30, the tsar arrived in Veliky Novgorod, where he met with Augustus II's envoy, Saxon Field Marshal Prince Charles Eugene de Croy. The Saxon commander arrived there directly from the besieged Riga, bearing a royal request for a prompt dispatch of 20,000-strong reinforcement, along with artillery and ammunition.[337] Ten days later, accompanied by a foreign commander, together with Russian troops led by Major General Ivan Buturlin, Peter I pulled up at Narva, located just thirteen kilometers away from the Gulf of Finland. In addition to Prince de Croy, whom Peter I soon appointed commander-in-chief of the tsar's army, the Russian camp included other Saxon and Polish high commanders, including Lieutenant General (lieutenant general according to the military ranks of the Russian army) Ludwig von Hallart. He was ordered to take an inventory of the cannons and ammunition required to mount an effective siege.[338]

[337] Ibidem, p. 10.

[338] Ibidem, pp. 14–15; приложения, № II:44, pp. 169–175. Lieutenant General Ludwig von Hallart (Ludwig Nicolaus von Allart) was a Saxon engineer and cartographer in the service of Augustus II and, from 1700 onwards, of Peter I. He took an active part in the Siege and Battle of Narva, during which he kept meticulous records and made sketches, based on which he would later write a diary chronicling the operations; see L.N. Hallart, *Generallöjtnant Ludwig Niclas Hallarts journal rörande Narvas belägring, slaget vid Narva och fångtransporter till Sverige (1700–1701)*, RA,

The city of Narva, together with the nearby Ivangorod (a former Russian fortress, located just across the Narva River), constituted a heavily fortified Swedish defense system guarding access to the Baltic Sea from 1611 onwards. After the great fire of 1659, Narva was divided into two parts: Old Town and New Town, separated from each other by a thick stone wall. It was also then that a major expansion of the bastion system protecting it from the outside began. No money was spared to modernize Narva's fortifications. In the 1680s, from several hundred to more than a thousand workers (mostly soldiers of the Finnish regiments) took part in the construction of the bastions. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the Great Northern War, the condition of the Narva stronghold left much to be desired. Of the projected nine bastions, only seven were completed: in the north, *Gloria, Honor, Victoria*; in the west, *Fortuna, Triumph, Fama*; and in the east, only *Spes*, since the work on *Pax* and *Justitia* was still unfinished. Also missing were the majority of the ravelins and one of the three main gates (see Figure 6.1).[339]

It was not only the condition of the fortifications that was inadequate. Colonel Henning Rudolf Horn, who commanded the defense of Narva, failed to reinforce its standing garrison of 1,500 infantry and 200 cavalrymen in time for effective defense. The only support consisted of 400 armed residents.[340] Detailed information in this regard can be found

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Manuskriptsamlingen, nr 96. This study uses a nineteenth century translation of von Hallart's diary into Russian.

[339] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. IV, ч. 1, p. 13; А.В. Петров, *Город Нарва. Его прошлое и достопримечательности. В связи с историей упрочения русского государства на Балтийском побережье. 1223–1900*, Санкт-Петербург 1901, pp. 178–180; M. Laidre, *Bitwa pod Narwą 1700. Początek upadku szwedzkiego mocarstwa*, transl. W. Łygaś, Zabrze–Tarnowskie Góry 2015, pp. 90–92; *История нарвских бастионных укреплений*, http://www.estwar.ee/zamki/21.4%20bastionnye%20ukreplenija%20Narvy.html (accessed November 30, 2020).

[340] Е.И. Порфирьев, *Петр I – основоположник военного искусства русской регулярной армии и флота*, Москва 1952, p. 121. The number of Narva defenders is a matter of debate. Both Otto Sjögren and Heldur Palli confirm the participation of about 400 townsmen and 200 cavalrymen

in the diary of Lieutenant General Ludwig von Hallart. He noted that on October 9 (19), 1700, cavalry captain Christian Felix Bauer (Baur), a future Russian cavalry general (he went by the name Rodion in the tsar's service), who deserted from the fortress,[341] stated that the stronghold held "no more than 900 infantry soldiers in Horn's regiment and 400 peasants who were assigned to assist them, as well as 150 cavalry soldiers, and 400 burghers."[342] The Swedes' principal advantage was the formidable defenses of the city and the fortress, along with its mighty artillery, standing at 400 guns.[343]

Despite de Croy's pleas, the first target of the offensive was to be Narva, followed by Riga. The choice of attack was strategically deliberate. Narva could serve as a bridgehead for further operations on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. The first troops reached the fortress on September 9 (20), 1700, heralding the concentration of all Russian forces. The *Journal of 1700* recounts the arrival of the division led by General Weyde (see

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in the battle, estimating the size of the infantry at 1,200 soldiers; see O. Sjögren, *Karl XII och hans män*, Stockholm 1889, p. 172; Х.Э. Палли, *Между двумя боями за Нарву. Эстония в первые годы Северной войны 1701–1704*, Таллинн 1966, p. 113. Hendrik Seep, on the other hand, agreeing with the generally accepted number of burghers summoned to arms, lists the Swedish garrison at as many as 1,900 soldiers; see H. Sepp, *Narva piiramine ja lahing a. 1700*, Tallin 1930, p. 130. in a similar vein, Magnus Laidre argues that during the 1700 Siege of Narva, its garrison consisted of between 1,800 and 1,900 men; see M. Laidre, op. cit., p. 94.

[341] Christian Felix Bauer decided to flee Narva and join the tsar's service after he killed a Swedish soldier in a duel. Subsequently, as commander of the tsar's cavalry, he participated in the major campaigns of the entire Great Northern War (1700-1721); see РБС, т. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1900, pp. 598–599; A.B. Беспалов, op. cit., p. 41.

[342] Л.Н. Галларт, *Подробное описание осады города Нарвы и сражения под сим городом в 1700 году (Отрывок из Истории Петра Великого, сочиненной генералом Аллартом. Рукопись)*, СА, 1 (1822), p. 5. As per the Russian source, the famous Peter's *Journal or Daily Notes*..., which reported on the most important events of the ongoing war, also referenced the information obtained from cavalry captain Bauer. According to the entries in the *Journal*, the garrison stood at fifty more men and included 1,300 infantry, 200 horsemen and 400 armed burghers; see. *Журнал, или поденная, записка*..., ч. 1, p. 14.

[343] Е.И. Порфирьев, op. cit., p. 121. The entire Swedish artillery was manned by as few as thirty gunners.

Table 3) at Narva in the following words: "On October 1, i.e., Tuesday, the captain [i.e., Tsar Peter I] ordered to welcome General Adam Adamovich Weyde. The regiments arrived before dusk, announced by cannon fire and a volley by all the soldiers. At midnight, there was shelling from the fortress; [the Russians] also hurled three bombs [at Narva]; of these, one exploded in the air, and two did not detonate at all. That night, the generals commenced retrenchment works on all sides."[344]

The siege works began immediately after the arrival of Weyde's division. On the night of October 1–2, under von Hallart's guidance, Russian soldiers started digging trenches and building a battery (see Figure 6.1). Shelled by the Swedes, the besiegers suffered their first two casualties.[345] The concentration concluded on October 14 (25) with the arrival of Avtamon Golovin's troops and Boris Sheremetev's cavalry. At its peak, the military camps around Narva were host to between 34,000 and 36,000 soldiers (amounting to thirty-three regiments, including the newly appointed infantry and dragoon units, as well as the original riflemen, *pomestna* cavalry, and Novgorod reiter regiments). Sixty-four siege guns, seventy-nine regimental guns, four howitzers and forty-eight mortars were also hauled to Narva.[346] In addition, approximately 10,000 troops stationed near Novgorod, with another 11,000 Cossacks camped outside Pskov.[347]

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[344] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № V, p. 508.

[345] Т.А. Базарова, *Создание „Парадиза": Санкт-Петербург и Ингерманландия в эпоху Петра Великого. Очерки*, Санкт-Петербург 2014, pp. 61–62.

[346] В.С. Великанов, op. cit., pp. 130–143. In view of the high attrition rates in the regiments (see Table 3), the above figures seem unreliable.

[347] Б. Сушинський, *Козацькі вожді України. Історія України в образах її вождів та полководців XV–XIX століть*, Одеса 1998, pp. 500, 618–619. According to Ludwig von Hallart, the Cossack corps numbered 8,000 men; see Л.Н. Галлартъ, op. cit., СА 2 (1822), p. 117. In turn, Ukrainian historian Oleksandr Ohloblyn mentions five regiments: Poltavskyi, Chernhivsky, Nezhinsky, and two volunteer (Serdyuk) regiments and artillery units; see О. Оглоблин, *Гетьман Іван Мазепа та його доба*, Нью-Йорк–Київ–Львів–Острог–Торонто 2003, p. 239.

Weyde set up his quarters at the southern end of the besiegement, on an island located on the Narva River (see Figure 6.1, letter E). Before long, the Russians encircled the Swedish fortress with fortifications in the form of a contravallation line facing the fortress, and a circular line, facing the field, to prevent effective enemy relief. To the north and south, they leaned against the banks of the Narva, extending a total length of seven and a half kilometers. They were designed as an improved version of the field fortifications established around Azov in 1696 (see Figures 2.2 and 6.1–6.6).

As noted by Andrey Petrov who described the siege, the works conducted and their outcome left much to be desired.[348] One could even argue that the fortifications constructed by the Russians were a major contributor to their defeat. The Russian historian stressed the lack of possible evacuation routes in the form of bridges drawn across the Narva. The entire belt controlled by the Russian army contained just a single fortified pontoon bridge, which linked it to Kamperholm Island and served as a potential route for retreat in the event of enemy supremacy (Figure 6.2). The second river crossing remained in the forefield (west of the pontoon bridge), slightly below the first passage, but already outside the investment. Busy with siege works (entrenchment towards the city from the south, setting up batteries), Adam Weyde neglected to lay a bridge in his section of the siege works. Only one of the maps shows a bridge extending to the quarters on the island; however, the Russians failed to connect the island to the other shore. While it may not have been the general's decision, this omission directly affected the situation of the division positioned south of Narva during the subsequent clash with the Swedes.[349]

[348] А. Петров, *Нарвская операция 1700 г.,* ВС 7 (1872), pp. 24–27.

[349] See I.L. Welsch, *Plan de la ville de Narva et du château d'Ivanogrod assiégés par le tsar... et délivrés par le roi de Suède Charles XII*, Bibliothèque nationale de France, GED-3031 (the aforementioned bridge connecting the left bank of the Narva River with Adam Weyde's headquarters on the

Figure 6.1. Adam Weyde's camp at Narva in 1700 (letter E in the lower right corner) and the siege works underway in the southern section.
Source: *Plan af staden och fästningen Narva med des situation*, KA, Kungsboken 1655–1735, 4–1 (excerpt; no mention of the author and date of execution).

Joala
Tatigarden

Having besieged the fortress, the Russians started a regular artillery shelling on October 20. However, its effectiveness was marginal due to a shortage of cannonballs. Moreover, the gunpowder used was of poor quality, as were the cannons, whose barrels cracked when firing. The tsar's men were growing frustrated by the lack of food, despite the dispatch of over 10,000 carts towards Narva. Unfortunately for the Russians, the coming of the fall extended the supply routes and hampered the progress of the wagons.[350]

On November 19 (30), 1700, the first major Russian-Swedish clash in the Great Northern War of 1700-1721 unfolded at the ramparts of Narva. Having besieged the fortress, the tsar's army was suddenly forced to regroup and reposition upon reports of Charles XII marching to relieve the defending garrison. News of the rapidly advancing Swedish king, who dashingly moved his troops across the sea from Denmark to Pernau and was on his way to Narva, caused understandable concern among the Russian commanders. Anxiety about the outcome of a clash with one of Europe's finest armies, estimated at as many as 30,000 soldiers (as reported by the Swedish captives taken by the tsar's cavalry scouts) was entirely justified. The Russian army at the time consisted overwhelmingly of newly formed units with limited combat experience (see Chapter 5 and Table 3). The circumstances and lay of the land were adverse as well, as discussed in the later part of this chapter.

In addition to the various accounts of the Battle of Narva, the invaluable plans for the siege have also been preserved to this day, depicting the events unfolding at Narva in numerous variants. This cartographic documentation was executed with utmost precision and depicts the battle from the perspective of the Swedish command, accounting for the various battle

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island); *Plan af staden och fästningen Narva med des situation*, KA, Kungsboken 1655–1735, 4–1 (absence of said bridge; see Figure 6.1).

[350] А.В. Беспалов, op. cit., pp. 41–42.

formations of the two armies. This is especially evident in the four prints of battle plans, the first of which was done by French cartographer and engraver Nicolas de Fer (Figure 6.2),[351] the second by an engineer and officer of Charles XII's army, Zacharias Wolf,[352] the third by Pieter Mortier (Figure 6.4),[353] and the fourth, much less accurate one, published in *Theatrum Europea*.[354] In addition, some manuscript battle plans have survived that contain many more details (Figures 6.1, 6.6).[355] Of particular interest is the battle plan, as well as the clash portrayed from an oblique perspective, commissioned from Johan Litheim by Erik Dahlbergh (Figure 6.5).[356] As for Russian cartographic sources, the only surviving battle plan is that by Lieutenant General Ludwig von Hallart.[357] A historical map of the battle is also relevant, featured in a seminal study by nineteenth-century military historian Dmitry Buturlin, titled *A Military History of Russian Campaigns in the 18th*

[351] N. de Fer, *Plan de Narva assiégé par 80000 Moscovites, qui furent attaqués et deffaits dans leurs lignes par Charles Xll Roy de Suede comandant son Armée en personne a l'age de dix huit ans, le 30 Novembre 1705* [1700!], Paris 1701, http://purl.pt/1813%20 (accessed August 15, 2020). The plan of the siege and battle of Narva, drawn up by Nicolas de Fer, was included as an anonymous work and with significantly abridged descriptions in a cartographic publication on selected European, Asian, African and American fortifications, published around 1702 in Amsterdam; see P. Mortier, *Les Forces de l'Europe, Asie, Afrique et Amerique, ou descriptions des Principales Villes, avec Leurs Fortifications*, Amsterdam [1702], Table 146.

[352] Z. Wolf, *Entsatz der Stadt Narva und der Moscoviter grosse Niederlageden 20.21 des Novembermonats 1700*, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Narva_Zacharias_Wolf_1700.jpg (accessed August 12, 2020).

[353] P. Mortier, *Plan de Narva, Assiegé par 80000 Moscovites, qui furent attaqués et d'effaits dans leurs lignes par Charles XII, Roy de Suede … le 30 Novembre 1700*, Amsterdam [1702–1703], https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/collectie/RP-P-OB-83.034-150 (accessed August 12, 2020).

[354] *Gründriss der belagerüng und Succurs Narva Anno 1700*, https://www.digar.ee/viewer/ru/nlib-digar:50706/15789 (Accessed March 13, 2021).

[355] *Plan af staden och fästningen Narva med des situation*, KA, Kungsboken 1655–1735, 4–1; I.L. Welsch, op. cit.; L.N. Hallart, op. cit., unpag. [sheet 24].

[356] J. Litheim, [E. Dahlbergh], *Delineation Af Staden och fästningen Narfwa*, KB, Kart- och Bildsektionen, Dahlbergh, 12:49; J. Litheim, [E. Dahlbergh], *Geometrisch och accurat delineation af staden och fästningen Narwa*, KB, Kart- och Bildsektionen, Dahlbergh, 12:47. Several copies of these plans exist.

[357] L.N. Hallart, op. cit., [p. 42ff].

Century (the first edition was published in French), which highlights the site of Adam Weyde's command.[358]

As early as around 10:00–11:00 a.m on November 19 (30), 1700, the first soldiers in blue uniforms began to emerge from the forest covering Hermansberg Hill (where the Swedish artillery soon stood; see Figure 6.6).[359] However, Peter I was unable to witness the sight, as he was no longer in the Russian camp. For reasons unexplained to this day, perhaps driven by fear, he left the Narva encampment on the night of November 18 (29), entrusting Prince Charles Eugene de Croy with supreme command. Shortly thereafter, the Swedes faced the Russian fortifications. The Russians remained convinced that the enemy force numbered some 24,000-25,000 well-trained and supplied soldiers.[360] In fact, as few as 8,500 Swedes were present, comprising seven infantry and nine cavalry regiments (totaling at twenty-one infantry battalions and forty-five cavalry squadrons), and supported by thirty-five cannons. As Ludwig von Hallart assessed in retrospect, "Their army was fatigued by the rainy weather and the difficult march; also evident were the insufficiency of its provisions and horses which had seen no provender for two days."[361]

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[358] Д.П. Бутурлин, *Планы и карты к военной истории походов россиян в XVIII столетии*, ч. 1, т. 4, Санкт-Петербург 1821, пл. № 1. The plan was drawn up in 1819 by cartographer and surveyor Major General Aleksandr Khatov.

[359] This is credited to Estonian guide Stefan Rabe (Krauklis), who led the Swedish troops along the shortest forest road. Rabe subsequently became quite popular in Sweden, with his figure taking on magical abilities. See jobbing print *Kürtzer Bericht von dem Entsatz der Stadt und Vestung Narva*, npd; BK, arkivkopia.se-kb-18628915 and print KB, arkivkopia.se-kb-18628917.

[360] See J. Nordberg, *Histoire de Charles XII…*, vol. 1, p. 130; H.J. Hansen, *Geschichte der Stadt Narva*, Dorpat 1858, pp. 143–146; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 43; Ch. von Sarauw, *Die Feldzüge Karl's XII. Ein Quellenmässiger Beitrag zur Krieggeschichte und Kabinetspolitik Europa's im XVIII. Jahrhundert*, Leipzig 1881, p. 51; H. Seep, op. cit., p. 259; А. Петров, op. cit., pp. 12–13.

[361] Л.Н. Галлартъ, op. cit., 2 (1822), p. 126. As they were rushing to aid Narva, Charles XII's soldiers, especially the Finnish regiments, were plagued by numerous diseases in addition to cold and starvation; see Z. Anusik, *Karol XII*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 2006, p. 52.

Upon arrival at Narva, the Swedes fired two cannon shots to signal their readiness to engage in battle. Field Marshal de Croy convened a council of war to devise a plan of action. At the meeting, it was only Boris Sheremetev who drew everyone's attention to the severely extended defensive positions (Figure 6.2). In his opinion, it was necessary to give battle in the field, keeping some soldiers in fortified camps. Fellow generals dismissed Sheremetev's sound judgment, opting instead for a more defensive tactic to protect the fortifications. General Adam Weyde's stance on the matter was all the more surprising given his first-hand experience at Zenta, which should have made him aware of the danger posed by ceding the initiative to the enemy (see Figure 4.1). The decision of the Russian commanders may have been justified by a very poor reconnaissance, since they were not even familiar with the approximate strength of the enemy. In contrast, the Swedes knew virtually everything about the Russian troops and their fortifications.[362]

Based on an analysis of surviving written and cartographic sources, we know that when readying for the clash, Adam Weyde left his secure quarters located on the island (Figure 6.1) and took command of the right wing of his division (Figures 6.5 and 6.7, letter G). His units were responsible for a third of the length of the contravallation lines. The plan drafted by Nicolas de Fera shows the precise dislocation of all troops forming Weyde's division. Thus, the Lefortovsky Regiment commanded by Colonel Lim was situated closest to the center of the Russian fortifications, followed by the other units, deployed in the following order: Gordon's, Gulic's (dragoons), von Werden's, Fyodor von Balken's (Balck's), von Schwyeden's, Jungor's, Nikolai von Balken's (Balck's), William von Delden's, and Ivan

[362] А.В. Беспалов, op. cit., p. 43.

Figure 6.2. Field fortifications and distribution of Russian regiments around Narva in 1700.
Source: Nicolas de Fer, *Plan de Narva assiégé par 80000 Moscovites, qui furent attaqués et deffaits dans leurs lignes par Charles XII Roy de Suede comandant son Armée en personne a l'age de dix huit ans, le 30 Novembre 1705* [1700!], Paris 1701, http://purl.pt/1813 (accessed August 15, 2020)

NARVA
Tranchée
Lignes
Justice
Attaque du General Welling.
La Paix entre le Roy de Dannemarck et le Duc de Holstein estant faite et le Roy de Suede etant repassé de Zeelande en Scanie dans le mois de Septembre 1700. apprit quelques temps apres que les Moscovites, contre la foy du Traité Nouvellement conclu, estoient entrés en Livonie et avoit formé le Siege de la Ville de Narva le 22. Septembre ce qui fit resoudre Sa Majesté Suedoise malgré la saison trop avancée les risques de la Mer et la difficulté de rassembler des Vaisseaux de trãsport; de passer en Livonie, avec un Corps de troupes Capable de former une Armée de 23000. hommes y comprenant celles qui estoient deja dans cette Province il a bordé à Pernau le 16. Octob. avec peu de monde le mauvais temps ayant escarté la plus grande partie des Vaisseaux
Il choisit Wesemberg pour rendevous general, et ayant apprit que Narva etoit aux Abois ou dans la derniere necessité resolut de l'aller Secourir avec 8. a 9000. hommes l'Extremité ou etoit la place ne permettant pas d'attendre que les autres troupes fussent arrivez. Il partit de Wesemberg le 23. Novembre, donna la Chasse a 6000. Moscovites aux deffilez de Lagena et Pyajoggi le 29. Il attaqua et força leurs Lignes le 30. et defit entierement leur Armée forte de 8000. hommes. 9. Generaux y furent faits Prisonnier; 24. Colonels pris, Tuez ou Blessez, et d'autres Officiers a proportion. 22000. Moscovites y resterent sur la Place, ils y perdirent 196. Canons ou Mortiers. 171. Drapeaux et Etandards 6. pairs de Timbales, les Tentes du Czar et le Tresor de l'Armée, toutes ces choses restées aux Suedois sont les Fruits de leur Valeur et les marques de cette Celebre Victoire.



Figure 6.3. Adam Weyde's wing during the siege of Narva in 1700.
On the right hand side of the plan, a note was added, "The place where General Weyde capitulated with the left wing of the Muscovite army."
Source: Pieter Mortier, *Plan de Narva, Assiegé par 80000 Moscovites, qui furent attaqués et d'effaits dans leurs lignes par Charles XII, Roy de Suede ... le 30 Novembre 1700, Amsterdam [1702-1703]*, https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/collectie/RP-P-OB-83.034-150 (accessed August 12, 2020) – excerpt.



von Delden's (Figure 6.3).[363] Boris Sheremetev's *pomestny* cavalry, constituting the bulk of the tsar's mounted force, were positioned by the river.[364]

A cursory analysis of the Russian fortifications would have one assume that the Swedes had to attack the lines commanded by Generals Weyde and Sheremetev (see Figures 6.2, 6.7). They were the least fortified,

[363] N. de Fer, op. cit.

[364] Sheremetev's cavalry was dispatched to delay the march of the Swedish army and did not arrive at the camp until November 18, 1700. А.В. Беспалов, op. cit., pp. 42–43.

and the lay of the land was conducive to mounting an offensive. However, the Swedish staff decided to attack in two columns at the center of the Russian defense, bypassing General Ivan Trubetskoy's fortified hilltop camp (Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.7). The solution was noteworthy for several reasons. First, the Swedes opted to capitalize on Hermansberg Hill, which provided fine artillery fire (Figure 6.6). Second, they pounced on the Russians' lack of initiative, striking using the bulk of their force arrayed in two columns.[365] Despite the numerical odds overwhelmingly favoring the Russians, this targeted strike against the defense line that stretched the length of over seven kilometers guaranteed a breach of the Russian defenses. In today's military terminology, the Swedish staff used the concept of all-out attack (an attack involving a concentration of combat power). Third, in the second stage of the battle, their plan was to split the Russian forces and push them towards the two most outlying positions along the riverbank, thus isolating Trubetskoy's camp. With only one bridge, it was impossible for the Russian army to escape, especially for the regiments staggered in the southern section. Thus, a maneuver was employed to put the enemy at a disadvantage from the onset of the battle.[366]

The attack was simple in its premise but required excellent reconnaissance. The latter was successful, which was the key to Swedish victory. Although De Croy commanded the regiments to set up advance sentries, some of the troops failed to comply with the order. This enabled an engineering and exploration group led by Colonel Bernhard Otto Rehbinder and Captain Carl Gustaf Örnestedt to survey the condition of the Russian fortifications. On the night of November 18, the Swedes investigated and measured the depth of the moats, the height of the fortifications, and

[365] See G. Adlerfeld, *The Military History of Charles XII. King of Sweden*, London 1740, p. 53.
[366] S. Drumowicz, *Aktualność klasycznych zasad walki Clausewitza we współczesnej sztuce wojennej*, "Obronność – Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania i Dowodzenia" 1 (2012), pp. 48–63.

the spacing of the redoubts.[367] When inspecting the Russian defensive earthworks, it is clear that they had been constructed on a grand scale. The moat was 3.6 meters wide and as deep as 1.8 meters. The 1.8 meter-high earthen rampart was reinforced with chevaux de frise and a palisade, which protected the firing lane, equipped with a firestep, which covered the soldiers up to the height of 1.5 meters (Figure 7.3).[368]

The Swedes attacked on November 19, around 2:00 p.m. In doing so, they took advantage of favorable weather conditions, as they launched their assault in a violent snowstorm, with the wind blowing from the west, which severely impaired the Russian soldiers' vision.[369] For the attack to be successful, the Swedes had to backfill the moat, undraw the palisade and destroy the earthen ramparts to allow the Swedish cavalry to penetrate to the rear of the enemy. Entrusted with the main assault were 500 grenadiers, advancing in the first line of each column. They were carrying fascines to fill the ditch, and ladders to scale the parapets.[370]

The targeted attack of the Swedes sidelined Adam Weyde from the main defensive operations in the first phase of the battle. However, it soon became apparent that the southern column commanded by General Otto Welling (Welingk, Vellingk), targeting the left wing of Trubetskoy's army, also threatened the right section of General Weyde's division. During the attack, the Russians fired inaccurately, while the advancing Swedes fired an effective volley from thirty meters, filling the ditch with fascines, overcoming the *chevaux de frise*, and storming the Russian positions using cold

[367] B.N. Grigor'ev, A.V. Bespalov, *Kampen mot övermakten: Baltikums fall 1700–1710*, Stockholm 2012, pp. 27–28; [Sweden Armén Generalstaben], *Karl XII på slagfältet: karolinsk slagledning sedd mot bakgrunden av taktikens utveckling från äldsta tider*, vol. 2, Stockholm 1918, p. 324.
[368] *Plan af staden och fästningen Narva…*, KA, Kungsboken 1655–1735, 4–1. See J.A. Nordberg, op. cit., p. 130.
[369] C. Cronstedt do J. Troiliusa, Narwa, 6 XII 1700, [in:] *Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens historia*, tryckte hos J. Hörberg, vol. 19, Stockholm 1834, pp. 402–403.
[370] А.В. Беспалов, op. cit., p. 43.



Figure 6.4. Cross-section of field fortifications of the Russian army at Narva in 1700.
Source: *Plan af staden och fästningen Narva med des situation*, KA, Kungsboken 1655–1735, 4–1 (no mention of author and date of execution – excerpt).



weapons (see Figure 6.4, 6.5, 6.6).[371] The grenadiers completed their assignment with great efficacy, as depicted in a sketch of the battle by Johan

[371] Interestingly, it was the Russians who had superior gunpowder that enabled them to fire more effectively at long range; see C.M. Posse to N. Posse, Narva, December 9, 1700, *Bref upplysande svenska historien. Ur frih. Carl Magnus Posses korrespondens*, HT, årgång 2, Stockholm 1882, p. 87.

Figure 6.5. Grenadier attack and breach of the Russian lines in the section defended by General Adam Weyde at the Battle of Narva in 1700 (Weyde's tent is marked with the letter G).
Source: J. Litheim, [E. Dahlbergh], *Delineation Af Staden och fästningen Narfwa*, KB, Kart- och Bildsektionen, Dahlbergh, 12:49.

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Litheim, who highlighted the fact that these units overcame the Russian defenses, protected by earthwork fortifications (Figure 6.5).

General Weyde personally commanded the attacked section, at which time he was hit by a rifle bullet, which struck his left side.[372] The defense line was breached in this section, to which its commander responded with great lucidity. The events unfolding at the time were recounted in 1720 by Lieutenant Colonel Awraam Korret (then major of Alexander Gordon's regiment). Adam Weyde noticed that, after breaking through the Russian defensive lines, the Swedish soldiers of General Otto Wellig skirted past Weyde's command post and turned to the right, towards the positions occupied by Gordon's regiment (Figures 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7). In doing so, they recklessly left behind the earthen fortifications and the artillery posts. Seeing this, Weyde ordered Major Korret to one of the redoubts, commanding him to turn the cannons and start firing at the enemy. Major Korret promptly obliged. Accompanied by twenty soldiers, the major managed to break through the enemy troops and shell the flank of the advancing Swedish troops. Korret's efforts were only partially successful, as he was soon forced out of the redoubt by the Swedes, who pursued him until he reached Charles-Peter Devson's regiment (part of Avtamon Golovin's division), stationed on the right flank of the Russian forces.[373]

Adam Weyde kept his division disciplined. His detachments were gradually tightening ranks, falling back toward the river. Conversely, Boris Sheremetev's cavalry regiments panicked, fleeing the field *en masse* in an attempt to swim across the river, with approximately a thousand

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[372] А. Петров, op. cit., p. 35.

[373] *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1, p. 1169. See also И.В. Бабич, *Опыт неформального анализа формуляра: по офицерским сказкам 1720–1721 годов*, [in:] *Война и оружие...*, ч. 1, Санкт-Петербург 2016, pp. 88–90.

cavalrymen drowning in the process.[374] The situation was even more dire in the other divisions, as the Russian soldiers went on a rampage and started slaughtering their own foreign officers, who in turn surrendered to the approaching Swedes, offering ransom. The others, horrified by the enemy attack, rushed towards the only bridge on the Narva to save their lives, overcrowding and causing it to collapse, which resulted in the death of many more soldiers. Seeing the overwhelming panic among his troops, Field Marshal de Croy capitulated, stating, "Let the devil himself fight at the head of such soldiers!"[375] He then dashed through the mud down the Narva, toward the Swedish troops stationed there, handing his sword to Colonel Magnus Stenbock as a sign of surrender.[376]

Although Field Marshal de Croy surrendered to the enemy, the Russian army did not capitulate just then. The units that mounted determined resistance and persevered in their positions were the two guard regiments, the Preobrazhensky and the Semyonovsky, positioned at the bridge connecting the shore with Kamperholm Island (Figure 6.2), as well as General Weyde's division on the opposite flank (Figure 6.3).[377] Having failed to breach the positions of the Russian guard regiments and with the coming of dusk, Charles XII decided to continue the battle the following day. To this end, he ordered his commanders to make adequate preparations. In the meantime, after a council held around 8 pm, the most senior Russian generals, Yakov Dolgorukov, Alexander Archilovich Bagrationi, Avtamon Golovin and Ivan Buturlin, sent a messenger to Charles with an

[374] А.В. Беспалов, op. cit., p. 43.
[375] E. Schuyler, *Peter the Great. Emperor of Russia. A Study of Historical Biography*, vol. 1, New York 1884, pp. 397–398.
[376] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 4; *Svenska slagfält*, av L. Ericson et al., Värnamo 2004, p. 257; A. Marklund, *Stenbock. Ära och ensamhet i Karl XII:s tid*, Lund 2008, p. 118. See also B.N. Grigor'ev, A.V. Bespalov, op. cit., pp. 34–35.
[377] *Северная война 1700–1721 гг. К 300-летию Полтавской победы. Сборник документов*, т. 1: *(1700–1709 гг.)*, ред. Л.Г. Бескровный, Г.А. Куманев, Москва 2009, № 57, p. 75.



Figure 6.6. Attack of the southern column of the Swedish army commanded by General Otto Welling during the Battle of Narva in 1700. Source: I.L. Welsch, *Plan de la ville de Narva et du château d'Ivanogrod assiégés par le tsar... et délivrés par le roi de Suède Charles XII*, Bibliothèque nationale de France, GED-3031, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8441861x (public domain; accessed October 30, 2020).


ntrevallation
Lieut: Reinschild
Cap: Sperling
G: M: Posse
Gen: Welling.
Gen: Lieut: Wachtmeister

offer of surrender. After lengthy negotiations, the king eventually permitted the Russian army to leave freely, with its banners and weapons (albeit without artillery), over a makeshift bridge on the Narva, which his sappers began to reassemble at 11 p.m. that night.[378]

Meanwhile, separated from the remaining Russian forces by General Welling's detachments, General Weyde was initially unaware of the agreement. He allegedly received the news of the surrender from Ivan Buturlin. Colonel Alexander Gordon, who participated in the battle, noted that General Weyde received this information from the adjutant general of Prince Yakov Dolgorukov (according to Gordon, the second most senior officer in the Russian army after Field Marshal de Croy). The latter instructed him not to take any action and to accept the agreed terms of surrender.[379] Accordingly, Adam Weyde sent a written message to General Welling shortly before dawn on November 20 (December 1), expressing his readiness to continue fighting and his willingness to consent only to an honorable surrender, if any. "Separated from the army," wrote the Russian commander, "we are ready to fight to the last man; should we reach an agreement, though, and should the terms be generous, I shall acquiesce."[380]

The Swedes responded that he could only count on the king's favor, provided that his troops lay down their weapons beforehand. Isolated from the rest of the Russian units, and with no insight into the situation unfolding at Narva, Adam Weyde chose to capitulate (the location is shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3). An eye-witness to these events, Count Charles Wrede, deputy marshal of the Swedish royal court, recounted the event as follows: "If a Russian general with up to 6,000 [soldiers] under

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[378] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 48.

[379] A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 153.

[380] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 49. Zob. też G. Adlerfeld, op. cit., p. 53; J.A. Nordberg, op. cit., p. 134; *Журнал, или поденная, записка...*, ч. 1, p. 20.

arms had elected to strike at us, we would have undoubtedly been shattered: we were verging on exhaustion, with neither food nor rest for several days; in addition, our soldiers became so drunk with the wine they found in the Muscovite camp that it was impossible for the few officers remaining with us to bring them to heel."[381]

This raises the question: why did General Weyde refrain from continuing the fight against the Swedes, while still having a similar force under his command? In addition, the Swedish troops scattered and tired from the battle they had just fought, while his own soldiers retained a degree of freshness and were combat-ready. Alexander Gordon corroborated this by noting that some of the foreign officers serving in the army refused to comply with Field Marshal de Croy's decision regarding the surrender, considering it disgraceful, since a more numerous army should not lay down its arms before a much weaker opponent.[382] On the other hand, Adam Weyde's decision may be excused on account of the fact that, as a soldier, he simply heeded the order issued by Prince Dolgurokov, who stood above him in the chain of command.[383] That he did not cower is indisputable, as evidenced by his involvement in the battle (he was, after all, wounded in the process). It seems more likely that the general simply lacked the relevant skills to command large tactical compounds and

[381] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 49; т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № II: 50, pp. 178–182. For a similar opinion, see C. Cronstedt to J. Troilius, Narva, December 6, 1700, [in:] *Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia...*, pp. 402–403. On the initial advantage of the Swedes during the attack on General Weyde's division, Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № III, p. 452.

[382] A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 153.

[383] The hierarchy of the Russian higher command involved in the Battle of Narva was thoroughly detailed by an anonymous author of a Swedish map depicting the clash, which was most likely drafted as early as 1700. According to the above documented, Adam Weyde was only fourth in the chain of command behind Field Marshal de Croy, Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, and Infantry General Avtamon Golovin; see *Fält Charta, eller topographisk delineation, öfwer, Narfwen och Iwangorod...*, Royal Collection Trust, inventory No. 724094 (se. https://militarymaps.rct.uk/other-18th-19th-century-conflicts/ivangorod-and-narva-1700-falt-charta-eller; accessed December 10, 2020). See J.A. Nordberg, op. cit., p. 135.

was afraid or unwilling to assume the responsibilities of a supreme commander. This was noted by Alexander Gordon, who stated that Weyde "was made general by [the tsar's] grace, yet he was a man lacking in experience and may never have battled the enemy, but in terms of leadership he exceeded Prince Dolgorukov."[384]

Adam Weyde reported to Charles XII's camp on the morning of November 20. By this time, the regiments of the guard and the soldiers of Avtamon Golovin's division, still under arms, had crossed the bridge, which had been rebuilt by the Swedes. However, this is where compliance with the terms of surrender negotiated by Major General Ivan Buturlin and the other commanders of the tsar's army, subsequently communicated to General Weyde, ended.[385] The soldiers of Weyde's division were indeed permitted to leave, but not before surrendering their weapons and banners, and being stripped of their uniforms and robbed of their possessions. According to the official census of soldiers conducted by the Russians following the defeat at Narva, this tactical compound, which did manage to reach Veliky Novgorod, amounted to 9,040 men.[386] Thus, General Weyde's troops suffered no losses and became the building block for the restoration of the Russian army.

A far graver fate befell the captured Russian generals, detained under the pretense that their commissars had carted away the camp's

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[384] A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 153.

[385] *Северная война 1700–1721 гг…*, № 57, p. 75.

[386] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 51. An analysis of the data on the numerical composition of this division before and after the battle showed that this tactical compound walked away virtually unscathed. 9,061 soldiers reportedly reached Narva, of whom as many as 9,040 survived. As a result, only twenty-one men were killed in the clash with the Swedes. Such a state of affairs is confirmed by the fact that General Weyde's division, isolated from the rest of the troops, remained battle-ready until the end of hostilities at Narva. On the other hand, its numbers may have been bolstered by the wounded and sick left whom the division had left behind on its way to Narva.

treasury, estimated at as much as 300,000.[387] Before long, it turned out that Peter's commanders would remain in captivity for years to come, with some of them never leaving it alive. From a military point of view, Charles XII's decision was justified, as it deprived the enemy's army of its highest echelon, while also demoralizing its non-commissioned officers and rank-and-file soldiers. In the end, seventy-nine senior officers ended up in captivity, of whom ten were generals.[388] For the next ten years of the war, the Swedish monarch consistently sought to retain the Narva POWs in captivity. Among them was General Weyde.

The Battle of Narva was a spectacular success for Charles XII and at the same time a great defeat for Peter I. There is a wide discrepancy among historians on the personnel losses sustained by Peter's army. Scholars usually estimate them at about 8,000 killed and wounded,[389] although participants in the clash estimated these numbers to be much higher; for example, Lieutenant General von Hallart recorded that

[387] Ibidem, p. 49; т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № II: 50, p. 180. The amount the Swedes projected to seize was enormous and would have aided their subsequent warfare considerably. For example, the annual pay of a private in the tsar's army at the time was twelve rubles. Thus, after proper recalculation, 300,000 rubles allowed the Russian ruler to field and maintain as many as twenty-five regiments for a year if each of said regiment stood at 1,000 men. Eventually, the amount of money conceded to the Swedes at Narva totaled at 32,000 rubles; see ibidem, т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № II: 50, p. 180.

[388] Ibidem, т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 50–51. The register of generals and officers taken prisoner (including those who fell) and other Russian army captives (or civilians serving therein), as well as officers of the Polish king detained at Narva, was compiled by Ludwig von Hallart; see Л.Н. Галлартъ, op. cit., 2 (1822), pp. 133–137.

[389] А. Петров, op. cit., p. 35; P.K. Масси, *Петр Великий*, пер. с англ. Н.Л. Лужецкой, В.Э. Волковский, т. 2, Смоленск 1996, p. 84. Russian historians Yevgeny Porfiryov and Anton Kersnovsky estimated the Russian losses at 5,708 men (including soldiers who died during the march to Narva); see Е.И. Порфирьев, op. cit., p. 131; А.А. Керсновский, *История русской армии*, т. 1, Москва 1992, p. 24. Polish scholars Władysław A. Serczyk and Zbigniew Anusik list the Russian losses at 9,000 killed and 6,000 who died of starvation; see W.A. Serczyk, op. cit., p. 99; Z. Anusik, op. cit., pp. 61–62. The aforementioned German historian Christian von Sarauw estimated the Russians losses at as many as 18,000 men; see Ch. von Sarauw, op. cit., p. 64.

Figure 6.7. Panorama of the Battle of Narva in 1700 (letter G marks the position taken by Adam Weyde).
Source: [*Narva, som belägrats av ryska trupper sedan början av sept 1700, undsattes av Karl XII, som den 20 nov anföll och besegrade ryska belägringshären under hertigen av Croys befäl*], KA, Historiska planscher, Omslag 1677–1700, call no. 1700:30 (1700).

Prospect
Der Stadt Narwa
Als Ihro Königß Majt: von Schweden
CARL der XII
Selbige A: 1700 den 20 Novemb: rühmlichst ent-
setzte und den Czaar Peter Alexewitz
gäntzlig schlug und verjagte.
P. Attaque von Ivanegorod.
Q. Die Attaque am Schloß.
R. Reffels und Mortiers.
S. Batterien.
T. Logement an der Contrascarp.

9,000 soldiers fell,[390] while Colonel Alexander Gordon put the figure at as many as 12,000.[391] Swedish historians emphasize the high mortality rate in the retreating Russian divisions following the battle, estimating total enemy losses at 14,000.[392] A much higher number of Russian casualties and MIAs was recorded by another Great Northern War combatant, Charles XII's chamberlain and chronicler Gustav Adlerfeld, who reported that the enemy had suffered as many as 18,000 casualties, with only 2,000 killed among the Swedes.[393] The Swedes also plundered the Russian camp, capturing all of the 177 guns of various calibers, along with 24,000 muskets.[394] Charles XII could not contain himself as he inspected the twenty grand banners and 151 standards of Peter I's regiments.[395]

The tactical compound headed by General Weyde suffered few losses, with the regiments formed or commanded by the general in 1699–1700 gaining experience in the subsequent phase of the war. Early into the eighteenth century, it was customary to use the term "Weyde Division," which somehow implied that the general would return to a prominent position after his release from captivity. However, no one expected his confinement to last so long.

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[390] Л.Н. Галларт, op. cit., 2 (1822), p. 132.
[391] A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 154.
[392] P. Ullgren, *Det stora nordiska kriget 1700–1721: en berättelse om stormakten Sveriges fall*, Stockholm 2008, p. 57.
[393] G. Adlerfeld, op. cit., p. 56. Identical figures were listed in the official Swedish printed account of the battle, published in Narva as early as November 28, 1700; see *Kurtzer doch wahrhaffter Bericht, von dem herrlichen und unvergleichlichen Sieg…*, npd, p. [8]. According to Andrei Petrov, the Swedes lost 3,000 men at Narva; see А. Петров, op. cit., p. 35.
[394] *Kurtzer doch wahrhaffter Bericht…*, [pp. 6–7]; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 52–53; O. Kuylenstierna, *Det svenska artilleriet under Karl XII*, KFÅ 1917, Lund 1918, p. 11. As per Jacob Bruce, who fought in the battle, the Russian forces lost a total of 181 cannons of diverse types; see Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., p. 53.
[395] А. Петров, op. cit., p. 35.

7. IN SWEDISH CAPTIVITY

The battle of Narva emphatically exposed all the shortcomings and inadequacies of the Russian army, which essentially ceased to exist after the clash. The Russians lost approximately a third of their personnel (killed, wounded, MIAs, deserters and POWs), along with vast quantities of armaments and all sorts of military equipment. The top-ranking commanders participating in the battle were also captured: Field Marshal de Croy, Imeretian Tsarevich Field Marshal General Alexander Bagrationi (also known as Alexander Imeretinsky),[396] Commisary General Prince Yakov Dolgolukov, Infantry General Avtamon Golovin, general and Governor of Novgorod Prince Ivan Trubetskoy, Major General Ivan Buturlin, and Infantry General Adam Weyde, as well as several Saxon commanders who fought on the tsar's side: Lieutenant General Ludwig von Hallart (officially in Russian service since 1706), Major General August Freiherr von Langen (extraordinary envoy of the Saxon Elector), and Chief

[396] Tarevich Alexander Archilovich Bagrationi was the son of Archil Bagrationi, the ruler of Georgia, forced out of his homeland by the Turks and seeking refuge in Russia, where he arrived with his family in 1682. He regained his throne three times in 1690, 1695 and 1698, respectively (his children remained in the Russian capital), before the political situation caused him to settle in Moscow permanently in 1699. Alexander Archilovich ranked among the closest friends of Peter I, who included him in the Grand Embassy of 1697, instructing him to acquire artillery expertise in the Netherlands. For this reason, the tsarevich was appointed General Feldzeugmeister of the Russian artillery forces.

Engineer Major General Schacher (Schaher?). Among those imprisoned were also ten colonels, five lieutenant colonels, fourteen captains, seven lieutenants, including the commander of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, Colonel Ivan (Johann Ernst) von Blomberg, and artillery colonel Casimir von Kraghe (Kragen), who died that same year as a result of the wounds sustained in the battle.[397]

The Swedish side was keenly aware of the prominence of its prisoners, who had been instrumental in the modernization of Russia's armed forces.[398] The captives were to remain in isolation, a decision that was something of a hallmark of Swedish foreign policy during the war with Russia. Therefore, some of those apprehended at Narva never returned to their homeland. Such was the fate of Field Marshal de Croy, who, forgotten by the tsar, died in Reval in 1702. Alexander Bagrationi died in 1711 in the Swedish town of Piteå whilst heading for St. Petersburg following his release. The other generals and senior officers were held hostage for years to come because of Charles XII's steadfast refusal to exchange POWs with Russia. Those who were nominally in the service of Augustus II were released first, including Ludwig von Hallart, exchanged in 1705 for Lieutenant General Arvid Horn, whom the Saxons had imprisoned in Warsaw earlier that year.[399] It was not until 1710 that the first Russian general,

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[397] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 50–51. For a list of the generals and officers taken prisoner (including those who fell) and other soldiers or persons present with the Russian army at the time of the battle, see Ludwig von Hallart's account, Л.Н. Галлларт, op. cit., 2 (1822), pp. 133–137.

[398] The reorganization of the tsar's armed forces, which could not be hidden from outsiders, was monitored keenly by many foreign diplomats posted to Russia at the time. One of them was the Swedish representative in Moscow, Tomas Kniperkron (Kniper), who actively participated in the diplomatic and social life of the Russian capital. For more details, see E.E. Рычаловский, *Резидент Томас Книпер в России в Петровскую эпоху*, [in:] *Шведы в Москве: материалы российско-шведской научной конференции. Москва, 1–2 июня 2000 год*, отв. ред. Т.А. Тоштендаль-Салычева, Москва 2002, pp. 62–79.

[399] RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1525, unpag. As of 1705, von Hallart was the highest-ranking officer among Augustus II's soldiers still in Swedish captivity.

Buturlin, was released, followed by Adam Weyde in the early days of 1711. That year, Yakov Dolgolukov escaped and returned to his homeland (he and other prisoners captured a ship and arrived in Reval, which the Russians controlled at the time),[400] effectively bringing the exchange of captives to a halt. Avtamon Golovin and Ivan Trubetskoy returned from captivity in 1718.

The initial location of all seventy-nine high-ranking Russian detainees was Narva. They remained in isolation, under heavy guard, without access to pens, paper or ink, which prevented any communication with the tsar or their respective families.[401] Eventually, the prisoners were allowed to notify Peter I and his associates of their plight, with the Swedes rigorously censoring the correspondence. The surviving November 1700 letter from Prince Yakov Dolgolukov, addressed to the head of the MP Prikaz of General-Feldmarshal Fyodor Golovin, then in charge of foreign affairs, reveals the physical and mental state of the captives, including General Weyde, in the early days of imprisonment. The following is an extensive excerpt from said correspondence:

I report to Your Grace that Alexander Archilovich [Bagrationi], Avtamon Mikhailovich [Golovin], Adam Adamovich [Weyde], Prince Ivan Yuryevich [Trubetskoy], Ivan Ivanovich [Buturlin] and I, Prince Yakov, are alive. We have been prohibited to report on the miserable end to our cause [i.e., the battle fought], or on anything else, even though Your Grace has doubtless received the news from

[400] С.В. Черников, op. cit., p. 708. For more on the fate of the Russian captives in Sweden, see С.А. Козлов, op. cit., passim.

[401] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 55–56; Л.Н. Галларт, op. cit., 2 (1822), pp. 137–140. The conditions in which the generals were detained were by no means comfortable, as the Swedes converted the captured earthen fortifications erected by the Russians during the siege of Narva into prison space. This is confirmed by the Swedish documents. One of them, dated November 24, 1700, a mere few days after the battle, states that "(...) Prince Dolgorukov, Prince Imeretinsky, Golovin, Buturlin and others captured in the wake of the battle, [are] staying in a wooden house, underground, in a trench;" see Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № II: 49, p. 178.

those who saw it all and participated in the affair; we only ask You to give credence to the words [conveyed] by the faithful and God-fearing people who were witnesses to our cause to its very end (...). We have remained in Rugodiv [the Old Russian name for Narva] for two days before being separated and refused the clemency of seeing one another or learning through our men if the rest are ailing or in good health. Adam Adamovich [Weyde] was wounded, shot in the side with a rifle; however, his health has since slightly improved.[402]

On December 12 (23), 1700, Charles XII, who was still in Narva, marched his army toward Dorpat. Two days later, a strong convoy of 300 Swedish soldiers moved from the fortress toward Reval, escorting all the captured generals and officers, along with their servants. The column arrived in Reval on December 31.[403] For the first two months, the situation of the prisoners did not change, as they were still heavily guarded. According to Ludwig von Hallart, it was not until February 23 (March 6) that the Governor General of Reval received a royal decree allowing Russian generals and officers to visit one another and walk around the city, accompanied by a Swedish officer or non-commissioned officer. However, their situation changed soon thereafter, and on March 7 (18) they were once again forbidden to receive visitors, and their mobility in the city was restricted to religious purposes only (with the church as the only admissible destination). These actions were partly dictated by the requests filed by the foreign diplomats stationed in Reval (envoys of the Holy Roman Empire and Denmark) not to be disturbed by any visitors, and partly so that the captives would not discover what the Swedes intended for them

[402] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № II: 48, pp. 177–178. See also ibidem, приложения, № II: 49, p. 178.

[403] Exceptionally in this chapter, due to the very complicated and oft-unresolved issues in the source texts and subject literature, we have adopted the Julian calendar (binding at the time) with respect to the daily dates of the respective events involving the Russian prisoners held in Sweden. In comparison with the Julian calendar also in use in Russia, one day should be added.

next.[404] In the course of the following days, the conditions of the Russian prisoners of war in Reval improved.[405]

In mid-May 1701, all Russian POWs held in Reval (134 persons) were transferred to Stockholm aboard seven ships. General Weyde reached Scandinavia aboard the *Stenbocken*, along with twenty-four of his companions (commanders and servants).[406] It was in Sweden proper, primarily in its capital, that the POWs stayed for the duration of the war. The group included not only officers and soldiers of the Russian army but also their Ukrainian Cossack allies, as well as soldiers of the Polish-Lithuanian army.[407]

Clearly, the Swedish authorities employed a variety of propaganda measures involving their POWs in an effort to discredit the combat value of the Russian army and raise the morale of their own soldiers. News was spread of the glorious victories clinched despite the enemy's vast

[404] Л.Н. Галларт, op. cit., 2 (1822), pp. 142–143.

[405] This is confirmed by a subsequent 1702 report by the tsar's resident in Stockholm, Prince Andrey Khilkov; see *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента в Швеции А.Я. Хилкова (1676–1717). К истории Северной войны. Сборник документов*, сост. С.Р. Долгова, Г.Р. Якушкин, № 40, Москва–Санкт-Петербург 2015, p. 112.

[406] Л.Н. Галларт, op. cit., 2 (1822), pp. 114–115. There are discrepancies as to the exact time of the prisoners' transfer from Reval to Stockholm. According to Nikolai Ustryalov, it took place in mid-May 1701. See Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 55–56. Without citing any source, Sergei Kozlov states that the detainees were first sent from Reval to Kexholm, before being transferred to Stockholm on 17 May 1701; see С.А. Козлов, op. cit. pp. 132, 201. The claim of the Russian captives spending four months in Reval is supported by the work of Russian historian Galina Shebaldina, who notes that the order to send the detainees to Stockholm arrived on April 27, and was only executed on 17 May 1701; see Г.[В.] Шебалдина, *Заложники Петра I и Карла XII. Повседневный быт пленных во время Северной войны*, Москва 2014, p. 24. Ludwig von Hallart, whose account was not referenced by the aforementioned historians, offers a somewhat different perspective. As an eye-witness to the events, von Hallart mentions a royal order to have the prisoners shipped to Stockholm, which was carried out after May 12 (23) 1701; see Л.Н. Галларт, op. cit., 2 (1822), p. 143.

[407] For more on the subject, see H. Henriksson, *När stora nordiska kriget kom till Bornholm*, "Bornholmske Samlinger" 8 (2014), pp. 193–219; idem, *Ukrainian Cossacks and Other Prisoners of War in Sewden During the Great Northern War (1700–1721)*, [in:] УЦСЄ, відп. ред. В. Смолій, вип. 16, Київ 2016, pp. 247–259. Lists of prisoners held in Stockholm are currently kept in the Riksarkivet collection: RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1525, unpag.



6:te Ledet { Capitain Fries. / Dito Christoph. Folcherson. / Secreteraren Sigismund. / Fendrich Serger.

The andre fångarne ståltes alt 4 i hwart led.

Ifrån Skepsbroen och mehrbem:te Wälb:ne Herr Borgmästerens huus fördes the til Sahl. Handels-Mannens Scharenbergs huus / hwareſt ifrån Porten / genom gången och öfwer gården / ända til baakhuſet och thet rum / the förſamlades vthi / et Compagnie af Stadſens Borgerſkap i 2. Linier ſtält war. Therifrån fördes ſedan hwart partie för ſig til the huus / ſom them förordnade woro.

Såſom therefter Chriſtt Himmelsfärds dag inföll / drögdes medh the öfrigas vphämtande til den 31. Maij. på hwilken dag the öfrige / ſom wore på ſkepen / vptoges / på ſamma ſätt; allenaſt med then åtſtildnad / at öfwer the förra ännu ett Compagnie af borgerſkapet til fot them ledſagade / ſom icke war ſkedt förra gången.

The ſom tå vpkommo / woro följande:

Förſta Ledet { General Dolgorucka. / General Adam Weide.

2:dre Ledet { General Lieut. Allard. / General Major Butterlin.

3:die Ledet { General Adjutant Gottfred Schagge. / Öfwerſt Weſthoff.

4:de Ledet { Öfwerſt Jacob Gordon. / Öfwerſt Alexand: Gordon.

5:te Ledet { Öfwerſt von Delden. / Öfwerſt Carol Jwanischj.

6:te Ledet { Öfwerſt Lieut: Decutre. / Major Pihl.

7:de Le-

Figure 7.1. List of prisoners marched through the streets of Stockholm during the May 1701 triumph.
Source: jobbing print entitled *Sannfärdig berättelse om the ryska-fångars ankomst til Stockholm...*, Stockholm [1701], [p. 7].

numerical superiority.[408] Triumphal marches were held on the streets of Stockholm featuring the captured banners and Russian prisoners, starting with the first captives transferred to the Swedish capital on May 26, 1701.[409] The first triumphs were held as early as May 28 and 31, with the Swedish soldiers (reiters, infantry and members of the merchant guard) parading down the main streets, leading prisoners and boasting the captured banners.[410] In honor of these events, engravings and pamphlet prints were released to help publicize the victory at Narva (see Figure 7.1).[411]

In this respect, two poetic pieces published on this occasion are worthy of mention: *Narva* (1701) by Andreas Stobaeus[412] and *In Victoriam Narvensem…* (1701) by Magnus Rönnow.[413] Both panegyrics lauded the military genius of King Charles XII and the bravery of his soldiers and officers in defying the might of Peter I's army. The pieces include brief mentions of General Weyde (see Table 3). In both cases, he was mentioned among

[408] Е.В. Ермасов, *Отражение начала Северной войны в немецкой публицистике первой четверти XVIII века*, https://www.sgu.ru/archive/old.sgu.ru/files/nodes/10082/10.pdf (accessed September 10, 2018).

[409] У. Биргегорд, *О русских высших чинах в шведском плену*, [in:] *Полтава. Судьбы пленных и взаимодействие культур*, ред. Т.А. Тоштендаль-Салычева, Л. Юнсон, Москва 2009, p. 212. Sergei Kozlov reports that the captives arrived on May 28 and 31; see С.А. Козлов, op. cit., p. 132.

[410] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 40, p. 111. Characteristically, such actions provoked retaliation from the Russian authorities, as reported by Just Juel, a Danish envoy who was in Russia in 1709-1712; see Ю. Юль, *Записки датского посланника в России при Петре Великом*, [in:] *Лавры Полтавы. Ю.Юль. Оттон Плейер…*, p. 104.

[411] *Sannfärdig berättelse om the ryska-fångars ankomst til Stockholm, theras vphämtade [!] och huru the äro fördehlte, och hållas vthi sin arrest. Jämpte en richtig förtekning uppå the wid Narva erhållna trophèer, stycken, fahnor och standarer*, Stockholm [1701], pp. 1–24.

[412] A. Stobaeus, *Narva*, [in:] *Andreas Stobaeus, Two Panegyrics in Verse*, edited, with introduction, translation and commentary by M. Berggren, Uppsala 1994, pp. 162–221 (pages 222-281 contain a commentary on the poem).

[413] M. Rönnow, *In Victoriam Narvensem…*, [in:] *The Voice of a Waning Empire. Selected Latin Poetry of Magnus Rönnow from the Great Northern War*, edited, with introduction, translation and commentary by E. Dahlberg, Uppsala 2014, pp. 173–195 (pages 196–224 contain a commentary on the poem).

the foreign commanders serving in the Russian army. The authors charge them (Weyde in particular) with betraying Western European civilization, emphasizing their status as mercenaries in Peter's service and the fact that they were Peter's mercenaries, who commanded armies fighting an unjust war. The harsh epithets against Adam Weyde were presumably attributable to his Lutheran denomination. Thus, commanding "barbarian" (i.e., representing a different civilization and affiliated with Orthodox Christianity), "bloodthirsty" soldiers, seeking to harm the Protestant subjects of Charles XII, had particularly negative overtones.

Table 3. Summary of mentions of Adam Weyde in Swedish panegyrical pieces celebrating victory in the Battle of Narva (1700).

Title	Content	Source
Magnus Rönnow, *In Victoriam Narvensem…*, 1701	Quid territans, dic, Crojus, Allard, Weide que Sarmaticusque Lange, Auro coëmti perficiunt duces? Quid, dic, patrarunt barbara nomina, Dirus Trobetzkoy, Dolgorukoy, Artzschelowitz, Golovin, Buterlin? Quos multitudo inconditia caeterae Plebis, marino vix sabulo minor, Extrameos tptp prbe partis Credita sollicitis magistris?	*The Voice of a Waning Empire. Selected Latin Poetry of Magnus Rönnow from the Great Northern War*, ed. by E. Dahlberg, Uppsala 2014, p. 180.
Andresa Stobaeus, *Narva*, 1701	Nec deerat Moschi votis et tristibus ausis Teutonicus miles Germanisque excita terris Ductorum selecta manus. Non segnis iniquo In bello nam Weide furit, mox Kragius atque Westhofius, Delden, Gordon fidusque satelles Blumenberg Domini juratus et assecla Petri Introeount totis in detestanda maniplis Castra malae nimium cumulantes robora causae.	*Andreas Stobaeus, Two Panegyrics in Verse*, ed. by M. Berggren, Uppsala 1994, pp. 181–182.

Initially, therefore, Weyde's denomination was not helpful. On the contrary, it triggered additional resentment. Nonetheless, Weyde gradually established himself as a respected authority among the Swedes. This was a consequence of his profound piety and pre-established contacts with the Pietist circles in Germany. It was especially Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf who showed concern for his imprisoned friend, as evidenced by his 1702 letter to Weyde.[414] Moreover, the prominent philosopher, diplomat and orientalist was planning to travel from Copenhagen to Stockholm in 1704 to visit the Russian prisoners. Clearly, his first concern was his Lutheran co-religionist Adam Weyde, although the other Russian generals were not insignificant, not least for the fact that the representatives of the Pietist center in Halle held Russian state officials in high esteem.[415] For most of his captivity, Weyde was allowed to leave his place of confinement to attend church services, which afforded him a substantially greater degree of liberty than the fellow generals.[416]

After the staged triumph, which was undoubtedly a traumatic experience for the proud officers, the Russian POWs were allocated quarters according to their rank. The state authorities made decisions on where and under what conditions to hold the detainees. Direct responsibility for their stay in Stockholm rested with its then Governor Christoffer Gyllenstierna. The generals' housing conditions were significantly better than in the case of other prisoners. Naturally, they had to pay appropriate fees for the added comfort, including food and drinks (for a detailed discussion, see below).[417]

[414] H.W. Ludolf to A.A. Weyde, London, August 11, 1702, AFSt./HD 23, Bl. 109v.–110v.
[415] J. Tetzner, *H.W. Ludolf und Russland*, Berlin 1955, p. 52.
[416] *«А паче всего слезно просим милости, незабвенны мы были о свободе своей...». Русские пленные в Швеции в годы Северной войны. 1700–1721 гг.* публ. подг. С.Р. Долгова, "Исторический архив" 3 (2009), № 2, p. 6.
[417] С.А. Козлов, op. cit., pp. 132–133; Г.[В.] Шебалдина, op. cit., p. 25.

Adam Weyde's stay in Swedish captivity can be portrayed as sinusoid, with periods of great hardship and harshness interspersed with considerably relaxed months (see Figure 6). Following their participation in the humiliating triumph, the situation of the prisoners in Stockholm quickly improved. Generals Dolgorukov, Golovin and Trubetskoy, along with servants and several other prisoners of noble birth, occupied a house managed by Christina Krystyna Falkenberg.[418] They were also permitted to hire two cooks and a washerwoman. Over time, the Swedish soldiers posted at the house began to report to their superiors that "the Russians lead a convivial life, make merry and carouse with women." Placed in the same building was Major General Buturlin; however, he was put in solitary confinement, and his cell was located in a basement room with barred windows, guarded at all times by two soldiers.[419] Tsarevich Alexander Bagrationi rented the house of Chief Inspector Paul Sterndal, enjoying considerably better treatment from the Swedish authorities.[420] By

[418] Since it was inhabited by several Russian generals, Prince Chilkov referred to this quarter as the "general's house" in his letters. It was also there that the Swedish authorities allowed an Orthodox church to be set up for the use of the Russian Orthodox prisoners of war. Since General Weyde was a Lutheran, he attended services at one of Stockholm's protestant churches.

[419] Г.[В.] Шебалдина, op. cit., pp. 24–25. The conditions of Ivan Buturlin's detention were most likely dictated by Charles XII's personal vendetta for Buturlin's heroism during the Battle of Narva. The troops he commanded, including the Preobrazhsky and Semyonovsky guard regiments, put up fierce resistance. In addition, together with Adam Weyde, Buturlin stoutly negotiated the terms of surrender of the tsar's army (including the critical fate of the tsar's treasury). It should be noted that, based on the agreement reached, Major General Buturlin was free to leave Narva with his soldiers and the guard regiments, but decided instead to remain with the rest of the soldiers until the end of the evacuation. This decision determined his subsequent fate, as Charles XII broke the agreed terms of surrender and imprisoned the Russian generals and senior officers; see E.B. Анисимов, «*Барабанил вместе с генералом Бутурлиным»: И.И. Бутурлин и Петр Великий*, „Петербургский исторический журнал" 4 (2019), p. 136.

[420] By virtue of his noble background, tsarevich Imeretinsky enjoyed a more privileged position than the other Russian detainees. He was held in special esteem by members of the Swedish royal family, including King Charles XI's mother, Queen Hedwig Eleonora, and Charles XII's sisters, Ulrika Eleonora and Hedwig Sophia. He was especially "popular" among Swedish ladies, likely on account of his Oriental looks. At the end of 1701, Charles XII's grandmother even sent a court physician to aid

contrast, General Adam Weyde, Major General von Langen and their servants were stationed in separate quarters, with the former occupying the home of a certain Johann Kupers. As with the other commanders, armed guards from the merchant guard were also posted at their homes.[421]

It was precisely during one such relaxed stretch of captivity that Elias Brenner painted a tiny portrait (gouache) of Adam Weyde,[422] although there is no information as to who commissioned and paid for the painting (Figure 7.2).[423] It undoubtedly testifies to the general's contacts with representatives of the Swedish elites, including members of the royal family, for the general even corresponded with Charles XII himself and met with his sister Ulrica, the future heiress to the throne (for more on this, see the subsequent part of this chapter).

It should be noted that over the following years, the housing conditions and overall treatment of Adam Weyde and his comrades were constantly changing and depended on factors of both an external nature (the course of hostilities and state policy, including the personal decisions of Charles XII) and internal character (the behavior of the Russian POWs). When the Swedes liberalized the conditions of captivity, the prisoners were able to maintain personal contact with Swedish residents and officials, as well as the foreigners residing in Stockholm. Excluding

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the ailing tsarevich. In the summer of 1706, Imertynsky's personal priest Father Pankratiy visited him and celebrated masses in Georgian and Greek for the high-born prisoner. During his captivity, Alexander Bagrationi also participated in the work on the typeface of Georgian letters, which were used at the time in Moscow to print prayer books written in this language. For more on the tsarevich's captivity, see У. Биргегорд, op. cit., pp. 221–226, 141–143.

[421] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 40, p. 111. The remaining captives, mostly rank-and-file soldiers, were initially placed in city hall rooms, before being transferred to the Stockholm orphanage following several escape attempts; see Г.[В.] Шебалдина, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

[422] See П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот на Балтике при Петре Великом*, Санкт-Петербург 2017, p. 436.

[423] Elias Brener was a royal court miniaturist; his portraits are approximately 35×28 mm in size and bear no signature.

particularly severe periods of repression, General Weyde enjoyed the assistance of servants. Staying with him for an extended period were Michael Hirck, who hailed from Königsberg, and two Germans formerly residing in Russia: Anthoni Cereli and Gregorius Smirnhoff.[424]

An influential Swedish official, the master of ceremonies (Swed. *ceremonimästare*) Johann Gabriel Sparwenfelden was a particularly valuable contact who enabled the prisoners to acquire extensive knowledge of the current political and military developments. This comprehensively educated Swede (graduate of Uppsala University and traveler to the Netherlands, France and Italy), was a royal diplomat accredited to Moscow in 1684. During his three-year mission in the East, he became well acquainted with the customs, mentality and, above all, the workings of the Russian state and its military structures. It was also then that he made the acquaintance of Prince Khilkov, the future Russian envoy to Sweden.[425] There is every indication that Sparwenfeld's past sojourn in Moscow and his scholarly interests in Russia (historical, cultural, linguistic) took a form far removed from the usual sympathy and compassion shown to the tsar's subjects who found themselves in Sweden as POWs at the time. This is confirmed in Prince Khilkov's secret correspondence to Moscow, posted through trusted Russian merchants, often via Lübeck and Copenhagen. Sparwenfeld's favorable treatment of the captives, which included allowing them to conduct correspondence and keeping them informed of the Swedish authorities' intentions, entailed great risks for all participants in these secret contacts. Khilkov's letter to Moscow, dated April 26, 1702,

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[424] RA, Kollegiers m fl, landshövdingars, hovrätters och konsistoriers skrivelser till Kungl Maj:t, Skrivelser från landshövdingar, 22, call no. 17, unpag.

[425] *Nordisk familjebok: Konversationslexikon och realencyklopedi*, ed. Th. Westrin, Bd. 26, Stockholm 1917, col. 567; О. Янссон, *И.* Майер, *Упсальское генеалогическое древнодинастическое древо династии Рюриковичей: описания и история создания*, [in:] *Родословные древа русских царей XVII–XVIII веков*, сост. А.В. Сиренов, Москва 2018, p. 85. Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeld was also the author of a seminal study on the lexicography of Slavic languages, title *Lexicon Slavonicum*.

included information about a meeting Sparwenfeld had held three days earlier with the prince and representatives of the tsar's army command at the "generals' house," during which the participants discussed the very real danger of detection by the Swedish authorities of the secret correspondence maintained primarily by Prince Khilkov, but also by Adam Weyde.[426] These meetings were legal, since, with the permission of the Swedish Senate, Sparwenfeld had the exclusive right to meet with all Russian generals. Therefore, the master of ceremonies did so in accordance with the law; however, by providing the captives with valuable information on current diplomatic and military affairs, he undoubtedly overstepped his authority. Thus, though far removed from their homeland, the Russian commanders were keenly aware of the course of the ongoing war, including the number, armaments, type and future deployment of troops leaving Sweden proper.[427] Making such observations was primarily Prince Khilkov, who enjoyed a relatively unrestricted movement in Stockholm, but also Adam Weyde, who never lost track of any military matters. One excellent example of his espionage while in captivity was a drawing of a horseman, dated April 14, 1703, smuggled to Moscow through a Russian resident and English merchants. It was addressed directly to Alexander Menshikov, who oversaw the formation and activities of the tsar's dragoon units.[428]

Another major problem, even in the periods of relaxed repressions, was the insufficient funding for the maintenance of the prisoners. Several attempts were made to resolve the issue in different ways throughout the Great Northern War. The main source of sustenance for the Russian captives was state assignations (bills of exchange) and remittances made

[426] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента*..., № 37, p. 106.
[427] Ibidem, № 40, pp. 112–117; № 100, p. 234. The generals also drew their knowledge of the battles fought at the time from the German and French newspapers reaching Stockholm.
[428] Ibidem, № 57, p. 148.

Figure 7.2. Elias Brenner, alleged portrait of Adam Weyde (1700–1706)
Source: KB, reproduction from the authors' collection.

by families and relatives of the POWs.[429] While still in Reval, in March or early April 1701, Adam Weyde sent a letter to the tsar's favorite, Alexander Menshikov. In a letter from Head of the Admiralteysky Prikaz and Azov Governor Fyodor Apraksin to Fyodor Golovin dated April 7, 1701, the author notes that "Adam Adamovich Weyde sent a letter to Alexander Menshikov, stating that they are in dire need of money up there, and the Great Gosudar [i.e., the tsar] has instructed me to write to you, asking that you summon Andrei Stiejls [English merchant who also took

[429] *«А паче всего слезно просим милости, незабвенны мы были о свободе своей...». Русские пленные в Швеции в годы Северной войны. 1700-1721 гг.*, публ. подг. С.Р. Долгова, „Исторический архив" № 3 (p. 7–9), № 8 (p. 12).

on various diplomatic assignments from Peter I][430] and ordered him, to send 2,000 yefimok [i.e., thaler] to Reval, if possible through the mail, to Generals Prince Yakov Fyodorovich [Dolgorukov] and Adam Adamovich [Weyde], of which they will disburse at their own discretion; you are to transfer the money to Andrei [Stiejls] (...) without delay, so that they are not left in need."[431]

Cash or bills of exchange were delivered through some kind of intermediary (that role was mostly reserved for merchants or traders). For General Weyde, such a person was Franz Popp, a Hamburg-based merchant working with Peter I. Unfortunately, the assistance from the Russian authorities did not always come in regular intervals, forcing Weyde to repeatedly ask for regular financial transfers.[432]

Over time, with more and more soldiers ending up in captivity, promissory note settlements were used: the Swedish generals received money from the tsar's treasury, which they then distributed among their soldiers, posting a promissory note to Stockholm for the amount received. On the basis of such documents, the Royal Council paid an analogous amount to the Russian prisoners. This solution offered no stability on account of frequent reprisals, i.e. retaliatory measures adopted in response to the harsh treatment of Russian captives. Peter I would lower the "standards of living" of his Swedish captives. Other methods were also employed, such as giving Swedish officers, non-commissioned officers or

[430] Andrei Stiejls (b. Henry Stiles) was an English merchant and entrepreneur, who enjoyed special favor with Peter I. He was one of the major foreign investors in Russia, and the companies he owned produced gunpowder, sulfur, saltpeter and other materials for the tsar's army. Stiles was also involved in exporting Russian goods, including potash and tar, to Western European countries; see В.Н. Захаров, *Западноевропейские купцы в России. Эпоха Петра I*, Москва 1996, pp. 59, 242–244; А.В. Демкин, *Британское купечество в России XVIII века*, Москва 2019, pp. 176–177.

[431] П. и Б., т. 2, p. 708.

[432] A.A. Weyde to F.A. Golovin, [Stockholm] February 25,1703, [in:] «А паче всего..., № 1, p. 6.

soldiers parole to leave for their homeland on condition of providing the tsar's men held in Sweden with cash.[433]

Prince Khilkov discussed this system at length in a letter addressed to Fyodor Golovin, dated June 11, 1702. The general staff and the vast majority of officers provided for themselves at their own expense. However, some lower-ranking officers and soldiers without adequate financial security were forced to use money from the Swedish royal treasury, which was then reimbursed by the Russian authorities. The daily rate of the so-called board money depended on the POW's rank. Thus, a colonel received a thaler, a lieutenant colonel and major each received half a thaler, a captain received a Swedish thaler, equivalent to eight kopecks, while a lieutenant and standard bearer received a smaller portion of a thaler, equivalent to seven kopecks; bombardiers, medics, sergeants and trumpeters were paid even less, i.e., a portion of a thaler equal to about six kopecks.[434] Another way for (lower-ranking) captives to earn money was to take on a variety of handicraft, craftsmen or administrative jobs.

State aid only partially guaranteed the prisoners' subsistence. Consequently, their financial situation did not correspond to that of the officers and depended mainly on the economic status of one's family. Thus, officers who came from rich and distinguished families were able to secure a steady cashflow, which afforded them reasonably good conditions of confinement. General Weyde, nominally high in the hierarchy of the tsar's army, was in a dire situation though. As foreigners and religious dissenters living in Moscow's Nemetskaya Sloboda, they had no

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[433] М.О. Акишин, *Полтава. К 300-летию…*, [in:] *Полтава. К 300-летию Полтавского сражения. Сборник статей*, редкол. О.Г. Агеева и др., Москва 2009, p. 176.

[434] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 40, p. 115. At the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one Muscovite ruble equaled two poltina, or ten grivnas, or thirty-three altina and two dengas; in turn, one grivna equaled three altinas and two dengas, or twenty dengas; one altina equaled six dengas.

land endowments, and so it was Adam Weyde's pay (initially officer's, later general's) that was their main source of sustenance. Thus, after Weyde's imprisonment, his wife and two children (aged sixteen and one, respectively) found themselves in a precarious situation. At the start of his captivity, when it seemed that it would not last long, Adam Weyde would receive remittances from his family. As late as August 4, 1701, his wife sent bills of exchange in the amounts of 400 thalers and 100 rubles.[435] Soon, however, she, too, ran into financial difficulties. In the subsequent years, it was Weyde who would request his long-time friends and associates to extend financial support and care for his family.[436]

To pay for his stay in captivity, the general also borrowed money directly from his fellow prisoner, Prince Khilkov. By 1703, his debt to the prince amounted to 200 thalers.[437] The general repaid his benefactor by writing letters to Moscow in which he mentioned the Khilkov's dire financial situation, his heavy debt and need for money.[438]

While information about the prince's poor financial standing was a ploy to increase funding from Russia, Weyde's own situation was indeed desperate at times. In such circumstances, the general depended on loans from foreign merchants. One of them was a certain Hardelof, who conned the general out of his highly valuable personal possessions. Accordingly, Weyde filed a civil suit against Hardelof, which dragged on throughout his captivity, with the case only heard on September 5, 1710. In the meantime, he received some documents from Russia to assist him in the proceedings.[439]

[435] П. и Б., т. 1, p. 870.
[436] A.A. Weyde to F.A. Golovin, [Stockholm] February 25 and August 31, 1703, [in:] «А паче всего…, № 1, 5, pp. 6, 10.
[437] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, [in:] № 66, p. 163.
[438] A.A. Weyde to F.A. Golovin, [Stockholm] February 25, 1703, [in:] «А паче всего…, № 1, p. 6.
[439] W.E. Svedelius, *Minne af kongl. rådet och öfverste marskalken grefve Karl Piper*, "Svenska akademiens handlingar ifrån år 1796" 34 (1869), p. 144.

Another major repressive measure undertaken by the Swedes was the control of correspondence. Although the captives were only allowed to mail requests for money and update relatives on their health status,[440] letters were rigidly checked and censored before mailing to remove any information that could assist the Russians in their war efforts.[441] On some occasions the Swedes refused the tsar's subjects to send and receive letters, which was especially the case with the generals. The fact that General Weyde was subject to these restrictions is evidenced by his correspondence with Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf (see Chapter 3). As late as 1702, the scholar would write letters addressed directly to his friend.[442] However, the following year, he addressed the correspondence to Prince Andrei Khilkov, whom the authorities permitted to visit the Russian generals who were in solitary confinement, though only to a limited extent and under close guard.[443]

Nevertheless, the measures adopted at the time by the Swedes (and the Russians) with regard to POWs were progressive from the point of view of international law of the era. We should recall that captives in Adam Weyde's day and age were not even guaranteed the right to live.[444]

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[440] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, [in:] № 42, p. 121.

[441] For more on the subject, see М.О. Акишин, *Пленные Северной войны…*, pp. 170–179; У. Биргегорд, op. cit., p. 214; С.А. Козлов, op. cit., Санкт-Петербург 2011, pp. 200–217; H. Almquist, *Ryska fångar i Sverige o svenska i Ryssland 1700–1709. Ryssarna i Sverige*, KFÅ, Stockholm 1942, pp. 38–191.

[442] H.W. Ludolf to A.A. Weyde, London, August 11, 1702, AFSt./HD 23, Bl. 109v.–110v.

[443] H.W. Ludolf to A.A. Weyde, Copenhagen, [n.d.] November 1703, AFSt./HD 23, Bl. 45.

[444] Russian historiography emphasizes the slaughter of Muscovite captives perpetrated by Grand Hetman of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland Jan Tarnowski in 1535; see М. Кром, *Стародубская война (1534–1537). Из истории русско-литовских отношений*, Москва 2008, pp. 59–83, 97–111. In the following century, the Dutch lawyer and philosopher Hugo Grotius laid the foundations of international law by advocating not so much for the extension of protection to soldiers, but rather the most vulnerable parties: women, children, and the elderly. Also spared should be members of the clergy, farmers, merchants, artisans, artists and students and scientists, provided that they abstained from the hostilities. Grotius also proposed extending the protection of the population in question, primarily by banning the rape of women; see H. Grotius, *Trzy księ-*

Interestingly, during the Great Northern War of 1700–1721, the warring parties implemented "policies of reciprocity." Deterioration of the living conditions of POWs detained by one of the warring parties automatically entailed analogous actions in relation to prisoners of the other. Correspondingly, a relaxation of the accepted norms prompted an equivalent reaction, causing the other side of the conflict to ease the living conditions of its own captives.[445] A prime example of this is a letter dated January 29, 1702, addressed to Fyodor Golovin, signed by as many as six generals in Swedish captivity at the time—Dolgorukov, Bagrationi, Trubetskoy, Weyde, Golovin and Buturlin—requesting specific assistance (see Figure 7.3). It was to involve the drafting of a relevant letter in Moscow by the Swedish resident in Moscow, Tomas Kniper (who was in custody at the time as part of Russian retaliatory measures). The letter attested to the fair treatment he and the other Swedish prisoners had reportedly received from the Russians: "Based on your [i.e., Fyodor Golovin's] letters, we are confident that they have encountered no hardships, and not only have they been free to attend church services but also visit, and receive visits from their friends, with all the officers placed in sound buildings,

gi o prawie wojny i pokoju, transl. and published by R. Bierzanek, Warszawa 1957, pp. 271, 355–356, 359–363. The writings of Hugo Grotius inspired the great military reformer King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden, who enforced the then-emerging principles of humanitarianism in military law within the ranks of his army; see N.G. Cooper, *Gustavus Adolphus Military Justice*, "Military Law Review" 92 (1981), pp. 131–132; S.R. Morris, *The Laws of War Rules by Warriors for Warriors*, "The Army Lawyer" [12] (1997), p. 5.

[445] У. Биргерорд, op. cit., p. 214. Such solutions were already in place in mid-seventeenth century warfare, as evidenced by Janusz Radziwiłł's entry in the Military Articles of 1648: "If you ride horses, you may get trampled." With this dictum, the hetman tried to instill in his soldiers the application of the fundamental principles of humanitarian law; see *Janusza Radziwiłła hetmana polnego W. Ks. Litewskiego artykuły wojskowe*, [in:] *Polskie ustawy i artykuły wojskowe do końca XVIII wieku*, ed. S. Kutrzeba, Kraków 1938, art. 60, p. 268.

and they pay for their sustenance not only at their own expense but also receive board from the state authorities."[446]

In conclusion, the Swedish policy toward Russian prisoners of war resulted in the development of international custom, while also consolidating the role of humanitarian law during hostilities.

Despite the enforced restrictions, the Russian POWs took kindly to Stockholm. The general conditions of accommodation there were far superior to those they had experienced in the previous period of captivity. When rumors reached the generals that Charles XII intended to relocate them to various cities in Sweden, they sent a supplication to the king, dated September 2, 1701. Dolgorukov, Trubetskoy, Buturlin, Golovin and Weyde asked for fair treatment, since their removal from the capital would entail "unbearable melancholy, mortal sorrow and illness." They also noted that if they were to die, they would not receive adequate ministrations. The king granted their request, limiting the displacement to the Saxon command only.[447]

Joining the senior commanders quartered in the "generals' house," most likely in mid-1702, were Adam Weyde and Prince Bagrationi, who were moved there at their own request.[448] While such a solution was indeed comfortable for the captives, the Sweidish royal advisors and senior officials must have seen it differently. Soon, Adam Weyde, Ivan Butirlin and Ivan Trubetskoy had their freedom of movement restricted

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[446] Письмо русских генералов из шведского плена 29 января 1702 г., БАН, Собр. Петр. гал. № 112 [№ 97], л. 1–1об. The contents of the letter (bearing a different date: January 24, 1702) was published in a nineteenth-century Russian periodical; see Письмо русских пленных генералов из Стокгольма, 24 января 1702 г., "Русский вестник" 1 (1841), p. 284.

[447] This topic is especially interesting given that there was only one Orthodox priest in Stockholm, who was staying with the Russian resident Prince Khilkov. While a Lutheran himself, Adam Weyde did not exclude himself from the supplication; see W.E. Svedelius, op. cit. pp. 123–125; S. Lang, *Stadsgården och Ryssgården*, "Årsberättelser/Museienämnden" 43 (1964), 2, p. 106.

[448] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, [in:] № 42, p. 121.



Figure 7.3. Letter from Russian generals (including Adam Weyde) held in Swedish captivity, requesting the improvement of the fate of Swedish captives held in Russia, [Stockholm] January 29, 1702.
Source: БАН, Собр. Петр. гал. № 112 [№ 97], л. 1.

even within the quarters and were prevented from leaving their chambers (in which they were kept under lock and key).[449]

As early as January 1702, in the absence of adequately qualified commanders, Peter I made efforts to exchange POWs, which the Swedes adamantly resisted.[450] April 1703 saw the publication of Charles XII's order, which mandated the dislocation of the Russian prisoners to the border areas, with the exception of the generals and Prince Andrey Khilkov. There was every indication that this first exchange of lower-ranking prisoners may soon be followed by the return of the generals, too.

[449] Ibidem, № 44, p. 123.
[450] Forewarned of the Russian plans, in a letter written in early 1703 Weyde expressed his hope for a Russian victory in the battle, which would allow an exchange of prisoners of war, see A.A. Weyde to F.A. Golovin, [Stockholm] February 25, 1703, «А паче всего…, № 1, p. 6.

However, this was not the case due to an escape attempt undertaken on May 2, 1703 by generals Ivan Trubetskoy, Ivan Butirlin and Adam Weyde. The Swedes quickly noticed their disappearance. Announcements of a reward to the huge amount of 4,000 Lübeck thalers for the capture of the Russian fugitives were promptly read out in the Stockholm churches. In the afternoon, the generals were apprehended in the suburban forests. They were at large for approximately twelve hours before being escorted back to Stockholm and imprisoned. Weyde was held under close guard in a "cramped cell" at the mayor's house.[451] What drove the prisoners to this venture were the steadily deteriorating conditions of their stay and the lack of response from the authorities to the complaints voicing their discontent with the fact.

The course of the escape was described by Russian historian Galina Shebaldina, showing that the operation was carefully planned. The date of the escape was not accidental, as May 2 was Holy Saturday and almost all the city's residents, not excluding the guards guarding the captives, were at church services. Trubetsky, Buturlin and Weyde broke out of the building where they were staying, through the wall of the room occupied there by two other Russian officers (Major Andreas Piel and Captain Vasily Fries). They then hopped into a hired carriage, which had been waiting outside, and headed out of town. However, after only three miles, they were captured, handcuffed and delivered back to Stockholm, straight before the mayor (at his house). On May 3, the fugitives were interrogated at the city hall, where, in addition to the insults, they reportedly suffered physical abuse (the last piece of information is unconfirmed). The mayor ordered Adam Weyde be confined to a small cell in an orphanage for a period of ten days, pending his transfer to prison. The other two

[451] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, pp. 62–63; т. 4, ч. 2, [in:] приложения, № II: 203, p. 282.

generals were also placed under strict arrest in tight rooms, along with the officers whose room they had used to break out of isolation.[452]

The reports of the tsar's resident were not far from reality. It was only a month after the attempted escape, in early June 1703, that Generals Trubetskoy and Buturlin were moved to quarters at the "guests' court" (a building intended for trade, storage of goods and merchant lodgings). Although the premises had already been used as quarters for the Russian officer prisoners, the living conditions of the relocated officers did not improve significantly. Buturlin was put in a first floor cell with a small window. Conversely, Adam Weyde refused to move and chose to stay in his original place of detention, i.e., the aforementioned "dark cell" in the mayor's house, where, as Khilkov noted, "within a minute, the air in the room [would become] foul, as if in a pigsty." Weyde himself would subsequently recall that during his four months in solitary confinement he saw "neither man nor animal," except for the *wachtmeister* who delivered him food twice a day. The conditions of Weyde's detention led to a significant decline in his health.[453] As part of the repressions, he was also banned from going to church and attending services.[454]

Initially, two guards were assigned to each of the three fugitives, keeping overnight watch in their cells. Following their relocation from prison, the situation did not improve, as described by Prince Khilkov, suspected of involvement in aiding and abetting the escapees, who in a letter to Fyodor Golovin dated July 24, 1703, wrote that, "The guards [are posted] at my quarter and inside the generals' [cells], and whoever moves

[452] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 62, pp. 155–156; Г.[В.] Шебалдина, op. cit., pp. 84–85. Por. С.А. Козлов, op. cit., pp. 134.
[453] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 59, p. 150; Г.[В.] Шебалдина, op. cit., p. 85; A.A. Weyde to F.A. Golovin, [Stockholm] August 3, 1703, [in:] «А паче всего …, № 5, p. 10.
[454] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, [in:] № 61, p. 153. Similar restrictions also befell Generals Buturlin and Trubetskoy, who were forbidden to visit the Orthodox church set up in the "generals' house." Exempt from this prohibition were Prince Khilkov and Tsarevich Bagrationi.

near is immediately approached by a guardsman with a loaded weapon. They took the fugitives for questioning at the city hall, demanding to name the leader, but the prisoners did not name anyone (...). Over here, they blame the Russians for no reason at all; they scold them unabashedly and mock them (...). They have harassed our merchants with heavy labor, without considering my objections. There are as many as 160 of them in Stockholm."[455]

It was not until September 22 that Adam Weyde and the other escapees were relocated to better quarters. Their new lodging was a building where the Russian merchants had previously been held, with guards stationed only in the stairwell, affording the captives freedom inside the rooms.[456] Moreover, the Swedish authorities authorized the establishment of an Orthodox church on the premises, allowing Orthodox POWs to receive their ministrations there. Meanwhile, Adam Weyde received permission to visit the Protestant church again.[457]

In the following years, the fate of the Russian prisoners continued to depend on the policies of the Swedish authorities, who followed the principle of reciprocity, assessing the treatment of the Swedish captives in Russia. A well-known complaint has survived, submitted in March 1704 by Generals Trubetskoy and Weyde to the Swedish authorities, requesting the rental of a house and permission to take walks and contact fellow prisoners.[458] Unfortunately, the motion met with refusal. Another piece

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[455] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 2, приложения, № II: 203, p. 282. Prince Khilkov also mentions another escape attempt. In 1702, a piece of material was found in the apartment of Lieutenant General Ludwig von Hallart (which the latter had reportedly used to slide down from a window and escape), along with horses and weapons prepared for the occasion. However, the Swedes did not pursue an investigation and turned a blind eye to the entire affair; see *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 62, p. 156.

[456] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 66, p. 162; № 67, p. 164.

[457] Ibidem, № 71, p. 169.

[458] S. Lang, op. cit., p. 108.

of correspondence from this period is a letter dated October 17, 1704, written by Adam Weyde to his daughter Elisabeth Justine. The dispatch was detained by the Swedish authorities. In a personal message, the general mentions the hardships of his four-year captivity, emphasizing his longing for his daughter and hoping for his imminent release. Concluding the letter, he also greets and wishes good health to the other members of his family, including his wife, his second daughter, and the grandmother of his two girls (Figure 7.4).[459]

In the summer of 1705, most of the captives held in Stockholm, including the generals, were transferred under heavy guard to various Swedish cities with a prohibition to meet or talk with anyone. Confirming this is Prince Andrei Khilkov's letter sent to Moscow at the time, in which he reported on the repressions imposed on the Russian prisoners as retaliation for the mistreatment of the Swedish captives of Russia. One form of punishment against the Russian general staff was to relocate them from Stockholm to other parts of Sweden. On October 2 of that year Adam Weyde was sent overland to Gälve.[460] The decision of the Swedish authorities was not accidental, as it followed from the espionage activities undertaken by Prince Khilkov.[461] After the relocation of the captives outside Stockholm, their living conditions deteriorated significantly, with General Weyde complaining of the cold and lack of daylight. This was corroborated to Prince Khilkov by one of the Russian captains who

[459] A.A. Weyde to E.J. Weyde, [Stockholm] October 17, 1704, RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t – 1800t, M 1521, unpag. [sheet 160].
[460] Письмо князя Хилкова из шведского плена, 1705 года, [in:] П.И. Щукин, *Краткое описание Щукинского музея в Москве*, Москва 1895, pp. 59–61; *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 83, p. 191; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 63; S. Lang, op. cit., p. 108; Г.В. Шебалдина, *«Северная война» резидента Хилкова*, [in:] *Гиштории российские, или Опыты и разыскания к юбилею Александра Борисовича Каменского*, сост. Е.В. Акельев, В.Е. Борисов, отв. ред. Е.Б. Смилянская, Москва 2014, p. 55.
[461] Г.В. Шебалдина, *«Северная война» резидента Хилкова…*, p. 55.



Figure 7.4. Letter from Adam Weyde to his daughter Elisabeth Justine written in Swedish captivity, [Stockholm] October 17, 1704.
Source: RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag. [sheet 160].

had the opportunity to visit General Weyde at the time: "and as he saw him, he could not recognize him, as he had lost much weight and stayed in the rooms of the lower floor, located in the building occupied by the governor, which previously served as cellars, and now they broke the windows for him there and inserted double bars and imprisoned him there."[462] After seven months, during which Weyde continued to mail his protests, he was moved to more comfortable quarters.[463]

In early 1707, the Russian commanders were transferred back to the capital. They were allowed to visit one another, take walks and visit temples and baths. During this time, the officers even held parties. We know that Weyde remained in contact with his future son-in-law Pyotr Lefort, who was also in captivity, as well as Prince Dolgorukov.[464]

It cannot be ruled out that the return to the capital was connected with another attempt to exchange prisoners of war, arranged by Alexander Menshikov. A convenient opportunity therefore presented itself after the victory of the combined Russian-Saxon-Polish forces over General Arvid Mardefelt's corps on October 18 (29), 1706 near Kalisz, in which Menshikov was personally involved.[465] In his correspondence to Vice Chancellor Pyotr Shafirov dated October 30, Menshikov mentioned that he had transferred the Swedes captured on the occasion to King Augustus II. This measure was meant to translate into possible intermediation by the Polish king in an exchange of captives, as confirmed by Shafirov's note: "Please present the royal reverse [of Augustus II] to General Weyde's

[462] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 83, p. 192; № 84, pp. 197–198.
[463] Г.В. Шебалдина, *Заложники Петра I…*, p. 120–121; С.А. Козлов, op. cit., p. 139.
[464] P.H. Bruce, *Memoirs…*, p. 112.
[465] For more on the subject, see В.А. Артамонов, *Победа генерала А.Д. Меншикова под Калишем в 1706 г.*, [in:] *Северная война, Санкт-Петербург и Европа в первой четверти XVIII в. Материалы международной научной конференции. Санкт-Петербург, декабрь 2006*, отв. ред. В.Е. Возгрин, Санкт-Петербург 2007, pp. 262–275.

wife to inspire hope in her."[466] Regrettably, Menshikov's efforts proved unsuccessful, too.

In a letter sent to Moscow on May 18, 1708, Andrei Khilkov reports on another exile from Stockholm. Adam Weyde was ordered to prepare for leaving the city within two to three days. Eventually, the tsar's resident was sent back to Örebro, while the general ended up spending some time in the small town of Västerås.[467] It is most likely from there that he wrote an undated letter, addressed directly to Swedish King Charles XII, in which he bemoaned the conditions of his imprisonment, requesting at the same time that he be allowed to return to Stockholm to serve his prison term in the same way as the other Russian generals. In addition, as a devout Pietist, he complained to the ruler about being mistreated by the Lutheran Church and the local religious community. Indeed, as Governor Gustaf Cronhielm reported on June 23, 1708, the general's room was tight and stuffy, and he subsequently received slightly better accommodation, adequate to his position.[468] Despite the fact that Weyde was a Lutheran, he did not have it any easier than the Orthodox captives. On the contrary, the Swedes treated him as a heretic and traitor to their religion.[469] Even many years later, when helping Swedish captives in 1719, he stressed that he had suffered many humiliations himself during his captivity in

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[466] *Походная канцелярия вице-канцлеря Петра Павловича Шафирова: новые источники по истории России эпохи Петра Великого*, изд. подгот. Т.А. Базарова, Ю.Б. Фомина; сост., вступ. ст., коммент. Т.А. Базарова, ч. 1: *1706–1713 годы*, Санкт-Петербург 2011, № 13, p. 136.

[467] П. и Б., т. 10, вып. 2, ред. Б.Б. Кафенгауз, Москва 1956, p. 687; Г.[В.] Шебалдина, *Заложники Петра I…*, pp. 124, 165. On top of the above, the Swedes transferred Prince Dolgorukov to Gälve. Consequently, it was Prince Trubetskoy who became the highest-ranking Russian general left in Stockholm.

[468] O. Blomqvist, *A Clash of Kings: States, Captives and Loyalties during the Great Northern War*, p. 28, https://www.academia.edu/43221094/A_Clash_of_Kings_States_Captives_and_Loyalties_during_the_Great_Northern_War (acessed October 2, 2020).

[469] A.A. Weyde to Charles XII, b.m. i d. [1708–1709?], RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag.

Sweden.[470] We believe that the problem of non-acceptance was more palpable in smaller towns; when in cosmopolitan Stockholm, Weyde did not feel uncomfortable.

Until early 1710, General Weyde's stay in the town of Västerås was uneventful.[471] It was then that he engaged in a fierce and personal dispute with the governor. Cronhielm explained the situation to the authorities in Stockholm in two letters dated March 17 and April 4, 1710, respectively. According to the governor, the general was accommodated in a castle apartment, but had the right to stay anywhere in the city. At his disposal in the castle were a hallway, an atrium, a bedroom and a second room. He was allowed to visit the governor and go to church whenever he so desired. He had the right to maintain contact with "decent people" and accompany the governor on travels both by water and land. The correspondence suggests that the Swedes feared the general's escape and moved him from the upper floor to a smaller temporary apartment, which he occupied at the beginning of his stay (and thus in May and early June 1708). He was also banned from unrestricted contact with Swedes and foreigners. These new arrangements caused great dissatisfaction in Adam Weyde, who complained about being put in prison. In fact, the new suite consisted of a large hall with a chamber in the middle. The general took offence and refused to return to the superior rooms following the introduction of escape precautions. Cronhielm alleged that the general's statements were untrue, that he was "filled with anger and bitterness," and that his behavior was highly unusual.[472] Undoubtedly, Adam Weyde's mental condition was poor at the time. In March 1710, he also came

[470] A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg March 23, 1719, AFSt/HA 173:22, Bl. 1–2v.
[471] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 92, p. 214.
[472] W.E. Svedelius, op. cit., pp. 140–143.

into conflict with the governor's butler, Jean Christian Bahr (of German descent). The latter accused the general of stealing his rapier.[473]

Despite the fact that on June 27, 1709 at Poltava, the Swedish army suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Russians, with a significant number of capable officers and senior commanders, in addition to thousands of soldiers, taken prisoner, nothing heralded a breakthrough in the exchange of captives.[474] The Swedish monarch remained implacable and did not allow the liberation of the opposing side's commanders. In his correspondence to the tsar dated December 22, 1709, Andrei Khilkov stressed that upon the news of the battle reaching the city, the living conditions of the prisoners even worsened, as manifested by a complete ban on writing and sending letters. In the prince's estimation, this was done in an attempt to prove that Sweden's situation was not dire, but the opinions of the people of Stockholm were supposedly unequivocal, as their initial disbelief turned into widespread despondency when the secretary of the royal chancellery, Joasis Cederhielm, arrived in the capital and confirmed the report. The aristocracy, nobility and burghers were striving for peace after Russia had captured scores of captives; the public opinion desired that the prisoners be sent home. However, Charles XII reportedly stood in complete opposition to any concessions.[475]

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[473] RA, Kollegiers m fl, landshövdingars, hovrätters och konsistoriers skrivelser till Kungl Maj:t, Skrivelser från landshövdingar, 22, call no. 17, unpag.

[474] *Полтавская битва 27 июня 1709 года. Документы и материалы*, отв. ред. Е.Е. Рычаловский, Москва 2011, № 337, pp. 439–452; № 340, pp. 454–478; Т.А. Базарова, *«Долгая дорога домой»: Возвращение русских военнопленных в 1710 г.,* [in:] *Санкт-Петербург и страны Северной Европы. Материалы восемнадцатой ежегодной конференции (12–13 апреля 2016 г.),* ред. В.Н. Барышников, П.А. Кротов, 18 (1–2), Санкт-Петербург 2017, p. 66.

[475] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1863, p. 65. As early as July 1709, Charles XII sent a letter to the State Council in Stockholm, informing its members of the battle of Poltava. Said letter contained an order to draft new recruits and form new infantry and cavalry detachments; see *Військові кампанії доби гетьмана Івана Мазепи в документах*, упоряд. С. Павленко, т. 2, Київ 2009, № 203, pp. 514–515.

It was only with the victorious campaign of the Russian army in 1709–1710 that Charles XII had a change of heart. An all-out Russian offensive resulted in the capture of Riga, Dünamünde, Vyborg, Reval, Kexholm, and Arensburg, among others. Peter I and his advisors strongly linked the two issues, tying the surrender of Vyborg and Riga to the exchange of representatives of the supreme command. The proclamations concerning the surrender of these two fortresses based on a prior accord between the combatants contained a provision stipulating the release of the soldiers of the Vyborg and Riga garrisons only upon completion of the aforementioned exchange of the generals.[476] Adam Weyde and Prince Khilkov were immediately transferred to Stockholm. By May 3, the general was already in the capital and while thanking the authorities for the transfer, he requested the punishment of Governor Cronhielm at the same time.[477] In July 1710, Weyde was transported to Björkösund, reaching Reval on August 1, with the city still controlled by the Swedes (until September that year).[478] Unfortunately, General Weyde's return to his homeland was somewhat protracted, as the proposal to exchange him for General Adam Lewenhaupt (Löwenhaupt) met with refusal. Characteristically, it was the representative of the Swedish community in Russian captivity, Chancellor Count Charles Pieper, who pushed for this specific exchange, while Peter I, concurring with the opinion of the envoys of Poland and Saxony (Friedrich Vitstum von Eckestädt) and Denmark (Just Jules), staunchly opposed it. According to the foreigners, Adam Weyde should have been exchanged for the Russian captive and recent

[476] П. и Б., т. 10, вып. 2, pp. 619, 681–682.
[477] *Carl Pipers och Carl Gustaf Rehnschiölds mottagna brev 1709–1713*, utgivare L.O. Berg, Stockholm 1997, p. 65; W.E. Svedelius, op. cit., pp. 143–144.
[478] I. Maier, O. Jansson, L. Bruzelius, *Försökte ryske residenten furst Andrej Chilkov fly ur svensk fångenskap under det Stora nordiska kriget?*, "Slovo. Journal of Slavic Languages, Literatures and Cultures" 61 (2020), p. 17.

commander of the Riga garrison, Governor General Nils Strömberg, who had much less combat experience and enjoyed far less popularity among the Swedes than General Lewenhaupt. This was a completely understandable and pragmatic position, for in the course of the ongoing war, the latter Swedish general would be of "far greater assistance to his homeland" than the defender of Riga.[479] Meanwhile, Weyde was shuttled from place to place, his last stop being Sarvlax (located about fifty kilometers east of Helsinki, near the town of Pernå). To get there, he traveled by ship across the Baltic Sea, accompanied by Charles XII's sister (and future queen) Ulrika Eleonora, among others.[480] Ultimately, the Swedes acquiesced to the tsar's terms, agreeing to release General Weyde in exchange for Strömberg.[481]

After lengthy negotiations, the parties settled on the terms of exchange. The first to return to his homeland in 1710 was Major General

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[479] *Донесения и другие бумаги чрезвычайного посланника английского при русском дворе, Чарьлза Витворта, и секретаря его Вейсборда с 1708 г. по 1711 г.,* [in:] СИРИО, т. 50, Санкт-Петербург 1886, № 146, p. 380. See also W.E. Svedelius, op. cit., pp. 155–158. Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt (Löwenhaupt) (1659–1719) was one of the most prominent leaders of Charles XII's army. In the 1670s and '80s, he studied at the universities of Lund, Uppsala, and Rostock. In 1684, he was stationed in Moscow as a Swedish diplomat. In 1685, he embarked on a military career, initially in Bavaria, participating in military campaigns against Turkey. In the following years he reached the rank of major in the army of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. In 1697, he returned to Sweden. He was actively involved in warfare with Russia from its inception. In 1703, Charles XII appointed him commander of all Swedish troops in the eastern Baltic provinces. A year later, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, and in 1705, already as an infantry general, he was named the Governor of Riga. In 1708, he suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Lesnaya, as he and his corps tried to break through to Charles XII, who was operating in Ukraine. He also fought in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, another Russian victory, ending up in Russian custody alongside the other Swedish high commanders. Despite numerous efforts by the Swedish authorities (including King Charles XII and his successor Queen Ulrika Eleonora), he never returned to his homeland and died as a prisoner of war in Moscow in February 1719; for more details, see. G. Artéus, *Adam Ludwig Lewenhaupt*, https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/Presentation.aspx?id=11268 (accessed February 18, 2021).

[480] I. Maier, O. Jansson, L. Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 30.

[481] Ю. Юль, op. cit., p. 234.

Ivan Buturlin (in exchange for Major General Johann August Meyerfeldt). Shortly thereafter, the Swedes also released Adam Weyde, exchanging him for the aforementioned Nils Strömberg (Tsarevich Alexander Bagrationi and Prince Trubetskoy were to be swapped for Count Carl Piper, while Prince Dolgorukov and Avtamon Golovin were to return to Russia in exchange for Field Marshal Charles Rehnsköld).[482] On October 5, 1710, a ship lifted anchor from Stockholm, carrying Russian officers, non-commissioned officers and privates back to their homeland, along with Adam Weyde's luggage: "two trunks of lumber."[483] Thus, the general did not leave Sarvlax before 1711 and, according to Just Jules (a Danish envoy to the tsar's court), on January 16 (27) he stepped foot in a city that was wholly new to him: St. Petersburg. Once again, involved in the exchange was Alexander Menshikov. It was he who promised the general's wife, Justine Weyde, that he would make every effort to ensure her husband's

[482] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 4, ч. 1, p. 65. As already mentioned, the latter two exchanges failed to materialize, because Tsarevich Imeretinsky died on his way back to Russia, on February 3, 1711 on the island of Piteå in the Gulf of Bothnia. In turn, Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, who was being escorted towards Russia, decided to take advantage of the inattention of the Swedish escort on June 3, 1711, and, together with forty-four other Russian captives, captured the Swedish ship, which was headed towards Reval. The events caused the Swedes to decide to suspend further exchanges of prisoners of war, so Ivan Trubetskoy and Avtamon Golovin did not regain their freedom until seven years later, in exchange for the release of Field Marshal Karl Rehnsköld. Andrei Khilkov never returned from captivity, and died in 1716 in Vesterås. In 1718, his body was brought to St. Petersburg and buried in St. Alexander Nevsky Monastery. For more details, see [Е. Тыртов], *История о князе Якове Федоровиче Долгорукове. С прибавлением сведения о других знаменитых мужах славной фамилии князей Долгоруких*, ч. 2, Москва 1808, pp. 9–10; П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 2, ред. Б.Б. Кафенгауз, А.И. Андреев, Л.А. Никифоров, Москва 1964, pp. 381–382; С.А. Козлов, op. cit., pp. 153–164.

[483] Т.А. Базарова, Т.А. Базарова, *«Долгая дорога домой»...*, p. 68. Also loaded onto the ship were large pieces of luggage (a coach with harness, a sleigh, and a *telega* treasury carriage) owned by Andrey Khilkov, who was also expected to return to Russia soon. Adam Weyde's luggage was sent back from Sweden in its entirety, unlike the belongings of Nils Strömberg that the latter had left behind in Riga, by then captured by the Russians. This is significant because the Swedish officer alleged that, by withholding the luggage of one of the exchanged POWs, the Russians did not conduct his exchange for General Weyde in a manner consistent with the principle of equality; see *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента...*, № 103, p. 239; № 106, p. 242.

swift return home.[484] Adam Weyde was very fortunate with respect to his return, since Count Piper, who determined the fate of all Swedish captives in Russia, had a change of heart about the mutual release of prisoners. As Prince Khilkov reported to Moscow on May 1, 1711, Piper issued a verbal order to members of the Senate to suspend any exchange pending his return. The chancellor did not want Weyde to be released and did his best to prevent it. However, it was too late for such obstructions, as the relevant decisions had already been made, and the general himself had long been in his homeland, and was even actively involved in the military campaign against Turkey at the time (discussed in more detail later in this book).[485]

In this context, the diplomatic success can be linked to Adam Weyde, who played the role of intermediary in the Russian-Swedish negotiations, perhaps on account of his Lutheran religion, as well as his linguistic and military competence.[486] Indeed, Weyde's memoranda of July 1710, addressed to the Swedish authorities, have survived. Two documents, dated July 12, contained information concerning the possible liberation and return to Sweden of General Lewenhaupt.[487] In another memorial, bearing the same date, Weyde offered his agency in connection with a possible exchange of prisoners of war. The general was to consult a list of soldiers and civilians in Stockholm and try to establish the number of Swedes in Russia. The captives staying in Stockholm were to

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[484] Ю. Юль, op. cit., p. 234. Por. J. Juel, *En rejse til Rusland under Tsar Peter: Dagbogoptegnelser af viceadmiral Just Juel, dansk gesandt i Rusland 1709–1711*, København 1893, p. 326; I. Maier, O. Jansson, L. Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 30.

[485] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 98, p. 224.

[486] Lending credibility to this hypothesis is the fact that, as late as 1719, influential Protestants asked Adam Weyde to provide care for the Swedish POWs of Protestant denomination held in Russia; see A.H. Francke to A.A. Weyde, Halle, March 4, 1719, AFSt/HA 173:18, Bl. 1–3.

[487] Memorial, July 12, 1710 [nr 1], RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag.

return to St. Petersburg.[488] At that time, the warring parties managed to reach an agreement regarding the exchange of top military commanders detained by each side. There is every indication that Adam Weyde was privy to these activities, since in a memorial note dated July 18 the general complained that he had not yet been assigned a "vehicle," that is, a vessel to ship him back to Russia. At the same time, he pleaded for his case not to be "impeded."[489]

Captivity was a trying time that strained the general physically and mentally. In the following years, he manifested concern for the fate of the Swedish prisoners, as he often interceded with Peter I for the Lutheran Swedish soldiers held captive in Russia. He extended his care over them through the Pietists (see Chapter 13). He was also responsible for the welfare of the most important captives, such as Karl Gustav Rehnskiöld.[490] When captured by the Swedes, Weyde left behind an adolescent daughter and a year-old infant. His family received no regular financial support from the state, and the Lutheran population of Sweden made it clear that they considered him a traitor (see Table 3). Also telling in this regard was Peter I's stance, as the tsar blocked the exchange of his former friend, believing Löwenhaupt to be a more capable commander. The decade-long separation weakened the ties between Weyde, the tsar, and his fellow officers. It was clear that Weyde would have to reinvent himself from scratch. Aiding his cause was his careful observation of the workings of the Swedish state, which he would later employ in his proposals for the modernization of Russia.

[488] Memorial, July 12, 1710 [nr 2], RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag.
[489] Memorial, July 18, 1710, RA, Militaria, Krigshistoriska samlingen 1500t–1800t, M 1521, unpag.
[490] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 189.



Chart 6. Schematic timeline of the conditions under which General Adam Weyde was held captive by the Swedes between 1700 and 1711.
Source: own study based on materials used in Chapter 7.

8. BACK IN SERVICE

8.1. The Danube campaign

Adam Weyde's return after many years of captivity was crucial, since it fell at a time when Peter I, disregarding the ongoing war with Sweden, engaged in a parallel armed conflict with Turkey. Not without significance is the fact that the resumption of hostilities on this front was also the aim of Charles XII, who, after his defeat at Poltava, found refuge in the Turkish-controlled fortress of Bender.[491] As noted by Russian historian Lubomir Beskrovny, other countries (Holy Roman Empire, France and England) also pressed to drag Russia into the war with Turkey.[492] For Turkey, Russia's victory at Poltava and the steady consolidation of its positions in the territories on the Sea of Azov—which it had captured more than a decade earlier—sent signals that were too clear to be ignored (see Map 1). The prospect of Russian interference in the Balkans in defense of the Orthodox believers living there seemed particularly threatening.

[491] R.M. Hatton, *Charles XII in Turkey "Narrative of the King of Sweden's movements 1709–1714 (?),"* "Tarih Araştırmaları" 1 (1957), pp. 83–142; S.A. Nilsson, *De svensk-turkiska förbindelserna före Poltava*, "Scandia. Tidskrift för historisk forskning" 22 (1953–1954), h. 2, pp. 113–163.
[492] Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., p. 218.

Accordingly, on November 9, 1710, in the presence of Sultan Ahmed III, the grand council consisting of ulemas, high army commanders and viziers, having read out a relevant manifesto, decided to engage in hostilities against Russia.[493] News of this reached Moscow on December 20, but it was not until February 1711 that Turkey officially declared war on Russia.[494]

Shortly after arriving in St. Petersburg, Adam Weyde set off for Moscow to meet with his family, who were anxiously awaiting his return. He arrived in the capital on January 21, 1711, but did not rest there for long because of Peter I's war plans.[495] By the end of March 1711, the general and his army had already left the city. The Russian army headed for Smolensk, but due to logistical difficulties and poor weather it eventually turned to Kyiv, choosing it as a stopover on its march southward.[496] The tsar opted to strike the Balkans and head towards the Danube, crossing the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where he planned to set up his food depots. As per the diplomatic arrangements made, the lords of Moldavia and Wallachia and hitherto fiefs of the Porte, Constantin Brankovan and Dmitrie Cantemir, pledged their military support in the war that was just beginning. They promised to ready supplies and field

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[493] В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход Петра I. Русская армия в 1711 г. не была побеждена*, Москва 2015, p. 10.

[494] ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2322.

[495] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, Москва 1962, ред. Б.Б. Кафенгауз, А.И. Андреев, Л.А. Никифоров, p. 468. In a letter dated April 29, 1711 (which he already wrote as a participant in the hostilities against Turkey), Weyde mentioned that if he had received an order from the tsar to report to the army upon his arrival in St. Petersburg, he would have executed it without delay, without even making a stop at his home in Moscow. See А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года. (Прутская операция)*, [in:] *Сборник военно-исторических материалов*, ред., предисл. А.З. Мышлаевский, т. 12, Санкт-Петербург 1898, № 71, p. 86; П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, p. 473.

[496] W. Rakowski, *Pamiętniki Wielkiej Wojny Północnej*, eds. M. Nagielski, M. Wagner, Warszawa 2002, p. 140.

an army of 40,000 soldiers. Also offering their help were the Serbs and Montenegrins.[497]

For Adam Weyde, who had spent a decade in Swedish captivity, which translated into the obvious lack of his participation in the most spectacular successes achieved by the continuously reforming Russian army (the capture of the Baltic strongholds in 1702–1710, the Battles of Lesnaya (1708) and Poltava (1709)), involvement in the commencing military campaign was vital in many respects. The general was presented with an opportunity to revive old relations with Peter I and the officers of the general staff. The former Swedish prisoner of war was able to showcase his organizational and command qualities again, also putting the military knowledge he had acquired during his years of captivity to use. It is conceivable that General Weyde also had some misgivings as to whether he would be able to establish himself on the frontlines after his yearslong separation from the art of war. The answer to this question came in no time, as the tsar's associate soon reestablished himself as a key member of the general staff, overseeing the war with Turkey.

Peter I did not forget his friend, reintegrating Weyde into his closest circle. This is evidenced by the seven-point resolution presented on April 13, 1711 in Lutsk by General-Feldmarshal Boris Sheremetev, in charge of the entire military campaign against Turkey. It concerned the appointment of the leadership of three divisions, hitherto commanded by Alexander Menshikov, Anikita Repnin, and Ludwig von Hallart, respectively. Sheremetev named the latter two and Adam Weyde as the new commanders of the three tactical compounds.[498] Therefore, what it spelled for

[497] Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., p. 219. For more on the subject, see В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход…*, pp. 10–15.

[498] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 15, Москва 1843, № 1283, pp. 196–197; Б.П. Шереметев, *Фельдмаршал граф Б.П. Шереметев, Военно-походный журнал 1711 и 1712 гг.,* ред. А.З. Мышлаевский, Санкт-Петербург 1898, p. 18. Eventually, in the course of the expedition the Russian was divided

Weyde was a sort of return to service in an equally prominent position, as he was to command part of the old regiments he had formed.[499] Granted, the units received were not the same as those he commanded in 1700 (see Tables 5 and 4 for comparison); they also saw a considerable rotation of officers between them. The link between the old and the new was the Lefortovsky Regiment.

Naturally, the appointment was pending the tsar's approval, which came as great ennoblement for Adam Weyde. The general expressed his gratitude in a letter to the tsar dated April 29, 1711, posted from the village of Kołki (in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). He informed the ruler that he had received the news of the nomination on April 22, and that he had "tracked" the division entrusted to him precisely to the vicinity of Kołki on April 28 (the unit was trailing behind the other detachments heading toward the Turkish border). It consisted of eight infantry regiments (Astrakhansky, Ingermanlandsky, Ivangorodsky, Koporsky, Lefortovsky, Rentzel's (Saxon), Tobolsky and the newly-formed Weyde's Grenadiers (with the general newly appointed as its immediate commander, see Tables 7, 9–10).[500] In the course of the expedition, the division

into four infantry divisions, two cavalry corps, a separate "Guard Brigade," and artillery units. For more on the functioning of the various units, see the following section if this chapter.

[499] The commanders of each of the division's nine original regiments would change, e.g., in 1706; see А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, приложения, № 6, pp. 332–333.

[500] ВЭ, т. 3, pp. 274–275. The regiments of Adam Weyde's division included newly drafted recruits who had yet to be taught "military discipline." The general himself expressed considerable concern about the feasibility of their swift training. For more details, see *Журнал, или поденная, записка…*, ч. 1, p. 331; А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Война в Финляндии в 1712–1714 годах. Совместная операция сухопутной армии, галерного и корабельного флотов*, Санкт-Петербург 1896, p. 23; В.А. Артамонов, *Русско-турецкая война 1710–1713*, Москва 2019, p. 69. Later on, the number of General Weyde's divisional units fluctuated; for example, in 1713, when his tactical compound was finally redeployed to the north of the country, it only included six regiments: the Grenadiers', Lefortovsky, Slisselburgsky, Rentzel's (Saxon), Tobolsky and Koporsky; see А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, приложения, № 35, pp. 395–396.

saw slight changes in its composition, with the Astrakhansky and Ingermanlandsky regiments separated to form a separate brigade together with the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, known as the so-called Guard Brigade (during the retreat of the Russian army, these units were transferred to the rearguard). In their place, the division now included the Rostovsky Regiment, itself eventually replaced by the Shlisselburgsky Regiment (at the end of the military campaign), which comprised part of Prince Repnin's division during the Danube expedition.[501]

At the onset of the campaign, Weyde noted the excessively slow pace of the march, though he failed to make a thorough investigation of its underlying causes, nor did he demand—without stating why in the letter—a report from Major General Alexei Golovin, who was the formal commander of the division at the time.[502] The detachment quickly made up for its sluggish progress, as Weyde reported to the tsar from Ostrog as early as May 10. In addition, he informed the ruler that he had received news of the Turks having put two bridges across the Danube, as well as of the situation in Bender, where the Turkish Janissaries sent to protect Charles XII rebelled against the Swedish king (who was also reportedly receiving visits from the French envoy).[503] That same day, the general sent a dispatch to Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev, in which he complained about the insufficient food supplies found in Ostrog, inadequate for the needs of his division.[504] Attempts were made to redress the problem promptly. In a letter dated May 19, the tsar instructed Adam Weyde to head toward the Dniester and establish food depots. Also

[501] See А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском...*, приложения, № 15, p. 292; № 21, pp. 360–363; В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход...*, p. 48; idem, *Турецко-русская война...*, p. 69.
[502] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 71, pp. 85–86; № 28, p. 332.
[503] Ibidem, № 82, pp. 95–96. For more on Charles XII's situation in Turkey, see J.D. Hultman, op. cit., pp. 42–58.
[504] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 83, pp. 96–97.

notable in the correspondence was the ruler's decision to appoint Weyde commander of the entire infantry in the absence of Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev, who commanded the entire expedition (busy with regular cavalry reconnaissance, Sheremetev was not always present at the headquarters).[505]

The next destination along the route of General Weyde's division was Bar, from where, on May 30, he reported to the tsar that he was in regular contact with the commanders of the other divisions and that measures were being taken to acquire provisions. After due reconnaissance, he stressed that supply problems were to be expected on the Dniester. He also suggested that all three divisions change the tsar's designated route and head toward the Dniester, directly toward Jampol, bypassing Bracław, where they were to join forces with the divisions led by Sheremetev. Changing the route would save dozens of miles of unnecessary travel.[506] Eventually, on June 12, Adam Weyde's division reached the Dniester, where the tsar himself soon arrived, too, before setting off for Jaworów on June 16; the monarch was scheduled to join the general on the march (he would later change his mind).[507] Meanwhile, Adam Weyde proceeded in accordance with the order of Peter I, who, as late as June 7, instructed him to build a bridge across the Dniester, deploying "Standard Bearer Gubarev, who had always constructed bridges at the crossings during our expeditions," to aid the general.[508] Supervising the construction was Lieutenant General von Hallart, with the first troops crossing to the right bank of

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[505] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, p. 237; И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 15, № 1301, p. 209.
[506] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года…*, № 104, т. 15, pp. 113–114. The concept was put into practice with the army passing through the village of Soroki on the Dniester, located opposite Jampol (the two settlements are ten kilometers apart).
[507] *Журнал, или поденная, записка…*, ч. 1, pp. 332, 335; *Письма и указы Императора Петра I к разным лицам. Письма и указы особ царского семейства и письма сотрудников Петра I*, [in:] СИРИО, т. 11, Санкт-Петербург 1873, № 16, p. 195.
[508] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, p. 279.

the river on the night of June 14. The Russian army then moved directly toward the Danube, where, according to Peter I's plan, it was to join forces with Dmitrie Cantemir's army (Constantin Brankov eventually withdrew from the standoff against the sultan). The combined Russian-Moldavian force reportedly amounted to between 60,000 and 70,000 men (as it turned out, these estimates were grossly miscalculated). In fact, according to Vladimir Artamonov's estimates, Cantemir fielded only 6,000–7,000 Moldavians to support the Russian army, while the size of the latter in the key battles against the Turks never exceeded 38,000 men.[509] In reality, the state of the tsar's army engaged in the expedition was slightly higher and amounted to about 50,000 soldiers. The most reliable data comes from Alexander Myshlayevsky, who reports that, in mid-July 1711, the tsar's army, taking into account only non-commissioned officers, privates and rearguard soldiers (including artisans and orderlies), numbered 46,377 men, including 7,850 soldiers assigned to General Weyde's division at the time (see Table 4).[510]

[509] В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход...*, pp. 19, 34. The study lacks specific figures for the Russian army engaged in the Danube expedition.

[510] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 15, pp. 292–293. The authors of this book have corrected the erroneously tabulated figures for the tsar's troops.

Table 4. Number of soldiers (excluding officer staff) included in the Russian army engaged in the Danube expedition in mid-July 1711.[511]

Separate regiments and regiments within individual divisions	Number of battalions	Non-commissioned officers, privates, rearguard soldiers, orderlies, coachmen
Infantry		
Guard Regiments		
Preobrazhenssky	4	3,294
Ingermanlandsky	2	1,428
Semyonovsky	3	2,337
Astrakhansky	2	1,143
Jointly	*11*	*8,202*
General Weyde's Division		
Grenadiers' (Weyde's Grenadier Regiment)	2	849
Rentzel's	2	1,176
Tobolsky	2	1,144
Ivangorodsky	2	1,124
Lefortovsky	2	1,185
Rostovsky	2	1,204
Koporsky	2	1,168
Jointly	*14*	*7,850*
General Repnin's Division		
Grenadiers'	2	861
Kyivsky	3	1,651
Tversky	2	880

[511] The table corrects cavalry figures erroneously compiled in the source text.

Separate regiments and regiments within individual divisions	Number of battalions	Non-commissioned officers, privates, rearguard soldiers, orderlies, coachmen
Narevsky	3	1,458
Butyrsky	2	1,211
Shlisselbursky	2	962
Belgorodsky	2	1,066
Recruits from the Novgorodsky and Kargopolsky regiments	×	409
Jointly	*16*	*8,498*
General Hallart's Division		
Grenadiers'	2	806
Pskovsky	2	1,085
Sibirsky	2	1,034
Kazansky	2	1,035
Nizhgorodsky (Nizhnovgorodsky)	2	1,056
Moskovsky	3	1,606
Jointly	*13*	*6,622*
General von Enzberg's Division		
Grenadiers'	2	940
Ryazanskiy	2	1,009
Vyatsky	2	1,037
Chernihivsky	2	929
Velkolutsky	2	1,079
Ustiuzhsky	2	760
Jointly	*12*	*5,754*
Artillery		

Separate regiments and regiments within individual divisions	Number of battalions	Non-commissioned officers, privates, rearguard soldiers, orderlies, coachmen
Non-commissioned officers, bombardiers, gunners, fusiliers and others on duty		777
Officers' orderlies		54
Furmeister and *Fuhrleute*		1,128
Apothecary students, Tartars, Cossacks and recruits		77
Jointly in the artillery		*2,036*
Jointly in infantry and artillery regiments		38,962
Cavalry		
General Kropotov		824
General Rozhnov		755
Novgorodsky Regiment		793
X [regiment name could not be determined].		639
Kazansky Regiment		817
Petrogradsky Regiment		758
Azovsky Regiment		783
Bialozersky Regiment		765
Jointly in dragoon regiments		6,134
Soldiers from regiments commanded by General Rönne		
Dismounted, sick and on weak horses ("light horsemen")		881
Squadron General		400
Jointly in cavalry		*7,415*
Jointly in infantry (including artillery) and cavalry		46,377

Source: А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года…*, № 15, pp. 292–293.

During the march, Adam Weyde exchanged regular correspondence with Peter I, keeping the tsar thoroughly updated on all activities to date, including contact with the commanders of the other divisions on the march, the gathering of supplies,[512] or the construction of a bridge on the Dniester. In one of the letters (undated), he also promised to compile a tabular statement on the preparation of an adequate number of tents, uniforms and other equipment provided for the Russian infantry.[513] He also lent his exceptional organizational skills to regulate the marching principles. He issued his first document on June 16, 1711, near the village of Soroki on the Dniester, in which he drafted regulations for the service of officer orderlies and introduced the function of gewaltiger general in the army. Adam Weyde ordered it be announced across all divisions that, effective immediately, generals, staff- and ober-officers were prohibited from ordering soldiers to perform personal services (and thus from deploying them to their supply train wagons). All work unrelated to military service and "running errands" was to be performed by orderlies only; soldiers were merely obliged to haul wood and hay.[514] The second order was issued on June 30 that year, after the general noticed disorder during the march, with a great many soldiers lingering behind the columns and walking by the company wagons, causing the formation to lengthen and exposing it to

[512] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, p. 285. Peter I was aware of the inadequate grain supplies available to his army during the expedition. Accordingly, he instructed Adam Weyde to supplement the soldiers' rations with meat (beef), which was in abundance. The remaining provisions were to be replenished with purchases made in Wallachia.

[513] The document, which contained much more information on the functioning of the entire Russian land army, came into force that same year, albeit slightly earlier than the date declared by the general. In the February 19, 1711 edition of *Military Ranks in Infantry and Cavalry Regiments*, Weyde detailed their number, the pay awarded to each rank, as well as data on weapons and all sorts of soldier equipment; see ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2319. In view of the above, one can assume that Adam Weyde was already familiar with the document, and his proposal on the compilation of data specifying the type and quantity of equipment issued to infantry soldiers partially referred to said document.

[514] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцею 1711 года…*, № 3, p. 345. See KWPI, p. 341.

enemy attacks. Approved by the tsar, the newly appointed gewaltiger general (Prince Yuri Shakhovsky) was to watch over the orderly march formation henceforth, and to "hang lawbreakers without mercy," assisted by regimental and company provosts.[515] The order of June 17 of that year, issued to the infantry near the aforementioned village of Soroki, concerned the organization of marching formations, as well as the camp life of the army, which was about to enter enemy territory. Adam Weyde ordered that he be provided with inventories of all wagons—generals', officers', soldiers' (company), as well as innkeepers'—accompanying the army.[516]

At the start of the campaign, Weyde expressed his dismay at the fact that officers' wives participated in a military expedition. He did not approve of this very much, as expressed in a letter to the tsar, in which he stated, "in my division, as in the others, general and officers are accompanied by their wives, but as to whether they are to be present with the army or, I have no resolution from the Field Marshal General."[517] Unfortunately, his interpellation was unsuccessful, since the example came from the very top: with Peter I accompanied by his future wife Catherine I, many generals and officers followed suit.[518]

The appointment of Adam Weyde as commander of the division in place of its former superior Prince Menshikov seems extremely instructive from the perspective of actor-network theory. One result of state policy was the influence of various actants on the tsar. The appearance of a major new actor (Adam Weyde) implied a shake-up in the existing

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[515] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцею 1711 года…*, № 39, pp. 261–262. See KWPI, pp. 129–131, 344.
[516] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцею 1711 года…*, № 4, p. 345.
[517] Ibidem, № 140, p. 143. See also Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., p. 34. For more on the presence of women in eighteenth-century armies, see T. Ciesielski, *Rodzina wojskowa w połowie XVIII wieku*, [in:] *Rodzina i gospodarstwo domowe na ziemiach polskich w XV–XX wieku. Struktury demograficzne, społeczne i gospodarcze*, ed. C. Kuklo, Warszawa 2008, pp. 231–246.
[518] В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход…*, p. 39; Артамонов В.А., *Русско-турецкая война…*, pp. 94, 121, 155.

structure of influence. For the general, the appointment came as an honor, but at the same time a nuisance, since his promotion cast the all-powerful tsar's favorite, Menshikov, who had canvassed for Weyde's release from captivity, into the shadow (see Chapter 7).

In Weyde's undated letter to Alexander Menshikov (only the date of receipt by the addressee is known: July 2, 1711), the general did his best to address the circumstances in a polite manner, at the same time indicating the various reasons for entrusting him with command of the division. One important figure in this regard was Major General Alexei Golovin, who served as the division's commander in the absence of Prince Menshikov, and rather understandably did not reconcile with the idea of ceding command to Adam Weyde. Moreover, according to said letter, Alexei Golovin was at odds with various generals and officers in the army, and was widely rumored to have abused alcohol, which, according to Weyde, endangered the entire division.[519]

In the context of the reciprocal animosities inside the Russian general staff, it should be added that the campaign immediately became host to a clash of strategic concepts. During the war councils of the general staff, two groups emerged. The first, the so-called "German party," comprising foreign officers, proposed to conduct defensive operations. Their adversaries from the "Russian party," which included the tsar's associates Chancellor Gavrill Golovkin, Vice Chancellor Pyotr Shafirov, Serbian nobleman Savva Vladislavich (Peter I's chief advisor on Balkan affairs)[520] and commanders Jacob Bruce, Vasily Dolgorukov, Anikita Repnin and Adam Weyde, all opted in favor of extending staunch support to the Orthodox Moldavians and advancing into Wallachia. An additional

[519] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 26, p. 330.
[520] For more on the subject, see Й. Дучич, *Граф Савва Владиславич. Серб-дипломат при дворе Петра Великого и Екатерины I*, Санкт-Петербург 2009.



Figure 8.1. Arrangement of Russian encampment besieged at Stănilești on the Pruth (July 9/20, 1711).
Source: A. de la Mottraye, *A. De La Motraye's Travels Through Europe, Asia, and into Part of Africa...*, vol. 2, London 1723, Pl. 26B.

argument for undertaking offensive operations was the desire to secure the food depots located in the two principalities.[521]

Known in historiography by the unfortunate name of the "Pruth campaign,"[522] the Danube expedition was a setback for Peter I, resulting in a failure of his foreign policy in the south. The army still reached Jassy on July 3 (14), joining forces with the Moldavian army three days later. However, on July 8 (19), when heading toward the Danube along the Pruth River, the tsar's troops were surrounded by a formidable enemy army, estimated at up to 140,000 men.[523] The Russians set up camp near the village of Stănileşti, where they intended to mount a defense. The course of the entire campaign is meticulously detailed in the account of Aubry de la Mottraye, a Huguenot émigré residing in England, diplomat, traveler, merchant and collector, who lived at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In his famous *Travels Through Europe, Asia, and into Part of Africa...*, Mottraye characterizes the political situation at the time and the armed forces of Russia and Turkey. Also included in the book is a map illustrating the Russian camp on the Pruh, including the deployment of the respective units (Figure 8.1).[524] As shown in the illustration, regiments from each

[521] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей...*, p. 256; В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход...*, pp. 36–37; idem, *Турецко-русская война...*, p. 119.

[522] Russian historian Vladimir Artamonov has rectified this issue in his recent research; see В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход...*, pp. 12–19; idem, *Русско-турецкая война...*, pp. 45–72.

[523] Idem, *Дунайский поход...*, p. 47.

[524] These were not the only cartographic materials produced in the course of the campaign. An almost identical plan in German can be found—albeit much more modestly annotated, with only minor differences in the locations of the respective Russian divisions—in a collection of miscellaneous materials pertaining to the historical papers of Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov; see План военных действий в Прутской кампмнии 1711 г., РНБ, ОР, Эрм. собр. № 363, Князь Михаил Михайлович Щербатов. Сборник материалов к его трудам по русской истории и биографические материалы, л. 76об.–77. A sketch of the besieged Russian troops was also drawn by Just Jule, who was with the Turks at the time; see Ю. Юль, op. cit. p. 313. A jobbing print was also issued on the occasion; see *Courieuser Abris von der Battaillie so zwischen Sr. Gross-Czarischen Mayt. und denen Türken bey dem Flus Prut den 11./12. Julii A. 1711 vorgefallen*, n.p., [1711].

division (see Table 4) were scattered in different locations along the entire line of camp fortifications. Such an arrangement was most likely dictated by the current operational circumstances, since the more experienced regiments, formerly comprising General Weyde's division and subsequently then separated therefrom (the Astrakhansky and Ingermanlandsky, known in historiography as the guard regiments),[525] were deployed along the more vulnerable section of the defense on the left flank (looking from the tsar's quarters, as drafted on the map in de la Mottraye's work), extending all the way to the Pruth. Intermingled with other regiments, the remaining units of the general's tactical compound stood closer to one another, occupying the fortifications on the right flank.[526] The situation of the encircled Russian army seemed precarious. Accordingly, the tsar appointed three of his top commanders—General Feldzeugmeister Jacob Bruce, General Anikita Repnin and General Weyde—as coordinators for the proper cooperation of the combined Russian force.[527]

So significant was the enemy's advantage that on July 8 (19), 1711, the Russian command decided to halt the operation and seek measures to break out of the encirclement to save not only the soldiers but also the ruler himself.[528] As of July 9-10, the situation seemed desperate, but for the immediate circle of the Russian generals—Adam Weyde, Mikhail Golitsyn, Jacob Bruce, Ludwig von Hallart and Anikita Repnin—capitulation was not an option. They all signed up to the mutually agreed position of the general staff that in the event of the Turks' rejection of the submitted offers and the subsequent demand for the tsar's army to lay down its weapons, it was necessary to "engage in battle along the river," that is, to resist the enemy in a fortified camp leaning against the Pruth, situated in the vicinity of the

[525] В.А. Артамонов, *Русско-турецкая война*..., p. 69.
[526] A. de la Mottraye, op. cit., pp. 3–20, Pl. 26B.
[527] R. Wittram, op. cit., Bd. 1, Göttingen, p. 381.
[528] J.D. Hultman, op. cit. pp. 59–60.

village of Stănilești (Figure 8.1).[529] This is what they did and, from November 8 to November 11 the Russians heroically resisted the overwhelming Turkish forces, repelling their fierce attacks on every occasion.

The narratives produced during any such intense warfare tend to be extremely subjective. In order to truly evaluate the three-day battle, we have used the figures at our disposal and reproduced (i.e., recalculated) them in Chart 7.[530] The evidence collected indicates that during the three days of the clash, the tsar's army lost a total of 2,874 men, which accounted for 6.2% of the initial count. Obviously, in July 1711, the size of the Russian army must have sunk below the original 46,000 soldiers; however, whether it dwindled to 38,000 (i.e., down to 82% of the initial count, as argued by Russian historians) is difficult to assess. Had this been the case, the total losses would have amounted to 7.56%. The cavalry suffered the heaviest casualties among all units, ranging from 12.32 to 15.03% (approximately 30% were MIAs, including presumable deserters). If one factors in this aspect, it will become clear that the main assault targeted General Hallart's division, whose losses ratio is estimated at 10.59-12.92%. Compared with these numbers, the attacks on the regiments of Generals Weyde and Repnin were much weaker, as evidenced by the losses: 3.71-4.53% and 3.37-4.11%, respectively. One unflattering incident was the abandonment to the enemy of fifty-six sick or rearguard soldiers who were stationed on the river island. Thirty-nine were part of Adam Weyde's division, which the general considered as a personal setback, and one cannot exclude the possibility that his subsequent, near-exaggerated concern for the sick and wounded was a consequence of this event.

[529] Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., p. 55; П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, p. 316; A.F. Büschings, *Wöchentliche Nachrichten von neuen Landcharten, geographischen, statistischen und historischen Büchern und Schriften*, Berlin 1778, p. 409; *И.И.* Голиков, op. cit., т. 15, № 1326, p. 228.
[530] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 12, p. 288.



Chart 7. Types of losses suffered by the Russian army while fighting the Turks on July 8-11, 1711.[531]
Source: own calculations based on: А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 12, p. 288.

[531] For a comparison of personnel counts, see Table 4.

How should one evaluate the accumulated data on losses? Detailed studies that can serve as a point of reference are scarce. It is estimated that during battles in seventeenth-century Europe the victor would lose approximately 15% of the soldiers, and the loser twice as many (roughly 20% of the army's personnel were taken prisoner). Sieges were more dangerous, although one should note that, as a rule, they extended over considerably longer periods, during which disease, famine and cold could wreak havoc. Hence the indications are that the victorious party could lose about 20% of its troops, while the loser's casualty ratio could amount to as much as half its entire army strength.[532] On the one hand, juxtaposing the data with the above assumptions suggests that the clash at Pruth can hardly be considered bloody. On the other hand, the event in question was a short, four-day siege, which may lead to a wholly different assessment of the events described.

By analogy, let us consider the four-day battle of Okhmativ, which unfolded between January 29 and February 1, 1655 between a Polish-Tatar army and a Russian-Cossack force. In both cases, not only was the timing of the clash similar but there was also no clear-cut settlement. More importantly, accounts of detailed losses incurred throughout the four-day battle have survived. Unfortunately, these reports are limited to two dragoon regiments of the Polish army, commanded by Stanisław Czarniecki and Henryk Dönhoff.[533] The former nominally stood at 545 soldiers (with the presumed actual number at the time of battle down to 436), while the latter was slightly larger (596 and 477, respectively). The combined total losses amounted to 192 soldiers, including 118 killed and 74 wounded, or between about 17.35% and 21.69% of the original count. Therefore, the

[532] F. Tallet, op. cit., p. 106.

[533] S. Augusiewicz, *Nieznane materiały do bitwy ochmatowskiej 1665 roku w Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbestitz Berlin-Dahlem*, "Echa Przeszłości" 7 (2006), pp. 167–173.

clash was much bloodier than Peter's 1711 battle, even including Hallart's division, which suffered the heaviest losses.

In conclusion, the defense of the Stănilești encampment was effective and certainly did not diminish the fighting qualities of the Russian army. More dangerous was the distance from the supply lines and the threat of disease outbreaks among the weakened soldiers. In fact, the threat of disease was also palpable on the Turkish side. Hence, the Ottoman Porte was by no means confident of victory, which made the subsequent negotiations more difficult. Finally, on July 12, the tsar's parliamentarians, Vice Chancellor Pyotr Shafirov and Mikhail Sheremetev (son of Boris Sheremetev), managed to reach an agreement, under which the Russian army was allowed to leave the lands of the Ottoman Empire.[534] According to Johan D. Hultman, after Peter I bribed Baltaci Mehmet Pasha with an exorbitant sum of money, a clandestine deal was made, whereby the vizier would force Charles XII to leave Bender and return to Christian territories.[535]

Nevertheless, with the Russians disbelieving the Turks and fearing the actions of Charles XII, the withdrawal proceeded in defensive formation. Command of the rearguard troops was entrusted to

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[534] According to the agreement, known as the Treaty of the Pruth, Russia pledged to return the lands it had conquered in 1696 and to raze the fortresses therein, including Taganrog, located directly on the Sea of Azov; see Map 1; *Документы относящиеся к деятельности фельдмаршала, графа Бориса Петровича Шереметева, с 1704 по 1722 год, извлеченные из Архива Артиллерийского Музея, Императорской Публичной Библиотеки, Московского общаго Архива Главного Штаба, Сенатского Архива, Румянцовского Музея, Архива Морского Министерства и архива Сергея Шереметева*, [in:] СИРИО т. 25, Санкт-Петербург 1878, № 287, p. 321; A. Quennerstedt, *Vid Prut*, KFÅ Lund 1710 (1711), pp. 166–204; ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2398. Mikhail Sheremetev's role in the negotiations with the Turks has so far been overestimated. On the other hand, instrumental to the treaty were the "gifts" delivered by the Russians to Grand Vizier Baltaci Mehmet Pasha, commander-in-chief of the Sultan's army and a person with direct influence on the content of the agreements concluded.

[535] J.D. Hultman, op. cit. pp. 60–62.

three experienced generals, Weyde, von Hallart and Golitsyn.[536] The return journey of the Russian army was an endless string of misfortunes. Along the way, many soldiers died from wounds and exhaustion, and all expendable wagons and weapons that hindered the march were abandoned. However, it appears that Peter I's force was spared an epidemic that would have decimated the army, thereby salvaging the core of the tsar's elite units.[537] On July 28, the divisions of Generals Weyde and von Hallart, which were securing the retreat, reached the Dniester, marking the end of the campaign.[538]

Also retrieved was the tsar's treasury, containing the sizeable amount of 1.2 million rubles. Fearing that the money might fall prey to the enemy, Peter I ordered its partitioning and assignment to trusted "keepers," one of whom was General Weyde. A sum of 500,000 rubles was divided into three smaller amounts, which were handed over to the military commissars, of which 16,667 rubles were transferred to the guard regiments. The outstanding amount of 700,000 rubles was distributed evenly among seven representatives of the general staff. All the commissars and commanders had to sign the relevant orders of payment.[539]

[536] В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход…*, pp. 58, 69. Staying in Turkish territory since his defeat at Poltava in 1709, Charles XII attempted, to no avail, to persuade the vizier to pursue the fleeing Russians; see J.D. Hultman, op. cit. p. 61.

[537] A study on diseases in armies of the early modern era contains several examples involving the Russian army. For instance, during the expedition to Crimea (and occupation of Bakhchisaray) in 1736, commanded by Burkhard Christoph von Münnich, the Russians lost 56% of their soldiers to diseases caused by the consumption of water contaminated with human and animal remains. In turn, during the siege of Riga in 1709, the Swedes and Russians alike suffered from the plague. The defenders lost almost half of their soldiers, with the disease claiming as many as 10,000 Russians. See P. Lenihan, op. cit., pp. 71–81, 113–120.

[538] Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., p. 62; В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход…*, p. 72. On August 1, 1711, the tsar, heading the Preobrazhensky Regiment, with a bare saber in his hand, left Turkish lands and crossed the border bridge over the Dnieper. This posture was meant to bolster the morale of the soldiers after the exceptionally tortuous retreat from the Pruth. In a way, it was also a clear demonstration that Peter I and his army had not conceded defeat.

[539] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 1, p. 320.

In assessing Adam Weyde's attitude during the "Danube expedition," it is necessary to consider the conduct of all those Russian commanders (including Weyde) advocating an offensive form of warfare. This was an ill-conceived decision, overly optimistic in its assessment of the allies. We should also emphasize that the entire campaign was a failure both strategically and operationally. The Russian generals, still living on the recent successes achieved over the Swedish army (the Battle of Poltava and the capture of the enemy's strongholds on the eastern Baltic coast), and with the memory of the capture of Azov in 1696, completely underestimated the combat capabilities of the Turkish-Tatar armies. The overly reckless and radical attitude of the generals of the "Russian party," who operated in isolation from their own hinterland and lines of communication, brought lamentable results. To some degree, another problem was the emergence of General Weyde, who violated the existing command order, although his role should not be overestimated. Certainly, following his release from ten-year captivity, the general was not burdened with any of the daunting combat tasks. This is evidenced by the lower loss rates during the siege of the camp in July 1711 (see Figure 7). On the other hand, at the organizational and operational level, both Weyde and his troops performed well, displaying high morale and discipline. Therefore, despite suffering a complete defeat, the tsar presented the participants of the campaign (commanders and soldiers alike) with decorations and pecuniary prizes. Among the awardees was Adam Weyde, who received a subsidy to the amount of his annual pay.[540]

Adam Weyde summed up the Pruth campaign in a letter sent to Alexander Menshikov dated July 23, 1711. Therein, the general made a brief characterization of the war effort, emphasizing the abysmal supply of provisions and, above all, the inadequate numbers of his own cavalry.

[540] В.А. Артамонов, *Дунайский поход...*, p. 73.

The latter factor translated directly into the impossibility of continuing hostilities and marching further into enemy territory. Nevertheless, Weyde stressed that despite all the inconveniences, the retreat proceeded in an orderly manner, all the way to its fortuitous end. In conclusion, he listed three elements that contributed to the Russians' defeat of the expedition: "unhealthy, dangerous and ineffective war councils, failure to ensure supplies, and an insufficient number of cavalry troops."[541] It seems that the general staff were unable to adopt a unified front of action, with bickering, competing private interests and personal disputes derailing any chance of an effective expedition. Adam Weyde's positions as a supporter of the "Russian party" should be emphasized, despite the rather unequivocal correspondence in which he stressed the lack of cavalry, the excessively slow marching pace, and the shortage of supplies.[542] At the time, Weyde offered a voice of reason amidst various proposals, but he was also a solitary figure among fellow commanders.

The Danube expedition was a vital episode in the general's life and military career. Nothing indicated that the return to his "profession" would be so successful: after a decade of absence from the Russian army, he re-established himself as a key member of the tsar's general staff. It fell to him to command a division and to be a decision-maker in matters of crucial tactical and strategic importance (he was among the generals who planned and executed the successful withdrawal of the Russian army from Moldavia).

[541] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года...*, № 43, p. 341–342.

[542] Based on the letters themselves, Brian Davies goes so far as to argue that Weyde was in fact a member of the foreign (German) faction; see B. Davies, op. cit., p. 116.

8.2. In Ukraine

The 1711 war campaign was over, but the Russo-Turkish war continued and the threat of attack from Turkish-Tatar armies remained viable. Therefore, Peter I decided to adequately secure the southern borders, leaving his troops in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russian-controlled Left-bank Ukraine. Thus, Weyde's division, as well as his second tactical compound, assigned to him after the dismissal of General Nicola Friedrich von Enzberg from service,[543] was still combat-ready, albeit in poor condition, as noted by the commander himself: "... there was neither footwear nor clothing, nor sufficient armaments; the return passage through Poland to [our own] borders was marred by great shortages of supplies, with discipline deteriorating to the extent that to maintain it took resorting to such extraordinary methods as the erection of gallows at every night's lodging, as a precaution for the immediate enforcement of punishment without trial for any escape attempt ventured."[544]

On August 12, 1711, Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev received word of a possible march of the Swedish king from Bender, through Polish lands toward Sweden. Fearing the return of Charles XII, potentially combined with a strike by Tatar or Turkish troops, the commander-in-chief ordered the Russian troops that were returning from Moldavia to remain in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. These troops were to deploy in the following order: the cavalry of General Karl

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[543] Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., p. 64–65. Nicola Friedrich von Enzberg took command of one of the tsar's divisions during the Pruth campaign. Earlier, as an officer in the army of the Holy Roman Empire, he fought in the War of the Spanish Succession, attaining the rank of major general. In 1711, he returned to his previous service, and the following year was named Field Marshal General in the army of Emperor Charles VI Habsburg.

[544] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском...*, pp. 22–24, 35.

Rönne in Olesko; Lieutenant General Mikhail Golitsyn in Dubno with his four most valuable regiments: Preobrazhensky, Semyonovsky, Ingermanlandsky and Astrakhansky; Prince Repnin's division in Ostrog; the dragoons of General Lebrecht Gottfried Janus von Eberstädt (commonly known as Janus) and the units of Major General Prince Alexander Volkonskiy in Międzyrzecz near Równe. On the other hand, the combined divisions of Generals Weyde and Enzberg were to occupy the easternmost outpost in Połonne. In addition, Ludwig von Hallart's division was ordered to Zasław.[545] Adam Weyde reached Połonne on August 21, alongside his soldiers and artillery.[546] Soon the above dislocation of forces underwent changes, as the rumors regarding the expected return of Charles XII proved false. Before long, part of these forces were redeployed and headed for Kyiv via Połonne, before continuing further, in accordance with their respective marching orders.

Meanwhile, the condition of General Weyde's regiments was increasingly deteriorating. His report to Field Marshal General Sheremetev dated August 23, 1711 leaves the reader with no illusions. The commander reports on large-scale desertion and a high mortality rate among soldiers. On one night alone, eighteen soldiers died in the division, with many falling ill. There was also a shortage of horses capable of pulling the food wagons, as the ones at his disposal were carrying the sick.[547]

In the early days of October, Adam Weyde accompanied Boris Sheremetev on a short trip to Ostrog, after which he returned to Połonne. By mid-October, the town was host to four Russian divisions: the infantry divisions of Generals Weyde and von Hallart and the cavalry divisions of Janus and Rönne, which according to General-Feldmarshal Sheremetev's

[545] Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., pp. 66–67, 73.
[546] Ibidem, p. 73.
[547] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 2, p. 413.

assessment would soon receive orders to leave for Kyiv. After seeking Adam Weyde's advice, Sheremetev intended to order von Hallart's division to follow suit. The decision to send this tactical union "back to their perimeters" was dictated by the dire condition of the soldiers' uniforms, and the looming approach of colder days. Without waiting for the tsar's confirmation, on October 12, Weyde and Sheremetev commanded the artillery to return to Kyiv, and its personnel were instructed to head for Moscow in two columns.[548]

In October, Sheremetev designated winter quarters for the respective troops. General Weyde's division was to split and head towards two governorates: Kyiv and Azov. The general and his staff were ordered to Sevsk, along with Weyde's Grenardiers' Regiment, Lefortovsky Regiment, Rentzel's (Saxon) Regiment, and the Shlisselbursky Regiment; Novy Oskol was to host Major General Ivan Busch along with the Tobolsky, Koporsky and Ivangorodsky regiments. On October 14, the general's troops departed towards Kyiv to their designated winter quarters.[549] This decision was soon changed and General Weyde's division was moved "back to its perimeter,"[550] as the tsar also explained to Boris Sheremetev in a letter dated November 3, 1711. A Russian garrison was to station in Połonne until Charles XII left Bender. Meanwhile, the divisions of Generals Weyde and von Hallart were to position themselves near Moscow, ready to move towards St. Petersburg in the winter if necessary.[551] The decision was prompted by the news of Charles XII's possible return to Sweden via the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or Russia. Following personnel and uniform replenishments, the divisions of both

[548] Ibidem, p. 540.
[549] Ibidem, pp. 86–89, 95–96; *И.И. Голиков*, op. cit., т. 15, № 1384, p. 277.
[550] *И.И. Голиков*, op. cit., т. 15, № 1382, p. 278.
[551] П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 2, т. 15, pp. 235, 261.

generals were to ready for action in the Baltic theater of war by March 25, 1712.[552]

Despite his attempts, the vizier failed to expel Charles XII from Turkish territory, and the king's mere presence in Bender thwarted preparations for the Finnish campaign. At the same time, the Russian armed forces were constantly redeployed from one place to another. The condition of General Weyde's division was deplorable. Suffice to mention that in 1711 alone the soldiers had to cover 3,150 kilometers on foot, often in difficult conditions, and without adequate supplies. Winter was nearing, and the much-anticipated receipt of new uniforms (shoes in particular) in Kyiv, which Weyde had called for, proved to be unfeasible. In view of the above, as early as November 28, Peter I sent a resolution to the Governing Senate to address uniform shortages in the general's division.[553]

In addition to the initiatives undertaken by Charles XII, another pretext for the resumption of the hostilities was the tsar's deliberate failure to comply with the arrangements made on the Pruth River, thereby delaying the return of the southern strongholds, and continuing to meddle with the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Peter I and Field Marshal General Sheremetev, who remained in Kyiv in January 1712, reckoned with the possibility that both the Turkish army, as well as the Crimean Tatars and Zaporozhian Cossacks and the few Swedish troops under the command of Charles XII, could strike back at any

[552] *И.И.* Голиков, op. cit., № 1396, p. 288; № 1411, p. 300; т. 5, Москва 1838, pp. 23, 27.

[553] Ibidem, т. 15, № 1409, p. 298; т. 5, p. 30; П. и Б., т. 11, вып. 2, p. 263. On December 23, 1711, the senators informed Peter I that the uniforms for General Weyde's division had already been loaded onto carts and prepared for shipment. Ibid, p. 581. According to the assurances of Major General Luka Chirikov, who was in charge of these matters as Oberst-Commissar, they were to reach the division by the end of January 1712, ibid, p. 595. In fact, the Governing Senate was unable to comply with this task, which resulted in only half of the soldiers in General Weyde's division receiving uniforms; see *Доклады и приговоры...,* ред. Н.В. Калачов, т. 1, кн. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1880, № 441, 501, 550; т. 2, кн. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1882, № 218, 533; кн. 2, № 665.

time. Therefore, all of the tsar's generals were commanded to remain in full combat readiness. They received orders to replenish their units' hardtack supplies for a period of one month. Also awaiting their marching orders were General Weyde and his division: seven infantry regiments quartered in the towns of Oryol and Bolkhov.[554]

As it turned out, this time, too, Charles XII was able to keep the powerful Russian army in check without involving his own forces. The original plans to send General Weyde's division back to St. Petersburg faltered. Instead, Boris Sheremetev instructed Weyde to expect orders to march south. On January 19, 1712, the strength of Weyde's troop increased, as he was named commander of General von Hallart's division, hitherto led by Major General Bohn (since the end of 1711; see Figure 14.2), with whom he was instructed to be in contact. It is worth noting that, while consulted with other top commanders,[555] Peter I's decisions were subject to frequent changes at the time, as the ruler was simultaneously engaged in offensive actions targeting Swedish Pomerania. This is evidenced by the February 19, 1712 order sent to General Weyde, instructing him to separate four infantry regiments from von Hallart's division and send them back to Moscow (they had been on standby nearby until then).[556] Eventually, the general's troops were redeployed in Ukraine, spreading out near Baturyn. This is confirmed by Adam Weyde's correspondence to Chancellor Gavrill Golovkin, sent from the former capital of the Cossack Hetmanate on May 13, 1712, in which he implored Golovin to aid Prince Khilkov, who was still in Swedish captivity at the

[554] П. и Б., т. 12, вып. 2, ред. Л.Г. Бескровный, Б.Б. Кафенгауз, Л.А. Никифоров, Москва 1977, pp. 234, 383; *Статейный список П.П. Шафирова и М.Б. Шереметева 1711 г.* [in:] Т.А. Базарова, *Русские дипломаты при османском дворе. Статейные списки П.П. Шафирова и М.Б. Шереметева 1711 и 1712 гг. (Исследование и тексты),* Санкт-Петербург 2016, p. 269.
[555] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 5, p. 68.
[556] Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., pp. 118–132.

time.[557] Two days later, on May 15, the division relocated again, as Weyde was ordered to deploy near Kyiv. In addition to the infantry, he was now placed in command of the cavalry (together with General Rönne's dragoons), including irregular units.[558]

Adam Weyde pushed northeast, as confirmed by Boris Sheremetev's letter to the tsar dated June 11, in which Sheremetev reported that the general's division was in the vicinity of Starodub.[559] There is every indication that Weyde's detachment did not remain in the south for long. Once again, decisions were made to rearrange the "chess pieces" on the board that was Eastern Europe. On October 1, the general received orders to set out with his infantry regiments, then stationed in Seversky Novgorod. The swift marching pace enabled Weyde's division to cover between three to four miles a day.

Along the way, he was to join forces with artillery troops in the village of Pogar. Should he overtake the artillery, Weyde was to continue marching according to the prescribed route to Roslavl, where the artillery was to join him. He also received instructions to send any redundant powder supplies back south, down the Desna River, to Chernihiv. As planned, the route of General Weyde's march was to be as follows: Seversky Novgorod – Hremiach (6 miles) – Pogar (4 miles) – Boiklan (4 miles) – Pochep (2 miles) – Vyskokie (4 miles) – Ledenevo (3 miles) – Krivoy Les (4 miles) / Berestok n. Krivoy Les – Zharyn (6 miles) – Roslavl (4 miles).[560]

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[557] *Эпистолярное наследие русского резидента…*, № 11, pp. 299–300.

[558] Ibidem, p. 159. Boris Sheremetev did not specify which troops were involved. One can only assume that they were Cossack units (Ukrainian and Danube Cossacks), Kalmyk forces, and Wallachian and Serbian troops.

[559] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому от генерал-фельдмаршала, тайного советника, малтийского с. апостола Андрея, Белого орла и прусского ордена кавалера графа Бориса Петровича Шереметева*, одобрение А. Барсов, ч. 3, Москва 1779, № 262, p. 156; *И.И.* Голиков, op. cit., т. 5, p. 360.

[560] Б.П. Шереметев, op. cit., pp. 200–201.

On October 20, the general's division and other units of the Russian army were directed to Smolensk and its vicinity.[561] On December 4, Boris Sheremetev sent a list to Peter I , informing the tsar of the whereabouts of his corps's winter quarters. In the case of General Weyde's division, the infantry regiments (Weyde's Grenadiers, Lefortovsky, Rentzel's, Shlisselbursky, Tobolsky and Koporskyy) were to station in Smolensk, while the artillery was to set up camp in the nearby villages.[562] Despite his earnest pleas, the general's soldiers were still lacking new uniforms. Upon Weyde's subsequent complaint on the matter, Peter I issued a resolution to the Governing Senate, dated November 30, 1712, commanding the issuance of the appropriate orders.[563]

In total, Weyde's detachment traveled approximately 1,350 kilometers throughout 1712, whereby the linear distance between the starting and ending locations was a mere 300 kilometers. However, the soldiers of Adam Weyde's division did not get to rest for long after reaching Smolensk. As early as December 24, 1712, Field Marshal General Sheremetev received orders from the tsar to march to Pskov and beyond, towards St. Petersburg.[564] Following Alexander Menshikov's alarming reports of the Swedish advance from Mecklenburg into Poland, the general's tactical compound was to remain in Smolensk, combat-ready and awaiting further orders. These came rather quickly, for as Boris Sheremetev reported to the tsar on January 15, 1713, General Weyde's division (Kyivsky and Nizhinsky regiments) moved to quarters in Kyiv, while the artillery headed for Chernihiv; staying in Smolensk were the soldiers who had not been issued shoes and mantles (which the general continually

[561] Ibidem, p. 206; *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому…*, № 267, p. 176.
[562] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому…*, № 268, pp. 177–179.
[563] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 5, p. 114.
[564] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому…*, № 270, p. 183.

requested).[565] Weyde, too, lingered in Smolensk for a little longer, since on January 27, 1713, his daughter Justine Elisabeth was to marry Pyotr Lefort.[566]

On April 11, Boris Sheremetev, who was stationed in Pryluky, reported to the tsar that the general's division had reached Nizhin "by a quick march," and was recuperating at its quarters.[567] The Field Marshal General informed the tsar that due to the grueling pace of the march, he had not yet sent these soldiers to Kyiv, where they were to help erect earthen fortifications within the city and in its immediate vicinity (beyond the Dnieper River and along the Lybed River). Sheremetev's decision stemmed from his fear that should the soldiers of General Weyde's division be sent back to assist in laying fortifications in Kyiv, he would lack adequate forces to repel a possible enemy attack.[568]

Between the second half of 1711 and early 1713, troops were relentlessly redeployed. The strategic circumstances were especially trying, since Peter was in a fight with two enemies operating at the opposite ends of the country; to make matters worse, the tsar also had to consider the western front, i.e., the situation in Mecklenburg and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The decision to dispatch General Weyde's division to Kyiv was linked to the political contingencies of the day. The tsar continued to renege on agreements made on the Pruth River, which threatened a resumption of hostilities by Turkey. According to intelligence obtained by the Russians, the main target of the attack would be Kyiv. Consequently, the immediate reinforcement of the city and its vicinity

[565] Ibidem, № 271, p. 185; № 272, p. 187; № 275, p. 195.
[566] *Genealogisches Handbuch der baltischen Ritterschaften...,* Bd. 3, p. 290.
[567] The report seems exaggerated, since the distance covered amounted to about 501 kilometers, with the average pace over fifty-two days amounting to less than ten kilometers per day. Of course, one should bear in mind that weather was likely at its least conducive to travels, with frequent enforced stopovers along the way.
[568] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому...*, № 278, pp. 218–220.

remained a priority. In a letter dated April 18, 1713, Boris Sheremetev confirmed the tsar's order. "In accordance with Your Grace's [Peter I] instructions, numerous fortresses [fortified sites] should be erected around Kiev and the Dnieper and the Lybed, yet there is not a single engineer present here, and I struggle to find any; I humbly request that you send me an engineer, as my needs in this regard are great."[569] The tsar detailed that the Field Marshal General was to reinforce the already-fortified Pechersky Monastery, Podil and the Old Town, connecting them into a single point of resistance through a line of fortifications.[570] Reinforcements were also plotted along the nearby rivers (Dnieper and Lybed). Apart from workers procured in Ukrainian territory, Russian soldiers were assigned to the earthworks, including General Weyde's division and the four garrison infantry regiments annexed thereto, as well as three dragoon regiments. Supervised by the general, the soldiers commenced work on May 31.[571] Due to staff shortages, Adam Weyde was directly involved in the operations as a field engineer.

It is worth noting that—possibly mindful of the fateful misplaced mine during the siege of Azov in 1695—the tsar's associate continued to study fortifications, seeking to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of Peter I, fellow army commanders, and ordinary soldiers. While in Swedish captivity, he had the opportunity, albeit very limited, to examine the organization and workings of the enemy army, including its fortifications.[572] In February 1711, an interesting exchange of correspondence occurred between

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[569] Ibidem, № 279, p. 229.

[570] For more on the condition of Kyiv's fortifications at the end of the seventeenth century, see Г.В. Алферова, В.А. Харламов, *Киев во второй половине XVII века. Историко-архитектурный очерк*, Киев 1982.

[571] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому…*, № 282, p. 256; № 283, pp. 268–274; № 284, p. 276; № 286, p. 297.

[572] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, p. 253; C. Peterson, op. cit., p. 123.

Adam Weyde and the tsar concerning the establishment of the function of commandant and the issues related to fortification in the broadest sense, above all the correct drafting of sketches. In a letter dated February 27, 1712, Peter I thanked the general for sending him a book on fortifications, entitled *Des Commandanten-Spiegels*.[573] The ruler instructed Weyde to assess whether the publication was sufficiently up-to-date to be translated into Russian; if not, another, more valuable item on the subject, selected by the general, was to be published in Russian.[574]

The aforementioned tsar's order was dictated by his desire to systematize the existing management of urban areas, combined with the establishment of garrison forces in 1711.[575] In the tsar's eyes, the management of cities should be predicated on the Western European model and include the aforementioned position of commandant.[576] Although the latter had already been introduced in Russia in 1706, it was only on February 15, 1712 that the Governing Senate circulated a relevant decree to all governorates, according to which governor generals and governors were to appoint commandants of cities and oversee their operations. Should a commandant violate any laws, he would be answerable to

[573] *Des Commandanten-Spiegels* was written by German engineer Johann Jacob Werdmüller (more active as a practitioner rather than theoretician), who served the Holy Roman Empire and Saxony; it was first published (in two volumes) in 1685 in Frankfurt am Main under the full title *Des Commandanten-Spiegels, oder gründlicher Unterrichtung, wie ein Commandant seinen Platz fortificiren, verbessern und in gutem Stand erhalten solle. Aus dem Französischen in das Teutsche übersetzt-demübersetzt.vermehret und hervorgegeben durch Johann Jacob Werdmüller.* The second volume is kept by the BAN; see Вердмюллер Иоганн-Яков, Комендантское зерцало, БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. I Б, № 8 (Петр. гал. № 10), л. 1–523.

[574] П. и Б., т. 12, вып. 1, p. 99.

[575] See ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2319; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne…*, pp. 85–86.

[576] See B. Dybaś, *Fortece Rzeczypospolitej. Studium z dziejów budowy fortyfikacji stałych w państwie polsko-litewskim w XVII wieku*, Toruń 2018, pp. 424–444.

a court-martial consisting of the governor, vice governor, ober-commandant and landrechts.[577]

In the same letter (dated February 27, 1712), the monarch also thanked the general for drafting a "baseline sketch of the [Georg] Rimpler [bastion]."[578] In return, the tsar presented Weyde with a book "on manifold fortifications," including guidelines for "the [Menno] Coehoorn variation, where the author expounds with great lucidity how to draft sketches" on page 57 (Figure 8.2).[579] In accordance with the ruler's instructions, Adam Weyde was to draw up another "basic sketch of the Rimpler variation," following the guidelines he had sent in advance (see Figure 8.3). This request stemmed from Peter I's deliberations on the shape of the fortresses to be erected.[580]

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[577] ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2481; СВМ, т. 1: *Исторический очерк развития военного урпавления в России*, гл. ред. Д.А. Скалон, сост. Н.А. Данилов, сотруд. Н.М. Затворницкий, Санкт-Петербург 1902, pp. 57–60.

[578] Georg Rimpler's study was translated into Russian and published in 1708; see [Г. Римплер], *Римплерова манира о строении крепостей*, Москва 1708. Devoted to the rudiments of stronghold fortification, the publication consists of three volumes, yet left the tsar dissatisfied due to its thinness and lack of illustrations. Despite these shortcomings, it was reprinted in 1709; see П. и Б., т. 9, вып. 1, ред. Б.Б. Кафенгауз, Москва–Ленинград 1950, p. 12; Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., pp. 203–204. For more on Georg Rimpler; see ВЭЛ, т. 11, Санкт-Петербург 1856, p. 227.

[579] The book that the tsar sent to Adam Weyde was the work of the famous Dutch fortification engineer Menno Coehoorn. It was a translation of his seminal *Nieuwe Vestingbouw op een natte of lage Horizont…*, whose second edition was published in 1702 in Leeuwarden (the first edition was released in 1685); see M. Coehoorn, *Nieuwe Vestingbouw op een natte of lage Horisont…*, Leeuwarden 1685). In Russia, it lived to see two editions (printed in 1709 and 1710), translated by Mikhail Shafirov (brother of Vice Chancellor Pyotr Shafirov), proofed by Jacob Bruce and illustrated by Peter Picart; translated into English, the Russian title read *New Fortification Works on a Wet or Low Horizon…* (Rus. *Новое крепостное строение на мокром или низком горизонте…Повелением царскаго величества в Москве лета Господня 1709*, Москва 1709); see [М. Кугорн], *Новое крепостное строение на мокром или низком горизонте… Повелением царскаго величества в Москве Лета Господня 1709го в Ноябре месяце*, Москва 1709. See also М. Кугорн, «Новое крепостное строение на мокром или низком горизонте…», БАН, ф. Библиотека Петра I, П. I Б, № 20, л. 1–165.

[580] П. и Б., т. 12, вып. 1, p. 99.



Figure 8.2. Sketch of an ideal fortress according to Menno Coehoorn.
Source: own study based on the book: [M. Кугорн], op. cit., Москва 1709 (fig. B, which Peter I sent to Adam Weyde).

Due to his obligations as a commander, Adam Weyde did not reply until March 24, 1712. In his view, should the tsar wish to erect a fortress (small, medium or large, in accordance with "the Rimpler variation"), "several experienced engineers" should be consulted. During the construction, particular attention should be paid to ensuring proper shelter for the

besieged at the time of a bombardment, a factor overlooked by Coehoorn in his treatise.[581] As for the translation of the treatise on fortification into Russian, Weyde recommended one of two works by the aforementioned German military theorist Major Johann Sebastian Gruber, published in Nuremberg in the late seventeenth century, *Neuer und gründlicher Unterricht von der heutigen Fortification und Artillerie...*.[582] or *Neue und gründliche mathematische Friedens- und Kriegs-Schule...*[583] Weyde's reply to the tsar's letter provides further indirect evidence that he was familiar with Gruber's books (having purchased them during the Grand Embassy); in fact, he had drawn on Gruber when drafting his own Regulations in 1698 (see Chapter 4). That Weyde sustained his interest in fortifications in the following years is evidenced by the fact that in 1715 he presented the tsar with another book on the subject.[584]

The above corroborates Adam Weyde's basic engineering competence, which enabled him to contribute to the fortification of Kyiv in 1713. As per the tsar's orders, the city was to be transformed into a sturdy point of resistance and equipped with adequate "lines of fortifications" and "forts" (separate fortified points of resistance with a bastion-like structure), comprising a holistic system of defenses.[585] A colored plan of Kyiv's fortifications drafted in 1713 marks the three principal landmarks: the Pechersky Monastery, the district of Podil, and the Old Town, interconnected

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[581] Ibidem, p. 373.

[582] J.S. Gruber, *Neuer und gründlicher Unterricht von der heutigen Fortification und Artillerie...*, Nürnberg 1700.

[583] Idem, *Neue und gründliche mathematische Friedens- und Kriegs-Schule...*, Nürnberg 1697. The treatise was re-issued in the early eighteenth century; see idem, *Neue Und Gründliche Mathematische Friedens- Und Kriegs-Schule...*, Nürnberg 1702.

[584] O. Medvedkova, *La bibliothèque d'architecture de Pierre le Grand. Entre Curiosité et Passion*, "Cahiers du monde russe" 47 (2006), 3, p. 485.

[585] For more on the fortification of Kyiv at the time, as well as in the years prior and thereafter, see С.А. Иванюк, *Крепостные сооружения города Киев в период Великой Северной войны (1700–1721 гг.),* "Вопросы истории фортификации" 2 (2011), pp. 56–64.

by a line of fortifications. The legend describes all the new reinforcement works underway at the time, detailing, among other, "General Weyde's line."[586] To fortify Kyiv, the general most likely also drafted three layouts, depicting forts with three, four and five bastions.[587] It is unclear, however, exactly how they were used during the fortification work conducted at the time. The blueprint of the five-bastion foundation includes a note stating its origin ("by General Weyde"), which implies that it was most likely officially submitted to Field Marshal General Sheremetev for his consideration. Peter I may have examined the plan, too.[588]

[586] План г. Киева в основных его разделах: Старый Киев, Печерск и Подол, с новыми линиями укреплений [1713 г.], ОР БАН, F 266, т. 4, л. 47 (чертеж № 51).
[587] See Собрание Иностранных Рукописей ОР БАН, F 266, т. 1, л. 31, 32, 38.
[588] «От генерала Вейда» [Пятибастионная крепость], ОР БАН, F 266, т. 1, л. 31–31об.



Figure 8.3. Pentagonal fortification plan drafted by Adam Weyde in 1712.[589]
Source: «От генерала Вейда» [Пятибастионная крепость], ОР, БАН, F 266, т. 1, л. 31–31об.

Summarizing Weyde's participation in the first war operations following his release from long-time captivity, we should note the general's consistent concern for his subordinates, as evidenced by the repeat reports concerning various problems related to provisions and lack of uniforms, submitted to the tsar. Based on the surviving documentation from 1712, it seems that Peter I appreciated the general's attention to the basic needs of his soldiers. The monarch forwarded extracts from the general's letters to the Governing Senate, ordering their immediate enforcement.[590] The general also did his best to ensure adequate care for the ailing soldiers. This was noticeable during the Pruth campaign, when he ordered that all the sick be sent to a field lazaret and supply them with adequate provisions. In addition, he assigned to the lazaret one feldsher from each division engaged in the hostilities.[591]

[589] See the note in the top left corner, copied from the reverse, confirming authorship.
[590] П. и Б., т. 12, вып. 1, pp. 172–173, 373, 459; вып. 2, pp. 233–234.
[591] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Война с Турцией 1711 года…*, № 32, p. 335. All the sick soldiers who fought in the campaign were escorted back to the lazaret, located in the rearguard. Adam Weyde supervised these matters personally; see ibidem, № 7, p. 348. This subject matter is covered in detail by the military code instituted in the Russian army in 1716; see KWPI, pp. 126–127.



9. FINNISH CAMPAIGN

Still in 1712, Peter I prepared for another offensive against Sweden, ordering Alexander Menshikov's troops to head for Swedish Pomerania and the German Reich. Once there, they were to reinforce the Saxon and Danish armies before striking together against the Swedish forces stationed nearby.[592] The northeastern front was also important, where the Swedes ventured constant raids against the burgeoning city of St. Petersburg. Thus, predictably, in a letter to Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin dated August 2, 1712, the tsar ordered the preparation of strikes against Finland to seize Helsingfors, which would translate into the strengthening of Vyborg, held by the Russians since 1710. After setting up winter camps in the captured Finnish and Estonian territories, the Russians sought to launch a strike on the all-important Finnish city of Åbo in the spring of the following year. Peter I hoped that its capture would result in the Swedes surrendering all of Finland and offering terms. As he noted in a letter to Apraksin, "their whole life is bound to Finland." Should the forces engaged in the operation be insufficient, General Weyde's division was to come to their aid from Ukraine.[593]

[592] Д.П. Бутурлин, *Военная история походов россиян в XVIII столетии*, т. 2, ч. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1820, pp. 508–570.
[593] П. и Б., т. 12, вып. 2, p. 34.

Ultimately, the planned winter foray into Finland in 1712 never materialized, as Peter feared unfavorable weather conditions. In addition, the tsar believed that sending all the troops at his disposal in the region could significantly weaken the defenses of Vyborg and St. Petersburg should the Swedes mount a counteroffensive. Instead, the Russians opted for a combined land and sea operation, which would begin in the spring of 1713. Integrated into the prospective campaign were the units heading north from Ukraine, commanded by Adam Weyde, who received his marching orders on October 1, 1712.[594]

Meanwhile, in the second half of 1712, Peter I received news of a Swedish landing party led by General Magnus Stenbock, that was expected to land in Gdańsk. According to Russian intelligence, Stenbock was to move south across Polish territory, with the goal of reuniting with Charles XII, who had reportedly left the Turkish-held Bender, where he had taken refuge after the defeat at Poltava. As a result, General Weyde's division, which the tsar intended to divert to St. Petersburg in December 1712, was forced to stay put in Smolensk and its vicinity, where it had set up camp for the winter. Although Magnus Stenbock eventually landed on the island of Rügen, the decision to retain Weyde's tactical compound at Smolensk was correct, since, depending on the ever-changing circumstances, Peter could deploy it to St. Petersburg (i.e., the northern front), Swedish Pomerania and Riga, or back to Ukraine. In the end, General Weyde's division remained near Smolensk until January 1713, after which it was dispatched to winter quarters in the Kyiv Governorate (Nizhin and Kozelets), before helping to fortify Kyiv.[595]

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[594] For more details on the subject, see Chapter 8. See also *Статейный список П.П. Шафирова и М.Б. Шереметева 1712 г…*, p. 332.

[595] For more on the subject, see chapter 8.

It was only once the southern front was secured that Peter could put General Weyde's division to proper use. On June 13, 1713 in Adrianople, Russia signed the much-coveted twenty-five-year truce agreement with Turkey. The accord sanctioned the prior arrangements regarding the return of the lands on the Sea of Azov, conquered by Peter (see Map 1).[596] As a result, Adam Weyde's "Kyiv assignment" also came to an end that summer, and his division was again included in the expeditionary force set to march on Finland.

The two years spent in Ukraine radically improved the condition of Weyde's division. This is evidenced by divisional reports, including one outlining the situation as of August 2, 1713 (see Chart 8). In light of this document, the division's manpower was close to the regulatory optimum. With the regulatory total of soldiers and line officers projected at 7,610, personnel shortages were limited to as few as eight vacancies and two desertions (0.13%), with another three soldiers absent due to postal duties. A more serious problem was of medical nature, with the Russian army posting both officers and ordinary soldiers to tend to such cases (at the ratio of 6.25:1). The total number of indisposed and their caregivers posted to two lazarettes in Smolensk and Kyiv was 410 (5.4%). The condition of rearguard soldiers was equally strong, with a total of 1,252 ready for duty,[597] seventy-six (6%) short of the regulatory headcount, with an apparent shortage of locksmiths as the major problem. The unit only had two men trained in firearm repairs, with as many as forty-five vacancies. The sick and their caregivers totaled fifty-one. (4.1%).

[596] ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2515; т. 5, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 2687. Among others, under the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia was to withdraw its troops from Polish lands within two months and cease to interfere in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

[597] The logistics support comprised regimental and company doctors, company scribes, signalmen (oboists, buglers, drummers), craftsmen (carpenters, blacksmiths, and locksmiths), provosts, orderlies and, above all, coachmen.

At the disposal of the entire grouping of 8,778 men were a total of 477 wagons, with another three coachman vacancies waiting to be filled, complete with wagons and horses. This translated into one cart for every eighteen-or-so soldiers. Each regiment had between seventy-two and seventy-nine carts, coupled with twenty-four lazaret wagons to house and transport the sick. Thus, judging by early eighteenth-century standards, the division's transportation was superb, as it relied on coachmen hired as full-time troops, who continuously improved their skills in the difficult art of maneuvering the supply train. Accompanying each regiment should be sixty ordinary wagons, twelve for officers, twelve for soldiers' belongings and provisions, twelve for supplies, twelve for transporting the sick, and twelve for hauling tents (the latter were transported on two-wheeled carts drawn by two horses each). Rounding out the supply train were oversized carts, four for the colonel, three each due for the lieutenant colonels and majors, and one each for the quartermasters and barber. In addition, every battalion was assigned a merchant's wagon.[598] Nominally, a total of seventy-seven wagons should follow each regiment; according to the data collected, the average number was 79.5 vehicles, an almost perfect proportion that resulted from the intricate balance between convenience and extension of the marching column.[599] This state of affairs evolved from the continuous marches over vast distances that took place between 1711 and 1713.

The analyzed data testifies to Adam Weyde's near-pedantic diligence in conforming to formally prescribed norms (incidentally, some of

[598] A.L. Oelsnitz, *O bagażach wojska w polu będącego*, ed. K. Łopatecki, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 52–53, 68–70.

[599] Assuming that the ratio of four-wheeled wagons drawn by four horses to two-wheel carts pulled by two horses stood at 6.5:1, one can calculate the maximum extension of General Weyde's marching column. If the division moved in a single column (which was, of course, impossible), then the supply train stretched the length of 4.6 kilometers and consisted of 1,780 horses.



Chart 8. General Adam Weyde's division stationed in Kyiv (Gernadiersky, Lefortovsky, Shlisselburgsky, Rentzel's/Saxon, Tobolsky, Koporsky regiments). Status as of August 2, 1713. Source: own study based on: A.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском...*, приложения, № 35, pp. 396–397.

them were his own ideas). It also attests to his outstanding organizational competence.

As previously agreed between Boris Sheremetev and the tsar, on August 4, 1713 the above tactical compound headed north toward St. Petersburg (the Nevsky Regiment stayed behind to replenish its ranks with new recruits). Peter himself delineated the itinerary, which was to march towards Starodub, Yaroslavl, Smolensk, Velikiye Luki, Pskov, Gdov, Yamburg (without reaching Narva), Kopor'e, and on to the new capital. The cavalry, on the other hand, was to proceed to St. Petersburg via Moscow (past Smolensk) and Veliky Novgorod.[600]

[600] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому...*, № 288, p. 307; № 290, p. 312; И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 5, pp. 159, 169, 172.

While the route was not the shortest, it consistently bypassed the lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Its length stretched as far as 1,526 kilometers, yet the infantry marched relatively quickly, covering an average of about twenty-seven kilometers per day. By the end of September, the division was already within the St. Petersburg Governorate, where it set up quarters: two regiments stationed in the capital, and four more near Narva.[601] Thus, the division traversed another 2,160 kilometers in 1713. On aggregate, General Weyde's subordinates marched a total of 6,660 kilometers between 1711 and 1713. Later that winter, they were to continue north to reinforce General Mikhail Golitsyn's corps operating in Finland.[602] In the end, it was only the Lefortovsky Regiment that was dispatched north. The remaining troops were to achieve full combat readiness by April 1714, which was when the new Finnish campaign was announced. In the end, the regiments of General Weyde's division, totaling more than 7,200 men, became part of the reserve for the main assault force (the so-called Finnish Army of 36,000 men), sent to operate in Finland in 1714.[603]

With the Baltic fleet set to play a key role in the prospective warfare, Peter I ordered the port of Reval to be reinforced with bastions fitted with large-caliber guns. The expected impact of the enemy's naval forces was also to be repelled by the firepower of four line ships anchored nearby, as well as several smaller vessels. The ceremonial groundbreaking of Revel's

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[601] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, приложения, № 35, pp. 396–397.

[602] In the winter of 1713, the tsar planned to redeploy Weyde's division to Nyslott, still in Swedish hands at the time, but quickly abandoned the idea. The Russians captured the fortress in July 1714.

[603] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Война в Финляндии…*, pp. 335–337, 361–366. See also idem, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, приложения, № 39, pp. 402–403. Peter's biographer, Pastor Benjamin Bergman, mentions that General Weyde's division at the time consisted of eight regiments, each comprising 1,400 soldiers; see B. Bergmann, *Peter der Grosse als Mensch und Regent*, Bd. 3, Riga 1826, p. 191.

harbor fortifications, with the tsar himself in attendance, accompanied by Fyodor Apraksin and Adam Weyde, took place on February 2, 1714. From then on, Reval was to serve as the main base of the Russian Baltic Fleet.[604]

Russia's war campaign of 1714 commenced with delay due to major ice jams on the Neva. It was not until April 27 that the commanders of the three galley squadrons received orders to proceed with the launch of their ninety-nine vessels. Leading the squadrons were Prince Vasily Dolgorukov, Rear Admiral and General Ivan Botsis, and Adam Weyde. They were in charge of launching the galleys, manning them with crews, and preparing provisions for the coming month.[605] Two days later, the galleys were fully provisioned, all soldiers aboard and ready for combat operations. Also poised for the offensive by early May were the larger vessels of the Russian fleet, wintering on Kotlin Island: nine line ships, five frigates (with a combined firepower of 408 and 176 cannons, respectively) and four snows.[606] In the course of the coming campaign, these two tactical compounds—the galleys and naval vessels—were to operate in unison.

Finally, on May 9, Peter I personally led a flotilla of galleys from St. Petersburg out to sea, "in due formation, canons continually ablaze."[607] The following day, the tsar inspected the sailing ships stationed at the roadstead near Kotlin, and on May 11, he officially assumed command of the fleet as Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. At the same time, he entrusted command of the vanguard of the galley flotilla to Adam Weyde.[608] Weyde received his nomination the same day from General-Admiral Fyodor

[604] П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, p. 369.
[605] МИРФ, подгот. С.И. Елагин, ч. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1865, № 781, p. 487; № 786, p. 491; МИГО, вып. 4, Петроград 1918, № 221, pp. 390–391.
[606] A snow (Dut. *Snauw*, Ger. *Schnau*, Rus. *шнява*) is a nimble, lightweight, square-rigged sailing ship (vessel) with two masts, used predominantly for supply purposes, convertible into a warship when fitted with canons.
[607] П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, p. 365.
[608] МИГО, вып. 4, № 246, p. 420; П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, p. 366.

Apraksin, the supreme commander of the entire Russian armed forces (naval as well as land) committed to the campaign.[609] The decision may have come as a bit of a surprise; however, given the general's prior experience in "naval affairs," if only during the Grand Embassy, when he studied the Dutch and English fleets, and later while participating in the construction of the Azov fleet, the appointment was not objectionable. Moreover, the tsar's associate was an experienced frontline officer, and aboard the vessels he commanded were the soldiers of his own division.

The naval offensive mounted by the Russians proved to be instrumental to the success of the entire campaign. In Finland, the land army defeated a much weaker Swedish force in the Battle of Storkyro (Lappola) on February 19 (March 2), 1714.[610] The Russian forces were gaining a decisive advantage on the Finnish coast, yet the Swedes still ruled the sea, preventing the delivery of provisions. After a long wait for an opportunity to navigate the waters of the Gulf of Finland, units of the high seas fleet left the port on Kotlin Island on May 20, 1714, followed by the galleys. Two days later, the Russians held a war council attended by Peter I, the commanders of the flagships, and Prince Vasily Dolgorukov and Adam Weyde, aboard the ship *Saint Natalya*, led by Apraksin. The participants adopted strategic objectives for the land and sea campaign in Finland. The overarching goal was to capture and hold Åbo, and then strike through the Åland Islands, where a fortress was to be established that would be serve as a launching pad for future attacks on the coast of Sweden proper.[611]

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[609] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Война в Финляндии…*, приложения, № 109, p. 110; *Походная канцелярия вице-канцлера Петра Павловича Шафирова…*, ч. 2: *1714 год*, Санкт-Петербург 2011, № 206, p. 164.

[610] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, № 174, p. 221.

[611] Idem, *Петр Великий. Война в Финляндии…*, pp. 373–375; МИРФ, № 804, pp. 499–500; B. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 192; П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, p. 367.

The next two weeks saw an intensive exchange of correspondence between the tsar and the respective decision-makers involved in the military campaign, which helped coordinate the operational activities on land and sea. Peter I did not underestimate the striking power of the enemy's ships, which is why in May and June he sought to receive adequate naval support from King Frederick IV of Denmark. Meanwhile, the Swedish line ships did not idle, either, arriving near Reval in May. Having witnessed the strong coastal fortifications erected by the Russians, Admiral Gustav Wattrang, who commanded the Swedish fleet, opted not to attack the city. The appearance of the Swedes triggered a response from the Russian fleet, which left the port on Kotlin Island. As early as June 11, the Russian vessels appeared at Reval, while the flotilla of galleys, moving in parallel, arrived at Helsingfors. During these operations, the two parties maintained visual contact with each other in order to join forces if necessary. In addition, the commanders of the two naval tactical compounds continued to exchange correspondence at all times. On June 17, Vice Admiral Erik Lille, leading six Swedish line ships, launched an attack on Reval. In response, on the same day and the day that followed, some of the tsar's units left the port, forcing the enemy to retreat. The naval battle at Reval did not come to be. The decisive clash of the campaign was to take place soon, albeit in a different location.

As mentioned, on June 11 the galley flotilla reached Helsingfors, where it dropped anchor for ten days. In the meantime, the crews unloaded provisions for the ground troops led by Prince Mikhail Golitsyn and repaired the damaged vessels. The flotilla then set sail for Åbo, heading for the Hanko Peninsula. On June 24, General-Admiral Apraksin, who commanded the entire tactical compound, sent a letter to Peter I with the news of the capture of two sailors serving on the flagship of Admiral Gustav Wattrang, whose squadrons were stationed near Hanko. The deserters testified that the ships under their admiral's command were

in poor condition. Apraksin decided to take advantage of this information and requested Peter I to move with the line ships standing in Reval toward Hanko and "create a diversion for the enemy fleet." Apraksin saw this move as a twofold advantage, as it offered the possibility of defeating a weakened opponent and enabling the galleys to reach Åbo. Luring the Swedes out of their positions would also allow the tsar's galleys to avoid dangerous artillery fire from enemy ships.[612]

On June 28, Peter I convened a council of war, which, upon Apraksin's message, did not consider it advisable to dispatch the line ships from Reval against the Swedes. The council resolved not to get embroiled in a major naval battle involving its sea vessels, instead shifting the entire burden of operational activities to the galleys situated off the coast of Finland. It was the latter, supported by their own artillery arrayed on the coast, that were to repel Admiral Wattrang's squadron into the sea and break through to Åbo, and onward to the Åland Islands. The decision was correct, as evidenced by the subsequent developments, since the area stretching from the Hanko Peninsula to the Åland Islands was filled with skerries, rendering the galleys was much more maneuverable than any of the large sailing ships (see Figure 9.1).[613]

On June 30 and July 1, Fyodor Apraksin, Adam Weyde, and the other Russian commanders took to the sea in boats for a reconnaissance of the enemy forces. They established that the Swedes, stationed in the waters off the Hanko Peninsula, had gathered a fleet of fifteen line ships, two bombardier ships, a pram[614], and eight galleys, followed by provisions

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[612] МИРФ, № 843, pp. 516–517.

[613] Russian analysts assessing these operations stressed that the Swedish fleet was disoriented and unable to police all possible routes along the Finnish coast; see *Походная канцелярия вице-канцлеря Петра Павловича Шафирова…*, ч. 2, № 263, p. 317. See А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Война в Финляндии…*, p. 419.

[614] A pram is a type of two- or three-masted ship with a flat bottom and shallow draft, intended for coastal warfare. Prams were used mainly in the Baltic Sea in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-

ships. In addition, five line ships and a single snow were actively operating in the sea. Admiral General Apraksin did not dare to attack these forces without the tsar's order. Meanwhile, in the following days, the deployment of the Swedish ships changed, as carefully noted by the Russian command, who continued to stay put, without engaging the enemy independently. On July 3, Apraksin and Weyde once again went to sea to survey the enemy forces and seek out any free passage for the galleys towards Åbo along the coastline. However, the situation remained unchanged. The commanders made similar explorations in the following days.[615]

Peter I reached the galley flotilla on July 20, spurring the subsequent operations. The ruler inspected the enemy's naval forces and studied the topography of the peninsula. After a thorough cartographic analysis, confirmed by terrestrial reconnaissance, the tsar ordered to build a twenty-five-hundred-meter portage at the most convenient section of the promontory,[616] allowing to haul the galleys overland to the northern shore without clashing with the Swedish ships. Having learned of the Russian plans, Admiral Wattrang decided to split his forces and attack the enemy from both sides of the peninsula. On July 25, Rear Admiral Nils Ehrenschiöld's squadron, comprised of ten vessels (a pram,[617] six galleys, and two or three *scheerboot* ships)[618] headed toward where the Swedes estimated the overland transfer of the Russian galleys would take place. Conversely, Vice Admiral Erik Lillie's squadron (eight line ships,

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[615] *Журнал графа Апраксина*, [in:] МИГО, вып. 3, Петроград 1915, pp. 84–85.

[616] A portage is a purposely designed stretch of land (usually lined with wooden logs) used to haul ships or boats from one body of water to another.

[617] This was Nils Ehrenschiöld's flagship, the *Elefant*, incorrectly identified as a frigate in Russian historiography.

[618] A *Scheerboot* (Dut.) is a compact, single-masted bay vessel designed for coastal navigation amidst skerries. There are discrepancies in the sources as to the number of scheerboots at Nils Ehrenschiöld's disposal at the time.

a snow, and two bombardier ships) was deployed against the remaining Russian forces, which were busy building the portage. Gustav Wattrang's plan to use a pincer maneuver against the Russian galleys was bold and potentially successful.[619] However, the Swedish admiral underestimated his opponent. The key position of the Hanko Peninsula was now only guarded by Wattrang's weakened forces, a fact that Peter I exploited to his advantage on July 26-27, moving his galleys in several batches to the north side of the peninsula by sea. Capitalizing on the windless weather, the Russian units, ineffectively shelled by Wattrang's ships standing at sea, broke through along the skerried coast and advanced directly towards Rear Admiral Ehrenschiöld's squadron, which had been separated from the main Swedish fleet (Figure 9.1; with the Russian galleys on the move, Admiral Wattrang summoned Vice Admiral Lillie's ships to join him). The decision to use this method to move the majority of Russian galleys (the brunt of the Russian galley flotilla, divided into three squadrons) was made by a war council composed of Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin, Major General Mikhail Golitsyn, and General Adam Weyde. The latter assumed command of the squadron at the head of the whole formation.[620] Notably, the commanders of the respective galley detachments remained in constant communication throughout the operation. Confirming this is Peter I's letter to Adam Weyde dated July 26, in which the ruler reported that he had sent the first thirty vessels to run the Swedish blockade, of which twenty made it safely past the enemy fleet. Accordingly, the tsar ordered the general to follow suit and run the blockade with all his galleys (ten of which he was to leave behind to pick up the sick), while

[619] *Журнал адмирала Ваттранга*, [in:] МИГО, вып. 3, pp. 182–183.
[620] МИРФ, № 853, pp. 522–523; № 854, p. 523; № 860, p. 526; № 868, p. 529; *Книга Марсова, или воинских дел…*, Санкт-Петербург 1766, pp. 187–190; А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, № 177, pp. 223–224; № 179, pp. 242–243; *Журнал графа Апраксина…*, pp. 89–90; П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, pp. 379–393.

maintaining adequate security measures. Peter I warned the general that in the event of a breeze, the Swedish ships standing at sea might take countermeasures that would result in the separation of the galleys. Thus, if the Swedes managed to set sail, the operation was to be stopped.[621] As noted by Russian historian Pavel Krotov, the measures for the safe conduct of the flotilla of Russian galleys between the coast and the Swedish ships were implemented in an organized manner (with only one galley captured by the Swedes), which had tremendous consequences for subsequent course of the 1714 campaign.[622]

The Russians seized the initiative completely and engaged in a naval battle with the Swedes on July 27, off the northern shore of the Hanko Peninsula, near Rilax-fjord. It was there, in the shallow skerried waters, most likely in the strait between the islands of Kadermo and Byön,[623] that Rear Admiral Nils Ehrenschiöld positioned his forces. Bracing for the encounter, the Swedish commander arranged the ships of his squadron in a crescent-like formation (with the *scheerboots* in the back, forming a sort of second line). Aboard the Swedish units were 941 soldiers and sailors. The Russian fleet comprised ninety-eight galleys with no more than a thousand sailors, while the rest were infantry soldiers numbering between 12,000 and 15,000. These included the guard regiments,

[621] МИГО, вып. 2, Петроград 1915, № 278, pp. 494–497; вып. 1, ч. 2, Петроград 1914, № 247, p. 194.
[622] For more on the subject, see П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, pp. 393–406.
[623] To this day, the exact whereabouts of the naval clash have not been determined. Historiographers once assumed that it took place in the northern section of Gloppet Fjord, between the islands of Lakkiser and Gavelsholm, opposite the northern end of Mount Rilax, situated on the southeastern shore of the Bromarv Promontory, 6 km north of the Hanko Peninsula. For more on the attempts to determine the exact location of the clash, see А.В. Лукошков, *Результаты российско-финских экспедиционных работ 2014 г. По локализации места Гангутского сражения,* [in:] *Меншиковские чтения – 2014. Научный альманах*, гл. науч. ред. П. Кротов, вып. 5, Санкт-Петербург 2014, pp. 225–235.

along with the Ingermanlandsky Regiment and five regiments of General Weyde's division.[624]

Due to the confined space in which the battle occurred, only twenty-three Russian galleys, with more than 3,900 troops on board, participated in the assault phase. Leading six of them, forming the right flank, were Adam Weyde and Captain-Commander Matvey Zmajević (Matii). The entire clash lasted over two hours and saw extreme ferocity on both sides. The Swedes had superior artillery and occupied a far more advantageous positions (the galleys standing on the flanks of the formation anchored by the adjacent islands). The clash opened with an exchange of artillery fire, before evolving into a boarding battle. Rear Admiral Ehrenschiöld's soldiers were not about to give up easily and put up fierce resistance. Nevertheless, they were outnumbered by the Russians, who sent successive units into the fray. In addition, Peter's troops also ventured a bold maneuver to the rear of the Swedish units. In the end, the Battle of Gangut concluded with a decisive Russian victory. The Swedes suffered a defeat, and those who survived were taken prisoner along with their commander.[625] In the course of the clash, Adam Weyde displayed courage and leadership, heading the attack of the galleys advancing in the first line of the battle formation (see Figure 9.1).[626]

A print by the famous Russian engraver Alexei Zubov, who lived in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, created shortly after

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[624] *Книга Марсова, или воинских дел…*, p. 191; А.З. Мышлаевский, *Петр Великий. Война в Финляндии…*, pp. 410–411; приложения, № 109, p. 110; С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 264; П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, p. 400. See Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, f. 230, op. 1, call no. BO 13 I, sheet 213.

[625] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, № 177, pp. 224–225; МИГО, вып. 2, № 279, pp. 498–499. See also П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, pp. 414–424.

[626] А.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, № 179, p. 244; *Журнал графа Апраксина…*, p. 90; П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот…*, pp. 375–376.

the Finnish campaign (1715), shows the naval operations featuring galleys during the Battle of Gangut (Figure 9.2).[627] Zubov focused on depicting only the direct attack of the Russian galleys on the Swedish flagship pram, the *Elephant*, commanded by Nils Ehrenschiöld. However, his account should not be fully trusted (even the date of the clash provided in the signature is incorrect). Nevertheless, the rendition of the combat conducted at the time is close to impeccable. The print emphasizes the role of the soldiers grouped on the galleys, who fired at the enemy using their rifles and fought with cold steel (bayonets were not in use yet). No less important were the galleys themselves, ramming smaller vessels or "clipping" their oars. The key element was the boarding of enemy ships. In the case of large vessels, soldiers boarded hostile warships using ladders.

The above manner of warfare required rigid discipline and high morale from the infantry units. It was the men, not the artillery, who decided the outcome of the battle. Thus, one should emphasize General Weyde in this respect, as confirmed by the reports of personnel losses compiled by the Russians. In total, they reportedly lost 468 sailors and soldiers. The casualties in Adam Weyde's units included 341 wounded and 125 killed.[628] Thus, nearly all casualties incurred during the battle were his subordinates. The attack he led was pivotal to the entire battle.

[627] МИГО, вып. 3, Петроград 1915, p. 94; М.А. Алексеева, *Гравюра Петровского времени*, Ленинград 1990, pp. 137–138.

[628] Swedish military historian Julius Mankell dramatically inflates the Russian losses, estimating them at 3,000 dead and 1,600 wounded. One should treat Mankell's assessment with great caution, for it implies a genuine hecatombe of casualties and dozens of sunk galleys, which the sources fail to mention; see J. Mankell, *Anteckningar rörande finska arméens och Finlands krigshistoria. Särskildt med afseende på krigen emellan Sverige och Ryssland 1788–1790 samt 1808–1809*, del 1, Stockholm 1870, pp. 247–248. Mankell most likely relied on data found in a substantially older publication on Swedish-Russian naval warfare in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, penned by Swedish Admiral Johan Henrik Kreuger (Kreüger); see J.H. Kreuger, *Kort framställning af Svenska skärgårdsflottans bedrifter*, Stockholm 1845, p. 3.

Figure 9.1. Battle of Gangut, July 27, 1714.
To the left, Admiral Gustav Wattrang's squadron is seen anchored and firing at a flotilla of galleys that has moved past the Hanko Peninsula (center). To the right is a depiction of the naval battle, with the attack of Adam Weyde's ships marked by the letter "D."
Source: RA, KA, 0425 (Sveriges Krig 1521–1864), 13, nr 89.

Swedish losses were much heavier, amounting to 700 killed and wounded and 232 captured.[629]

The victorious battle did not spell the end of the ongoing campaign. The Russian forces reached the coast of Finland, and even ventured a reconnaissance operation towards the coast of Sweden proper. Also taking part in these operations was Adam Weyde, who from August 4 to August 11, together with the tsar and other commanders, stayed in and around Åbo (the Finnish capital at the time). On August 11, after Peter I conferred with General Weyde and General-Admiral Apraksin, the Russians resolved to penetrate the Åland Islands (for cattle requisitions, among others), located only several dozen kilometers off the Swedish coast (the galley fleet set its course for the islands on August 5). Peter I, accompanied by General Weyde, spent August 12 touring the archipelago. The following day, a consortium consisting of top commanders reconvened to determine further course of action. Later that day, after lunch, the tsar and his entourage traveled to the local town of Sund to see the royal castle of Kastelholm. August 14 saw another war council, with the participants unanimously agreeing to conclude the war campaign of 1714. However, part of the galley fleet led by Fyodor Apraksin was to remain in situ to harass the enemy off the coast of Finland. Among the commanders assigned to the Åland Islands was Adam Weyde.[630] Meanwhile, the remaining Russian ships, bringing home the enemy ships and captives, headed for the coast of Finland, past the Hanko Peninsula, and back home to Russia. Among the returnees was Peter I, who reached the

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[629] *Книга Марсова, или воинских дел…*, pp. 191–192; МИРФ, № 883, pp. 536–537. See A.З. Мышлаевский, *Северная война на Ингерманландском и Финляндском…*, № 177, pp. 223–224; № 179, pp. 242–247; приложения, № 43, pp. 408–410. The figures presented regarding the Swedish losses differ slightly from the total number of men placed under Rear Admiral Ehrenschiöld's command.

[630] МИГО, вып. 2, № 234, pp. 428–429.

Beryozovye Islands near Vyborg on August 28, before proceeding to the port of Kronshlot. Once there, they were to prepare for the ceremonial entry into the capital, which took place on the morning of September 9. Accompanied by a thunderous cannon blaze from "both fortresses" (i.e., the Admiralty Citadel and the Peter and Paul Fortress), the tsar and his soldiers triumphantly glided up the Neva, boasting the captured ships and prisoners of war to the citizens of St. Petersburg.[631]

That same day, the tsar presented his officers and soldiers with commemorative medals and monetary rewards. He also awarded his faithful associate Adam Weyde, who remained on the distant Finnish front, the highest and most ancient Russian military decoration, the Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle the First-Called. This was undoubtedly meant as a token of recognition of the valor displayed by General Weyde during the naval battle, as well as an appreciation of his long-standing service.[632] The general remained in regular contact with the ruler. In a letter to Peter I dated September 30, written during a stopover at the Siduta wilderness, four miles away from Kristinenstad,[633] Weyde thanked the tsar for the "great love" extended to him.[634] The general also enjoyed more tangible benefits. He received granted lands to the northwest of Ingria (Ingermanland), formerly constituting part of the province of Vyborg. The estate included two manors, and 188 farms located in the parish of Rautu

[631] *Журнал 1714 года из «Гистории Государевой о войне с Швецией»,* [in:] МИГО, вып. 3, pp. 40–52; *Походный журнал 1714 года*, Санкт-Петербург 1854, pp. 47–138; И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 6, Москва 1838, pp. 250–256.

[632] B. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 369; Н.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Списки кавалерам российских императорских орденов Св. Андрея Первозванного, Св. Екатерины, Св. Александра Невского и Св. Анны с учреждения до установления в 1797 году орденского капитула*, изд. подгот. П.А. Дружинин, Москва 2006, pp. 66; Г. Гельбиг, *Русские избранники и случайные люди*, ч. 1, Тюбинген 1809, „Русская Старина" 50 (1886), № 4–6, pp. 80–82; ВЭ, т. 5, Санкт-Петербург 1911, pp. 274–275.

[633] Kristinenstad was a town in the Gulf of Bothnia, on the road connecting Åbo and Vasa.

[634] МИГО, вып. 2, № 242, pp. 441–442.

Figure 9.2. Print depicting the Battle of Gangut on July 27, 1714.
Source: А. Зубов, Баталиа близ Ангута при урочище Рилакс-фиель. 1714. Июля 25 [sic!], [Санкт-Петербург 1715], reproduction from the authors' collection.

(currently Sosnovo). However, Weyde did not become a landowner in the full sense of the word. Notably, the area spanned disputed territories, and the Russian-Swedish peace did not materialize until 1721.[635] Nevertheless, he eventually expanded his assets before passing away. Weyde's heirs did not retain the Rautu estate, seized by Prince Anikita Repnin in 1725.[636] Weyde also received other endowments in Livonia.[637] The estimated total income generated by his landholdings amounted to 12,000 rubles per annum.[638]

Interestingly, Adam Weyde himself also sought to recognize the heroism of the officers of the four galleys that bypassed the Swedish warships and attacked them from the rear. In December 1714, based on his "Ordinance," lauding their heroism, he requested the tsar to decorate them with special gold medals to commemorate the victorious clash (non-commissioned officers and privates were to receive silver medals). A note on the awarding of such medals was published in the *Journal of Warfare*

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[635] The tsar gifted his favorites so-called endowments in Finnish territories, consisting of an area with inhabitants, bestowed as a reward for their service. The newly minted landowners were to collect taxes from the peasants and mandate them to perform other duties. After the Russians occupied these lands, the existing Swedish solutions remained in place. Since the majority of the endowed lived in St. Petersburg, they appointed representatives (usually persons of German or Baltic origin) to oversee the estates. A third of the income was transferred to the state, with the landowner pocketing the outstanding two-thirds. Such a practice did not strictly entail the transfer of property rights, but was a form of estate land holding (Lat. *tenuta*). See J. Paaskoski, *Vanhan Suomen lahjoitusmaat 1710–1826*, Helsinki 1997, pp. 64, 73, 291; https://rautu.fi/Tallenne/Lahjoitusmaa/Rautulista.htm.

[636] Е.А. Балашов, *Русские усадьбы на Карельском перешейке*, [in:] *Санкт-Петербург и страны Северной Европы. Материалы четвертой ежегодной международной научной конференции*, ред. В.Н. Барышникова, С.Ю. Трохачева, Санкт-Петербург 2003, pp. 314–318; Ю. Пааскоски, *Жалованные земли на территории Старой Финляндии. 1710–1812*, [in:] *Русский сборник: исследования по истории России*, ред. О.Р. Айрапетов и др., т. 17: *Финляндия и Россия*, Москва 2015, pp. 88–89.

[637] 1715 г. Дело по челобитью генерала Адама Вейде, о даче ему жалованной грамоты на мызы в ревельском уезде с принадлежащими деревнями, РГАДА, ф. 154 (Жалованные грамоты на вотчины), оп. 2, д. 94, л. 1–3.

[638] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 202.

of 1714,[639] which was issued much later than the General's "Ordinance." Therefore, one can assume with high probability that it was Weyde who initiated the decoration of all participants in the 1714 military campaign, accordingly to their rank. When mentioning the distinctions, Pavel Krotov speculates that the three most important commanders who fought in the battle, i.e., Peter I, Admiral General Apraksin, and General Weyde, were also to receive the honors. The presentation of the most impressive medals, which weighed between seventy to a hundred chervonets coins,[640] did not come to be, since the tsar eventually had them recast.[641]

The Finnish campaign of 1714 was extremely intensive. Its hardships affected all of the tsar's soldiers, including Adam Weyde, who, after the victorious Battle of Gangut, led his army to the west coast of Finland. The hostilities did not end for him until October 31, when he set off from the town of Rauma, located on the Gulf of Bothnia, towards Tavastuga and Vyborg, reaching St. Petersburg after nearly a month (on November 28) for some hard-earned respite.[642]

[639] *Журнал 1714 года из «Гистории Государевой о войне с Швецией»...*, p. 52.
[640] A gold coin minted during the reign of Peter I in 1701-1716. The chervonets was used both in the internal financial circulation of the state and in foreign trade. At the time, the weight of one chervonets equaled 3.47 grams, with a gold purity of 986.
[641] П.А. Кротов, *Российский флот...*, pp. 424, 432–435.
[642] *Журнал графа Апраксина...*, p. 112.

10. IN THE HEART OF EUROPE

The successful military campaign of 1714 was not the last in Adam Weyde's military biography. The first half of 1715 marked a period of rest from the grueling warfare. He spent this time in St. Petersburg, frequently meeting with Peter I (on the occasion of home visits and tours of the ruler's lathe workshop) and other representatives of the supreme command to discuss the prospective military operations.[643] The tsar, his generals and members of the Governing Senate also met officially, e.g., at the Admiralty Office on May 5, to address Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev's resolution regarding army supplies. Among others, Adam Weyde and the other members of the war council approved the construction of a pontoon bridge, the inspection and replacement of inoperative weapons, and the stocktaking and typology of ammunition available to infantry, cavalry and artillery soldiers.[644]

In the second half of the year, the general accompanied Peter I to Reval, where he partook in the inspection of the fortress on July 10. Thereafter, the monarch ordered him to set off for Finland to replenish his division, which was to leave for Swedish Pomerania (other Russian troops

[643] *Походный журнал 1715 года*, Санкт-Петербург 1855, pp. 45–46, 48.
[644] *Переписка императора Петра I с графом П.Б. Шереметевым*, [in:] СИРИО, т. 25, Санкт-Петербург 1878, № 351, pp. 416–417.

were already on their way there).[645] In August, Weyde found himself in Reval again, with the tsar still on site, before they both headed for the Åland Islands.[646] That same month, the troops of Weyde's division, redeployed from Finland, arrived in Pernau. On August 23, Peter I instructed the local commander, Brigadier Alexei Bolobanov (Balobanov), to supply them with provisions before they continued their journey to Swedish Pomerania.[647] The subsequent route of Adam Weyde's soldiers took them to Riga, which is why two days earlier (on August 21), aboard the ship *Ingermanlandia*, anchored near Reval, Peter I wrote a letter to the Governor of Riga, Pyotr Golitsyn, announcing their arrival: "Upon General Weyde's arrival in Riga, however many [men] he may require from you as soldiers (from the garrison of Riga) to supplement his five infantry regiments, you are to dispatch such a number to him without delay."[648]

That said, Weyde did not accompany his division, but instead was told to await Peter I's arrival and head west with the tsar. It was not until October 27 that the ruler, who was in St. Petersburg at the time, notified Pyotr Golitsyn of the need to arrange transportation to Dorpat.[649] Peter I's illness caused him to leave Krasnoye Selo and head for Narva with

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[645] *Походный журнал 1715 года…*, p. 60; *Журнал, или поденная записка…*, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1772, p. 7.

[646] *Походный журнал 1715 года…*, pp. 63, 65. In August 1715, the general also made efforts to recruit foreign civil servants for the colleges (new state administration offices scheduled for establishment in the near future). For more details, see Chapter 13.

[647] *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725). 23.08.1715*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/248757725 (accessed January 5, 2021).

[648] *Рескрипты и указы императора Петра I к лифляндским генерал-губернаторам,* [in:] *Сборник материалов и статей по истории Прибалтийского края*, т. 2, Рига 1879, № 53, p. 504. For more on the subject, see the headcounts of A.A. Weyde's division for 1715 , РГАДА, ф. 9, отд. II, оп. 3, кн. 23, л. 84–85об.

[649] *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725). 27.10.1715,* https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/248767944 (accessed January 5, 2021).

Generals Adam Weyde, Ivan Buturlin, and Colonel Yuri Trubetskoy as late as January 28, 1716.[650]

The first leg of the journey was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, specifically Gdańsk, where the tsar intended to sit with the Danish king to discuss the possible joint invasion of Scania.[651] Accompanying Peter was a sizable entourage, including commanders Adam Weyde, Yakov Dolgorukov and the ministers (former Istanbul resident and senator Pyotr Tolstoy, Chancellor Gavrill Golovkin, Vice Chancellor Pyotr Shafirov). The tsar began his two-month "stay" in the city (from February 18 to April 19) with a blockade, which he only lifted after Augustus II's intervention and repeat pleas from the city senate. Still, Gdańsk was compelled to sign an official agreement with Russia. While in the city, the monarch also arranged the marriage of his niece to Duke Karl Leopold, coupled with an alliance with the Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.[652] Finally, Gdańsk was also host to Peter's meeting with Augustus II, who paid a brief visit to the tsar's quarters after midnight of March 23.[653]

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[650] *Походный журнал 1715 года…*, p. 79; *Походный журнал 1716 года*, Санкт-Петербург 1855, pp. 15, 62.

[651] See A. Kobuch, *August II. und Peter I. in Danzig (3. April bis 7. Mai 1716). Eine Studie über die Beziehungen zwischen Polen und Russland im Großen Nordischen Krieg,* [in:] *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia ku czci profesora Jacka Staszewskiego*, vol. 2, ed. J. Dumanowski [et al.], Toruń 2003, pp. 311–327. For more on the allied landing in Scania, see R.E. Lindgren, *A Projected Invasion of Sweden, 1716*, "Huntington Library Quarterly" 7 (1944), 3, pp. 223–247.

[652] Pursuant to the treaty, the city was to cease all correspondence and trade with Sweden, accept a Russian representative (a commissar with twelve soldiers to oversee these matters), field four privateer ships to be used against the Swedish fleet (under the flag of the Polish king and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) and, if necessary, dispatch two or three vessels to Copenhagen to deliver ammunition or Russian troops there, among others. A penalty of 150,000 thalers was also imposed on the municipal authorities for trading with Sweden; see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 3021; P. Krokosz, *Bałtycka polityka Rosji Piotra I…*, p. 308; A. Perłakowski, *„Ta konfederacyja nie stała się contra Maiestatem…": postawa Jakuba Zygmunta Rybińskiego, wojewody chełmińskiego, w czasie konfederacji tarnogrodzkiej (1715–1717)*, "Zapiski Historyczne" 85 (2020), 2, p. 58.

[653] Шереметев Борис Петрович, генерал-фельдмаршал. Выписки из его военно-походного журнала за 1711–1716 гг., РНБ, ф. 568, Пекарский, № 450, л. 9–11.

It was also in the city that the codification of Russian military law, initiated in 1698 with the drafting of Adam Weyde's *Regulations*, reached its conclusion (see Chapter 11).

Meanwhile, the Russian troops were not only present in the vicinity of Gdańsk, but also throughout Poland, which plunged into political and military chaos.[654] The tsar and his generals did not hide their intent to improve the condition of the Russian army before entering the Reich. As early as March 5, 1716, Peter I ordered Adam Weyde to completely resupply his troops. The general received permission from the tsar to take decisive action in case the Polish and Saxon armies were unwilling to allow him to assume quarters.[655] These responsibilities forced him to leave Gdańsk, albeit not for long. Meanwhile, on March 18, Prince Anikita Repnin received orders to depart for Mecklenburg-Schwerin at the helm of the Russian troops. A month later, the tsar traveled to Königsberg to meet a galley flotilla transporting two guard regiments and the Astrakhansky Regiment from Libau. Their arrival in Gdańsk on April 27 caused great anxiety among the bourgeoisie, as the ships dropped anchor in the nearby village of Ganskrug (where the tsar established his quarter). Shortly thereafter, on April 30, 1716, at 4 p.m., the squadron of galleys with Peter I on board departed for Swedish Pomerania. At the same

[654] After the formation of the anti-Saxon Tarnogród Confederation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on 15 (26) XI 1715, Peter I assumed the role a peacemaker in this intra-state dispute. This resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Warsaw on August 23 (November 3) 1716, and its subsequent approval by the Silent Sejm in 1717; see K. Kościelniak, *Działania nieregularne wojsk konfederacji tarnogrodzkiej 1715–1716*, "Prace Historyczne" (2016), 4, pp. 743–752; M. Zwierzykowski, *Negocjacje pacyfikacyjne w okresie Sejmu Niemego (1716–1717). Porażka partykularyzmów i sukces racji stanu?*, [in:] *Spory o państwo w dobie nowożytnej. Między racją stanu a partykularyzmem*, ed. Z. Anusik, Łódź 2007, pp. 175–185; T. Ciesielski, *Konfederacja tarnogrodzka i obrady Sejmu Niemego – aspekt militarny*, [in:] *Sejm Niemy. Między mitem a reformą państwa*, ed. M. Zwierzykowski, Warszawa 2019, pp. 37–68.

[655] *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725). 05.03.1716*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/228315512 (accessed January 5, 2021). For more on the deployment of other Russian troops, seeA. Perłakowski, *„Ta konfederacyja"…*, pp. 45–46.

time, the remainder of the army under the command of Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev advanced overland in the same direction.[656] At about the same time, Weyde also proceeded west at the head his division, which was part of a larger concentration of Russian forces known as the Pomeranian Corps. By then, the tsar, enjoying greater freedom of movement, was well ahead of his army, calling at several German cities along the way. Nevertheless, Peter was mindful of his prior large-scale allied plans for Sweden, and so on June 26, in a six-point resolution, he ordered the general to push for Rostock, where he had just arrived.[657] As of July 1, 1716, the total strength of the Russian army about to engage in the hostilities in the Reich has been estimated at 38,816 soldiers.[658]

Not only did Peter I intend to oversee further warfare, but he used the tour to hold diplomatic talks and visit various places of interest. As was the case in 1697–1698, Adam Weyde once more accompanied the tsar on his travels in Europe.[659] Peter's voyages were mainly prompted by the need to coordinate the subsequent operations of the anti-Swedish coalition.[660]

In the summer of 1716, the general reconnoitered the Swedish coast together with the sovereign, in preparation for the aforementioned allied landing in Scania.[661] There was every indication that the operation, planned

[656] *Журнал, или поденная, записка…*, ч. 2, pp. 18–20.
[657] Resolution in 6 points regarding the march on Rostock, issued to General Weyde, June 26, 1716, Rostock, РГАДА, ф. 9, отд. I, оп. 2, кн. 22, лл. 22–23об. At the time, Adam Weyde and his division were already in the territory of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, where they had made the necessary preparations with regard to soldier quarters and provisioning. For a detailed description of the subject, see the following section of this chapter.
[658] *Письма и указы императора Петра I к разным лицам…*, № 165, p. 322.
[659] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, pp. 26–27.
[660] As noted by Władysław A. Serczyk, the tsar "did not relent in his attempts to convince the allies of the necessity to bring the war with Sweden to a swift end. He believed that the best means toward this end would be to invade the Swedish coast, and hoped that 1716 would see the long-awaited resolution;" see W.A. Serczyk, op. cit. pp. 179.
[661] Шереметев Борис Петрович, генерал-фельдмаршал. Выписки из его военно-походного журнала за 1711–1716 гг., РНБ, ф. 568, Пекарский, № 450, л. 27–66.

jointly since 1714 with Denmark and England, would see the light of day.[662] At the turn of August1716, a force rarely seen in the early modern period gathered near Copenhagen. Some 23,000 soldiers of the Danish army and 30,000 Russians camped outside the walls of the capital. The tsar, who arrived at the site on July 6 (17), was accompanied by his own fleet of fifty galleys and fourteen naval vessels (in addition to fourteen British and nineteen Danish ships). The local population also received news of the arrival of a Cossack regiment. Finally, on August 29 (September 9), Adam Weyde arrived from Rostock (Map 6, B-5/6) with several regiments of his division, with Prince Repnin's army following suit six days later.[663]

King Frederick IV of Denmark planned to land in Scania on September 10 (21), 1716; however, two days before the planned attack, Peter I withdrew from the agreement. Considering the enormous cost of the venture, his decision caused astonishment throughout Europe. Various reasons have been identified behind Peter's change of heart, from clandestine negotiations with the Swedes to the growing distrust of the Danish allies, or the Russian plans to conquer Denmark. Scholars have emphasized the psychological factor: the tsar supposedly grew anxious of the invasion, and above all feared the possible postponement of the landing till after the harvest season, which reportedly precluded the invasion. However, Raymond E.

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[662] In 1713, with Charles XII's army almost completely ousted from Swedish Pomerania and North Germany (the only garrisons still standing were those in Stralsund and Wismar), Peter I revisited his plans for an allied landing in the Stockholm area. Such an operation would only be possible with the participation of the Danish fleet. To this end, Adjutant General Pavel Jaguzhinsky was ordered to Copenhagen to persuade King Frederick IV to launch a joint assault in May 1714. Despite the agreement reached in March 1714, which provided for the deployment of thirty ships (eighteen Danish and twelve Russian vessels) and 15,000 Russian soldiers, the landing on the Swedish coast did not materialize. In April 1716, Wismar, which had been under siege by the Danish-Prussian-Hanoverian forces since 1715, capitulated (see Map 6, B-3), and the idea of a joint invasion of Scania resurfaced. See Н.Н. Молчанов, *Дипломатия Петра Первого*, Москва 1984, p. 327.

[663] H. Bagger, *En begivenhed der ikke fandt sted. Den dansk-russiske landgang i Skåne 1716*, „Historisk Tidsskrift" 103 (2003), h. 1, pp. 118–119.

Lindgren proved and Hans Bagger subsequently confirmed, the abandonment of the projected landing on the coast of Sweden proper was dictated primarily by a sober evaluation of the current operational situation and the condition of the Danish army, relayed to the tsar by Adam Weyde. The general briefed Peter I on the state of the Danish forces (for a detailed description, see below), stressing their complete sluggishness with respect to the preparations for the landing operation.[664]

August 30 (September 10) 1716. Peter I, accompanied by General Weyde, who had arrived hastily from Mecklenburg-Schwerin that very day, and General-Feldmarshal Sheremetev, boarder a ship for a reconnaissance "excursion." The ruler and his commanders personally inspected the strength of the artillery in the enemy fortifications of Borseby and Malmö. Two of the tsar's snows, the *Princessa* and *Lizeta*, were damaged in the ensuing exchange of fire.[665] After this event, the Danes noticed growing hesitation regarding the planned operation among their Russian allies. However, it was not so much the artillery shelling that weighed on the situation, but rather the opinions of Sheremetev and Adam Weyde, who advised Peter I against the invasion. Even after returning from the reconnaissance, Peter I continued to consult with his military staff. During the deliberations, concern was expressed that Scania could become a trap for the invading force. The generals suspected a possible presence of a strong Swedish detachment (up to 40,000 soldiers) in the targeted areas, accentuating possible problems with provisions and the unfavorable winter season. All these observations originated from the 1711 expedition against Turkey. The tsar would

[664] R.E. Lindgren, op. cit., pp. 230–231; H. Bagger, op. cit., pp. 118–160. Por. МИРФ, ч. 4, Санкт-Петербург 1867, № 98–116, pp. 109–122; С.А. Фейгина, *Аландский конгресс. Внешняя политика России в конце Северной войны*, Москва 1959, pp. 80, 96–105.

[665] *Журнал, или поденная, записка…*, ч. 2, отд. I, p. 40; *Походный журнал 1716 года…*, pp. 11–12, 44, 90.

nevertheless hold these assessments against his commanders early into 1717.[666]

Peter I was most impressed with the report penned by Adam Weyde (who was already stationed in Mecklenburg-Schwerin at the time) on the state of the Danish army. After the debacles of Narva (1700) and Pruth (1711), the general was extremely conservative about the possibility of a successful landing. According to him, the allied forces, amounting to approximately 50,000 men, were too weak to capture Scania. It was in this context that he stressed the deplorable condition of the Danish allied force. Its sole combat value was the navy, which was national in character. Much worse was the cavalry, consisting mainly of Holsteiners and Mecklenburgers, underwhelmed by the perfectly organized Swedish army. Even worse was the condition of the infantry, arranged in various ways and consisting mostly of mercenaries from Pomerania and Swedish prisoners of war captured at Stralsund and on Rügen. Infantry units composed of native Danes were scarce, and at the same time the finest regiments, composed of Norwegians, were stationed in Norway. Based on these premises, Adam Weyde concluded that the Danish army could not be trusted, especially in battle conditions, when its cavalry was likely to display passivity on the flanks.[667] Weyde's findings were particularly relevant to the current strategic situation, i.e., the totality of the ongoing war operations conducted by the countries of the anti-Swedish coalition, as well as the tactical situation, namely, the envisaged joint military action. It is worth noting that, in characterizing the armed forces of the Danish allies, the tsar's associate used terms reserved for a national army (he referred to the native subjects of the Danish king as "national population"),[668] an obvious indication of its superior-

[666] H. Bagger, op. cit., pp. 151–152; R.E. Lindgren, op. cit., pp. 230–231.
[667] H. Bagger, op. cit., p. 152.
[668] Ibidem.

ity over an army composed of mercenary troops. The report corresponds with Weyde's *Regulations of 1698* and the principles of military recruitment and training initiated in 1699-1700 (see Chapters 4 and 5). According to the Danish envoy in Berlin, it was Weyde's opinion that influenced the tsar's ultimate decision, which proved to be the right one, especially considering the fact that the planned operation would be one of the largest offensives of its kind in military history.[669]

According to the Russian *Journal of Warfare*, General Weyde was in Copenhagen in September and October 1716, where he met with Peter I. It is very likely that he also accompanied the tsar when he briefly left the Danish capital and traveled to various nearby locations.[670] He was then ordered to enter Mecklenburg-Schwerin together with Prince Anikita Repnin's corps (see Map 6). This was due to the fact that the ruler of this duchy, Karl Leopold, was inclined to tighten relations with Russia. Bilateral international contacts had begun back in 1712, when the tsar requested the duke's help in provisioning his troops operating in Swedish Pomerania.[671] In return, Peter promised to prevent the Swedes from plundering the principality. The Russian ruler not only sought a military presence in the Reich, but also wanted to strengthen his interests at the political level. On January 22, 1716, a marriage contract was concluded in St. Petersburg between Duke Karl Leopold and the tsar's niece, Catherine Ivanovna of Russia (daughter of Tsar Ivan V). It was on this occasion that

[669] H. Bagger, op. cit., pp. 151–152; R. Wittram, op. cit., Bd 2, p. 289.
[670] Походный журнал 1716 года..., pp. 92–95.
[671] In the summer of 1711, a Russian reinforcement corps led by Brigadier Pyotr Yakovlev, numbering 6,000 dragoons, entered Swedish Pomerania together with the Saxon army of Augustus II. Together with the Danish army, these forces proceeded to lay siege to Stralsund. Peter I intended to send several more infantry regiments to their aid, commanded by General Rodion Bauer. As the march of the latter units was delayed and the allies suffered from a shortage of infantry, the Russian dragoons were dismounted and deployed to siege works, while their horses were sent back to Poland; see Д.П. Бутурлин, *Военная история походов...*, pp. 495–499; А.Б. Широкорад, *Северные войны России*, Москва 2001, p. 291.

Peter made concrete pledges, promising to help Mecklenburg-Schwerin regain the cities of Wismar and Warnemünde (see Maps 6, B-3 and A-5) and to commit ten regiments of his army to Karl Leopold's command.[672]

The sojourn of 12,000 Russian troops under the command of Adam Weyde in Mecklenburg-Schwerin was not a pleasant one.[673] The duchy was unprepared to host such a large army, and the Russians were to act according to their status as allies, refraining from any abuse of the local population.[674] Consequently, appropriate measures were adopted there by the respective Russian commanders, including General Weyde. On June 29 (July 10) and July 3 (14), 1716, in the town of Parchim, where his men were stationed, the commander issued letters to the local nobility regarding the quartering and provisioning of Russian soldiers.[675] Weyde issued similar documents on July 11 (22), July 30 (August 10), and August 6 (17) of that year for the soldiers of his divisions quartered near Poppendorff and Lübz.[676]

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[672] ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 2984; Н.Н. Молчанов, op. cit., pp. 324–326. The marriage was dictated by both political and economic interests. On the day of its conclusions, the rulers also signed a treaty on perpetual alliance and mutual assistance against the enemies, and on the development of trade relations. Peter I intended to ensure favorable trading conditions for Russian merchants operating in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, who would no longer have to rely on the costly intermediation of the maritime states (England and the Netherlands) when conducting business with Western Europe. For more on the subject, see P. Krokosz, *Bałtycka polityka Rosji Piotra I…*, pp. 305–307; I. Félicité, *Entre Mars et Vénus: Pierre le Grand dans les villes et du duchés du nord de l'Allemagne (1716)*, "Quaestio Rossica" 6 (2018), 3, pp. 643–657. For a detailed account of the Russian army's stay in Mecklenburg, see the study by Russian historian Sergei Yefimov (С.В. Ефимов, *«Совершенная безопасность от всех внутренних и внешних беспокойств». Русская армия в Мекленбурге в 1712–1719 годах*, [in:] *Война и оружие… Труды Восьмой Международной научно-практической конференции 17–19 мая 2017 года*, ред. С.В. Ефимов, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 2017, pp. 178–220).

[673] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 168.

[674] The tsar forbade the general to seize anything from the residents that was guaranteed by the Mecklenburg authorities; see И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 6, p. 203.

[675] J. Schaevius, *Höchst-gemüssigter Historische-Ascten-mässiger Bericht, Von dem Was von Anfang der im Monath Augusto 1713 angetretenen Regierung des Durchlauchtigsten Fürsten und Herrn. Hm Carl Leopold… Mit Beilagen von No. 1 bis No. 885*, n.p., 1719, No. 209, p. 232; No. 210, pp. 232–233.

[676] Ibidem, No. 212, p. 234; No. 213, p. 234–235, No. 221, p. 239; No. 230, pp. 245–246.

As a result of these policies, the Russian regiments soon found themselves lacking in virtually all provisions: from food and provender for horses to uniforms and artillery supplies. Another major problem was the lack of adequate winter quarters. Complaining about these problems in his correspondence was General-Feldmarshal Boris Sheremetev, who quartered in Boizenburg in late 1716 and early 1717 (see Map 6, D-1), exercising supreme command over all Russian troops stationed there.[677] Sheremetev's was the westernmost Russian military operation, and the relevant supplies, primarily clothing, footwear and galleys (the latter necessary for communications and transportation), were to be sent by sea from Copenhagen to Lübeck (see Map 6, B-1). Once there, the supplies were to be unloaded and the galleys transported by land to Rostock (see Map 6, B-5/6). There was one basic problem, however, as there were no workers able to unload said shipment, nor were there enough horses to haul the galleys.

A spatial analysis of the distribution of Russian troops in Mecklenburg (see Map 6) shows that Prince Repnin's division (12,737 soldiers) was deployed in the western and central parts; Adam Weyde's division (8,332 troops) was deployed in the eastern part of Mecklenburg, while the units commanded by Pyotr Golitsyn (6,540 portions) were situated between the former two groupings. General Weyde strictly regulated that garrisons be deployed only within the borders of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. In particular, the soldiers did not encroach on the land of Stargard (Herrschaft Stargard) in the east, which was a major component of the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, ruled by Adolf Friedrich III. Another outpost, comprising 800 soldiers commanded by Anikita Repnin, stationed in the second component of Mecklenubrg-Strelitz, the Principality of Ratzeburg.

[677] On November 9 (20), 1716, as a result of Sheremetev's illness, the tsar temporarily entrusted the supreme command to General Weyde; see *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725). 09/20.11.1716*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/244223884 (accesed January 3, 2021).

Pointing to the locations of General Weyde's division's quarters on the map are two sets of coordinates: letters (A-E), showing the number of successive horizontal rows, and numbers (1-9), indicating the vertical rows. The map bears the names of the localities where General Weyde's division was deployed; below, in parentheses, is the number of soldiers stationed at each location: Gnoyen B-7 (1,327), Neuenkahlen (spelled Nienkalen) C-7 (649), Stavenhagen C-7 (2,182), Ivenack C-7 (122), Wredenhagen (spelled Wredenhag) E-6 (906), Plau D-6 (418), Malachow (spelled Malachau) D-6 (344), Goldberg D-5 (493), Wahren (spelled Waren) D-7 (1,021), Pentzelien (spelled Pentzlin) D-8 (135), Malchin C-7 (336), Teterow C-6 (155), Teszien (spelled Tesin) B-6 (133), Nienkahlen (spelled Nienkalen) C-7 (225), Lübtz (spelled Lübs) D-5 (201), Parchim D-4 (282), Güstrow C-5 (293).[678]

The division was deployed across seventeen locations, with Weyde dispersing the provisioning of his troops far more than the other commanders. He concentrated half of his forces at four sites, breaking the rest into smaller groupings of 150-200 men. Adam Weyde's headquarters was based in Güstrow (see Map 6, C-5).[679] This choice was not accidental. The city was located in the central part of the duchy, allowing the general to efficiently manage all of his troops stationed in Mecklenburg. Meanwhile, the state of the Russian army was concerning. The general expressed this in a December 1716 report, stating that soldiers would not survive the three winter months under such conditions.[680] This is because they were assigned rural buildings located around urban areas, and their equipment as it stood did not guarantee safe wintering. Therefore, the commander was particularly anxious to provide his subordinates with uniforms and

[678] J. Schaevius, op. cit., No. 379, p. 375.
[679] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 6, Санкт-Петербург 1859, pp. 59–60; приложения, № 66, pp. 370; P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 169; C. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 66–67.
[680] *Письма к государю императору Петру Великому...*, ч. 4, Москва 1779, № 365, p. 246.

proper quarters in the cities, far superior to the ones they occuppied in nobility estates. However, the ruler of Mecklenburg refused to entertain the idea. The housing situation of General Weyde's regiments must have been so critical that the general (without prior approval from Peter I) arbitrarily ordered his units to enter Mecklenburg's cities in January 1717, coercing residents to find quarters for his soldiers.[681]

An important part of the logistics of the Russian army stationed in Mecklenburg was the possession of galleys, which were used for communication and inland and maritime transportation. At the end of 1716 and into early 1717, only three such vessels were stationed in Rostock (Map 6, B-5/6); and so the Russians began to build more galleys.[682] To this end, Peter I dispatched his relative Stepan Lopukhin, half-brother of his first wife Eudoxia Lopukhina and specialist in "maritime affairs," to the Reich.[683] The choice of Lopukhin was substantiated by his expertise and hands-on experience as a graduate of the Moscow School of Mathematics and Navigation and long-time serviceman in the English fleet between 1708 and 1717. Adam Weyde was to assist the tsar's relative and the accompanying shipbuilders to the fullest extent upon their arrival in Boizenburg (Map 6, D-1).[684]

With an alliance army that was numerous by Mecklenburg's standards, Karl Leopold chose to use this opportunity to establish himself as an absolute ruler.[685] The duke issued several orders to the Russian soldiers,

[681] Ibidem, № 372, pp. 267–268. Showing the dislocation of Weyde's division, Map 6 makes it abundantly clear that the Russian troops did not cross the border into the neighboring Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz.
[682] Ibidem, № 371, p. 266.
[683] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, ч. 3, Москва 1836, pp. 220–221.
[684] Peter I to A.A. Weyde, The Hague, March 19, 1717, РНБ, ОР, ф. 650: Романовы. Императорский Дом, № 71, лл. 1–2об.
[685] J. Schaevius, op. cit., passim. Por. P. Milton, *Intervening against Tyrannical Rule in the Holy Roman Empire during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, "German History" 33 (2015), 1, pp. 1–29.



Map 6. Hand drawn map of Mecklenburg (1721). Ducatus Megalopolitane, eller Hertigdomet Meklenburg, RA, KA, Utländska kartor 1550-1931, Mecklenburg Schwerin generalkartor, No. 003 (public domain)
Added to the map are the locations (as of December 29, 1716 / January 9, 1717) of the units comprising the divisions of Adam Weyde (✓), Anikita Repnin (×), and Pyotr Golitsyn (ϟ).
Source: own study based on: J. Schaevius, op. cit. pp. 375–376.

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Mappa Duc
Megalopolitane
Geographi sk Charta
öfver
Hertigdömmet
MEKLENBURG
Adam Weyde Division
Nikita Repnin Division
Petr Golitsyn Division

among others to arrest representatives of the local nobility (July 1716).[686] By the end of 1716, such measures resulted in the Mecklenburg nobility refusing to supply the Pomeranian Corps with food and provender, and calling on people to abandon locations "occupied" by the Russians. Given his background, knowledge of the German language, and various contacts with citizens of the Reich, as well as his family ties to the Danish and German nobility (see Figure 2.3), Weyde seemed the perfect candidate to defuse the conflict. However, he had little room for maneuver, as he was bound by the orders from the tsar and the duke. As he inquired about the motivations of the dissenting nobles, the latter answered that "they are not slaves to the Russians, nor do they wish to become ones." Consequently, Weyde applied repressive measures consisting of grain and cattle confiscations and using the "rebel" meadows and pastures to graze his cavalry's horses (starting with those instigating opposition towards the upkeep of the tsar's troops).[687]

Weyde may have copied a solution from the Russian army policies implemented in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[688] However, what worked well in Polish-Lithuanian territory proved ineffective in the Reich. In late 1716 and early 1717, the area saw a significant rise in anti-Russian sentiment, not only in the duchy itself, but also in the other north German territories. Leading the opposition was Andreas Gottlieb von Bernstorff, who solicited the help of Great Britain (which had been in personal union with the Duchy of Hanover since 1714) and the Emperor against the rule of Duke Karl Leopold. As a result, the opposition obtained permission for a state execution (Ger. *Reichsexekution*), whose implementation was entrusted to the Elector of Hanover and King of Great Britain

[686] С.В. Ефимов, op. cit., p. 194.
[687] Ibidem, p. 201. See also J. Schaevius, op. cit., No. 407, pp. 401–402.
[688] See, e.g., W.F. Rakowski, op. cit., pp. 38–39, 138.

George I. This prompted Karl Leopold to flee to Danzing in 1719, with the execution extending until 1727.[689] Weyde's decisions resulted in a natural cooling of his relations with the Pietists, who sent letters to the general, urging him to remember the virtue of mercy.[690]

Meanwhile, early 1717 brought a viable threat of conflict between the Russians and Holy Roman Empire. This mention comes from a Scottish officer in Russian service, Peter Henry Bruce, who was Adam Weyde's adjutant at the time. The Russian commanders, Lieutenant General Peter Lacy, Major General Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach and Brigadier Pyotr Lefort, received information that an Imperial army was gathering near Hamburg, in a vast encampment, seeking to expel the Russians from Mecklenburg. Without any delay, the generals led their troops out of their quarters and stood in a fortified camp near Gadebusch (Map 6, C-2). At the same time, Weyde, sent an adjutant to reconnoiter the enemy force. Eventually it became clear that there was no expeditionary army. The movement of the Russian troops, on the other hand, caused panic in Hanover. Peter Henry Bruce learned of this from a Russian resident in Hamburg. With the appearance of the tsar's troops at Gadebusch, rumors circulated in Hanover about the imminent incursion of the Russian army into the territory of the electorate, which in turn prompted numerous residents to seek haven in Hamburg and elsewhere. The initial tensions eventually subsided though, and the Russians returned to their quarters.[691]

The escalating anti-Russian sentiment among the population of the Reich, along with the provisions of the Silent Sejm (January 20 (February 1)

[689] P. Wilson, *German Armies: War and German Politics, 1648–1806*, London 1998, pp. 145–149; B. Simms, *"A False Principle in the Law of Nations": Burke, State Sovereignty, [German] Liberty, and Intervention in the Age of Westphalia*, [in:] *Humanitarian Intervention: A History*, eds. B. Simms, D.J.B. Trim, Cambridge 2011, pp. 94–96.

[690] A.H. Francke to A.A. Weyde, Halle February 27, 1717, AFSt/HA 170:7, Bl. 1–2v; A.A. Weyde to A.H. Franck, Güstrow March 21, 1717, AFSt./HD 170: 8, Bl. 1–2.

[691] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 168–169. See J. Schaevius, op. cit., No. 414, pp. 406–407.

1717), which regulated the internal situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,[692] spurred a gradual redeployment of the tsar's troops to the east. As early as February 1717, twelve Russian battalions left Mecklenburg and headed for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[693] Those leaving the Reich included the top commanders Boris Sheremetev, Anikita Repnin, Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach[694] and Herman Jensen Bohn. Twenty battalions remained in the duchy, commanded by Adam Weyde.[695] The Russian forces on the ground continued to grow thinner, as later that same month Peter ordered the general to send eight battalions toward the Polish borders.[696] On February 16, 1717, the tsar ordered Weyde to follow Field Marshal General Sheremetevs's troops with his own detachment.[697] According Peter's orders dated April 13 and 29, in the event of a Swedish attack, Weyde's forces would be reinforced by the troops of General-Feldmarshal Sheremetev, stationing in Poland at the time.[698]

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[692] See *Sejm Niemy. Między mitem a reformą państwa*, ed. M. Zwierzykowski, Warszawa 2019.

[693] J. Schaevius, op. cit., pp. 159–160; C. Whitworth to A. Hume-Campbella, Berlin January 30 (February 20), 1717, [in:] *Report on the manuscripts of the Right Honourable Lord Polwarth*, vol. 1, London 1911, p. 174.

[694] Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach was among the top commanders of Charles XII's army. In 1709, while having the rank of major general, he was taken prisoner by the Russians at Poltava. In 1712, he entered the tsar's service, taking command of the Ryazansky infantry regiment. Two years later, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. For more information, see B.K. Малиновский, *Бароны Шлиппенбах – офицеры императора Александра I*, [in:] *Сборник трудов потомков участников отечественной войны 1812 года*, отв. ред. В.К. Малиновский, вып. 3, Москва 2008, pp. 56–57, 73–74.

[695] J. Schaevius, op. cit., p. 160; P. Wick, *Versuche zur Errichtung des Absolutismus in Mecklenburg in der ersten Hälfte des 18 Jahrhunderts: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Territorialabsolutismus*, Berlin 1964, p. 105. See also Д. Редин, Д. Серов, *Второе путешествие Петра Первого в письмах барона П.П. Шафирова князю А.Д. Меншикову (1716–1717),* "Quaestio Rossica" 2 (2017), Приложения, № 13, p. 490.

[696] МИРФ, т. 4, Санкт-Петербург 1867, № 130, p. 135; C. Whitworth to A. Hume-Campbella, Berlin 10 (21) III 1717, [in:] *Report on the manuscripts…*, p. 192.

[697] Peter I to A. Weyde, Amsterdam, February 16, 1717, РГАДА, ф. 9, отд. I, оп. 2, кн. 22, лл. 214–214об.

[698] *Переписка императора Петра I с графом П.Б. Шереметевым…*, № 381, pp. 450–451; № 382, s. 451.

We should note that Adam Weyde maintained running correspondence with Peter I, who was on a tour of Europe, to secure the tsar's transit if necessary and implement other vital dispositions.[699] Among others, the general was still tasked with purchasing books for the Russian ruler. He received one such commission from the tsar, who was in Amsterdam at the time. In a letter dated December 11 (22), 1716, Peter I asked Weyde to send him a selection of geography books to be translated into Russian.[700]

At the time, the tsar's associate was also involved in the search for the "missing" Tsarevich Alexei. Peter I received the most recent news of his son on October 21 (November 1), 1716, while on his way from Copenhagen to Lübeck, in the Duchy of Holstein. According to the messenger's assurance, Alexei was to join his father soon. However, this did not happen and, after a two-month wait, on December 9 (20), while already in Amsterdam, the concerned monarch ordered General Weyde to investigate the whereabouts of his heir.[701] The matter was extremely serious and "top secret." Immediately upon receiving the order, the commander dispatched two of his most trusted and German-speaking officers, Adjutant Major General Dewson and Major Scharff, to scout the Reich in search for Alexei. Posing as merchants looking to buy three riding horses, they each set off in different directions, along the Breslau and Berlin trails. Weyde ordered them to search for Lieutenant Balck (Balken), for that was the name under which the tsarevich was formally traveling, and to extend their search all the way to Vienna.[702] Weyde's intuition proved correct, as Alexei did indeed arrive in the imperial capital on November 10 (21), 1716,

[699] *Письма и указы императора Петра I к разным лицам*, [in:] СИРИО, т. 11, Санкт-Петербург 1873, № 3, p. 54; P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 171.
[700] *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725 гг.). 14/25.12.1716*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/244891496 (accessed January 2, 2021).
[701] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 6, pp. 57–58.
[702] Ibidem, p. 59.

where he met with Vice Chancellor Frederick Schönborn, requesting an audience and intercession with Charles VI. However, the Emperor had no intention of meddling in the internal problems of the Russian royal family, and concealed the fugitive at Castle Ehrenberg in Tirol.[703]

The search undertaken by Weyde yielded several leads. The general shared them with the tsar in a letter mailed on December 22, 1716 (January 2, 1717). One of the emissaries confirmed the tsarevich's presence in Breslau, who reportedly "in a house inside the city, and was spotted by Russian army merchants nine weeks prior, with two sons and a daughter, before promptly departing down the Viennese trail. It must have been him."[704] In the second letter, sent on December 25, 1716 (January 5, 1717), Weyde reports that he had also dispatched a third officer, this time east, to Poland.[705] It was most likely he who informed Weyde of Alexei being "seen" in Gdańsk and Königsberg, with the general relaying the news to the tsar on January 13 (24), 1717.[706] In fact, it was the first lead that proved true. It was corroborated by Adjutant General Dewson, who arrived in Vienna, where he visited the Black Eagle beanery. The waiter there assured Dewson that he had seen the man in question, known to be the son of the Muscovite Tsar.[707] All in all, the actions taken by the general enabled the retrieval of Alexei and his subsequent return to Russia. However, the heir to the throne did not know that his father would not forgive his escape and would undertake a large-scale investigation that

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[703] For more on the subject, see I. Schwarcz, *Die Flucht des Thronfolgers Aleksej und der Wienner Hof*, [in:] *Die Flucht des Thronfolgers Aleksiej. Krise in der „Balance of Power" und den österreichisch-russischen Beziehungen am Anfang des 18 Jahrhunderts*, Hg. I. Schwarcz, Berlin–Wien 2019, pp. 179–197.
[704] Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 6, p. 59–60; приложения, № 66, p. 370. In fact, Tsarevich Alexei was traveling in the company of his mistress Euphrosinia Fyodorovna, her brother Ivan, and three servants.
[705] Ibidem, приложения, № 66, p. 370.
[706] Ibidem, p. 59.
[707] Ibidem, pp. 62–63.

would cost the lives of many of Alexei's friends and opponents of Peter's policies. As it soon turned out, Alexei himself ended up among them.

While in Paris in June 1717, the tsar ordered the general to leave Mecklenburg-Schwerin.[708] The two Russian corps (Weyde's and Repnin's) stationed there were to head for the Polish border together with the artillery and ammunition supplies.[709] All of Adam Weyde's soldiers were to board galleys in Rostock and head for Riga by sea.[710] Eventually, for strategic reasons, the Russians opted for an arduous, seven-month march back to the homeland. They left Mecklenburg and headed toward the Crown via Prussia-Brandenburg (July 13), arriving in Poland on July 25. Their subsequent itinerary passed through Güstrow, Stettin, Landsberg and der Warthe, Debrzno, Tuchola (where it made an extended stopover). Weyde's troops set out for Russia on October 2, moving along the main cities of Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga and Narva, before arriving in St. Petersburg on February 19, 1718. According to Peter Henry Bruce, the march was slow, and due care was taken for the soldiers, who rested in comfortable quarters four nights a week. In total, the party covered a distance of 2,072 km, at an average speed of 9.33 km per day.[711] Making the return journey was the general himself, who separated from his troops and called at Gdańsk in mid-September, awaiting the arrival of the tsar. It was there that Peter

[708] W. Mediger, *Mecklenburg, Russland und England-Hannover 1706–1721: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Nordischen Krieges*, Bd. 1, [Braunschweig] 1967, p. 366.

[709] J. Schaevius, op. cit., No. 390, pp. 159–160; МИРФ, т. 2, № 1631, pp. 225–226; *Журнал, или поденная, записка…*, ч. 2, p. 53. Securing the departure of General Weyde's division from Mecklenburg and its march through the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was Field Marshal General Sheremetev; see *Переписка императора Петра I с графом П.Б. Шереметевым…*, № 383, p. 451; № 384, pp. 451–454.

[710] МИРФ, т. 2, № 1644, p. 232. Weyde was to leave 500 soldiers on site, which made up the guard of the Duchess of Mecklenburg (Peter I's niece).

[711] Our calculations essentially match the information provided by P.H. Bruce; see op. cit., p. 174. Bruce estimated the route at 1,959 versts (2,115 km) or 1,306 land miles (2,101 km). The difference in pace can be compared with the march of the seven regiments detailed in Chapter 10, which covered some 1,000 km, heading for St. Petersburg at an average speed of 22.4 km per day.

I ordered him to investigate the abuses of the Russian generals and officers, committed while stationed on Polish soil.[712]

In early 1718, after Adam Weyde arrived in Riga, the tsar engaged him to receive Polish envoys heading to St. Petersburg. The purpose of the mission, led by the Starost of Kopanica, Franciszek Poniński, was to persuade Peter I to withdraw the Russian troops from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The tsar was adamant about having the Polish diplomat turn back before reaching the Russian capital. Weyde was to cut Poniński's short by relaying to him the tsar's (deceitful) assurances that his commanders had already received the relevant orders, and the Russian troops would leave the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within five weeks at the latest. Poniński stayed in Riga from January 25 to 27 (February 5 to 7), 1718. Despite a most polite reception, he mistrusted the general's assurances regarding Polish affairs and continued his journey to St. Petersburg.[713]

One should remember that the Russian troops did not completely withdraw from Mecklenburg. Two infantry regiments remained in place: the Yaroslavsky (of Repnin's division) and Vyatsky (of Weyde's division), along with two grenadier corps, which Peter I committed to Duke Karl Leopold as the personal guard of his niece. Adam Weyde was entrusted with arranging all matters relating to their subsequent stay in Mecklenburg, together with the duke.[714]

On March 5, 1719, the Russian soldiers stationed in Mecklenburg, whose nominal superior was General Weyde, received orders to prepare

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[712] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 172–174; *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725). До 19.09.1717*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/250741212 (accessed January 3, 2021); ibidem. *20.09/01.10.1717*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/250741255 (accessed January 3, 2021).

[713] K. Jarochowski, *Z czasów saskich, spraw wewnętrznych, polityki i wojny*, Poznań 1886, pp. 134–135.

[714] С.В. Ефимов, op. cit., pp. 203, 213.

for departure. Their destination was Russia, specifically St. Petersburg.[715] Spurring their return home was the changing international situation. The growth of Russia's power and the presence of its troops in the Reich, as well as the possibility of ending the war with Sweden and becoming its ally (relevant negotiations were held by Russian and Swedish diplomats in 1718-1719, during a bilateral congress on the Åland Islands), were a cause of concern for the rulers of several European countries, most notably Emperor Charles VI Habsburg.[716] No less concerned were Peter I's allies to date: the rulers of Denmark, Hanover and Prussia. The Elector of Saxony and King Augustus II of Poland were particularly anxious, noting Peter I's growing interference in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[717] On December 25, 1718 (January 5, 1719) in Vienna, Saxony, the Holy Roman Empire and England signed an accord with a view to stemming the spread of Russian influence in the Old Continent. The signatories of it intended to remove the tsar's troops from the Reich and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while preserving the territorial integrity of the latter, ruled by its incumbent king.[718]

That said, the tsar was hardly inclined to relinquish his territorial acquisitions, achieved in the years past at the expense of Sweden.[719] The situation was further complicated by an event that took place on the night of November 30-December 1, 1718. It was then, during the siege of the

[715] *Письма и указы императора Петра I к разным лицам...*, № 245, p. 383; № 246, p. 383.
[716] J.A. Nordberg, op. cit., No. 219, pp. 301–303.
[717] Relations between Russia and its allies hardened with the seizure of Wismar by the Danish, Hanoverian, and Prussian troops in 1716. Despite Peter I's insistence, his troops, if only in the strength of three to four regiments, were not permitted to participated in the siege; see Peter I to N. Repnin, Gdańsk, March 18, 1716, РГАДА, ф. 9, Кабинет Петра I и его продолжение, отд. II, оп. 3, кн. 28, л. 516–517. The situation between the allies was so tense that the parties only narrowly avoided an all-out showdown; See N. Repnin to Peter I, Wismar, April 10, 1716, РГАДА, ф. 9, отд. II, оп. 3, кн. 28, л. 531–532; J.A. Nordberg, op. cit., No. 218, pp. 299–300.
[718] J.A. Gierowski, *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...*, p. 288.
[719] P. Krokosz, *Bałtycka polityka Rosji Piotra I...*, pp. 279–313.

Norwegian fortress of Frederiksten, that Charles XII was slain.[720] While standing inside a sapping trench, the king sustained a head shot, dying on the spot.[721] Charles's sister and successor on the Swedish throne, Ulrika Eleonora, had no intention of pursuing further peace talks with Russia. Under the circumstances, the tsar opted to strike directly at Sweden proper, thereby forcing the queen to end the war.

The military campaign of 1719 was Adam Weyde's final one. The general participated in the operations only indirectly as a division commander, without accompanying his troops in the trenches. Fatigue from constant travels and war campaigns, preceded by a long and strenuous imprisonment in Sweden, took an ever-greater toll on him. At the same time, he was appointed to a new position, becoming the Second President of the College of War (the tsar appointed Alexander Menshikov as the First). The college was the highest state administration authority responsible for all matters relating to the functioning of the land army. Meanwhile, on March 5, 1719, the tsar issued an order instructing Weyde's tactical union stationed in Moscow to ready for a prospective departure to St. Petersburg. The troops were to be deployed in a planned strike against Sweden in the spring.[722] Five days later, the order became more specific, with only three infantry regiments ordered to travel to the city on the Neva in mid-April (Lefortovsky, Kyivsky, and Nevsky). Another regiment was also ordered to prepare for the trip, which would relieve the Arkhangelsky Regiment, stationed in the north at the time.[723]

A secret letter from General-Admiral Fyodor Apraksin to Prince Mikhail Golitsyn dated that same day sheds more light on the official

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[720] See L. Weibull, *Carl XII:s död*, „Scandia. *Tidskrift för historisk forskning*" 2 (1929), pp. 229–274; P. From, *Karl XII:s död. Gåtans lösning*, Lund 2005.
[721] J.D. Hultman, op. cit., pp. 89, 136.
[722] *Письма и указы императора Петра I к разным лицам...*, № 245, p. 383.
[723] Ibidem, № 246, p. 383.

orders. The sender reported that a powerful strike against the Swedish lands would commence as soon as "the ice breaks." The attack was to be launched from Finland, with the guard regiments and Adam Weyde's division expected to partake in the operations. Accordingly, Apraksin instructed Golitsyn to prepare provisions for two months in the form of hardtack for the entire corps (depots were to be set up in Åbo and Helsingfors). The supplies should then reach the Åland Islands, projected as the base for the upcoming campaign.[724]

Staying in St. Petersburg in 1719 as the Second President of the College of War, General Weyde worked intently on all sorts of military affairs, including legislative,[725] judicial[726], and state matters, actively participating in the social life of the capital's high society. Weyde took his first decisions on military matters as early as January 1, 1719. On that day, Peter I arrived at the College of War, ordering all of its members to attend a meeting to decide "urgent matters, and submitting a plan for the future war campaign."[727] The tsar was busy preparing for an offensive against Sweden, while at the same time securing his own borders against a possible enemy strike, assigning specific tasks to his top commanders. Lieutenant General Roman Bruce (Robert Bruce, brother of Jacob Bruce) received orders to secure the theater of war in Finland, Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin was placed in charge of the operations of the Baltic fleet, and General Weyde took command of the troops stationed in Livonia, securing the border with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[728]

[724] МИРФ, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1865, № 1889, pp. 347–348.
[725] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, p. 30.
[726] For more on the subject, see the following chapters of this study.
[727] И.И. Голиков, op. cit. т. 7, Москва 1838, pp. 398–399. What the tsar meant by "the future war campaign," was an attack on Sweden proper within the following two to three months, as he intended to launch the assault that winter, across the ice-covered Baltic Sea; see *Raporty rezydentów francuskich w Gdańsku w XVIII wieku*, vol. 2: *(1700–1721)*, eds. E. Cieślak, J. Rumiński, Gdańsk 1968, nr 2, p. 8.
[728] *Raporty rezydentów francuskich…*, nr 5, p. 14.

Soon, Adam Adamovich began to decide on the deployment of the various troops within Russia and its annexed lands. On June 15, 1719, the tsar ordered the two presidents of the College of War to prepare quarters and provide provisions and provender for the three dragoon regiments of Prince Repnin's division returning from Gdańsk (Yaroslavlsky, Novgorodsky and Kazansky). With the order reiterated on June 18, the two presidents executed it before August 10. Menshikov and Weyde were also tasked with deploying other army units (including garrison regiments) within Russian territory.[729] Their duties were not limited to decision-making only. From October 19 to 24, 1719, the two traveled to military hospitals to inspect the health of soldiers wounded at the front.[730]

On August 11, 1719, the tsar informed the Senate of the first stage of operations, conducted to the north and south of Stockholm. He reported on the destruction wrought by the Russian soldiers. At the same time, he noted that disagreements within Swedish leadership diminished the prospects of peace, and therefore it was necessary to mount another war campaign. To strengthen the infantry engaged in the operation, an additional 2,000 recruits were to be conscripted, with an adequate number of cannons and mortars supplied with ammunition and artillery support sent to Reval in the fall. Entrusted with all these tasks was Adam Weyde.[731] Eleven days later, the ruler sent an analogous letter directly to the general, commissioning him to supervise the conscription of 4,000 recruits from the Siberian Governorate.[732]

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[729] Н. Волынский (Н.П. Волынский), *История Лейб-гвардии Кирасирского Его Величества полка 1701–1901*, т. 1, кн. 2: *(1701–1733)*, Санкт-Петербург 1902, № 22, pp. 23–25.
[730] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 8, Москва 1838, p. 337.
[731] *Письма и указы императора Петра I к разным лицам…*, № 247, pp. 391–392; *Биохроника Петра Великого (1672–1725 гг.). 11/22.08.1720*, https://spb.hse.ru/humart/history/peter/biochronic/233792478 (accessed December 24, 2020).
[732] ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3490.

11. MUCH-ANTICIPATED CODIFICATION

Adam Weyde's supreme achievement was his contribution to the codification of Russian military law, a process which did not end in 1716 (as is commonly assumed), but three years later. One can safely posit that it was Weyde who spearheaded the entire effort. In 1698, he submitted his draft of military regulations to Peter I (see Chapter 4); a year later, he compiled the service regulations for new recruits and began to translate the military articles in force in other countries into Russian (see Chapter 5). To comprehend the process of this codification more readily, one can consult Table 5, which shows that each of the three books of the military code in force in Peter's army originated in its own, distinct manner.[733]

[733] For more on the subject, see P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia...*, pp. 367–398.

Table 5. Stages in the codification of Russian military law



Source: own study.

As shown in Table 5, Peter I's *Military Code of 1716* is divided into three books.[734] Book I (the so-called Military Law) was preceded by a preamble written by Peter I, invoking the military reforms initiated in the mid-seventeenth century. It concerns military and organizational issues (primarily the division of the army into tactical units: divisions, brigades). Book II consists of two parts. The first contains the *Military Articles with a Short Commentary*, constituting typical military articles understood as a military penal code. The second includes *A Short Outline of Procedures or Court Cases*, detailing the course of the judicial process and systematizing the type of punishments and their enforcement. Book III, on the

[734] The literature on the subject mentions that the code was divided into four books, based on the separation of military procedure as a distinct entity; see Т. Шворина, *Воинские артикулы Петра I*, ред. М.М. Исаев, Москва 1940, p. 5; L. Pauli, *Najważniejsze wojskowe kodyfikacje Europy Wschodniej XVII i XVIII wieku (dokończenie)*, "Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy" 2 (1946), 4, p. 206.

other hand, is divided into three minor parts: *On Drills or Training*, *On Preparation for Marching*, and *On the Ranks and Positions of Regimental Officials*.[735]

Some scholars regard the respective books as separate pieces of legislation with nothing in common except general military issues. In their view, the respective books constitute a set of three or more (depending on the interpretation) independent regulations.[736] Others argue to the contrary, noting that despite their different structure and content, all three parts (books) form a single military code. This was thought to be the result of a lengthy codification process, which spanned over a dozen years (starting in 1699).[737] In our view, the *Military Act* dated March 30 (April 10) 1716 was adopted for the needs of the Russian army, at the same time constituting Book I of Peter I's *Military Code of 1716*. Simultaneously, the volume capped the process of military legislation, but not its codification.

Confirming the above assumption is the fact that the decision-making bodies opted to merge all these acts into a single comprehensive body of law only three years later, i.e., on October 29 (November 9), 1719.[738] At that time, all three hitherto independent books were compiled into one

[735] Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., pp. 130–132.

[736] Russian literary scholar and historian Petr Pekarsky considers Book I (Military Law) as an entirely separate piece of legislation; see П. Пекарский, op. cit., pp. 349, 362–363. See *Памятники русского права*, вып. 8: *Законодательные акты Петра I, первая четверть XVIII в.*, ред. К.А. Софроненко, Москва 1961, pp. 280–281.

[737] М.П. Розенгейм, *Очерк истории военно-судных учреждений в России до кончины Петра Великого*, Санкт-Петербург 1878, pp. 67, 166; П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого...*, pp. 9–16; С.Н. Лютов, *Книга в русской армии (конец XVII – начало XVIII века)*, Новосибирск 2001, p. 13.

[738] *Книга Устав воинскии о должности генералов, фелт маршалов, и всего генералитеита, и протчих чинов, которые при войске надлежат быть, и о иных воинских делах, и поведениях, что каждому чинить должно. Купно при сем Артикул воинскии. И с процессом надлежащим к судящым. И эксерцициею о церемониях и должностях воинским людям надлежащих. Напечатася повелением Царского Величества в Санктпитербургскои типографии, лета Господня 1719, октября в 29 день*, Санкт-Петербург 1719. We have used the copy kept by: РНБ Отдел редких книг, инв. № 314 (шифр хранения П-388д).

compact publication issued in Russian (see Figure 11.1). A decision was made to keep separate page numbering for each of the books, most likely dictated by the concern for a more convenient use of the individual parts of the code (such a solution may also have rendered the printing process easier).[739] Each book was followed by an elaborate table of contents, allowing easier consultation of the collected material.[740] Also noteworthy is the fact that the print had the rank of an official legislative act, as confirmed by the relevant entry (Rus. *напечатася повелением Царского Величиства*, i.e., *Printed by Order of His Majesty the Tsar*; Figure 11.1b).[741] Also corrected at the time was the arrangement of Peter I's Military Code of 1716; however, the rearrangement did not concern the order of publication of the respective provisions, but rather their substance (see Table 5). In the years that followed, the code as a whole lived to see many editions, both in Russian and in a bilingual version (with a parallel translation into German).[742] The entire collection (following a division into three parts/books) was also integrated into a monumental nineteenth-century Russian source publication edited under the direction of prominent eighteenth- to nineteenth-century public lawmaker Mikhail Speransky under the title *The Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire* (first

[739] Zob. П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, p. 8; С.Н. Лютов, op. cit., p. 13; *Памятники русского права…*, pp. 279–280.

[740] Book I ran to 101 pages, followed by a table of contents on pages 1-6. Book II, the Military Articles (pp. 1-54) followed, and then Military Process (pp. 55-78), with an index of articles (pp. 1-6). Book III consisted of 36 pages and an unnumbered index of topics on a single page.

[741] Such a clause was also present in the so-called *Short Article* (also known as the *Menshikov Article*), which had been printed much earlier, in 1706, and remained in force since, regulating legal and organizational issues in the Russian military; see М.П. Розенгейм, op. cit., приложения, № 2, p. 294–313.

[742] П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, p. 8. By the mid-1920s, the code saw over ten editions; see С.Н. Лютов, op. cit., p. 14. For example, see *Военный устав с Артикулом военным, при котором приложены толкования, также с кратким содержанием процессов, экзерциициею церемониями, и должностьми полковых чинов, вторым тиснением напечатан в Санктпетербурге. При Императорской Академии Наук 1748 года*, Санкт-Петербург 1748.

edition 1830), containing more than 30,000 legal acts issued from 1649 to 1825.[743] The 1719 codification was preceded by a print published on February 4, 1717, which combined Books II and III into one (see Table 5). However, it still consisted of three parts, as the military articles and military process constituted separate components.[744]

The way the individual books of the Petrine Code came into force is characteristic. Unlike other, pre-existing and concurrent documents, the ruler conferred on them the direct force of universally binding law, approving a specific normative act, as evidenced by the relevant annotation in the printed copies.[745] Thus, Book I was enacted on March 30 (April 10), 1716 in Gdańsk (see Figure 11.1c).[746] It was published in St. Petersburg later that year. The plan was to release 1,000 copies (including 300 bilingual ones, in Russian and German), and present them to Russian and foreign officers in the service of Peter I. The Russian-German version was not published until December 1717, translated by Baron von Huyssen.[747] It

[743] ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006.

[744] The work had a somewhat misleading title: *Артикул воинскии. Купно с процесом надлежащии судящым*, Санкт-Петербург 1717. In this book, we used the copy kept by: РНБ, Отдел редких книг, инв. № 202 (шифр хранения П-225а-2). The title page was followed by a seven-page (unpaginated) preamble issued by Peter I. The military articles were contained on pages 1-152; the military process on renumbered pages 1-73; similarly, Book III spanned pages 1-109, accompanied by a three-page table of contents.

[745] Book I began with the words: "We, Peter the First, by God's grace the All-Russian autocrat..." The act ended with a standard in which the tsar informed the public that he retained the right to make amendments of any kind, and bound soldiers and officers to obedience. Book II began in a similar manner; see KWPI, pp. 91–93, 175, 225.

[746] In February 1716, the tsar arrived in Gdańsk, where he met with Augustus II in April. At that time, the Russian ruler was also planning to formally assume sovereignty over Gdańsk; see U. Kosińska, *Sejm 1719–1720 a sprawa ratyfikacji traktatu wiedeńskiego*, Warszawa 2003, p. 29; J. Trzoska, *Gdański handel i żegluga wobec zmian układu sił w Europie podczas wielkiej wojny północnej*, "Słupskie Studia Historyczne" 16 (2010), p. 52.

[747] *Книга Устав воинскии о должности генералов, фелт маршалов, и всего генералитеита, и протчих чинов, которые при войске надлежат быть, и о иных воинских делах, и поведениях, что каждому чинить должно. Напечатася повелением Царского Величества. В Санктпитербурхе лета Господня 1716. Иулуа в 19 день*, Санкт-Петербург 1716; *Книга Устав*



КНІГА
УСТАВЪ
ВОІНСКІИ.
О ДОЛЖНОСТИ ГЕНЕРАЛОВЪ, ФЕЛТЪ МАРШАЛОВЪ и всего Генералітета, и прочихъ чиновъ, которые при войскѣ надлежатъ быть, и о иныхъ войскихъ дѣлахъ, и поведеніяхъ, что каждому чинить должно.
КУПНО ПРИ СЕМЪ
АРТІКУЛЪ
ВОІНСКІИ.
ИСЪ
ПРОЦЕСОМЪ
НАДЛѢЖАЩІМЪ КЪ СУДЯЩЫМЪ.
И ЭКСЕРЦІЦІЕЮ
О ЦЕРЕМОНІЯХЪ
и должностяхъ воінскимъ людемъ надлѣжащихъ.

НАПЕЧАТАСЯ
ПОВЕЛѢНІЕМЪ
ЦАРСКАГО
ВЕЛІЧЕСТВА
ВЪ САНКТЪПІТЕРБУРГСКОИ ТІПОГРАФІИ,
ЛѢта Господня 1719,
Октября въ 29 день.



Буде же мы за благо изобрѣтемъ впредь сверхъ сего нашего воінского уставу, и указовъ въ сеи книгѣ изображенныхъ, для лутчего исправленія и порядку при воіскахъ нашіхъ, какія указы или учрежденія выдашь, то должно всѣмъ нашімъ воіскъ высокімъ и нізкімъ служітелемъ и рядовымъ, оныя почітать и исполнять равно, такожде яко бы оныя въ семъ уставѣ изображены были.

данъ при данціхъ марта въ 30 день, 1716 году.

Подлінной Его Царскаго Величества уставъ за собственною Его Величества рукою.

Figure 11.1. Comprehensive codification of Russian military law published in 1719: a) title page; b) tsar's sanction of published normative acts; c) confirmation of the issuance of Book I in Gdańsk on March 30, 1716.
Source: *Книга Устав воински о должности генералов...*, Санкт-Петербург 1719.

was fashioned after German models and employed numerous provisions of Adam Weyde's *Regulations*, as discussed in more detail in the following section.

In turn, Book II became effective on April 26 (May 7) 1715, upon the publication of its unabridged version.[748] Nevertheless, the individual normative acts that comprised the entire book had been published earlier. As early as July 7 (July 18), 1712, *A Short Outline of Procedures or Court Cases* was published by the Swedish ober-auditor Ernst Friedrich Krompein, who was taken into Russian captivity in 1710, after which he entered the tsar's service in the same capacity.[749] Krompein was of German descent: born in Eisenberg in Thuringia, he received his legal

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воинскии о должности генералов, фелт маршалов, и всего генералитеита, и протчих чинов, которые при войске надлежат быть, и о иных воинских делах, и поведениях, что каждому чинить должно. Напечатася повелением Царского Величества. В Санктпитербурхе лета Господня 1717. Декабря в 15 день, Санкт-Петербург 1717. See П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, pp. 7–8; С.Н. Лютов, op. cit., p. 13.

[748] *Артикул воинскии купно с процесом надлежащии судящим. Напечатася повелением Царского Величества. В Санктпитербурхе Лета Господня 1715, Апреля 26 дня*, Санкт-Петербург 1715. Zob. П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, p. 52. Some Russian researchers believe that Book II did not take effect until 1716. See В. Савинков, *Краткий обзор исторического развития военно-уголовного законодательства*, Санкт-Петербург 1869, pp. 9–11; А.Н. Филиппов, *О наказании по законодательству Петра Великого в связи с реформой*, Санкт-Петербург 1891, p. 381. Later that year, in November, a Russian-German edition of Book II was published, albeit without *A Short Outline of Processes*; see *Артикул воинскии с кратким толкованием. Напечатася повелением Царскаго Величества. В Санктпитербурхе Лета Господня 1715, Ноября 16 дня*, Санкт-Петербург 1715.

[749] *Краткое изображение процессов или судебных тяжеб, против римских, цесарских и саксонских прав, учрежденное от Эрнста Фридриха Кромпена обераудитора. В Санкт Питербурхе, Лета 1712 июля 7*, Санкт-Петербург 1712. In 1715, the publication was certainly on sale in St. Petersburg; see П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, pp. 30, 53; Д.О. Серов, *Забытые редакции Артикула воинского и "Краткого изображения процессов или судебных тяжеб" (из истории кодификации военного законодательства России XVIII в.)*, "Lex russica" 2 (2013), pp. 113–121; P. Hoffmann, *Peter der Grosse als Militärreformer und Feldherr*, Frankfurt am Main 2010, p. 165; «*Ведомости времени» Петра Великого: В памят 200-летия 1-й русской газеты, 1708–1719*, вып. 2, Москва 1906, pp. 61–64; В.А. Шагаев, *Эволюция ответственности за уклонение от военной службы в период реформ Петра I*, "Военно-юридический журнал" 10 (2010), pp. 30–31.

education at the University of Jena. By the time the Russians captured Vyborg, Krompein had established himself as an experienced lawyer, practicing law in Reval and serving as an auditor in the Swedish army. He was versed in German and Swedish, but presumably never mastered Russian to a sufficient degree. Consequently, in early 1712, Krompein drafted a German-language version of the normative act, which was translated into Russian and accepted by Peter I.[750]

A Short Outline of Procedures or Court Cases was based primarily on solutions developed in Denmark. This normative act regulated military procedure, established the types of provost courts and their jurisdiction, and provided information on the types of punishments and their execution. Thus, the definitions of ordinary and severe corporal punishments, as well as the types of capital punishment, were replicated almost verbatim from the Danish military procedure of Christian V.[751] Instead, the procedure adopted in the Russian act was similar to that employed by the Saxon army. In addition, it used the provisions of Chapters X–XII of the *Short Article of 1706*, tested during the war with Sweden.[752]

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[750] М.П. Розенгейм, op. cit., p. 104; П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, pp. 10, 30, 38, 48–50, 52–53; P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia…*, pp. 383–390. In Sweden, where E. Krompein had served until then, educated lawyers enjoyed great esteem regardless of whether they served in the civil administration or in the army; see K.Å. Modéer, *Mixed Legal Systems in Early Modern Sweden: Judical Traditions and Reforms in an Expanding European Great Power – Some Concluding Remarks*, "Rättshistoriska studier," 26 (2014): *The Svea Court of Appeal in the Early Modern Period: Historical Reinterpretations and New Perspectives*, ed. Mia Korpiola, Stockholm 2014, p. 411. One should also bear in mind that lawyers serving in the army as military auditors, by virtue of their specialized training, also constituted the ranks of scholars who influenced the development of legal sciences; see M. Meumann, *Forum militare. Zirkulation, Transfer, Professionalisierung und Verwissenschaftlichung militärgerichtlichen Wissens im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert – ein Problemaufriss*, "Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit", 22 (2021), Themenheft: *Militärisches Wissen vom 16. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert*, Hrsg. von Oliver Kann und Michael Schwarz, p. 199.

[751] П.О. Бобровский, *Происхождение артикула воинского и изображения процессов Петра Великого*, Санкт-Петербург 1881, приложения, № 1, pp. 43–46.

[752] М.П. Розенгейм, op. cit., приложения, № 2, pp. 294–313.

Two years later, E. Krompein drafted a preliminary version of the Russian military articles based on the Swedish regulations he had known, i.e., King Charles XI's of 1683, which were a slightly modified version of King Gustav II Adolf's earlier articles of 1621.[753] The first chapters drafted essentially followed the layout and terminology of the Swedish articles.[754] Only three chapters were introduced that had no Swedish equivalent: *On libel, scolding and profanities* (Chapter 18), *On perjury and similar excesses* (Chapter 22), *On executioners and provosts* (Chapter 23).

The final version of the *Military Articles* was submitted to Peter I, who, with the help of his secretary Alexei Makarov, made the appropriate corrections (Figure 11.2).[755] Not included in the manuscript were the *Manifesto* and the *Oath*, which were published in the printed version, borrowed from the Swedish military code of Gustav II Adolphus and slightly altered.[756] Changes were introduced to a total of thirty-five articles (nos. 13, 22, 29, 39, 42, 44, 54, 65, 66, 68, 79, 97, 100 (see Figure 11.2), 107, 120, 121, 122, 123, 129, 132, 133, 137, 143, 148, 149, 151, 157, 163, 166, 169, 171, 181, 194, 203, 205), accounting for 16.7% of all regulations. Thus, many of the provisions replicated from Swedish legislation took on a slightly different character. The alterations included harsher penalties for violations of military

[753] П.О. Бобровский, *Происхождение артикула воинского…*, pp. 7–20.

[754] E. Anners, *Den karolinska militärstraffrätten och Peter den stores krigsartiklar*, Stockholm 1961, p. 16–19 (chapter titles and overview). L. Pauli offered a similar collation, albeit with different findings, which largely resulted from a comparison of the Petrine Code with the military articles of Gustav II Adolf (rather than Charles XI); see L. Pauli, op. cit., pp. 207–208. In this context, on should not overlook the influence of the Danish military articles of King Christian V (1683), which Pavel Bobrovsky compared with the *Military Articles with a Short Commentary*; see П.О. Бобровский, *Происхождение артикула воинского…*, приложения, № 2, pp. 43–46.

[755] *Воинский артикул*, [n.p., 1714], РГБ, ОР, ф. 409 Пётр I (1672–1725), к. 1 ед. 1.

[756] П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого…*, pp. 48–53. Russian legal codifiers were already familiar with this form of the *Manifesto*, which had been included in the *Regulations of Years Past*, published in 1705. For more on the *Oath*, see В.Н. Бенда, *«Присяга на верность…» как одно из средств формирования традиций русской армии и патриотизма в России XVIII века*, "Вестник Челябинского государственного университета" 12 (2009), История, вып. 31, pp. 56–62.



Figure 11.2. The original version of the *Military Articles* bearing Peter I's remarks .
Source: *Воинский артикул*, [n.p., 1714], РГБ, ОР, ф. 409, Пётр I (1672–1725), к. 1, ед. 1, л. 46об.

discipline against superiors, and more relaxed measures in matters of external discipline, i.e., relations between soldiers and civilians.[757]

Notably, the Russian *Military Articles* were less repressive compared to analogous laws existing in Europe. Capital punishment remained the dominant type of sanction, but unlike in the seventeenth century, its enforcement was greatly reduced in favor of other measures (typical military sanctions: heavy and discretionary).[758] Mutilation—severing a hand, ear, nose, two fingers, or nailing a hand to the gallows—featured less regularly in Russian military law, but decimation was a relatively frequent measure. The gravest offences were punished by death or infamy. Others used included: corporal punishment (flogging/punishment through the ranks), pecuniary punishment (confiscation of pay or property), and deprivation of liberty combined sentencing to the galleys. Demotion and outright expulsion from military service were also options.[759] For a comparison of general trends, see Charts 9 and 10. We have adopted the military articles of Ladislaus IV Vasa (1633), in force in certain Polish-Lithuanian units, as a frame of reference. They mirrored some of the most popular Swedish regulations, issued by Gustavus Adolphus in 1621. Swedish patterns were copied not only in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also in the German Reich, England, Prussia-Brandenburg, and among the English colonists in Virginia (1675).[760]

[757] P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia...*, p. 385.
[758] Ibidem, p. 387. See W. Organiściak, *Kara śmierci w prawie wojskowym Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej od XVI do XVIII wieku*, "Problemy Prawa Karnego" 20 (1994), pp. 79–92.
[759] For more on the subject, P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia...*, pp. 387–388.
[760] K. Łopatecki, *Najstarsze północnoamerykańskie artykuły wojskowe*, "Czasopismo Prawno–Historyczne" 65 (2013), 1, pp. 198–199.



Chart 9. Types of sanctions in the *Military Articles*. Source: own study based on KWPI pp. 175–290.



Chart 10. Types of sanctions stipulated in King Ladislaus IV's Articles for the Foreign Troops. Source: own study based on: *Polskie ustawy i artykuły wojskowe…*, pp. 209–224.

Following minor corrections, the military procedure was published by a governmental publishing press.[761] The second page of the print indicates its official nature: *Повелением его Царского Величества всероссийскаго напечатася сия книга „Процесов или судебных тяжеб" в Санкт-Питербурхе* (*This book of "Procedures or Court Cases" was printed in St. Petersburg by order of His Majesty the Tsar of All-Russia*). Meanwhile, the *Military Articles with a Short Commentary* were published somewhat later, on December 22, 1714. (January 2, 1715), and then twice more in 1715, in two versions: an unabridged version in Russian and an abridged version in Russian and German (without the *A Short Outline of Procedures or Court Cases*).[762] Also deserving mention is the combined edition of 1717, collating the unabridged test of Book II and Book III of the Petrine Code.[763] It begs the question: why did the legislator only include two books in the edition? Why was Book I excluded from the print? Perhaps such a solution stemmed from the fact that, in the event of a discipline violation, it would be easier to simultaneously identify which article was breached specifically (Book II, part one – *Military Articles*), while also employing a readily available procedure (Book II, part two – *A Short Outline of Procedures or Court Cases*) and relate it to the obligations vested in the soldiers (Book III). This type of solution may explain

[761] Д.О. Серов, *Из истории военного законодательства России XVIII века: «Краткое изображение процессов или судебных тяжеб» (разыскания о внешней истории текста), [in:] Война и оружие...*, ч. 3: *Труды Третьей междунар. научно-практич. конф. (16–18 мая 2012 года),* [науч. ред. С.В. Ефимов], Санкт-Петербург 2012, pp. 180–186.

[762] *Инструкции и Артикулы военные, при том же и краткая примечания. Напечатаны повелением Царского Величества. В Санктпитербурхе, Лета Господня, 1714. Декабря в 22 день*, Санкт-Петербург 1714; *Артикул воинскии...Лета Господня 1715, Апреля 26 дня...* (Russian version, unabridged); *Артикул воинскии...Лета Господня 1715, Ноября 16 дня...* (Russian-German version, abridged).

[763] *Артикул воинскии купно с процесом надлежащии судящим. Напечатася повелением Царского Величества. В Санктпитербурхе Лета Господня 1715, Февраля 4 дня*, Санкт-Петербург 1717.

the absence of Book I—which was devoted principally to army organization—in the aforementioned edition of the code.

Book III was eventually published on April 26 (May 7), 1715.[764] It included the provisions in force in the Russian army as of the start of the Great Northern War (part one)[765] and an virtual reiteration of the military regulations originally drafted by General Weyde in 1698[766] (part three). In turn, the second part of Book III, *On Marching Preparations*, was based on the regulations drafted by the Saxon Field Marshal Jakob Flemming.[767]

Thus, one may conclude that the codification of Russian military law was a complex, multi-stage process. Individual normative acts regulating military issues were published between 1712 and 1716. Concurrently, individual acts were consolidated into a single collection, as was the case with the *Military Articles with a Short Commentary* and A *Short Outline of Procedures or Court Cases*, first printed in 1715. By 1719, all the books were bundled into a comprehensive body of law, ultimately codifying Russian military law (Figure 11.1).[768]

The above findings raise an extremely important question about Adam Weyde's role in the codification of Russian military law. We believe that he should be considered as the coordinator and actual originator of

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[764] *Книга о экзерциции, церемониях и должностях воинским людем надлежащих. Напечатана повелением царскаго величества в Санктпитербурхе, лета Господня 1715 г. Апреля 26 дня*, Санкт-Петербург 1715; see Ю.Ю. Битовт, *Редкие русские книги и летучие издания XVIII века*, Москва 1905, p. 29.

[765] The publication also contained a variety of measures borrowed from France; see ЭСБЕ, т. 6а, Санкт-Петербург 1892, p. 930; П.О. Бобровский, *Военные законы Петра Великого...*, pp. 10–11. Additionally, this part of the code included numerous references to the provisions introduced by Adam Weyde in 1698.

[766] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., 1–109 лл.

[767] Б.В. Колобов, М.И. Сизиков, *Армия и флот. Тексты нормативных актов. Предисловие*, [in:] *Законодательство Петра I*, отв. ред. А.А. Преображенский, Т.Е. Новицкая; коллектив авторов: В.М. Клеандрова и др., Москва 1997, p. 143; A. Баиов, op. cit., pp. 95–98.

[768] Памятники русского права..., p. 279.

the entire codification project. Our contention rests on three assumptions, which we rank according to their respective importance: the account of Adam Weyde's adjutant Peter Henry Bruce, the analysis of the legislation drafted, and its temporal correlation.

Of primary importance is the information included in the memoirs of the aforementioned adjutant general. It concerns the period after his superior's passing (1720) and before Bruce's own imminent departure from Russia (1721). Reporting on the injustice of Russian courts and Peter I's attempts to reform them, Bruce noted: "This new regulation [regarding the possibility of appeal and the institution of public defenders] was highly acceptable to all his majesty's subjects, but more especially: to the lower class: and as they had hitherto no written laws, the emperor caused a code to be composed of the civil law, in as plain, short, and easy a method as possible, agreeable to the method which marshal[769] Weyde had formerly adopted, in compiling the military law; which was contained in a small pocket volume, printed in the Russian and German languages, and of which every officer had one given to him for his instruction."[770]

Peter Henry Bruce's account is highly credible. First, he had no need to ingratiate himself with Weyde in any way, since the general had already died by the time Bruce resigned from the tsar's service. Secondly, the Scotsman does not describe the codification of Russian military law in detail, but merely mentions it in passing. It was not his purpose to fabricate this theme, as it was not the subject of his account. As a soldier and direct subordinate of General Weyde, he was well versed in the workings of the Russian army and the reforms to military law implemented at the

[769] In actuality, a general; Western European publications often incorrectly referred to Adam Weyde as a marshal or field marshal.

[770] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 222–223. This information comes primarily from German studies, following the translation of Bruce's diaries into German; see idem, *Nachrichten von seinen Reisen...*, pp. 260–261.



):(†):(

БОГУ

ЕДІНОМУ СЛАВА,

ВОІНСКІМЪ АРТІКУЛАМЪ

ГЛАВА ПЕРВАЯ.

О СТРАСЪ БОЖІИ.

АРТІКУЛЪ І.

Хотя всѣмъ обще, и кат дому хрїстіанїну без. ізъятія надлежитъ, хрїст анско и честно жїть, и не въ лїцемѣрномъ страсѣ божїи содержать себя: однакоже сїи салдаты, и воїнскія люди съ вящшею ревностію, уважать, и внїмать имѣютъ. понеже оныхъ богъ въ такое состоянїе опредѣлилъ, въ кото-

Figure 11.3. Bilingual Russian-German edition of the *Military Articles of 1715*.
The copy bears marks of continuous use by officers. While not all of the entries are legible; the first owner of the book was Lieutenant Colonel Frezer, followed by Johan Bruchener, as well as Second Lieutenant of the Semyonovsky Regiment Ivan Nikiforovich Rudakov and sergeant of the same regiment, Andrei Andreyevich Volkov; the copy also includes a note with the year date, "1734."
Source: РНБ, Отдел редких книг, шифр хранения П-170 (инв. № 168).

time. Finally, the surviving copies of the bilingual normative acts, which bear the marks of intensive use (see Figure 11.3c) corroborate Bruce's testimony.[771]

What, then, can one infer from the cited passage from the adjutant's memoirs? First, that the idea concerning the codification of military law should be attributed precisely to Adam Weyde. We believe it was he who sought to collate the individual books of military law, and

[771] Some of the surviving copies of military laws contain information of their purchase. Such was the case with a book issued on April 3, 1716, annotated with an inscription confirming its transfer from Tolbugin's Regiment from Lieutenant Mikhail Isakov on July 15, 1719. The buyer was one Alexei Unikovsky. РНБ, Отдел редких книг, инв. № 179 (шифр хранения П-196), p. 122ff, unpaginated pages at the end of the table of contents.



):(†):(

GOTT

allein die Ehre.

Der

Kriegs-Artickeln

I. Capitel/

Von der

GOttes-Furcht.

ARTIC: I.

NAchdem allen und jeden Christen ins-gemein und ohne Unterscheid obliget/ ein Christliches/ erbahres Leben und Wandel zu führen/ und in ungeheuchelter Gottes-Furcht einherzugehen; So muß doch solches von Soldaten und Kriegesleuten umb noch so vielmehr und eyfferiger erwogen und in acht genommen werden/ weil sie GOtt in einen solchen Stand gesetzet/ darin-

A nen



to consolidate them into a single code in 1719. In addition, Peter Henry Bruce mentions that booklets in German and Russian were printed in the form of convenient "pocket volumes." According to the adjutant, they were widely popular, with virtually every officer carrying one (Figure 11.3). This was hardly surprising in Europe. When describing Stefan Czarniecki's Polish division half a century earlier, Polish diarist Jan Chryzostom Pasek noted that, "he should not consider himself an officer who does not carry those [military articles] in his pocket at all times."[772]

An analysis of different editions of Russian military laws demonstrates that the individual books of the military code were printed as

[772] J.Ch. Pasek, *Pamiętniki*, ed. R. Pollak, Warszawa 1989, p. 45.

compact bilingual Russian-German booklets, with foreign officers serving in the Russian army as their intended readers (the bilingual versions were, of course, supplementary to the basic monolingual editions in Russian; Figure 11.1). The text was arranged alternately in both languages, with every Russian page followed by another in German, bearing the same content. The pocket format of the publication allowed officers to easily slip it in their jacket pockets. This is evidenced by the editions mentioned above, Book II (*Military Articles*) of 1715 and Book I (*Military Law*) of 1717.[773]

The second premise confirming our assumption is a juxtaposition of the *Military Code of 1716* with Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698* (see Table 6). The first part of the *Regulations* details the rights and obligations of the soldiers and officers serving in a regiment. Eighteen years later, this part formed the third and final section of the *Military Code*. Of the thirty-eight (unnumbered) points comprising the codification of twenty-six legal norms, ten found their way into Book I.[774] We have observed complete (albeit not verbatim) correspondence in eleven cases. Partially overlapping regulations accounted for twenty-four cases, with those contained in Book III (fifteen) showing much more similarity than those observed in Book I of the *Military Code* (nine). In three instances, the norm contained in the *Military Regulations* did not feature in the *Military Code*.

[773] *Книга Устав воинскии о должности генералов, фелт маршалов, и всего генералитеита...*, Санкт-Петербург 1717.

[774] In the instances where Book I of the *Military Code of 1716* includes a corresponding provision, pagination from this edition is listed in parentheses; see KWPI.

Table 6. Comparison of the provisions contained in Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698* compared to the prescriptions of Books I and III of Peter I's *Military Code of 1716*.

Military Regulations	*Military Code*	Similarity (R/P/O)
What, namely, constitutes a soldier	What does it mean to be soldier?	P
On the soldiers' rota	On the infantry rota	P
An infantry rota comprises the following ranks	On the infantry rota	P
Captain	On the captain	R
×	On the lieutenant captain	O
Lieutenant	On the lieutenant	P
×	On the second lieutenant	O
Standard bearer	On the standard bearer	R
Sergeant	On the sergeant	P
Cadet	On the cadet	P
Capternamus	On the capternamus	R
Company scribe	On the company scribe	P
Company doctor	On the company doctor	P
Corporal	On the corporal	R
Private	On the private	R
Leib-Schütz	On the Leib-Schütz	R
Drummer	On the drummer	R
On the battalion	×	O
On the infantry regiment	On the infantry regiment	P
A regiment features the following commanders	The staff officers are as follows	P
They are followed by the successive regimental ranks	Regimental officers on the staff	P
Colonel	On the colonel	P
Lieutenant colonel	On the lieutenant colonel	R

Military Regulations	*Military Code*	Similarity (R/P/O)
Major	On the major	R
Regimental quartermaster	On the regimental quartermaster	P
Regimental adjutant	On the regimental adjutant	P
×	On the regimental adjutant	O
Regimental camp commander	On the regimental camp commander	P
Artillery major	×	O
×	Regimental provisions master	O
×	On the regimental doctor	O
Regimental provost	On the regimental provost	R
Brigade	On the brigade	R (p. 99)
Brigadier	On the brigadier	P (p. 114)
What, namely, is an army	On the army	P (p. 100)
Generalissimus	On the generalissimus	P (pp. 102–103)
Infantry general	On the infantry general	P (p. 110)
General feldzeugmeister	General feldzeugmeister	P (p. 108)
Commissary general	On the war commissary	P (pp. 111–112)
Quartermaster general	On the quartermaster general	P (pp. 115–116)
Adjutant general	On the adjutant general	P (pp. 119–120)
Auditor general	On the auditor general	P (pp. 118–119)
Engineer general	×	O

Legend: O – original provision, P – partially borrowed from Adam Weyde's *Regulations*, – replicated from Adam Weyde's *Regulations*.
Source: own study.

The second, third and fourth parts of the *Regulations*—as we identify them (see Chapter 5)—were integrated into the first part of Book III

of the *Code*. Unfortunately, Peter's military law contains no prints modeled on the illustrations of soldiers that accompanied the *Regulations* (nor were they annotated as painstakingly as in Weyde's 1698 text). The commands in both documents are identical, save for minor linguistic differences. On the other hand, there is hardly any correspondence in the provisions concerning bayonet weapon grips, expanded in the *Code* when compared with Weyde's proposals. The same is true of grenadier activities. The third part of the *Regulations* also found its reflection in the *Code*. It concerns the maneuvers of the troops: military rotations, doubling of rows and ranks, platoon firing, and forming the *battaillon de quarre*. Reloading while kneeling, detailed in part four of Weyde's *Regulations*, devoted to the conduct of continuous fire, is absent from the 1716 document. Conversely, the second part of Book III of the Petrine *Code*, (*On marching preparations*) has no precedent in Weyde's *Regulations*. Finally, the fifth part of the *Regulations*, which concerned guard duty, became part of Chapters 49, 51-52 of the *Code*. In conclusion, Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698* constitute more than half of the substance of Book III of Peter I's *Military Code of 1716*. The general's work also served as a benchmark in the drafting of provisions concerning staff officers and the principles of guard duty in Book I. Thus, the regulations developed by the tsar's associate back in the late seventeenth century did not merely inspire the solutions adopted in the *Code*, but in fact lay at their foundation.

The third premise is the temporal factor. It is puzzling that the institution of a military code, first ushered in 1698–1700, was put on hold during Adam Weyde's captivity. It was only after his return in 1711 that the entire process resumed. Unfortunately, the general's itinerary and correspondence are too fragmented to directly tie his person to the publication of each book of the *Code*. One instance, however, provides indisputable evidence of his participation in the process. The work on Book

I (*Military Law*) concluded in Gdańsk on March 24, 1716. At that time, the tsar "attended the liturgy, and [then] the regulations were read out at Field Marshal [Sheremetev's] house."[775] In addition to the sovereign and members of the general staff, including Adam Weyde, the tsar's envoy plenipotentiary to Poland, Prince Vasily Dolgorukov, also participated in the council. Supplemented with a preamble, the act was promulgated six days later. The preamble included a reference to the first Russian military regulations of 1647.[776] It also stated that, thanks to the reforms implemented, the Russian state was able to conquer the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and contend with Sweden. However, subsequent negligence led to military decline, as evidenced by the failed Chyhyryn and Crimean campaigns, as well as the first Azov expedition and the Battle of Narva. Nevertheless, after some transitional difficulties, the Russian army underwent proper modernization, which was also duly noted in the preamble: "Thereafter, with the army put in order, and with the help of the Almighty, we have made great progress in our struggle with a famous and modern nation. Thus, everyone can judge that such an outcome was the consequence of nothing but good order: for the lawless barbaric customs are laughable, nor can any good be expected therefrom. Therefore, those proficient in these matters, for the sake of greater good, drafted this Military Code, so that every soldier may know his duties and the obligations according to his rank, without excusing himself for his ignorance."[777]

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[775] Б.П. Шереметев, генерал-фельдмаршал. Выписки..., л. 12.

[776] At that time, a translation of Johann Jacob von Wallhausen's seminal theoretical treatise *The Art of War on Foot* (originally published in German as *Kreigskunst zu Fuss*) was printed, which took on the characteristics of official Russian regulations (in "regiments of foreign provenance"). Two years later, the book–now supplemented with prints imported from the Netherlands–went into circulation under the title *The Training and Methods of Forming Ranks of Men on Foot*; see O. Rusakovskiy, *The Russian Edition...*, pp. 1–25.

[777] KWPI, pp. 92–93.

In conclusion, the codification of military law was too complex and extensive a process to be the work of any one man. Peter I himself was heavily involved in its development, reading and making relevant amendments to the final drafts of the various books of the *Military Code* (Figure 11.2). Ernst Friedrich Krompein, who was in charge of the drafts comprising Book II of Peter's *Code*, also played a vital role in its publication (Figures 11.3a and 11.3b). Undoubtedly, however, the coordinator and initiator (or co-initiator) of the entire venture was none other than Adam Weyde. Not only were his own *Military Regulations* of 1698 incorporated into the *Code*, but also the regulations developed in 1711, which concerned the marching principles. Weyde's participation in the development of the normative acts is particularly evident in Books I and III. There is much to suggest that the tsar's associated was also the originator of the 1719 merger of the respective books of the code into a single comprehensive body of work, so that no one might suggest that they were independent publications.[778] It was through no coincidence that Weyde was also appointed Russia's supreme military judge, as detailed in Chapter 12.

[778] To attribute the development of the entire code to Adam Weyde would be somewhat of an overreach or shorthand; see Е.А. Плешкевич, *Эволюция правовых представлений о документе в XVIII – первой половине XIX в.: по материалам законодательства*, [in:] *Документы. Архив. История. Современность. Материалы VII Всероссийской научно-практической конференции с международным участием. Екатеринбург, 16–18 ноября 2018 г.*, отв. ред. Л.Н. Мазур, Екатеринбург 2018, p. 178.

12. AT THE TOP

Adam Weyde's later years were marked by increased involvement in matters concerning the military and state administration. This was because Peter I chose to capitalize on his commander's organizational talents and extensive knowledge, entrusting him with responsibilities associated with the modernization of the state structures. In the mid-1710s, the tsar elected to dismantle the *prikazes*, which he saw as obsolete offices of the central state administration. They were to be replaced by new institutions, known as collegiums, whose work had already proven successful in Western European countries. It was therefore necessary to establish a modern administrative apparatus in Russia as a foothold for a thoroughly efficient state. It was not merely a matter of nomenclature, but that of well-organized structures and institutions ensuring the smooth functioning of the country. Above all, the newly constituted central administration authorities called for suitably educated individuals, and those were virtually impossible to find in Russia. To answer the call, in August 1715 Adam Weyde submitted a draft of his own resolution to Peter I, entitled *On inviting scholars of jurisprudence to Russia*. The document concerned the recruitment of foreign specialists, primarily lawyers, for the tsar's service. To incentivize potential candidates to move to St. Petersburg and work at the collegiums, exceptional remuneration was offered in the form of an annual salary of 500 rubles, along with accommodation paid for by

the state, a suitable rank in the Russian civil servant hierarchy, and the assistance of qualified interpreters.[779]

The tsar accepted the general's proposals and instructed him to determine as to which European central administration system best fitted Russia. Weyde was also tasked with recruiting people "versed and knowledgeable in legal matters, in order to handle matters at the collegiums." Weyde launched his recruitment operation in the lands seized from Sweden during the then-ongoing war (Estonia and Livonia), before continuing it in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the principalities of the Reich.[780] Weyde did not limit the headhunt to lawyers, also recruiting artisans and representatives of other professions and potentially of use to Russia. For example, in 1716, a physician named Georg Remus was hired in Gdańsk, with the future task of studying and documenting the famed mineral springs of Martial Waters, discovered near Olonets.[781] Ensuring Dr. Remus's safe passage to Russia in 1717 fell precisely to General Weyde.[782]

There is no doubt that as a recruiter of candidates for service during his activity as an administrative reformer, Adam Weyde drew on the knowledge gained and contacts established in the course of his yearslong

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[779] ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 2928; C. Peterson, op. cit., p. 124. The annual salary of a foreign official (specialist) as quoted in the document was similar to the annual salary offered to a foreigner in the rank of major who served as adjutant general in the Russian army at the time (i.e., 516 rubles); see ibidem, т. 4, № 2319.

[780] С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 264; C. Peterson, op. cit., p. 123.

[781] In 1719, the springs in the vicinity of Olonets were recognized for their therapeutic value, prompting the construction of a water pump room in the village, named Martial Waters (Rus. *Martsialnye Vody*), which effectively became Russia's first spa; see G. Remus, *De Aquis Martialibus Oloniecensibus, Epistola ad...*, [apud:] J.P. Breynii, *Epistola de melonibus petrefactis montis carmel vulgo creditis...*, Lipsiae 1722, pp. 25–34.

[782] *Первый исследователь Сибири Д.Г. Мессершмидт. Письма и документы. 1716–1721*, сост. Е.Ю. Басаргина и др., Санкт-Петербург 2019, pp. 42–43, письма и документы, № 10, p. 187.

captivity in Sweden.[783] Of these individuals, Holstein civil servant Heinrich von Fick played a particular part[784] (in the years prior, from 1700 onward, von Fick served in the Swedish army as a regimental scribe and regimental quartermaster). Before officially enlisting in Russian service in 1717, von Fick was dispatched on a secret mission to Stockholm. Starting in late 1715, he spent more than a year as a spy, gathering information as required by his principals. He was primarily interested in the workings of the Swedish state administration bodies. Charles XII's monarchy was to serve as the framework for the Russian reform of state offices. Given Sweden's fairly close ties with the Duchy of Holstein, the tsar's agent had little trouble accessing many documents pertaining to the work of the royal administrative commission. However, transcribing thousands of pages of text was a daunting challenge, running the risk of capital punishment if discovered. Adam Weyde was named the Holsteinian's supervisor, coordinating his espionage activity.[785] It is evident that when dealing with his protégé, Weyde drew on his own experience as a captive in Sweden (see Chapter 7).

[783] E. von Puttkamer, *Einflüsse schwedischen Rechts auf die Reform Peters des Grossen*, "Zeirtschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht" 19 (1958), pp. 377–378; R. Wittram, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 115. The aforementioned Russian resident in Sweden, Prince Andrei Khilkov, was known to have undertaken large-scale espionage operations; see Г.В. Шебалдина, *«Северная война» резидента Хилкова…*, p. 55. See C. Peterson, op. cit., p. 70.

[784] There are discrepancies as to exactly when the Russians recruited von Fick. He was likely the subject of Weyde's letter to the tsar, posted on November 13, 1715, although there is strong evidence that the two met as early as December 1714; see C. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 66–67, 70–71.

[785] Я.И. Прокопенко, *Генрих Фик и процесс интернационализации российской политической элиты в первой половине XVIII в.,* [in:] *Правящие элиты и дворянство России во время и после петровских реформ (1682–1750),* отв. сост. Н.Н. Петрухинцев, Л. Эррен, Москва 2012, pp. 160–161; C. Peterson, op. cit., p. 73. The collaboration between Adam Weyde and Heinrich von Fick evolved into a friendship. In 1717, the general's daughter Maria became one of the godmothers to von Fick's daughter Aurora (the other godmother was Maria Aurora von Königsmark, Augustus II's mistress and mother of the prominent leader Maurice de Saxe).

In December 1716, the general informed the tsar that Heinrich von Fick had completed his mission and returned from Stockholm. His contributions to the modernization of Russia were invaluable, for it was the intelligence he had exported that helped establish the collegiums and set the judicial reform in motion.[786] Heinrich von Fick was also the author of the so-called *General Regulations*, a code of civil service that came into effect in 1720.[787]

The Holsteinian's espionage efforts were instrumental in the introduction of the collegiate system in Russia. Moreover, under the tsar's decree of 1717 (no monthly or daily date given), Heinrich von Fick became involved in the translation and editing of the documentation regulating the activities of the new institutions. In keeping with Peter I's intentions, he joined Jacob Bruce and Adam Weyde on a task force charged with training the presidents of the collegiums for their prospective positions.[788] The tsar reiterated his will with another decree, promulgated on January 21, 1718, whereby he instructed the collegial presidents to seek any advice

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[786] Я.И. Прокопенко, *«Политический инженер» Генрих фон Фик и феномен реформ Петра I*, [in:] *Феномен реформ на западе и востоке Европы в начале Нового времени (XVI–XVIII вв.)*, отв. ред. М.М. Кром, Л.А. Пименова, Санкт-Петербург 2013, pp. 323–337; А.Н. Андреев, *Протестанты в составе российского высшего чиновничества при Петре I*, "Новый исторический вестник" 49 (2016), 3, p. 13; РБС, т. 21: *Фабер – Цявловский*, Санкт-Петербург 1901, pp. 73–75; А.А. Рогожин, *Тайные агенты русского правительства в Швеции в 1719–1721 годах*, [in:] *Война и оружие…*, ч. 4, Санкт-Петербург 2016, pp. 405–416; Я.И. Ларина, *Генрих фон Фик (1678–1750): служба иноземца в России первой половины XVIII века. Диссертация на соискание степени кандидата исторических наук*, Москва 2018, pp. 41–42, https://www.dissercat.com/content/genrikh-fon-fik-1678–1750-sluzhba-inozemtsa-v-rossii-pervoi-poloviny-xviii-veka (accessed September 20, 2020).

[787] ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3129, 3196, 3207; т. 6, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 3534; т. 7, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 4482. For more on the subject, see C. Peterson, op. cit., passim.

[788] Н.А. Воскресенский, op. cit., № 266, p. 221; C. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 89–90. In the decree, Peter I justified his decision by the fact that Jacob Bruce was still away because of his active involvement in the war effort, while General Weyde was "insufficiently trained" for the task, i.e., he did not yet possess adequate knowledge of the Swedish institutions, intended as a benchmark for the Russian reforms.

from von Fick, whose expertise in the field was the most comprehensive.[789] Nevertheless, although Peter I appreciated the foreigner's contribution, he nonetheless sought the advice of his trusted experts on every occasion. One of them was Adam Weyde, whom the tsar requested to address von Flick's suggestions and submit his own blueprint for the functioning of the new central offices based on the Swedish model.[790] As a result of the above efforts, nine collegiums were established, supervising: Foreign Affairs, War and Admiralty (known as the main collegiums), State Income (Kamer-Kolegium), Justice, Accounting, Commerce, State Chamber, and Mining and Manufactures, respectively.[791] The reform envisaged a minimum of two foreign assessors in every collegium, along with newly recruited scribes. The ideal candidates were to be familiar with chancery procedures and administrative proceedings. To this end, von Fick (supervised by Adam Weyde) was to travel to Silesia in 1717 and recruit scribes, preferably ones who spoke Polish or another Slavic language.[792]

After the establishment of the College of War (*de iure* in 1717, though the office only went into operation in 1719), its First President was the all-powerful Alexander Menshikov. His deputy, or the Second President (also known as the Vice President), was General Adam Weyde.[793] It was he who, upon returning from Mecklenburg to St. Petersburg (Figure 12.1), effectively organized the work at the college and steered the drafting regulations and guidelines governing the composition and activities

[789] Н.А. Воскресенский, op. cit., № 267, p. 221.
[790] Э.Н. Берендст, *Барон А.Х. ф. Люберас и его записка об устройстве коллегий в России. (Речь, произнесенная на годичном акте Археологического института 12 мая 1891 г. магистром Санкт-Петербург университет Э. Берендтсом),* Санкт-Петербург 1891, p. 4.
[791] For more on the subject, see М.В. Бабич, *Государственные учреждения XVIII века…*; C. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 88–89.
[792] C. Peterson, op. cit., p. 125.
[793] ИПС, т. 5, p. 117; ВЭ, т. 6, Санкт-Петербург 1912, p. 475; M. Klonowski, *Im Dienst des Hauses Hannover: Friedrich Christian Weber als Gesandter im Russischen Reich und in Schweden 1714–1739*, Husum 2005, p. 107.

Figure 12.1. Plan of the fortress and city of St. Petersburg in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.
Adam Weyde's house marked with the letter "V," with the nearby Lutheran church listed under "a."
Source: Georg Paul Bush, St. Petersburg: Grundriss der Festung Statt und Situation, [Berlin ca. 1717–1721], РНБ, Отдел картографии, шифр хранения К 1-Пб 2/21, л. 1.

Grundriss
der Festung Statt und Situation
St. PETERSBURG
STROM
PETRUS ALEXIEWISCH
IMPERATOR SEMPER AUGUSTUS
CAAR ET AUTOCRATOR TOTIUS RASSIÆ

of the institution, among others. Drawing on Swedish solutions, he proposed the appointment of three assessors with the rank of major general, each of whom would be responsible for one type of troops (artillery, infantry and cavalry). For this, a support apparatus was established at the college, managed by a chancellor (director) for military affairs, supported by three secretaries, six scribes, a German translator, an archivist, and chancellery staff. The college was to further include a judicial division with two auditors, a prosecutor and a foreign secretary. In total, Adam Weyde aimed to employ twenty-three civil servants. However, the College of War was rapidly expanding, and by 1719 the auxiliary staff alone grew to fifty-five.[794] In 1720, the entire college structure consisted of sixty-nine workers.[795] Notably, officials of the College of War were also frequently assigned to work in other central offices. As Weyde was keenly aware of the need for appropriate personnel transfers between institutions, in 1719 he permitted foreigners Sigismund Adam Wolf and a clerk named Till to transfer from the College of War to the Collegium of Justice, to work in the capacity of counselor and assessor, respectively.[796]

[794] Adam Weyde ordered salary reductions for the year to reduce the cost of the college's clerical services from 9,065 to 8,524 rubles. He envisioned the largest reduction for the mid-level staff: chancellery staff (from 250 to 143 rubles) and the highest-ranking secretaries (from 500 to 429 rubles; salaries of foreign secretaries were cut from 600 to 500 rubles); see П.О. Бобровский, *Развитие способов и средств для образования…*, приложение № 1, p. 8.

[795] C. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 400–402.

[796] Л.М. Балакирева, *Военные на службе в Юстиц-коллегии (1718–1719),* [in:] *Кровь. Порох. Лавры. Войны России в эпоху барокко (1700–1762). Сборник материалов Всероссийской научной конференции*, отв. ред. С.В. Ефимов, вып. 1, Санкт-Петербург 2002, p. 18. For more on the clerical structure of the college, including the significant percentage of foreign employees (primarily newcomers from various Reich states), see Н.Н. Петрухинцев, *Немцы в политической элите России в первой половине XVIII века*, [in:] *«Вводя нравы и обычаи Европейские в Европейском народе»: к проблеме адаптации западных идей и практик в Российской империи*, отв. сост. А.В. Доронин, Москва 2008, p. 82.

The general likewise drafted the relevant regulations for the general staff, field army and garrison regiments.[797] One of these measures was an eighteen-point resolution, which he co-signed with fellow senior military commanders: Alexander Menshikov, Boris Sheremetev, Roman Bruce, Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach and Johann Günther (Ivan Ginter); it concerned the implementation of more efficient management of garrisons stationed in the various governorates.[798]

Weyde's rising position in the state structures was validated on December 15, 1717, with his appointment as a senator, which made him a member of the Governing Senate. This institution predated Peter I's Danube expedition. The Senate was vested with supreme control over courts of law, ensured the growth of the state's streams of revenue, trade and finance, and should also supervise the activities of the governors. As such, it served as a senior executive authority in the day-to-day administrative affairs. In 1718, its institutional prerogatives expanded considerably, as the senators were joined by the presidents of the collegiums, i.e., the offices nominally overseen by the Senate.[799]

In 1718, Adam Weyde, along with other members of the general staff and the highest-ranking state officials, was among the 127 individuals comprising the Supreme State Court, all of whom signed a decree pronouncing Tsarevich Alexei Petrovich guilty of high treason.[800] As

[797] ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3383; т. 6, № 3511; С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 265.

[798] Копия. Пункты, по которым надлежит справнейшим образом поступать в губерниях во всех гарнизонах и что при том х которой команде пристойно и нужнейшею меру с ныняшнего 1719 году во осмотрении иметь, БАН, Тек. пост. № 662, л. 26–31об.

[799] Д.О. Серов, *Администрация Петра I*, Москва 2008, приложение № 3, p. 265. For more on Adam Weyde's work in the Governing Senate, see С. Петровский, *О Сенате Петра Великого. Историко-юридическое исследование*, Москва 1875, pp. 56, 337–338.

[800] Alexander Menshikov was the first to sign the verdict, while Adam Weyde did so as the eleventh commander, second only to the most senior ministers and army and naval commanders; see Приговор Верховного суда по делу царевича Алексея Петровича, 24 VI 1718, РГАДА, ф. 6 (Уголовные дела по государственным преступлениям), оп. 1т, д. 33, ч. 33, лл. 174–174об.;

previously noted, two years earlier, the tsar's son, likely unable to reconcile with his father's policies, fled Russia and sought asylum in the Holy Roman Empire. He was allegedly involved in a large-scale international campaign to overthrow Peter I. Deceptively brought back to Russia, he was detained in the Peter and Paul Fortress (Petropavlovskaya) in St. Petersburg as a political prisoner. During his imprisonment, he was tortured to reveal information regarding the involvement of other conspirators against the tsar. The repressive measures were far-reaching, leading to the incarceration of various nobles and officers associated with the tsarevich. Stripped of his right to inherit the Russian throne, Alexei died in prison under mysterious circumstances in 1718.[801]

Owing to his close friendship with Peter I, the general was widely perceived as being directly involved in the trial and subsequent death of Tsarevich Alexei. This perception found its reflection in the general's biographical note penned by Jerzy Adolf Wilhelm von Helbig, secretary of the Saxon legation in Russia between 1787 and 1796. In his account, Helbig dedicates a sizable portion of the narrative to Senator Weyde's involvement in the investigation, which included the torture of Alexei Petrovich. The Saxon diplomat also references a rumor prevalent in Russia at the time, suggesting that the tsar instructed his associate to procure poison from the court pharmacy for Alexei. According to this account, Peter I and the general then presented the brew to the tsarevich, and when he

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Acta Des Inquisitions-Processes, So zu St. Petersburg Wieder den Czaarowitz Herrn Alexium Petrowitz, Im Jahr 1718. angestellet..., Hamburg 1718, pp. 68–69; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit. т. 6, приложения, № 184, p. 533. One should note that Adam Weyde was one of three foreigners (the other two being General Polizeimeister Antony Devir and Colonel Johann Buholtz) who signed the verdict; see R. Wittram, op. cit., Bd. 2, p. 400.

[801] *Записка преставлению и погребению царевича Алексея Петровича*, „Отечественные записки" 20 (1842), отд. 2, pp. 38–39; Н.Г. Устрялов, op. cit., т. 6, passim; K. Jarochowski, *Car Piotr i carewicz Aleksy. Studium historyczne*, Kraków 1862 [Reprint from the "Czas" journal].

refused to consume it, they allegedly beheaded him with an ax.[802] While rather outlandish, this version of the tsarevich's death nonetheless suggests that the Russian elites saw Adam Weyde as the tsar's close friend and confidant.

Weyde was also among the individuals who adjudicated on the property left behind by the tragically deceased Tsarevich Alexei. Count Pyotr Tolstoy, a Russian diplomat who played a crucial role in persuading the tsarevich to return to his homeland and submit himself to his father's will, inquired about the principles of the division of assets. In a response dated August 15, 1718, General Weyde informed Tolstoy that, according to Peter I's decree, part of the tsarevich's land holdings would be transferred to his children, Natalya and Peter (the future Tsar Peter II); another portion would remain within the domain of the imperial court; still other estates would revert to their previous owners, including the Monastery of Saint Alexander Nevsky in St. Petersburg.[803]

The final years spent in the capital cemented Adam Weyde's reputation among his contemporaries (including Peter I) as an incorruptible, devout, competent, well-read individual, and an unwaveringly loyal servant of the tsar. While more capable and intelligent individuals certainly existed within the tsar's immediate circle, those of higher social and financial status, they frequently bartered their services for substantial financial rewards and significant personal ambitions. The newly established central and provincial offices created opportunities for such individuals to pursue their financial interests at the expense of the state treasury. Such circumstances forced Peter I to implement radical corrective measures in 1718. Among those implicated in fraud and misconduct were

[802] Г. Гельбиг, op. cit., pp. 80–82.

[803] С.Р. Долгова, *После приговора / Nach dem Urteil*, [in:] *Die Flucht des Thronfolgers Aleksiej. Krise in der „Balance of Power" und den österreichisch-russischen Beziehungen am Anfang des 18 Jahrhunderts*, Hrgst. I. Schwarcz, Berlin–Wien 2019, pp. 264–265.

his favorites, Alexander Menshikov, Governor of Siberia Prince Matvei Gagarin, and Prince Yakov Dolgorukov. Prince Dmitry Koltsov-Mosalsky, the commandant of Bakhmut, also faced allegations of embezzling funds—up to 60,000 rubles—from the sale of salt produced in the local saltworks[804] (with Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin attempting to "cover up" the scandal).[805]

The first blow to the corrupt machinery was the trial of Tsarevich Alexei. Beyond its political implications, Peter I sought to use it as a pretext to restore—or rather, establish—a proper bureaucratic ethos. This was noted by the French envoy Henry de La Vie (Lavie), who reported that several individuals involved in the embezzlement of state funds were executed at the time. On December 8, 1718, an hour after the execution of his son, the Tsar ordered the members of the Governing Senate to convene. He informed them that he had just punished "state criminals" and intended to take similar actions against the "leeches who, through their greed, have lined their pockets at the expense of their lawful Sovereign and his subjects." In view of the above, Peter I established a court, appointing Adam Weyde as its president and several other generals as assessors.[806]

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[804] Revenues from the salt works (private and state-owned), which had been operating since the sixteenth century on the Bakhmut River (a tributary of the Seversky Donets), were a vital source of revenue for the Russian state; see P. Krokosz, *Solnictwo w carskiej Rosji. Organizacja, technika wydobywcza, handel*, SMDŻ 29 (2014), pp. 184–185, 206.

[805] С.М. Соловьев, op. cit., кн. 8, т. 16, Москва 2001, p. 682; *Россия при Петре Великом, по рукописному известию Иоанна Готтгильфа Фоккеродта,* перевод с немецкого А.Н. Шемякина, [in:] ЧИОДР, кн. 2, отд. IV, Москва 1874, pp. 32–34; Н.А. Воскресенский, op. cit., № 59, p. 65; Ф.Х. Вебер, *Записки Вебера о Петре Великом и об его преобразованиях*, пер., предисл. и примеч. П.П. Барсов, "Русский архив" 6 (1872), col. 1142–1143. Prince Koltsov-Mosalsky died in 1718 while the case against him was underway. However, he did not escape punishment for his actions, as the tsar ordered his body to be exhumed and hung on the gallows, refusing to remove it for two months.

[806] *Донесения французских посланников и поверенных в делах при русском дворе и отчеты о пребывании русских послов, посланников и дипломатических агентов во Франции, с 1681 по 1718 г.,* [in:] СИРИО, т. 34, Санкт-Петербург 1881, № 139, pp. 395–397.

In fact, a general provost court was established to judge state criminals based on the *Military Articles of 1714*, which were integrated into the military code as Book II, in effect in the Russian army since 1716.[807]

The provost court was the single most important court operating in the Russian state at the time. In addition to its vital role related to upholding discipline in the army, its significance was much broader, as it comprised the sole body genuinely capable of countering the all-powerful aristocracy and the lawlessness of the top commanders.[808] This court was primarily intended to uproot endemic embezzlement, since the Russian army's budget exceeded 80% of all state spending.[809] Adam Weyde's actions demonstrated how the provisions of military law should be applied in practice.

The tsar reiterated his stance on the matter in January 1719 in an address to the nobility. He emphasized the challenges of state reforms and the ongoing war with Sweden, while also acknowledging the significant contributions of the entire Russian society. At the same time, the ruler noted that some individuals had undermined these efforts by committing abuses while holding public office. "Therefore," Peter I concluded, "I have decided to establish a court led by the chairman [i.e., president], Infantry General Adam Adamovich Weyde, who has never wronged me in any manner. The members [assessors] shall include Lieutenant Generals [Ivan] Buturlin and [Wolmar Anton von] Schlippenbach, Major Generals [Mikhail] Golitsyn and [Pavel] Yaguzhinsky, and Brigadiers [Mikhail] Volkov and [Andrey] Ushakov. The court shall conduct

[807] KWPI, pp. 175–313; P. Krokosz, K. Łopatecki, *Okoliczności uchwalenia...*, pp. 367–398.
[808] D.O. Serov, *Петр I как вершитель правосудия*, "Cahiers du monde russe" 55 (2014), 1–2, pp. 13–30.
[809] Russian historian Pavel Milukov discusses the financing of Peter I's army is discussed in more detail; see П. Милюков, *Государственное хозяйство России в первой четверти XVIII столетия и реформа Петра Великого*, Санкт-Петербург 1905, passim.

a thorough investigation of the actions of the individuals on the list I shall provide, and shall pass judgment on those found guilty."[810]

The most high-profile case handled by the general provost court involved the illegal allocation of 50,000 rubles from the Military Office's treasury for private use by Yakov Dolgorukov. This case was especially complex, as the prince held the position of Plenipotenriary General-War Commissary, responsible for supplying the army with funds, essential goods, and provisions. So intricate was the financial documentation that it rendered direct attribution of guilt to the accused exceedingly difficult. Eventually, the court passed no verdict against Prince Dolgorukov after Peter I unexpectedly suspended the open trial proceedings.[811]

From late 1718, Adam Weyde spent the majority of time in the capital, quickly solidifying his position at court. During this period, he attended a variety of ceremonies, both state and private. On December 18, 1718, he took part in the "festivities and conversations" held at the tsar's palace to celebrate the birthday of Tsarevna Elizabeth Petrovna (the future Empress Elizabeth, who reigned from 1741 to 1761).[812] In turn, on November 30, a solemn liturgy was held at St. Isaac's Church, attended by the tsar and his wife, Catherine (the future Empress Catherine I, who reigned from 1725 to 1727), and the Knights of the Order of Saint

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[810] *Донесения французского консула в Петербурге Лави и полномочного министра при русском дворе Кампредона с 1719 по 1722 г.,* [in:] СИРИО, т. 40, Санкт-Петербург 1884, № 6, p. 15. Por. P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 192–193 (English edition). The most striking example of financial misconduct at the time was the case of the Siberian Governor, Prince Matvei Gagarin, who was tried and executed by hanging in 1721 for numerous abuses of power and bribery. By order of the tsar, the prince's body was left hanging on the gallows for seven months. For more on the subject, see M.O. Акишин, *Полицейское государство и сибирское общество. Эпоха Петра Великого*, Новосибирск 1996, pp. 191–198.

[811] D.O. Serov, op. cit., p. 19.

[812] *Повседневные записки делам князя А.Д. Меншикова. 1716–1720, 1726–1727 гг.,* публ. С.Р. Долговой, Т.А Лаптевой, [in:] *Российский архив. История Отечества в свидетельствах и документах XVII–XX вв.*, гл. ред. А.Л. Налепин, т. 10, Москва 2000, p. 278.

Andrew the First-Called. Following the ceremony, the imperial couple attended a reception at the home of General Feldzeugmeister Jacob Bruce. Among the attendees were the most prominent commanders of the Russian armed forces, officials, and diplomats decorated with the order: Alexander Menshikov, Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin, Pyotr Tolstoy, and Adam Weyde.[813] Additionally, for the majority of 1719, General Weyde attended various feasts, assemblies or working meetings held by Prince Mensihkov or other members of the upper echelons of the government.

It is worth noting that significant military and political decisions were often made even during private gatherings or celebrations. For instance, on January 2, 1719, during a banquet hosted by Adam Weyde, Peter I drafted a response to a letter from Prince Boris Kurakin, sent on December 9, 1718, from Amsterdam, concerning the hiring of Colonel Engineer Hertel for the tsar's service.[814] In turn, on March 19, 1719, as the tsar, accompanied by the Generals Apraksin and Weyde, visited the ailing Prince Menshikov and were being entertained with feast, Peter I instructed the Governing Senate on the timely confirmation of ordinances received by the respective institutions.[815]

Upon receiving the title of senator and taking office as the second president of the College of War, Adam Weyde had to provide housing for himself and his family in the newly built state capital.[816] The plot of land he chose for his future residence was not accidental. The parcel was located in the very heart of the rapidly developing city and neighbored other properties owned by members of the ruling elite or the tsar's family.

[813] Ibidem, pp. 343–344.
[814] Ibidem, p. 282; И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 7, p. 400.
[815] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 7, p. 417; *Повседневные записки делам князя А.Д. Меншикова…*, p. 297.
[816] [Puzyna M.], *Petersburg w roku 1720 według opisu Polaka*, ed. W. Kętrzyński, "Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki" 5 (1877), 6, p. 524.

The construction of the general's house commenced in 1718, or possibly even earlier (as discussed below), and it was likely the first stone building on Red Street (which was officially marked out in 1715), situated on the bank of the Red Canal, deepened in 1711 to connect the Moika River with the Neva. The area was still very marshy at the time and was known as *usadbishche* before the construction works began.

That the general had his house built in a prime location is confirmed by the observations of the Great Lithuanian writer, Prince Michał Puzyna, who, while visiting the city on the Neva River in 1720 with the Polish delegation, described this quarter of St. Petersburg as follows: "On this side of the Neva, the palaces stretch one after another along the river, to the tsar's palaces, of which there are three, two for the summer and one for the winter [see Figure 12.1, letters P and Q]. The gardens are beautiful, (...) with many marble pieces, statues, monuments brought here by sea from Venice, Italy, England and the Netherlands, and even a gazebo made wholly of alabaster and marble, imported from Venice for the garden, which is situated on the river itself, between the canals [see Figure 12.1, letters S and Q – opposite Weyde's house]. It is host to numerous peculiarities, pergolas, galleries, pumps and trees of peculiar beauty. At the river end, the garden is underpinned: porches run through the garden toward the river, where one can board a bateau or a galley or a yacht, a *buyar* [see Figure 12.1, letter R] and go to the sea, or cruise along the canals and the wide and mighty river."[817]

The tsar ordered the plots situated on Red Street to have equal dimensions: three by twenty-five fathoms,[818] with the front of the plot facing the opposite direction, i.e., the then Rear Street (from the 1830s,

[817] Ibidem, pp. 524–525. Members of the Polish delegation visiting St. Petersburg in 1720 observed that the magnificent palaces would shake when a carriage passed by, and roof tiles would fall off in strong winds; see ibidem, p. 524.
[818] 1 fathom = 213.36 cm.

Apothecary Street, and later Apothecary Alley). To the west, the Red Canal separated the building with a strip of open space, known as the Great Meadow (from the 1720s to the mid-nineteenth century).[819] To the east, the meadow was separated by the Swan Canal, beyond which lay the Summer Garden, owned by the tsar, which was host to the Summer Palace of Peter I (Peter I's Summer House). Before 1721, a two-story house was erected on a plot to the right of Adam Weyde's house (looking from Krasnaya Street). This residence was occupied by Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein, the husband of Peter I's daughter, Anna Petrovna. In 1725, Alexander Naryshkin, Peter I's cousin, moved into the house, and from 1732 it became the property of Peter I's daughter, Tsarevna Elizabeth Petrovna. In the 1730s, the construction of new brick buildings began on the plots located north of the Tsarevna Elizabeth's house (palace). By the end of the century, a complex of buildings of the Orphanage was erected on the site of Adam Weyde's house, the Tsarevna's palace, and the adjacent plots. Between 1816 and 1821, the site became home to the new monumental barracks of the Pavlovsky Grenadier Regiment of the Imperial Guard, a structure that still stands today.[820]

Adam Weyde's residence did not differ significantly in terms of size and furnishings from the urban homes of other representatives of the Russian ruling elite (in this regard, it was only the grand and splendidly

[819] Its other designations included the Meadow in front of the Summer House (1732-1738), later known as the Tsar's Meadow (from 1771-1772); from 1805 onwards, the area was officially called the Field of Mars.

[820] С.П. Луппов, *История строительства Петербурга в первой четверти XVIII века*, Москва–Ленинград 1957, p. 33; *Акт по результатам государственной историко-культурной экспертизы проектной документации, обосновывающей проведение работ по сохронению объекта культурного наследия федерального значения «Казармы Павловского полка» по адрессу: Санкт-Петербург, Марсово Поле, д. 1, лит. А...*, т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 2016, pp. 43–57, 86–107, 332–337, https://kgiop.gov.spb.ru/media/uploads/userfiles/2016/06/15/4149.pdf (accessed January 10, 2021); *Казармы Павловского гренадерского полка*, https://www.citywalls.ru/house1894.html (accessed December 12, 2020).

furnished palace of Alexander Menshikov that stood out). Nonetheless, it was a sizable building, as confirmed by eighteenth-century cartographic records of St. Petersburg. The inclusion of this house on the city maps at the time resulted from the prominence of its owner, a close associate of the tsar and a holder of high-ranking state positions (Figure 12.1). The interiors were likely decorated according to the prevailing fashion of the era, given that, even before his death, the general hosted assemblies, weddings of his subordinates, feasts, also entertaining guests and visitors at the residence.[821]

There is no doubt that by the end of the second decade of the eighteenth century, St. Petersburg had already become a fairly modern and steadily evolving city, with many representatives of aristocratic and noble families settling there (admittedly, they initially did so with great reluctance). Its economic importance grew dynamically: new manufactories were established, and the port recorded an ever-increasing merchant ship traffic.[822] As a consequence, Moscow's role was diminishing. The former capital still remained a major and vital urban center, though the atmosphere there was far from the best, as can be inferred from Boris Sheremetev's 1718 letter to Alexander Menshikov: "I struggle to find anything positive to say about today's Moscow, for it is like a habitat of robbers: completely empty, with only thieves constantly punished here (...), I would not wish to live in Moscow these days, unless I were to face exile

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[821] И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 7, p. 405; *Повседневные записки делам князя А.Д. Меншикова*..., p. 287. On May 8, 1718, the tsar and his associates "attended the wedding of one naval officer after dinner, held at the home of General Weyde;" see И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 7, p. 354.

[822] П.А. Кротов, *Петербургский порт при Петре I,* [in:] *Феномен Петербурга. Труды Второй Международной конференции, состоявшейся 27–30 ноября 2000 года во Всероссийском музее А.С. Пушкина*, ред. Ю.Н. Беспятых, Санкт-Петербург 2001, pp. 423–433; М.С. Павшинская, *Конкуренция Архангельского и Петербургского портов в первой четверти XVIII века*, "Вестник Поморского университета", серия: Гуманитарные и социальные науки, 2 (2011), pp. 116–119.

or captivity."[823] Also leaving behind his former family in Moscow was Adam Weyde. According to the land and real estate cadastre and the census of mid-August 1718, the owner had already vacated the premises, now guarded only by the soldiers of the Lefortovsky Regiment.[824] The last information indicates that the senator's St. Petersburg residence became ready for occupancy as early as mid-1718, which in turn indicates that its construction must have commenced earlier than hitherto believed, i.e., before 1718.

[823] P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...*, pp. 272–273.
[824] *Перепись Ново-Немецкой слободы дворам и в них жителям*, подгот. Г. Александров, РА 11 (1905), p. 342.

13. RELIGIOUSNESS AND MILITARY ISSUES

When examining Adam Weyde's military and political activities, one should also emphasize his religiousness. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 1), the general was a lifelong Lutheran.[825] Moreover, he was a pious person, a trait that did not characterize many professional soldiers. His faith not only influenced his outlooks on life, but also directly reflected on numerous issues related to the organization of the tsar's military. In this particular case, all issues of a religious nature were governed by the provisions of Peter I's Military Code of 1716, as discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Adam Weyde expressed his religiosity through his affiliation with the European circle of Pietists. This term referred to adherents of a Lutheran religious movement initiated in the third quarter of the seventeenth century by the German theologian and historian Philipp Jacob Spener. Pietists emphasized inward religiosity, prayer, and the reading of Scripture. They also believed in the indispensability of personal

[825] Many foreign officers—"old" and "new" arrivals alike—opted to embrace the Orthodox religion, which afforded them an easier path to career advancement. For more information, see T.A. Опарина, *Иноземцы в России XVI–XVII вв. Очерки исторической биографии и генеалогии*, Москва 2007, passim; C.B. Черников, op. cit., p. 703.

involvement in the reform (transformation) of socio-economic structures, aligning them with the ideas of the Enlightenment. Last but not least, they highlighted missionary work and community life.[826]

Initially, Pietists were highly active in Saxony, where the Collegium of Bible Lovers was established at the University of Leipzig at the behest of August Hermann Francke. Soon after, Francke was forced to relocate to Brandenburg (followed by Spener in 1691), where the two gained the support of Elector Frederick III. Thus, Brandenburg established itself as the main center of the Pietist movement. With the assistance of the Hohenzollern dynasty, Francke and his collaborators established a university in Halle, which became the central hub for the propagation of Pietist ideas across nearly all of Europe.[827]

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Halle Pietists managed to establish contacts with Lutherans in many countries of the Old Continent, including remote Russia. The circles centered around Francke postulated the translation and publication of the Bible and Pietist literature into various national languages. The Halle Pietists were interested in propagating their ideas in the countries and lands of Central and Eastern Europe: Bohemia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia.[828] Disregarding the long distances and general difficulties encountered by dissenters in Russia, they disseminated their doctrine

[826] S. Pawłowski, *Pietyzm XVII wieku jako protestancka forma Nowej Ewangelizacji*, "Roczniki Teologiczne" 65 (2018), 7, pp. 119–127; S. Würker, *Myśl i praktyka edukacyjna niemieckich pietystów – poglądy i działalność Augusta Hermanna Frankego*, "Biuletyn Historii Wychowania" 24 (2008), pp. 47–48.

[827] J.A. Gierowski, *Pietyzm na ziemiach polskich (do połowy XVIII wieku)*, "Sobótka" 2 (1972), pp. 239–240.

[828] С. Менгель, op. cit., pp. 43–68.

there, while also ministering to the Lutheran communities in various cities and to the Russian military.[829]

One of Peter I's subjects whose close contacts with the Halle Pietists can be traced back to the 1690s was Adam Weyde. He established these connections as early as 1693–1694, when the aforementioned Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf was residing in Moscow. From that point on, Weyde became a patron of the Pietist movement in Russia (for a more detailed discussion of his activity in this regard, see Chapter 4).[830] He further strengthened these contacts during his captivity in Sweden, where he received support from his former protégés, reciprocating the assistance and kindness he had previously extended to them. This type of mutual sympathy fostered a deep trust, with the tsar's associate becoming one of the main intermediaries in the interactions between the Halle Pietists and the Lutheran community in Russia, and with the representatives of the ruling elites, including the tsar.[831] After regaining his freedom, he also cared for his Swedish coreligionists, Lutheran soldiers of Charles XII who ended up in Russian captivity. He did so by facilitating the communication

[829] С.Г. Корзун, *Генрих Гюйссен и борьба протестантов и католиков за влияние на русскую православную церковь в эпоху раннего Просвещения*, [in:] *Славянский альманах 2011*, отв. ред. К.В. Никифоров, Москва 2012, pp. 53–55. One example of this phenomenon were the members of the clergy subsequently associated with the Pietist center in Toruń. Among those engaged in religious agitation in Moscow was Michał Bogusław Ruttich, who taught Arabic in Halle and, from 1710 onwards, served as a professor at Pastor Johann Ernst Glück's school in Moscow. He even ended up in prison there on slander charges brought against him by the father of one of his students. Another figure who returned to Toruń was Jan Reinhold Boehm, who had served as pastor at the Church of the Holy Trinity in Moscow and as a chaplain in the Russian army starting in 1716; see ibidem, p. 55.; J.A. Gierowski, *Pietyzm…*, p. 256.

[830] H.W. Ludolf to J.S. Scharschmidt, London, February 7, 1696, AFSt./HD 144: 1–3, Bl. 1–3.

[831] For more on the subject, see M. Fundaminski, *The Communications Network of Halle Pietists in Russia*, [in:] *Foregin Churches in St. Petersburg and Their Archives, 1703–1917*, eds. P.N. Holtrop, H. Slechte, Leiden 2007, pp. 115–127. Among those who corresponded with the Halle pietists was Archbishop Theophan Prokopovich, an apologist of Peter I's reforms and president of the Mogilian Academy in Kyiv; see R. Collis, *The Petrine Instauration. Religion, Esotericism and Science at the Court of Peter the Great, 1689–1725*, Leiden–Boston 2012, pp. 343–348.

between the clergy (primarily Christian Eberhard) and the Swedish prisoners held in Siberia.[832] In 1719, he ensured that the Swedish king's subjects, hitherto remaining in captivity, would be allowed to enter the service of the Russian state upon meeting certain conditions.[833]

Among the members of the Pietist center in Halle who maintained direct contact with Adam Weyde or received support from him, the most significant figures included the likes of:

a) Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf, a distinguished German philologist, orientalist, missionary, and diplomat. As previously mentioned, his stay in Russia in the seventeenth century helped establish connections with many influential individuals, including General and Admiral Fyodor Golovin; diplomat Prince Boris Kurakin; physician, diplomat, and linguist Pyotr Posnikov (who translated the Quran into Russian); and Adam Weyde. Ludolf passed on all his "Russian" contacts to Francke, who used them to the advantage of the Pietist center in Halle. The bond between Ludolf and Adam Weyde was particularly close, dating back to the 1690s. Ludolf regarded the tsar's commander as "an exceptionally good friend, one of my closest."[834]

b) Christopher Eberhard, a theologian and geographer known for his mathematical and geographical experiments and inventions (he worked on instruments for measuring distances, among

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[832] D. Čyževśkyj, *Der Kreis A.H. Franches in Halle und seine Slavistischen Studien. (Ein vergessenes Kapitel aus der Geschichte der slavischen Philologie)*, "Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie" 16 (1939), No. 1–2, pp. 23–24; S. Schuldes, *Netzwerke des Buchhandels. Buchexport aus der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses (Halle/S.) in die protestantische Diaspora in Russland*, [in:] *Alles Buch. Studien der Erlanger Buchwissenschaft*, Hrsg. von U. Rautenberg, V. Titel, Bd. 5, Erlagen–Nürnberg 2003, pp. 29–30.

[833] A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg, March 23, 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 22, Bl. 1–2v.

[834] J. Tetzner, op. cit., p. 29. Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf also knew Peter I personally; see C. Менгель, op. cit., p. 60.

others). After Adam Weyde's return from Swedish captivity, Eberhard became his domestic chaplain. From 1711 to 1716, he accompanied the general on his military and diplomatic missions; in 1711, as a preacher to the general staff, he participated in the campaign against Turkey. In 1718, at the invitation of Peter I (whom he had met more closely in 1717 in Amsterdam, thanks to his patron), who was interested in his scientific research, Eberhard returned to Russia (serving the Lutheran community in Moscow) and was sent to Kamchatka to build a ship there and conduct research on the coasts of North America (Alaska). The tsar's death in 1725 thwarted these plans, and a year later, Christopher Eberhard returned to Halle. Thanks to Adam Weyde, he served as a liaison between August Hermann Francke and the Swedish prisoners (Pietists) exiled to Siberia.[835]

c) Justus Samuel Scharschmidt (Scharschmid), an assistant Lutheran pastor in Moscow towards the end of the seventeenth century, and subsequently a pastor at the second (new) Lutheran Church there. From the start of his ministry in Russia, he established and maintained close contacts with Adam Weyde.[836] In the following years, he ministered in Astrakhan and Smolensk, among others, returning to Halle in 1717 upon completing his mission.[837] He was "one of the main pillars of the Pietist move-

[835] A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Güstrow, February 8, 1717, AFSt/HA 170: 6, Bl. 1–2v; A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg, 23 III 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 22, Bl. 1–2v; *Algemeine Deutsche Biographie*, Bd. 5, Leipzig 1877, pp. 566–567; K.J. Whitmer, op. cit., pp. 87–92; *Nordisk historia ur Ericsbergs bibliotek*, vol. 3: *Stormaktstid, sammanställd*, av M. Petersson, M. Stenval, Stockholm 2012, pp. 122–126; S. Schuldes, op. cit., p. 29–30.

[836] H.W. Ludolf to J.S. Scharschmidt, London, February 7, 1696, AFSt./HD 144: 1–3, Bl. 1–3v; H.W. Ludolf to G.H. Neubauer, Halle, December 5, 1697, AFSt./HD 88: 133, Bl. 1–3v.

[837] *Scharschmidt, Justus Samuel*, http://192.124.243.55/cgi-bin/dhm.pl?x=u&t_show=x&wertreg=PER&wert=scharschmidt%2C+justus+samuel++-+BIOGRAFIE&reccheck=,27253 (accessed July 20, 2020).

ment" in Russia, ministering there on the personal recommendations of Spener and Francke.[838] While in Russia, he was drafted to serve in the tsar's army as a Protestant clergyman. In 1713, he returned to Moscow, and the person who petitioned for his released from the military post was Adam Weyde.[839] According to American historian Robert Collis, Scharschmidt was in Kyiv in 1713, serving as house chaplain to General Weyde.[840] In fact, he accompanied his superior until January 1713, after which he left for Smolensk.[841]

d) Johann Reichmuth, house chaplain for the Weyde family in Moscow from 1701 onwards. In 1702, he became a teacher and rector of the school of the German (Lutheran) community of St. Peter and St. Paul in Moscow, associated with the church of the same name. In 1704, he took on the role of teacher in the new Lutheran community in the capital. A year later, he was appointed a Latin teacher at the Moscow school of Pastor Johann Ernst Glück, a pedagogue and translator of the Bible into Latvian and Russian (Glück had been a subject of Charles XII and resided in Marienburg, captured by the Russians in 1702; his servant (or adopted daughter) was Marta Skavronskaya, the future wife of Peter I and Empress Catherine I). Pastor Glück's school was often referred to as a gymnasium, where foreign languages were taught alongside other subjects, including rhetoric, mathematics, geography, and history.[842] In 1718 he was the sec-

[838] R. Collis, op. cit., p. 343.
[839] J.S. Scharschmidt to A.H. Francke, Nischna, April 20, 1713, AFSt/HC 296: 88, Bl. 1–1v.; J.S. Scharschmidt to A.H. Francke, Moscow, September 4, 1713, AFSt/HC 296: 90, Bl. 1–1v.
[840] R. Collis, op. cit., p. 343.
[841] J.S. Scharschmidt to A.H. Francke, Smolensk, January 29, 1713, AFSt/HC 296: 87, Bl. 1–2v.
[842] The Halle Pietists tried to leverage all possible communications with the Protestants residing in Russia at the time. This group included Pastor Glück, as well as Baron Heinrich von Huyssen,

ond, and in 1721-1739 the first pastor of the Lutheran community in Moscow. During Weyde's lifetime, Reichmuth procured books for the general from Halle (these were likely religious publications, although one cannot rule out that some also concerned military matters).[843]

e) August Hermann Francke, a theologian, educator, and university lecturer in Halle, as well as founder of numerous philanthropic and academic institutions. He was actively involved in the advancement of the Lutheran Church in Russia, with a particular concern for ensuring the due provision of services to the faithful by the clergy (among others by Justus Samuel Scharschmidt). Accordingly, Adam Weyde was a natural recipient of Francke's letters. In his 1719 correspondence with the general, Francke expressed his concern for the Russian soldiers serving the King of Prussia (Francke made additions to a religious pamphlet directed at them). He also appealed to Adam Weyde to intercede on behalf the Swedish soldiers held captive in Moscow and Siberia at the time (see Figure 13.1). Until at least 1717, their relationship remained purely epistolary, as they had not met in person.[844]

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who taught at his school and was appointed Tsarevich Alexei's teacher in 1703. In the educational arena, Huyssen's activities were supported by a Pietist from Glück's school, Johann Werner Paus, who taught geography and history to Peter I's projected heir to the throne. All of the above maintained close correspondence with August Hermann Francke; see С.Г. Корзун, op. cit., pp. 55–57; C. Менгель, op. cit., pp. 45–46. The aforementioned Baron von Huyssen was involved in the work towards new military legislation for the Russian army. Like Adam Weyde, he contributed to the drafting of the *Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, pp. 49–56, 71.

[843] S. Schuldes, op. cit., pp. 29–30; *Reichmuth, Johann*, https://digital.francke-halle.de/fsbio/name/view/746992 (accessed January 3, 2021).

[844] A.H. Francke to A.A. Weyde, Halle, February 27, 1717, AFSt/HA 170: 7, Bl. 1–2v; A.H. Francke to A.A. Weyde, Halle, March 4, 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 18, Bl. 1–3; H.W. Ludolf to A.H. France, Haag, September 7, 1700, AFSt/HD 71, Bl. 49–50; H.W. Ludolf to A.H. Francke, Amsterdam, September



Figure 13.1. First and last page of Adam Weyde's correspondence to August Hermann Francke, St. Petersburg, March 23, 1719
Source: AFSt/HA 173: 22, Bl. 1, 2v.



f) Caspar Matthias Rodde, a clergyman and a talented translator of Halle Pietist writings into Russian. Born into a merchant family in Narva, in 1704, following the capture of the city by Russian forces he was taken prisoner and exiled to Vologda, where he learned Russian. Between 1711 and 1715, he served as a private tutor in the household of Peter Müller, an entrepreneur and head of the Lutheran community in Moscow, who had studied theology in Halle. Müller's home became a gathering place for Pietists, including the clergy and members of the upper classes associated with the circle of August Hermann Francke. From an early age, Rodde worked towards a career in the clergy. Between 1716 and 1719, he studied in Halle, although he did not complete his studies in full. At the request of Adam Weyde, who had petitioned Halle for the appointment of a "home preacher" to St. Petersburg, Francke recommended Rodde for the position. Despite concerns from the senator about Rodde's youth (he was then thirty years old), his candidacy was accepted on the condition that he deliver a successful mock sermon. After being ordained in Magdeburg, Rodde traveled to St. Petersburg to join the household of Adam Weyde. Following the death of his patron, Rodde returned to Narva.[845] In 1734, he was appointed the Bishop of Ingria.[846]

19, 1700, AFSt/HD 71, Bl. 51–52; A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg, March 23, 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 22, Bl. 1–2v; S. Würker, op. cit., pp. 49–60.

[845] As chaplain to General Weyde, Caspar Matthias Rodde traveled extensively in Russia, sharing his knowledge of the country with fellow Pietists; see A.A. Vierorth, *Memoir*, "The Moravian Church Miscellany" 2 (1851), 6, p. 149.

[846] A.H. Francke to A.A. Weyde, Halle, March 4, 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 18, Bl. 1–3v; A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg, March 23, 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 22, Bl. 1–2v; D. Čyževśkyj, op. cit., p. 30; O. Teigeler, *Die Herrhunter in Russland. Ziel, Umfang und Ertrag ihrer Aktivitäten*, Göttingen 2006, p. 279; С. Менгель, op. cit., pp. 60–61.

g) Georg Heinrich Neubauer, theologian, educator, and General Weyde's associate from the Grand Embassy onwards.[847]

A brief outline of the activities undertaken by selected representatives of the Pietist center in Halle effectively demonstrates the extensive network of contacts and the high esteem that Adam Weyde enjoyed among his fellow believers, both in Russia and abroad. He was responsible for bringing Protestant clergy to Russia and taking them under his patronage. It was no coincidence that as many as four of the Lutheran pastors mentioned (Caspar Matthias Rodde, Johann Reichmuth, Justus Samuel Scharschmidt, and Christopher Eberhard) knew Weyde personally and rendered religious services at his home, including during his participation in military campaigns. Adam Weyde not only provided for his chaplains' upkeep but also covered their travel expenses and even paid for their respective ordinations.[848] Christopher Eberhard and Justus Samuel Scharschmidt even served as military chaplains, a fact that invites reflection on the role of Protestant clergy within the Russian army.

Providing pastoral services to soldiers a standard in all armies of the Old Continent, whether Catholic, Protestant or the Muslim Ottoman Porte. Religion was a key element in maintaining high morale in the army. According to Frank Tallet, most modern armies consisted of people of different denominations, leading to forced mutual tolerance, which turned into religious indifference. This phenomenon was to intensify, in particular at the end of the seventeenth century.[849]

[847] See B. Klosterberg, *Provenienz und Autorschaft. Die Quellen von, zu und über Friedrich Breckling in Bibliothek und Archiv der Franckeschen Stiftungen*, [in:] *Pietismus und Neuzeit. Ein Jahrbuch zur Geschichte des neueren protestantismus, geschäftsführender*, Hrsg. U. Sträter, Bd. 33, Göttingen 2007, pp. 54–70; K.J. Whitmer, op. cit., passim.
[848] A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg, February 2, 1719, AFSt./HD 173: 17a, Bl. 1–2; A.A. Weyde to A.H. Francke, Petersburg, March 23, 1719, AFSt/HA 173: 22, Bl. 1–2v.
[849] F. Tallett, op. cit., pp. 126–128.

However, this was not the case everywhere; in certain countries, efforts were made to maintain religious uniformity according to the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio*. Additionally, a hierarchical structure for military chaplains was introduced, which enabled them to effectively fulfill their assigned duties. Such an order was established by Gustavus Adolphus.[850] The *Military Articles of 1621*, upheld in the subsequent statutes (including those of 1632 and 1683), mandated that public prayers were to be held every morning and evening. These services were to be conducted separately in each regiment, with the faithful being summoned by trumpets and drums. Sundays and religious holidays saw masses with sermons, held late in the morning and again in the afternoon. Depending on the circumstances, an additional two services were held during the week. In the course of these ceremonies, camp life came to a standstill—shops and taverns were closed, entertainment and alcohol consumption were prohibited, and any unjustified absence was subject to punishment.[851]

While the regulations instituted in Sweden yielded positive results, the imposition of religious coercion was rarely successful in other countries.[852] If a country had a religiously diverse population or if its conscription system relied on mercenary or enlisted troops, such regulations

[850] The chief supervisor of the military chaplains was the minister of the king or the commander-in-chief of the army. Other clergy serving with senior commanders were appointed as commissioners and assessors. The legislator stressed that representatives of the clergy be intricately connected with the faithful; therefore, they were to be appointed by a bishop from the same diocese as the recruits they served. Their duties included fostering piety among the soldiers; they were also held to strict moral standards themselves.

[851] *Krijgz Articlar, som fordom then Stormechtigste Furste och Herre...*, Stockholm 1621, art. 3–16, pp. [5–8]; *Schwedisches Kriegs-Recht Oder Articuls-Brieff Deß Durchleuchtigsten/ Großmächtigsten Fürstens und Herrns*, Nürnberg 1632, Titel 1–3, Art. 1–19, pp. 5–10; N.G. Cooper, op. cit., pp. 132, 134–135; K. Ögren, *Humanitarian law in the Articles of War decreed in 1621 by King Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden*, "International Review of the Red Cross" 313 (1996), pp. 438–439.

[852] One country in which solutions similar to the Swedish provisions were successfully introduced was England; see M. Griffin, *Regulating Religion and Mortality in the King's Armies 1639–1646*, Leiden–Boston 2004.

proved impossible to enforce in full. A case in point was the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which saw unsuccessful efforts to impose Catholic chaplaincy in the Polish and Lithuanian armies in the first half of the seventeenth century.[853] Despite the lack of a unified religious structure among soldiers and military pastoral structures, piety was encouraged through the implementation of three complementary elements: the institution of military chaplains, the promotion of religious ceremonies, and the propagation of the concept of God as the Lord of History.[854]

Compared to other European states, Russia had its own specificity.[855] Until Peter I's time, the country had been religiously homogeneous; however, this this did not extend to its military structures.[856] Starting with Ivan IV the Terrible, Russian rulers saw foreigners as a wellspring of effective state reforms, particularly in the military sphere. Over the years, newcomers from nearly all of Europe began to settle in various Russian cities, with most naturally gravitating toward Moscow. Foreigners enjoyed religious freedoms, and from 1575 onwards, Protestants were even permitted to build their own churches. In 1601, Boris Godunov established a settlement for foreigners near Moscow, at the confluence of the Kokuy Stream and the Yauza River, known as the German Quarter (Nemetskaya

[853] K. Łopatecki, *„Cuius regio eius religio w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej." Kwestia wolności głoszenia wiary wśród żołnierzy w latach dwudziestych XVII wieku*, [in:] *Studia nad Reformacją*, eds. E. Bagińska, S. Guzowski, M. Liedke, Białystok 2010, pp. 37–50.

[854] Idem, *Nabożeństwa wojskowe w Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej: zarys organizacyjno-prawny*, [in:] *Rzeczpospolita państwem wielu narodowości i wyznań. XVI–XVIII wiek*, eds. T. Ciesielski, A. Filipczak-Kocur, Warszawa–Opole (2008), pp. 521–539.

[855] Szerzej zob. P. Krokosz, *Aspekt religijny w rosyjskich siłach zbrojnych za panowania Piotra I*, [in:] *Україна в Центрально Східній Європі*, відп. ред. В. Смолій, вип. 15, Київ 2015; pp. 210–236.

[856] Russian historian Alexander Filushkin has researched this issue in the context of the First Northern War (1558-1583), which Russia lost not only militarily, but also in terms of propaganda. Its mishandling of ethnic and religious others resulted in the attribution of the Tsardom of Muscovy to the Asiatic cultural circle and its exclusion from the European community; see А.И. Филюшкин, *Изобретая первую войну России и Европы. Балтийские войны второй половины XVI века глазами современников и потомков*, Санкт Петербург 2013; pp. 291–332.

Sloboda). The term "German" was used to describe all Western European arrivals—Protestants and Catholics alike—who received permission to erect a Protestant temple there (the previous suburb with a church had been burned down in 1578). Keeping the foreigners out was motivated by the mutual distrust between the "Germans" and Russians.[857] In 1610, the settlement burned down but was restored in 1652, with the foreign residents of Moscow ordered to convert to Orthodoxy or relocate to Nemetskaya Sloboda.[858] At that time, the Church Council elected Nikon as Patriarch, imposing a string of restrictions on the growing community of non-Orthodox foreigners living in Russia, in particular due to their perceived improper and unacceptable attitudes toward matters of faith and religion. Among the incidents was the trial of Colonel Alexander Leslie, accused of shooting at icons and crosses on churches along with other officers. His wife was charged with burning icons. Consequently, foreigners were forbidden from dressing in the Russian style, maintaining friendly relations with Russians, or employing Orthodox servants.[859] The settlement quickly fashioned itself into a German-style town, and by the 1770s it already had four churches: three Lutheran and one Reformed (a Catholic church was also erected during Peter I's reign). 304 adults and approximately 700 children resided in Nemetskaya Sloboda, alongside a servant population of about a thousand. It is worth noting that 70% of all residents of the "German" settlement were officers, usually high-rank-

[857] I. Korczagina, *Europejczycy w Moskwie w XVII w. „Obcy" czy „swoi"?* "Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny" 17 (2020), 3, pp. 121–135.
[858] R. Menes, *Niemiecka słoboda w Moskwie w XVI–XVII wieku*, "Białostockie Teki Historyczne" 10 (2012), pp. 79–99.
[859] С.А. Нефедов, *Первые шаги на пути модернизации России: реформы середины XVII века*, "Вопросы истории" 4 (2004), pp. 33–52.

ing ones.[860] Sloboda was not the only settlement of its kind, with nine others around Moscow alone established in the seventeenth century, in addition to similar ones in the vicinity of other Russian cities.[861]

As a resident of the German Quarter, Adam Weyde was deeply involved in the religious life of the Moscow community centered around St. Michael's Church, of which he was a patron.[862] As noted by Russian historian Alexander Andreyev, Weyde's religious zeal also reflected on the conduct of his subordinates. When the general's division was stationed in the old capital in 1719, it "essentially formed a Lutheran community (...) which he cared for as if they were his own family."[863] In the following years, with Weyde's soldiers transferred to St. Petersburg, they comprised the "core" of the German Lutheran community of the Liteyny Dvor.[864] Originally founded in 1711, the Liteyny Dvor was a large foundry producing cannons and various equipment for the Russian army and navy. Over time, a residential-industrial district developed around the complex, home to prominent figures such as General Feldzeugmeister Jacob Bruce and members of the tsar's family.[865] Map 12.1 identifies two Protestant churches. The first, marked with the letter "X" near Weyde's residence, served the Finnish community, while the second, located in the city center and marked with the letter "a," catered to the German-speaking population.

[860] *Переписные книги города Москвы 1665–76 гг.*, Москва 1886, col. 231–238; С.К. Богоявленский, *Московская немецкая слобода*, "Известия АН СССР", серия: Философии и истории 4 (1947), 3, col. 220–232.

[861] I. Korczagina, op. cit., p. 127; А.Н. Гуслистова, *Немецкая слобода: дворы иностранных купцов в Вологде в XVII – начале XVIII в.*, [in:] *Чтения к 80-летию со дня рождения д. и. н., профессора Ю.К. Некрасова (1935–2006)*, ред. В.А. Саблин, А.В. Савина, Вологда 2016, pp. 86–89.

[862] A. Andreev, *Number of Protestants in the Russian Administrative Apparatus under Peter the Great*, "Littera Scripta" 9 (2016), 1, p. 12.

[863] Ibidem, pp. 12–13; А.Н. Андреев, *Протестанты в составе российского…*, pp. 8–23.

[864] See Figure 12.1. The complex was located to the east of Adam Weyde's house, behind the Summer Palace of Peter I.

[865] А.Э. Алакшин, *Протестантские общины в Петербурге в XVIII в.*, Челябинск 2006, p. 102.

This highlights that the military corps, particularly the officers, always included a significant ratio of Western Christian officers. As noted by Russian historian Moisei Rabinovich, it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether the "foreign officers" were actually newcomers from the West or native "Germans," whose families had lived in Russia for generations.[866] In the latter case, some officers converted to Orthodoxy to advance their careers or improve their legal status (for instance to be entitled to purchase land). Conversion was also frequently entailed in matrimonial plans.[867] As a result, foreign, German-sounding surnames did not necessarily indicate one's Protestant, Evangelical, or Catholic origins, though they made such an assumption more plausible.

In this context, it is worth noting the unique national and cultural bonds between German Protestants and Catholics living in Russia. Lutherans frequently served as godparents to children from Catholic families. In 1719, Adam Weyde, along with other Protestants—Brigadier Pyotr Lefort and Eleonora von Schlippenbach, daughter of Lieutenant General Wolmar Anton von Schlippenbach—became the godparents to Johann Herman Vuist, the son of the Catholic official and military secretary to Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, Franz Johann (Joann) Vuist.[868]

Religious diversity within the army continued to intensity during the reign of Peter I. Russian historian Sergei Chernikov detailed this phenomenon in his article on the changes in the composition of the

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[866] М.Д. Рабинович, *Социальное происхождение и имущественное положение офицеров регулярной русской армии в конце Северной войны*, [in:] *Россия в период реформ Петра I*, отв. ред. Н.И. Павленко, Москва 1973, p. 134.

[867] R. Menes, op. cit., p. 91. After his conversion to Orthodoxy in September 1652, Alexander Leslie was not only released from prison, but also received gifts to the value of 23,000 rubles. Other baptized officers were bestowed landed estates and 100-200 rubles each, in addition to their incorporation into the noble estate; see С.А. Нефедов, op. cit., p. 44.

[868] А.Н. Андреев, *Немцы-католики в Петербурге времен Петра Великого: социальные и биографические аспекты*, [in:] *Антропология Петербурга: сборник статей к 85-летию со дня рождения Н.В. Юхневой*, отв. ред. Н.Е. Мазалова, ч. 1, Санкт Петербург 2017, pp. 145, 152.

command structure of the Russian army and navy in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Chernikov demonstrates that in the early eighteenth century, foreigners occupied nearly all top-ranking positions in the army and navy. In subsequent years, this proportion shifted in favor of Russian officers (though foreigners continued to dominate the navy until 1725). Chernikov calculated that between 1700 and 1725, the top command echelon consisted of 203 individuals, of whom 128 (63%) were foreigners.[869] As a result, the vast majority of these foreigners were of non-Orthodox denominations. This raises the issue of diverse military chaplaincy, particularly with regard to Protestant chaplains.

Political life in Russia was directly intertwined with the Orthodox Church, making it impossible to clearly separate secular and religious matters.[870] Orthodox chaplains acted as the key intermediaries between state authorities, officers, and ordinary soldiers. They often conveyed the ruler's will and decisions in accessible forms, typically through speeches or sermons.[871] Their presence in the army seemed essential, as war expeditions were religious in nature. At the time, rulers entrusted their troops to the protection of God, the Mother of God, the holy Archangels (especially Saint Michael the Archangel), selected saints, and their own deceased ancestors.[872] Soldiers going into battle were always accompanied by "saints:" icons, crosses and flags.[873] These holy items were over-

[869] С.В. Черников, op. cit., pp. 704–725.
[870] В. Котков, Ю. Коткова, *Военное духовенство России*, Санкт Петербург 2005, p. 16. For more on the subject, see H. Kowalska, *Kultura staroruska XI–XVI w. Tradycja i zmiana*, Kraków 1998; eadem [H. Kowalska-Stus], *Kultura i eschatologia. Moskwa wieku XVII*, Kraków 2007.
[871] И.К. Смолич, *История Русской Церкви 1700–1917*, кн. 18, ч. 2, Москва 1996, p. 18.
[872] P. Krokosz, *Na Kremlu i w Twierdzy – w cieniu carskich nekropolii* [in:] *Dialog z Tradycją*, vol. 7: *Dawna i współczesna kultura funeralna*, eds. I. Steczko, R. Dźwigoł, Kraków 2018, pp. 199–230.
[873] А.Б. Григорьев, *Вера и Верность. Очерки из истории отношений Русской Православной Церкви и Российской армии*, Москва 2005, pp. 33–35; Т.В. Кузнецова, *Интересный экспонат: икона-реликвия «Явление Богоматери преподобному Сергию Радонежскому»*, http://www.musobl.divo.ru/const_int_expon.html (accessed July 22, 2015).

seen by the Orthodox clergy, most frequently priests of the tsar's court, aided by local priests whenever necessary.[874]

For an exceptionally long time, clerical structures in the Russian army had no formal organization. According to Frank Tallet, this, along with low rank and pay, translated into declining piety among soldiers.[875] At the onset of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), military chaplains were still deployed through ad hoc decisions made by the tsar or military commanders. For instance, between 1699 and 1700 Peter I assigned ministers to the newly formed regiments of the land army and the emerging navy (the responsibility for equipping warships was partly borne by the Patriarch of Moscow and other Orthodox Church hierarchs).[876] In 1704, Rear Admiral Cornelius Cruys requested the deployment of ten Orthodox priests to serve on seven galleys and one hundred brigantines.[877] Interestingly, Protestant chaplains were also hired, who provided spiritual care primarily for foreigners, especially officers.[878] In this regard, Adam Weyde played a crucial role; throughout his long military service, he used the services of three Lutheran military chaplains. This undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of a Protestant clerical structure within the

[874] For example, during Ivan IV the Terrible's Kazan expedition of 1552, his confessor Protopop Andrey of the Blagoveshchensky Sobor in the Moscow Kremlin was present in the camp. During the reign of Alexei or Fyodor III, clergymen were dispatched with the army either at the tsar's behest or in consultation with the Patriarchal Prikaz. On the other hand, during the Azov expeditions of 1695-1696, religious services in the Russian army were rendered by lower-ranking (local) clergymen who joined the marching columns; see В. Котков, Ю. Коткова, op. cit., pp. 15–16; А.Б. Григорьев, op. cit., pp. 221.

[875] F. Tallet, op. cit., pp. 126–128. Tallet contends that the regularity of religious practice—difficult to enforce in and of itself—was an important factor contributing to this state of affairs.

[876] П. и Б., т. 1, p. 111–113, 116–117; И.Г. Корб, op. cit., pp. 254–256.

[877] В.П. Иванов, *Становление института военного духовенства в русской армии в XVIII–XIX веках*, "Вестник Тверского государственного университета" 4 (2013), серия: Педагогика и психология, p. 296; В. Котков, Ю. Коткова, op. cit., p. 16–17; ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2070.

[878] To encourage experienced soldiers to serve in Russia, they were guaranteed freedom of religion as early as the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; see ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 1910.

Russian army, as the presence of pastors serving alongside the general seamlessly integrated with the daily lives of soldiers of the same denomination within his units. Moreover, it constituted a form of "promotion" of Protestant religiosity among his subordinates.

In the first decade of the eighteenth century, no normative acts regulated the presence of clergymen in line and garrison regiments and ship squadrons.[879] Chaplains are not listed in the February 1711 infantry and cavalry payrolls. However, the Senate decree dated December 15, 1712 mentions provisions issued to Orthodox priests, indicating their presence within the units. Still, the documents fail to provide any information regarding Protestant clergymen (pastors), which demonstrates a continued lack of their official recognition in military records.[880] The first Protestant chaplain was appointed in 1712 in the artillery corps. The pastor was to receive an annual salary of 120 rubles and was listed as a member of the regimental staff. Interestingly, no corresponding information is available with respect to Orthodox clergymen, which testifies to the predominance of Protestant soldiers in the artillery force.[881] Thus, chaplains of other denominations were permitted to serve in the Russian army and participate in war expeditions, as long as individual commanders invited them to be part of their units, as was the case with Adam Weyde, among others.

Religious matters in the land army were regulated only by the military code adopted in 1716[882] (with Adam Weyde contributing significantly to its drafting; see Chapter 11, Figures 11.2b–11.3a); in turn, the navy used

[879] К.Г. Капков, *Памятная книга Российского военного и морского духовенства XIX – начала XX веков. Справочные материалы*, Москва 2008, p. 29.
[880] ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2319; т. 43, ч. 1, Санкт Петербург 1830, № к 2612, p. 12.
[881] Ibidem, т. 4, № 2480; т. 43, № к 2480, p. 7. Regimental chaplains serving in the artillery were also recorded in Peter I's *Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 95.
[882] KWPI, passim.

the naval code passed in 1720.[883] Both legal acts included detailed provisions on military prayers and services, offering extensive protection for chaplains and establishing disciplinary rules they were to observe. A hierarchy of chaplains was also created: a senior field chaplain was assigned to the commander-in-chief, while lower-ranking chaplains were placed within the regiments and expected to comply with the directives of their superiors. The laws also specified offenses against faith and the clergy, along with corresponding penalties.[884] The number of chaplains was determined by the size of the regiments, whereas in the navy, their number was regulated centrally.[885] Such provisions directly mirrored Swedish solutions in this regard.[886]

At this point, one should emphasize a vital fact that historians dealing with religious aspects of the Russian army have overlooked. This is because Book I of Peter's *Military Code* emphasized the principle of religious tolerance in the army. With regard to prayers and services recited and celebrated in the army, the following passage was added: "And since there are people of other creeds in the army, these, too, must similarly act in accordance with their religious laws and pray at this time, under

[883] *Книга Устав морской о всем, что касается доброму управлению в бытности флота*, Санкт Петербург 1720, passim. Russian historians generally assume that the first naval legislation was drafted as early as 1668 by Captain David Botler, the commander of the tsar's ship *Eagle*, which was to operate in the Caspian Sea. However, said regulations did not constitute a typical naval code due to their limited extent and content, which amounted to as few as thirty-three articles and lacked a section on the manner in which seafarers were to be tried and the punishments prescribed for the respective offences; see Ф.Ф. Веселаго, *Очерк русской морской истории*, ч. 1, Санкт Петербург 1875, pp. 63, 537–538.

[884] KWPI, pp. 101, 122, 171, 178–179, 229–231. The presence of Orthodox clergy in each regiment was validated with the determination of the new ranks in the Russian army in 1720; see ПСЗРИ, т. 43, ч. 1, № к 3006, pp. 13, 18.

[885] In 1717, an order was issued mandating the presence of thirty-nine clergymen on warships. The priests assigned to these ships were to be drawn from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Veliky Novgorod, Pskov, Tver, and Vologda; see В. Котков, Ю. Коткова, op. cit., p. 17.

[886] For a detailed comparison, see Swedish historian Erik Anners, op. cit., pp. 16–19 (chapter titles and tables), pp. 20–80 (comparison of legal regulations).

the same penalty."[887] These practices were mandated for soldiers starting at least in February/March 1715, since it was then (on February 28) that a concise twenty-one-page prayer booklet for soldiers was printed in St. Petersburg. The first page contained an order regarding participation in prayers (just below the title), which was subsequently incorporated into the first book of the *Military Code*. The subsequent pages specified when and how often soldiers were to pray, also detailing the required conduct during specific prayers (such as removing hats, lowering, or laying down arms, and kneeling). The publication included texts of selected prayers, psalms, and passages from the Gospels. According to the instructions, prayers were to be read out by a clergyman; however, if no man of the cloth was present in the military units, the role could be filled by another individual referred to as a "lector" (Rus. *чтец*). This function was typically reserved for officers, owing to their literacy.[888]

In mandating prayers, the declaration introduced at the time was significant for several reasons. Beyond the aforementioned issue of religious tolerance, it fostered a sense of community among soldiers, bringing together adherents of the same faith and those of different confessions, since all soldiers, regardless of their religious affiliation, were required to pray at the same time. This also allowed for the creation of alternative military chaplain structures without the need for state funding. Despite many Protestant officers and generals serving in Peter I's army, it was the personal relations with the tsar and the actions undertaken by Adam Weyde that suggest it was he, more than anyone else, who introduced and regulated the practice of religious worship in the new military code.

[887] KWPI, p. 166.

[888] *Указ всем в войске россиском обретающимся. Вышним и нижним служителем православнокафолическия веры. Коим образом, и в которые время по вся дни должни приносить Господу Богу моления*, Санкт Петербург 1715.

14. SUMMARY OF LIFE

February 1719 saw the death of Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev, the commander of the tsar's cavalry, who was buried with highest honors on April 10 at the Alexander Nevsky Monastery in St. Petersburg (see Figure 14.1, bottom right corner and letter "L"). Peter I designated the monastery as the pantheon of Russian army leaders.[889] Performing the duties of marshal at the state military funeral ceremony was Adam Weyde.[890] What the general likely did not expect was that he, too, would be laid to rest in the very place less than a year later. However, before this occurred, on December 15, Weyde, accompanied by the tsar and other

[889] Peter I decided to found a new monastery in St. Petersburg dedicated to St. Alexander Nevsky (elevated to the rank of lavra in 1797) in 1710. Three years later, on March 25, 1713, the consecration of a wooden church dedicated to the Annunciation of the Theotokos took place where the Black River flows into the Neva, marking the official establishment of the monastery. The site was chosen on account of its historical significance as the location of a 1240 battle in which Prince Alexander Nevsky of Novgorod allegedly defeated the Swedes. This decision clearly resonated with the contemporary military and political situation. Canonized in Moscow in 1547, Alexander Nevsky was enshrined in the Russian pantheon of saints and, over time, became revered as the heavenly protector of the tsars, particularly those involved in military campaigns. The veneration of Alexander Nevsky grew significantly during the reign of Peter I, especially after 1724, when his relics were ceremoniously transferred from Vladimir on the Klyazma to the Nevsky Monastery in St. Petersburg. This event was marked by a religious and state ceremony laden with military undertones; see P. Krokosz, *Aspekt religijny…*, pp. 215, 225–228, 231–233.

[890] *И.И.* Голиков, op. cit., т. 7, p. 253; *И.* Воскресенская, *Российская империя. Полная энциклопедия «Табели о рангах»,* Москва 2009, p. 110.

commanders of the imperial army, once again visited the Alexander Nevsky Monastery. This time, he was there to bury his deceased daughter, Maria, the would-be fiancée of General Herman Jensen Bohn (Figure 14.2).

The death of this young woman followed from a combination of parental mistakes, family ambitions, and the growing wealth and prestige of her lineage. The full context of the event was brought to light through the recollections of Adam Weyde's adjutant, Peter Henry Bruce, who was also a relative of the General-Feldzeugmeister Jacob Bruce.[891]

To explicate these events, it is necessary to briefly reiterate and organize the information about the Weyde family presented in the previous chapters. Until Adam Weyde's capture at the Battle of Narva in 1700, his life followed the typical trajectory of a professional soldier's career. He made his living primarily from his pay and monetary rewards. He was entirely dependent on the state—or, more precisely, on the tsar's favor—which became even more evident during his more than a decade-long imprisonment in Swedish captivity (until January 1711). The general initially received assistance from his wife, who quickly found herself in financial trouble (with Prince Menshikov helping her maintain the household). Weyde was also supported by other, significantly wealthier generals and colonels in captivity, particularly Pyotr Lefort.

Weyde's return to St. Petersburg in early 1711 radically transformed his financial standing. After the 1710 campaign, the Russian army captured Estonia and Livonia. Peter I rented Adam Weyde vast estates in the newly conquered Livonia, with a projected annual income amounting to 12,000 rubles.[892] Following the victorious Finnish campaign of 1714–1715,

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[891] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 202–207, 278–279.

[892] В.А. Нащокин, op. cit., приложения, № 6, p. 194; Н.Н. Петрухинцев, *Проблемы интернационализации российской политической элиты в начале XVIII века*, [in:] *Проблемы*

Weyde received additional properties located to the northwest of Ingria (Ingermanland), previously part of the Swedish province of Vyborg, along with estates near Reval (see Chapter 9). Notably, these domains were situated within a German-speaking cultural area inhabited by Lutherans, suggesting that the allocation of these lands to the general was a calculated decision, possibly hinting at his future appointment as a governor or viceroy of the Baltic provinces. Due to the ongoing war, the benefits afforded by these estates were not yet substantial, although the ruling circles anticipated the eventual and complete integration of the annexed territories into Russia. As a result, the general's two daughters became highly sought-after marriage prospects within the Russian elites.

Adam Weyde carefully arranged the first marriage himself. Weyde's eldest daughter, aged twenty-nine, married his friend, the aforementioned Pyotr Lefort.[893] The late age of marriage is fairly understandable and stemmed from the fact that the bride's father had spent ten years in captivity, and upon his return, he was almost immediately deployed in a war campaign against Turkey.

Weyde's first son-in-law originated from the Lefort (Le Fort) family, originally from Piedmont. They were Huguenots who had moved to Geneva, where they engaged in trade. The Geneva patrician Ami Lefort (brother of the aforementioned general and admiral Franz Lefort, Peter I's friend) was knighted by Emperor Leopold I in 1698.[894] Ami's son, Pyotr,

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истории России, отв. ред. В.Л. Янин, вып. 9: *Россия и Запад в переходную эпоху от средневековья к новому времени*, Екатеринбург 2011, p. 226.

[893] The results of a quantitative study of the age of marriage among women from the magnate families of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania indicate that in the first half of the eighteenth century the average age of marriage was eighteen years and seven months (twenty six years and four months among men); see M. Liedke, op. cit., pp. 101, 107.

[894] P. Bayle, *Supplément au Dictionaire historique et critique*, Geneve 1722, p. 272; J.A. Galiffe, op. cit., pp. 66–67; M. de Romianmotier, *Histoire militaire de la suisse: et celle des suisses*, vol. 7, Lausanne 1788, pp. 500–503.

inherited his uncle Franz's vast Russian estate. Weyde's choice of Pyotr (who was thirty-seven at the time of the wedding) as a son-in-law was motivated by his background, cultural circle, religious denomination, profession, and personal connections. Unfortunately, the marriage was short-lived, lasting from January 23, 1713, until November 30, 1715, when Elizabeth Justine died shortly after giving birth to their daughter, Justine Elizabeth Catherine.

Adam Weyde pinned his hopes for the survival of the family on the marriage of his second daughter. This time, he did not intend to delay it for so long. Seeking Maria Weyde's hand in marriage was the Hanoverian envoy to Russia, Frederick Christian Weber (d. 1739), who met with her father's refusal (although Maria and Frederick were reciprocally in love).[895] Weyde likely wanted to bind his daughter to a Russian army officer, so that the family military traditions could continue, if only under a changed name. Weber was also at a disadvantage because he was not a subject of the tsar, which may have likewise displeased the father of his beloved.

Another suitor for the general's daughter was Peter Rumyantsev, a favorite and close associate of Peter I, who held the positions of adjutant general and major in the Preobrazhensky Regiment. Adam Weyde opposed this match, too. In this case, his objections were not due to the

[895] G. von Brevern, *Zur Geschichte der Familie von Brevern*, Bd. 2, Berlin 1880, pp. 16–17; P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 202–203. As an envoy of the Elector of Hanover to Russia, Frederick Christian Weber arrived in St. Petersburg in 1714. Three years later (1717), he briefly returned to Hanover for new instructions, before returning to the city on the Neva later that year. He eventually left Russia in October 1719; the information concerning Weber's alleged return to Hanover after the death of Peter I has not been corroborated. It is difficult to determine when he first planned to marry Maria Weyde (most possibly in 1718). What we do know is that in February 1719, Weber married another woman, Maria Luisa Dusterwald, in St. Petersburg. After returning to Hanover, he published a three-volume work *Das Veränderte Russland* (with the successive volumes published in 1721, 1739 and 1740, respectively). See F.Ch. Weber, *Das Veränderte Russland, in welchem die ietzige Verfassung Des Geist- und Weltlichen Regiments…*, Frankfurt 1721; W. Geier, *Russische Kulturgeschichte in diplomatischen Reiseberichten aus vier Jahrhunderten: Sigmund von Herberstein, Adam Olearius, Friedrich Christian Weber, August von Haxthausen*, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 106.

candidate's profession but rather his creed and social background. The general feared that Peter I himself might intervene on Rumyantsev's behalf, making it difficult to refuse the tsar's request. To preempt this possibility, Weyde made a hasty decision: he decided to expedite his daughter's marriage plans. It appears that there were few suitable candidates on the Russian "matrimonial market" who met Weyde's criteria. This scarcity likely explains why the general chose to marry his only surviving daughter to the much older Lieutenant General of Danish origin, Herman Jensen Bohn, mentioned earlier in this study. This choice aligned with the qualities he deemed essential for a son-in-law: faith, profession, and social standing. Considering Bohn's subsequent life, he seemed an ideal candidate who could continue the legacy of his father-in-law.[896] When evaluating Adam Weyde's matchmaking efforts, it seems clear that he sought to establish a powerful alliance of three families: the Weydes, the Leforts, and the Bohns.

The type of decisions that Weyde took as a father have been well documented in the literature. One can classify his case as an example of the so-called marital homogamy, that is, the choice of spouses based on their similar social standing and characteristics. However, his actions bear the hallmarks of something more, namely endogamy. The latter entails the choice of a partner (here, a husband for his daughters) within a given social group, in this case the community of foreign-born Lutheran

[896] Herman Jensen Bohn (1672-1726) began his military career in 1697, first in the Danish army, and from 1708 onwards, in Russia. Starting in 1713, he was commander of the Kazansky Infantry Regiment. In 1722, he was appointed lieutenant general; that same year, he married Katharina von Brevern (née Reutern), the widow of Hermann von Brevern, Vice President of the Chamber of Law in St. Petersburg. In 1726, he was named Governor General of Livonia, and a year later the Second President of the College of War. He died in 1742 as a landowner in Livonia; see DBL, Bd. 2, pp. 468–469; ВЭЛ, т. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1853, pp. 408–409; ЭВМН, т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1883, p. 479.

Figure 14.1. Adam Weyde's house in St. Petersburg (letter I) with the route of the funeral procession marked on the map.
Source: J. Keyser, *Nova ac verissima urbis St. Petersburg ab imperatore Russico Petro Alexii f. conditae…*, Amsterdam [1720], https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b53029421q (public domain).

AFBEELDING VAN DE NIEUWE RUSSISCHE HOOFT-RESIDENTIE EN ZEE STADT

St. PETERSBURG

BENEVENS HAARE NIEUWE VESTING DOOR ZYNE RUSSISCH-KEIZERLYKE MAJESTEIT Aº 1705 aan t eind van den FINNISCHE ZEE-BOEZEM, by den uitvloet van de RIVIER NEVA, op eenige Eilanden aangelegt.

AANWYZING DER LETTERS.

A Russisch Keizerl. mej: tuin en zomer huis.
B Water-Machine.
C Russisch Keizerlyke majest. winter huis.
D Werf alwaar de Oorlogs Schepen gebouwt worden, is gefortificeert Aº 1716.
E Magazein daar de Galeyen gebouwt worden.
F Giet huis.
G Generaal veltmug-meester Bruces Paleis.
H Tuig huis.
I Generaal Weides Paleis.
K Duitsch-Keizerlyke Residents woning.
L Gast- en Logement-huis.
M Oliphants huis waar in een schoone Oliphant staat.
N Woningen der Keyser en Yzersmits.
O Kabaka of Groot Bier huis.
P Logement-huis of Herberg, toebehoorende den Vorst Menzikof.
Q Vorst Menzikofs. woningen voor de konstenaars en hoveniers.
R Vorst Menzikofs paarden stal.
S Een hooge toren, waar na zig de Schippers in t inkomen regulieren.
T Boek drukkerye.
V Academie.
W Russische kerk der H. drie Eenigheit.
X Russische Admiraliteits kerk.
Y Vorst Menzikofs kerk.
Z Luitersche kerk.
a Finnische Luitersche kerk.
b Roomsch-Catolykshe kerk.
c Nieuwe Roomsch Catolykshe kerk.
d Russische kerken.

Figure 14.2. Portrait of Lieutenant General Hermann Jensen Bohn. Source: painting by Georg Christoph Groth, kept at the Kumu Art Museum (Eesti Kunstimuuseum - Estonia, Tallinn), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Generall%C3%B8jtnant_Hermann_Jensen_Bohn_(Georg_Christoph_Groth).JPG?uselang=-ru (public domain).

officers serving in the Russian army.[897] The second type of practice of significance in this context is denominational exclusivism, particularly evident in immigrant groups. As a backdrop, one can cite the geographically, ethnically (Slavic), and culturally similar Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Among the magnates of this religiously and confessionally diverse state, the phenomenon in question was virtually nonexistent.[898] The subject of marriage strategies among foreigners living in Russia, especially

[897] For more on this theoretical perspective; see M.H.D. van Leeuwen, I. Maas, *Endogamy and Social Class in History: an Overview*, "International Review of Social History" 50 (2005), S13, pp. 1–23; M. Kalmijn, *Intermarriage and Homogamy: Causes, Patterns,Ttrends*, "Annual Review of Sociology" 24 (1998), 1, pp. 395–421.

[898] M. Liedke, op. cit., pp. 221–225.

representatives of the officer corps, doubtless warrants further in-depth examination.

As noted by Peter Henry Bruce, the father's decision appeared as completely incomprehensible to his daughter. The young girl did not love the suitor, who was not only much older than her—at forty-seven, he was old enough to be her father—but also did not meet her expectations. Weyde seemed to choose his sons-in-law from among his own peers, just a few years younger than himself (Lefort was born in 1676, Bohn in 1672). Moreover, according to surviving accounts and portraits (see Figure 14.2), the latter was not particularly handsome. The marriage fell through eventually, as Maria Weyde fell into despair, which developed into a "prolonged indisposition." However, her father remained adamant about his decision. Those close to the family stated that Maria died on the day of the planned wedding. It is highly likely that she committed suicide, and the circumstances were concealed for religious and societal reasons.[899] It is noteworthy that, while Weyde enjoyed a strong familial bond with his elder daughter, such ties were nonexistent with Maria. Her father re-entered her life only when she was twelve years old (in 1711), and even then, he was mostly absent, preoccupied with the successive stages of the war with Sweden.

On December 18, 1719, following Maria's funeral service and ceremony, a wake was held at the general's home, attended by the tsar himself and his close associates.[900] The eulogy was delivered by German clergyman Heinrich Gottlieb Nazzius, who was associated with the Pietist

[899] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 203–204; В.А. Нащокин, op. cit., приложения, № 6, p. 194.

[900] *Повседневные записки делам князя А.Д. Меншикова…*, p. 346. There is every indication that the funeral saw an incident involving Peter I's scandalous behavior. The tsar was supposed to sing and read out a letter (eulogy). No details on the incident are known. As noted by German historian Reinhard Wittram, the context of the event was related to the so-called Most Drunken Synod of Fools and Jesters, an institution consisting of Peter I's closest friends, who scorned the rites of the Catholic Church during lavish carousals. The tsar's misconduct was not limited to the Catholic de-

center in Halle and who had been the first pastor of the Lutheran religious community in St. Petersburg after 1711 (see Figure 14.1, letter a). The text commemorating Maria Weyde, as spoken (read out) by Nazzius, was transcribed and published in print (as a thirty-page brochure) in Reval later in 1719 by the municipal printer Johann Köhler.[901]

This personal tragedy devastated the senator, who realized that he had acted inappropriately. His mental and physical health deteriorated rapidly.[902] Immediately after the funeral, at the end of 1719, Weyde traveled to Olonets to recuperate in the local spas. This was noted by the French King's representative Henry de La Vie. His report of January 4 (15), 1720, included the following information: "Word continues to spread about the tsar's imminent departure to the Olonets waters, as General Weyde, who is already very ill, is reportedly already there, and having no doubt about his imminent death, [everyone] regards Prince Repnin as [a kind of] his successor to the rank of Field Marshal."[903]

The treatment in Olonets consisted of drinking mineral water, but instead of improvement it brought further deterioration of Weyde's health. It was only with the presence of Peter I, his personal interest in his associate's problems, and the hiring of doctors who were to tend to the patient at all times, that the general's condition improved. It is difficult to judge the state of his health from the enigmatic notes; however, the problem that arose was of a mental rather than physical nature. One cannot

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nomination, as it turned out that Peter I behaved in a similar manner during the funeral of General Weyde's daughter, who was of the Lutheran faith. See R. Wittram, op. cit., Bd. 2, pp. 170, 546.

[901] H.G. Nazzius, op. cit.

[902] On December 21, 1719 (January 1, 1720), French diplomat Henry de La Vie noted that many of those around the tsar (including General Weyde) suffered from a condition that was a combination of "hypochondria and melancholy;" see *Донесения французского консула в Петербурге Лави…*, № 27, p. 73.

[903] Ibidem, № 29, p. 78. Prince Anikita Repnin had to wait several more years for the much-anticipated promotion. It was not until January 20, 1724 that he was appointed president of the College of War, receiving the rank of Field Marshal General on May 7.

exclude the possibility that the ruler's genuine concern and his declaration of Adam Weyde as the best and most loyal general in the empire sparked the officer's recovery.[904]

The tsar visited his friend again on April 22, 1720, this time on a yacht of the Baltic war fleet.[905] This marked one of the last private meetings between the ruler and his friend, as Adam Weyde died on the night of June 25 to 26, 1720.[906] After his death, he was dressed in a white embroidered uniform with a cloak and boots. A wig was placed on his head, and the Order of Saint Andrew the First-Called Apostle was hung around his neck. According to tradition, the body of the deceased was laid in one of the rooms of his former residence, placed on a *castrum doloris*, in a coffin under a canopy, and put on public display (see Figure 14.1). At that time, both during the day and at night, Weyde's close friends and distant acquaintances would come to pray, bid farewell to the late senator, or simply out of curiosity. No member of the Weyde family remained at the house (his brother-in-law Pyotr Lefort lived elsewhere), so the night watch fell on his former adjutant, Peter Henry Bruce. One night, Bruce startled those keeping vigil by moving the body to another location and lying in the coffin himself. He began moving under the pall, causing the visitors to believe that evil forces were at work; terrified, they fled the residence. No one returned to the house, and rumors of the night's events spread wildly. As Peter I heard these rumors, he summoned the adjutant, who clarified the entire incident, for which he was harshly reprimanded.[907]

[904] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 202.
[905] *Походный журнал 1720 года*, Санкт-Петербург 1855, p. 16.
[906] Ibidem, p. 49; С.А. Венгеров, op. cit., p. 265; ИПС, p. 117. Notably, Adam Weyde's death delivered another major blow to the general staff of the tsar's army, as it came on the same day (June 25, 1720) as the ceremonial funeral of Prince Yakov Dolgorukov; see *Походный журнал 1720 года…*, p. 25.
[907] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 207.

The ceremonial burial of the Russian commander took place on June 30. As the funeral procession with the general's body moved from his home and headed down Nevsky Prospekt toward St. Alexander Nevsky Monastery, twenty-five artillery salvos were fired from the Peter and Paul Fortress.[908] The body was transported on a carriage drawn by six horses, escorted by two battalions of infantry. Accompanying Adam Weyde on his final journey was his last surviving immediate family member, his granddaughter, Justine Elizabeth Catherine Lefort. Marching behind her were Weyde's sister-in-law and his brother's widow since 1710, Alena, alongside Justine Elizabeth's stepmother, Sophie Amélie Lefort, née von Barner. A large group of women proceeded behind them, followed by the tsar and the highest-ranking officials, Weyde's fellow officers and members of the Protestant community, including the ministers, burghers, and merchants. Despite Adam Weyde's Lutheran faith, his funeral took place at an Orthodox monastery. Recounting his late commander's burial, Peter Henry Bruce recorded that the ceremony cost as much as 10,000 rubles. [909] Map 14.1 documents the route of the funeral procession.

Peter I delivered a eulogy, as he had at the burials of his most prominent and distinguished commanders (Patrick Gordon, Franz Lefort and Boris Sheremetev). As the general's body was being laid in the grave, the soldiers gave a triple cannon and gun salute. The ruler also ordered that a banner bearing Weyde's image be raised over his grave (the only other general to whom this posthumous honor was extended was Boris Sheremetev).[910] Adam Weyde's grave has not survived to the present day,

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[908] В.А. Нащокин, op. cit., приложения, № 6, p. 194.

[909] Ibidem, p. 195; P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 207–209.

[910] *Походный журнал 1720 года…*, pp. 25, 49; Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, ч. 1, p. 256; П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*, p. 31; СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, p. 44; ВЭ, т. 5, pp. 274–275; *Вейде Адам Адамович 1667–1720*, http://lavraspb.ru/ru/nekropol/view/item/id/1815/catid/3 (accessed August 28, 2018); K. Jarochowski, *Rozprawy historyczno-krytyczne*, Poznań 1889, p. 122.

nor have the sepulchers of other Russian army commanders, members of the tsar's family, diplomats, or clergy buried at the Alexander Nevsky Monastery.[911]

The general's death was a major and irreparable loss to both the tsar's army and the Russian state administration. Gone was a man who dedicated himself entirely to reforming the Russian armed forces while helping to improve the state apparatus. One should also note that he died as a devout Lutheran and protector of the Halle Pietists living in Russia (for the record, Adam Weyde and Jacob Bruce were patrons of St. Michael's Lutheran Church in Moscow).[912] According to Peter Henry Bruce, the tsar and the entire army deeply mourned the general, who had enjoyed immense respect and was loved by ordinary soldiers and, despite his outward "harshness," never humiliated anyone in public, admonishing his soldiers only in private (courts-martial were a rarity in his units, as was the administration of severe punishments for the transgressions of his subordinates).[913]

The general died on the eve of the annual state celebrations commemorating the Russian victory over the Swedes at Poltava. The event coincided with the visit of the Polish envoy, Mazovian Voivode Stanisław Chomętowski, to St Petersburg. As noted by Polish historian Kazimierz Jarochowski, Weyde's death overshadowed the commemoration ceremony, which took place on June 27, 1720: "(...) the very days also saw the death of General Adam Weyde, highly favored by the tsar. The grand funeral ceremony in his honor was an occasion that busied the entire capital, the tsar's dignitaries, and the foreign diplomatic corps. While invited,

[911] *Мемориальная доска сподвижнику Петра I А. Вейде*, http://www.lavraspb.ru/ru/news/540-news (accessed August 28, 2018).
[912] A. Andreev, op. cit., p. 12.
[913] В.А. Нащокин, op. cit., приложения, № 6, pp. 194–195.

the Polish envoy did not participate in the mourning ceremony, allegedly struck by illness."[914]

In summary, the bulk of Adam Weyde's career was tied to the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, with the general dying on the eve of its conclusion.[915] Despite spending a decade as a prisoner of war, Weyde's commitment to military and state affairs positioned him among the victorious commanders and close associates of the tsar who laid the foundation of the Russian Empire, the official name adopted by Russia following its victory over Sweden in 1721.[916]

Adam Weyde's efforts to secure his lineage, undertaken in the latter days of his life, came to naught. 1710 saw the passing of his brother Franc (also a soldier); five years later, Weyde's older daughter died, followed by his younger daughter four years later. His wife Justine, née Gregorii, also passed in 1720. Weyde's lone heiress was his granddaughter (daughter of General Pyotr Lefort). However, as she was merely five at the time, a dispute commenced over the general's estate. With the alignment of actants around the tsar disrupted, Alexander Rumyantsev rose in stature and became Peter I's new favorite, replacing the once all-powerful Menshikov.[917] Rumyantsev was a personal enemy of Pyotr Lefort, blaming him in part for the unsuccessful outcome of his efforts to marry Maria Weyde. Lefort's relations with the tsar were incomparably inferior to the bond

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[914] K. Jarochowski, *Car Piotr I i August II, w trzechleciu po sejmie niemym z r. 1717. (Dokończenie)*, "Przegląd Polski" 85 (1887), 1, pp. 141–142.

[915] The Treaty of Nystad was signed on August 30, 1721. M. Hellmann, *Die Friedensschlüsse von Nystad (1721) und Teschen (1779) als Etappen des Vordringens Rußlands nach Europa*, "Historisches Jahrbuch" 97 (1978), pp. 270–288.

[916] P. Krokosz, *Koniec wojny – początek imperium. Rosyjsko-szwedzki traktat pokojowy 1721 roku*, [in:] *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczypospolita. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Andrzejowi Stroynowskiemu*, ed. M. Durbas, Częstochowa 2019, pp. 509–526; idem, *Armia Piotra I gwarantem mocarstwowej pozycji Rosji w Europie*, "Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej", 55 (2020), pp. 9–49.

[917] Idem, *Od sprzedawcy pierożków do generalissimusa. Zawrotna kariera Aleksandra Mienszykowa*, "Perspektywy Kultury" 1 (2019), pp. 139–166 (bibliography).

share by Peter I and Rumyantsev. The tsar's new favorite capitalized on his proximity to the monarch in a completely different way than Adam Weyde, who put the welfare of the army, the tsar and the state above his personal interests. Rumyantsev's ad hoc goal was to tarnish Weyde's legacy. To achieve this, he persuaded Peter I to take several, interconnected steps that effectively contributed to the partial erasure of the Weyde family from historical memory.

Immediately after the general's death, and prior to his funeral, Rumyantsev arrived at the Weyde residence (see Figure 14.1, letter l), where the father of Weyde's granddaughter, Pyotr Lefort, and the general's former adjutant, Peter Henry Bruce, were staying. While there, Rumyantsev personally oversaw the stocktaking of all furniture and valuables. All of these possessions were sealed, save for the money allocated for Weyde's funeral, apportioned to his son-in-law. The secured property reportedly amounted to 60,000 ducats (approximately 120,000 rubles).[918] As it turned out, the seizure of money was but a prelude to more punitive measures. Soon, the tsar, acting on the advice of his new favorite, stripped Weyde's granddaughter of her legal titles to the estates he had once bestowed upon the general, also confiscating all of Weyde's movable assets and incorporating them into the tsar's palace estate.[919] This was possible due to the fact that Weyde left behind no lineal ascendants or descendants; in addition, the estates granted to the general were situated in a territory that was a subject of a dispute with Sweden, and relinquishing them to the Swedes would facilitate the peace negotiations. In addition, Alexander Rumyantsev convinced Peter I's cousin Alexander Naryshkin to purchase Adam Weyde's residence. To this end, the court

[918] P. Bruce, op. cit., p. 205.

[919] *Опись высочайшим указам и повелениям, хранящимся в С.-Петербургском сенатском архиве, за XVIII век*, сост. П. Баранов, т. 2: *1725–1740 гг.*, Санкт-Петербург 1875, col. 3988.

estimated the market value of the property, including all of the inventoried furnishings and equipment. Apparently, the amount estimated was never paid out (or went directly to Rumyantsev), with the heiress securing as little as 12,000 rubles, along with a handful of her grandfather's jewels. Likewise, the heirs named in Weyde's will never received their respective legacies. For example, while Peter Henry Bruce collected the 200 ducats and coats bequeathed to him in the will, he never received the furniture due or a steed worth approximately 300 ducats.[920]

There is no doubt that the above case constituted a glaring violation of all kinds of principles. The first concern was of ethical nature: Peter I almost immediately disregarded the achievements of his faithful associate, depriving Weyde's sole heiress, as well as his associates, of the property he left behind. Also breached was the right of ownership, as the tsar did not even bother to issue any dispositions regarding the general's real estate and movable assets. In deciding to take such measures, Peter I acted inequitably in all respects. The seizure and redistribution of property of one of the most prominent and respected persons in the country violated the property rights of another important commander, Pyotr Lefort (and those of his daughter). Peter Henry Bruce could not comprehend how such blatantly unjust decisions came to be undertaken and enforced. The case sent ripples among foreign officers and soldiers, who realized that no one's property was exempt from forfeiture. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the seizure of Weyde's assets undermined the trust of foreign officers in the Russian state. At least two strategies can be noted in this context. Employing the first one was Weyde's former adjutant Peter Henry Bruce, who left the Russian military at the earliest opportunity (1721). Adopting the second was Pyotr Lefort, who, despite his rise in stature in Russia, moved (retired) to Mecklenburg after leaving

[920] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 205–206.

the service in 1733, mindful of the events of 1720.[921] Information as to the subsequent fate of Weyde's granddaughter can be found in the decision of the Governing Senate dated April 13 (24), 1731, pursuant to which she regained the Estonian domains bestowed on her grandfather by Peter I.[922] This was, of course, only possible following the death of the reformer-tsar and through the growing influence of her own father.

Tellingly, the memory of Adam Weyde and his achievements was effaced shortly after his death. The efforts of Alexander Rumyantsev and the peculiar passivity of the general's associates and friends had a significant bearing on the situation. Notably, no painting depicting the general has survived, save for a miniature effigy produced during his stay in Swedish captivity. Nor has any printed eulogy relating to his funeral or life and work appeared. Peter Henry Bruce stressed that even Weyde's granddaughter collected but a few of her grandfather's keepsakes.[923] Consequently, early nineteenth-century historians analyzing the reign of Peter I completely overlooked the general.[924] The memory of the tsar's confidant might have faded completely had it not been for two publications that restored it to posterity: *the Military Regulations of 1698*, published in print in 1841,[925] and a monograph on Weyde penned by Pavel Bobrovsky.[926]

If one were to inspect Adam Weyde's legacy in a conventional way, one would find it rather paltry. His death and the failure of his matrimonial strategies meant that the lone person to continue his life's work, albeit to a limited extent, was Pyotr Lefort. In addition, the confiscation of Weyde's assets resulted in the destruction of his material keepsakes,

[921] Н.Н. Петрухинцев, op. cit., pp. 326–327; P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 206ff.
[922] Ю. Пааскоски, op. cit., p. 89.
[923] P.H. Bruce, op. cit., p. 206.
[924] Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Деяния знаменитых полководцев…*, ч. 1–2.
[925] А.А. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный и посвященный Петру Великому…*
[926] П.О. Бобровский, *Вейде Адам Адамович…*

exacerbated by the fact that, during his lifetime, Weyde hardly cared for sponsoring artists, whose output would have helped him knowingly shape his image in the eyes of the future generations.

In the introduction to this study, we outlined the concept of actor-network theory, which we drew on when writing this book. Actor-network theory implies the subjectivization of institutions and even objects that influence state structures. According to the diagram in Figure 1, Adam Weyde was an actor related directly to the tsar, and if we adopt this perspective, we should conclude that he participated in the emergence of a number of actants that significantly influenced state structures in the subsequent decades.

Weyde's foremost achievement was undoubtedly his participation in the codification of military law, which helped produce Peter I's *Military Code of 1716* (discussed at length in Chapter 11). This set of norms superseded Weyde's previous work, i.e., *the Military Regulations of 1698* (Chapter 4). There is no doubt that both normative acts profoundly influenced the evolution of the Russian army and state. Appointed supreme military judge in 1718, Adam Weyde stood as a kind of guarantor of the military regulations he drafted. His efforts contributed to the improvement of discipline among the highest-ranking commanders and officials (Chapter 12).

Another major achievement of General Weyde involved laying the foundations for the Russian conscription system between 1698 and 1700, an undertaking he sought to improve upon his release from captivity. The reform was highly beneficial from a military standpoint and produced far-reaching social, economic, and cultural consequences, exerting continuous influence on the state's structures (see Chapters 5 and 12). At the Battle of Narva in 1700, Weyde demonstrated remarkable presence of mind, skillfully commanding his division and saving it from destruction while ensuring its combat readiness until the end of the clash. His

military activities in the second decade of the eighteenth century had a tangible impact on the soldiers serving in numerous regiments of the Russian army. Many officers served under his command at various times, with Adam Weyde personally determining their respective promotions (see Chapters 6 and 15). He effectively lobbied for, and played a key role in, replacing the old *prikazy* (ministries) with the more efficient collegiums. As the Second President of the College of War, he was, in fact, its true founder and leader, since the nominal head of the institution, Alexander Menshikov, was a virtual figurehead appointed by the tsar (see Chapter 12). Equally important was Weyde's contribution to the preparation and smooth progression of the Grand Embassy. It is also impossible to overlook his efforts with respect to the exchange of prisoners and his commitment to Protestant military chaplaincy (see Chapters 3 and 7).

Adam Weyde was keen on meeting new people and open to innovations across various disciplines. His travels throughout Europe allowed him to observe from up close the workings of states and armies in England (Great Britain), the United Provinces of the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Mecklenburg, Prussia-Brandenburg, Saxony, Austria, Hungary, the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire, the Polish Crown, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Weyde likely ranked among the most cosmopolitan representatives of the Russian elites of his time. Undoubtedly, he played the role of a conduit, transferring valuable foreign models and acting as a kind of demiurge by adapting them to Russian conditions. His influence was evident during the Grand Embassy, his time in Swedish captivity and, above all, his travels abroad from 1715 to 1717. A unique example of Weyde's contributions is his report on the state of the Danish army, which successfully dissuaded the tsar from launching an amphibious assault on Scania in 1716 (see Chapters 3, 7, and 10). The general also deliberately fostered religious tolerance within the Russian army, actively supporting Lutheran clergymen and chaplains, and serving as a patron

of congregations in Moscow and St. Petersburg (see Chapter 13). He was involved in acquiring books on a variety of subjects (not only military and legal) from abroad, recommending the most valuable works for translation and publication (see Chapters 3, 9). At the tsar's command, Weyde also developed fortification plans based on the "Rimpler method," which laid the foundation for the expansion of Ukraine's defensive lines in the coming decades (see Chapter 11).

When assessing Adam Weyde's body of work, one can also invoke the model proposed by Russian historian Oleg Stolyarov, who distinguished six categories of people considered to be part of the ruling elite in Russia in the first half of the eighteenth century, depending on the offices held and roles performed in the state administration. The general belonged to three of these categories: the first, which included the heads of *prikazy* and presidents of collegiums, i.e. people who manage the most important institutions of the central state administration (a total of thirty individuals);[927] the third, which included senators; and the fifth, which included those performing the most important state functions of a military and diplomatic nature (Stolyarov listed Weyde as the author of the *Military Regulations of 1698*).[928]

In evaluating the life and military career of a multi-talented man, such as the general, one should consider it from several perspectives. With respect to personal, private and family life, Adam Weyde failed miserably. However, if one were to examine his public activities, Weyde seems to be a prototypical "supporting actor." He orchestrated or inspired the tsar to establish so many institutions, regulations and concepts that it is virtually

[927] In this case, Oleg Stolyarov identified Adam Weyde directly as the President (1718-1720) and Vice President (1717-1718) of the College of War.

[928] О.Д. Столяров, *Иностранцы в правящей элите России в первой половине XVIII века: проблема критериев отбора*, "Вестник Самарского государственного университета" 18 (2012), 8/2, pp. 73–76.

impossible to overestimate his impact, and one can only wonder where the Russian army would have ended up in 1720 had Adam Weyde not spent more than ten years in Swedish captivity (1700-1711).

The life and work of Adam Weyde perfectly demonstrate the viable opportunities to navigate one's fate and career in the war-ridden realities of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. To this end, we draw on Pierre Bourdieu's field theory, adapting it to the historical context.[929] Every field (of activity) in social reality is characterized by the pursuit of rewards (capital). Capital has different natures, with the most significant being economic capital (landed assets and money, dividing society into possessors and non-possessors), cultural capital (education, command of languages, skills, but also possession of cultural goods in material terms), social capital (the totality of one's contacts, bond relations, affiliation to social, religious and state groups, family ties and friendships) and symbolic capital (which enables the exercise of power and symbolic violence).[930] When viewed from this perspective, the military field operates under distinctive rules, different from those regulating,

[929] Notably, Pierre Bourdieu did not develop his theory for the purposes of historical research, as he was primarily interested in analyzing the world of today (and its various societies), primarily France. Bourdieu's concept has since evolved and expanded, but in no work does one find a definite summary of his field theory. We consider Bourdieu's views as an inspiration for our analysis of Adam Weyde's career. See P. Bourdieu, *Reguły sztuki: geneza i struktura pola literackiego*, transl. A. Zawadzki, Kraków 2007; idem, *Dystynkcja. Społeczna krytyka władzy sądzenia*, transl. P. Biłos, Warszawa 2005. In the latter book, the author recognizes the role of historical context and the resultant contiguities; see, e.g., chapter *Trzy stadia pola* w książce *Reguły sztuki*.

[930] In a somewhat simplified way, one can compare this phenomenon to the situations described by Leon Petrażycki in relation to the actual functioning of legal norms. According to Petrażycki, law should be analyzed in the context of emotional experiences, which comprise the experience of obligation and the experience of entitlement. It is from these experiences that the strength or weakness of legal norms arises; see L. Petrażycki, *O pobudkach postępowania i o istocie moralności i prawa*, Warsaw [1924], passim, In particular, see Chapter 8, in which the author highlights the difference in the psyche of slaves and Roman citizens, which he argues stemmed from the impact of the law in the intellectual sphere. This, in turn, constitutes a common denominator in the analyses offered by P. Bourdieu and L. Petrażycki.

e.g., the clerical or literary fields. Naturally, one's success in a given field does not translate directly into one's other pursuits. Cultural competence relevant in the poetic field is of little value in the military field, and vice versa. However, in order to acquire one form of capital, other types of capital are necessary that one has already acquired through accumulation or reproduction or through reconversion from other kinds of capital.[931]

When viewed through this lens, several characteristic traits of Adam Weyde's life emerge. Above all, he was an active agent in shaping his own fate. After the mine-laying debacle at Azov in 1695, he realized that theoretical knowledge alone was insufficient. He personally proposed to expand the scope of his responsibilities during the Grand Embassy, offering to visit Hungary to monitor the Holy Roman Empire's war against the Ottoman Porte. Upon his return, of his own accord, he drafted a military code and submitted it to Peter I, inspiring the tsar to pursue further military reforms. During his time in Swedish captivity, Weyde sought to acquire as much information as possible about the workings of this highly organized state, subsequently applying this knowledge to the modernization of the Russian state structures (Chapters 7 and 12). His initial capital was his linguistic proficiency in Russian, German, and Flemish, a skill set he continuously refined. Crucial to his success, however, was the social capital he amassed, particularly through his friendship with Peter I. This relationship evolved over time: initially, it was marked by youthful dreams and merrymaking. The bond was then was tested during Weyde's long separation from the tsar upon the general's capture by the Swedes. Between 1711 and 1714, Weyde regained his previous stature and became Peter's closest confidant and associate, which was particularly evident in

[931] For a synthetic overview of field and capital theory, see A. Matuchniak-Krasuska, *Koncepcja habitusu u Pierre'a Bourdieu*, "Hybris" 31 (2015), pp. 77–111; T. Zarycki, *Kapitał kulturowy – założenia i perspektywy zastosowań teorii Pierre'a Bourdieu*, "Psychologia Społeczna" 4 (2009), vol. 1–2, pp. 12–25.

the years 1716–1720. It was at that time that Weyde consolidated significant symbolic capital, not only as a general and divisional commander but primarily as the Vice President of the College of War and a senator. For years, Weyde had accumulated no economic capital, relying solely on his military salary and the tsar's favor. It was only after 1714 that he could consider himself affluent, though, as mentioned earlier, coming into money would ultimately lead to personal tragedies. In summary, the driving force behind the general's career was his close relationship with the tsar and his exceptional command of foreign languages. Although he lacked formal higher education, Weyde was a lifelong learner: he read, observed, and tested ideas in practice, which enabled him to climb the ranks. Additionally, his religious devotion, incorruptibility, and humility, coupled with the fact that he did not come from the Russian elite, made him an ideal confidant in the eyes of the tsar.

The case of Adam Weyde offers a glimpse into the marital strategies among immigrant families of professional soldiers, who often sought to preserve their distinct ethnic, religious, and social identities. Despite the potential advantages, some officers were reluctant to abandon their former faith, language, customs, and traditions that set them apart from the native population. In Russia, this was facilitated by the existence of so-called *nemetskayae slobody*, i.e., separate city districts inhabited by foreigners. Marriages were arranged in ways that bolstered this distinctiveness, resulting in endogamous marriages. However, in the case of Adam Weyde, there is a visible sense of patriotism and loyalty to the tsar, which manifested in his refusal to consider marrying off his daughter to an official of a foreign ruler. Unfortunately, the events following Adam Weyde's death demonstrate that even the most distinguished individuals were quickly replaced by other "actants." The shifting balance of power among actors, with Peter I positioned centrally as the main actant, caused uncertainty among families whose success depended on the career of a single

individual. Russia offered a great deal to immigrants from Western and Central Europe, far more than they might have gained in other countries on the continent; however, the risk of losing nearly everything was equally high.

15. COMMANDERS: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH

The greatness of a commander is typically measured by his successful military campaigns, battles won, and fortresses captured, with his achievements in the realm of military theory, such as treatises and regulations, serving as supporting evidence. However, it is much more challenging to assess the role of a military architect, i.e., the organizer of armed forces. Based on the aforementioned criteria, Adam Weyde, who dedicated nearly his entire life to serving in the Russian army, and with great commitment, warrants such an overall assessment. His evaluation should be grounded in two types of analysis: qualitative and quantitative.

The assessment resulting from our research, outlined in Chapters 2–13, is not entirely unambivalent when compared to the conclusions drawn in the final part of this study (Chapter 14). Despite a military career that developed successfully (albeit not without setbacks and including prolonged captivity), Adam Weyde attained high-ranking positions and military roles, significantly contributing to the reform of both the military and state structures. On the personal and familial front, however, the general experienced a string of misfortunes. Nonetheless, considering the premises of actor-network theory, his overall output—primarily

the documents, institutions, and regulations he helped set in motion—remains impressive.

Conversely, Weyde did little to distinguish himself as a battlefield commander. His participation in the 1695 Azov campaign ended in humiliation and the death of many soldiers, and his role in the Battle of Narva remains debatable. However, there is no doubt that before the start of the expedition, the general did his best to ensure his division was well-trained and disciplined. During the battle and immediately afterward, the tactical unit under his command retained its structure and initial combat capability, subsequently providing a foundation for the eventual reconstruction of the tsar's army. Weyde's leadership was marked by the lack of critical reflection on the lessons learned from the Battle of Zenta (1697). The decisions he made independently were typically cautious, which prevented him from seizing the initiative and potentially altering the course of the battle. Similarly, the Danube and Mecklenburg campaigns did not reveal any potential operational or tactical genius, although in terms of organization, the tsar's confidant fulfilled his duties commendably. Weyde distinguished himself by preventing the planned invasion of Scania in 1716, yet it is difficult to assess the impact of his efforts in this regard since the potential outcome of such an invasion remains a matter of speculation. It was only in the 1714 naval Battle of Gangut that Weyde truly showcased his courage and leadership. He was undeniably an outstanding military theorist, though somewhat less effective in practice. His strength lay in operating behind the scenes: drafting military regulations, organizing institutional structures, ensuring proper training and provisioning for the troops, and, most importantly, developing and implementing modernization concepts that addressed a wide range of military problems.

In order to balance these two elements, it is advisable to conduct a quantitative analysis to assess the impact of Adam Weyde and the decisions he made on the military in sheer numbers. In our opinion,

the best solution is to refer to the so-called *officerskye skazky* (officer questionnaires).[932]

In 2015, Kirill Tararnikov collected and published these vital documents on the course of service of officers of line infantry and cavalry regiments.[933] The source edition enables researchers to make holistic use of the personal accounts of the officers serving in Peter I's army; thus, we believe that an analysis of the source texts collected will allow us to conduct such a quantitative study.[934] Our intention is to quantify the number of instances in which Adam Weyde's name is mentioned in the "officer questionnaires." These mentions vary in nature, often providing information about the commander under whom individual officers served, while also indicating the persons responsible for their promotions, invoking shared experiences on the front, and more. All of this allows us to assess the personal relationships between officers and their superiors (generals), and most importantly, their role in training the personnel of the respective regiments.

In order to collect this data, we used a mechanism determining whether an officer provided any information concerning Adam Weyde (or failed to do so). In "officer questionnaires" and "service record excerpts," it was not uncommon for one person to be mentioned multiple times, which in our research we identify as a single relation established between a given officer or non-commissioned officer and General Weyde. Such an analysis will allow us to identify direct contacts between the officers and their commander and, above all, to assess the percentage of actions and

[932] The term *skazka* (Rus. *сказка*) referred to an official document containing specific information on the issues surveyed; see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 24, Москва 2004, p. 169.
[933] *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века…*, т. 1.
[934] Our quantitative evaluation of Adam Weyde's military activity was inspired by an article by Russian historian Sergei Chernikov on the evolution of the supreme command of Peter I's armed forces (land army and navy); see С.В. Черников, op. cit., pp. 699–735.

personality of the actor that impacted the soldier's fortunes in each unit. In other words, we assess what influence Adam Weyde exerted on the modernized Russian army.[935]

First of all, it is necessary to clarify the nature of said questionnaires and the type of procedure as part of which they were conducted. Therein, soldiers gave answers to specific, typified questions, enabling the drafting of their respective "service records." The procedure was conducted in Russia in 1720–1721, with the officers required to answer the following questions:

- What was your rank before the promotion and under what circumstances were you promoted? (Officers were required to list the successive ranks achieved up to their current military title).

- When and in what formations have you served?

- Where have you served, in what battles and campaigns have you participate?

- What were the circumstances of your promotion, who decided thereon and under whose instructions?

- How many *pomiestiyas* (beneficial property) and *votchinas* (allodial titles) are in your possession?

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[935] It is worth highlighting Pavel Krotov's recent findings regarding opportunities for individual promotion in Peter I's army. Using the biographical examples of Naum Senyavin, a nobleman and rear admiral of the navy, and Potap Golokov, a lieutenant in the infantry regiment and representative of the so-called *boevie kholopi* (a social stratum between the peasants and the nobility), Krotov outlined the functioning of the so-called Roman (ancient) model of career advancement. This system allowed individuals from lower social strata to achieve promotion. Thus, commanders, including Weyde, had broad discretion in selecting the most meritorious candidates for promotion. See П.А. Кротов, *«Социальный лифт» на военной службе в годы Северной войны («случаи» вице-адмирала Н.А. Сенявина и поручика П.Г. Головкова)*, "Санкт-Петербург и страны Северной Европы" 1–2 (2020), pp. 9–19; idem, *Вице-адмирал Н.А. Сенявин (практика реализации «римской модели» службы в Петровскую эпоху)*, "Новый часовой. Военно-исторический журнал" 22 (2021), pp. 29–46.

Every officer was obliged to fill out and sign the questionnaire; in addition, foreign officers were required to answer two further questions:

- What is your nationality and how long ago did you arrive in Russia?

- What is your due pay and under what "capitulations" do you receive it?

In some instances, officers were requested to present additional documents to confirm the information provided. All those submitting their "officer questionnaires," and those drawing up "service record excerpts" based on the questionnaires, were cautioned about criminal liability for making false statements in the documentation.[936]

The first extensive research using this type of source text was conducted by Russian historian Moisei Rabinovich in the 1970s. Rabinovich established that the collection of "officer questionnaires" and compilation of "service record excerpts" in the army's line regiments began in January 1720. It finished, albeit in an incomplete form, more than a year later. A total of thirty infantry and twenty-one cavalry regiments submitted the documents, with four infantry and five cavalry units failing to return their records.[937] As Rabinovich noted, these figures differ from the official status of the Russian field army as of 1720, which was comprised of thirty-three cavalry (dragoon) regiments and forty infantry regiments. Each cavalry unit was supposed to include forty-six officers, with forty-eight officers per each infantry troop, amounting to a joint total of 3,438 officers (1,518 in the cavalry and 1,920 in the infantry).[938]

A significantly more precise pool of data comes from Kirill Tatarnikov. According to him, the "officer surveys" submitted to the

[936] М.Д. Рабинович, *Социальное происхождение…*, p. 134.
[937] Ibidem, pp. 134–135.
[938] ПСЗРИ, т. 43, ч. 1, к № 3511; М.Д. Рабинович, *Социальное происхождение…*, p. 135.

College of War, the Main Commissariat, and the field office of Prince Alexander Menshikov were crucial for the authorities to assess the current condition and needs of the army. The surveys facilitated an estimation of the personnel strength of individual units, the number of horses available, and the supplies of ammunition, uniforms, and weapons.[939] Tatarnikov notes that the form of "officer questionnaires" varies considerably, from laconic to more elaborate responses, accounting for the successive years of one's service. Nonetheless, a significant number of the reports contained general information only, since they were drafted even twenty-odd years after the event in question.[940]

Tatarnikov published "officer questionnaires" from 1720–1721, which were collected from officers of thirty-nine infantry regiments (no data on the Petersbursky Regiment) and thirty-two cavalry regiments (no information on the Rostovsky Regiment).[941] The entire infantry officer corps returned a total of 1,242 questionnaires, with the cavalry officers submitting 1,453.[942] This amounted to 2,695 cases, representing 78% (1,518 cavalry and 1,920 infantry) or 80.6% of all officer posts (following a deduction of the two regiments not included in the survey).[943] The lack of questionnaires for every fifth officer can be attributed to factors such as leaves of absence, illness, transfers between various regiments, etc.

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[939] К.В. Татарников, *Предисловие*, [in:] *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1, p. 3.

[940] The questionnaires contained numerous errors regarding the dates and course of certain events (including the battles of Lesnaya and Poltava), as well as confusion surrounding individual high commanders, including Adam Weyde, who was referred to as "krigs-president"(!) at a time when the College of War had not yet been established; see ibid., p. 6.

[941] Ibid, tables. Conversely, Moisei Rabinovich estimates the surviving documentation at 2,245 questionnaires, returned by officers serving in sixty infantry and cavalry regiments; see М.Д. Рабинович, *Социальное происхождение...*, pp. 134–135.

[942] К.В. Татарников, op. cit., p. 6, tables.

[943] Notably, the number of "officer questionnaires" returned by a given regiment may have been higher than its officer staff. Among others, this may have resulted from frequent personnel transfers following personnel losses (killed, wounded), departures to other units, or dismissals from the army.



Chart 11. Percentage of soldiers mentioning Adam Weyde when recounting their military careers. Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1; К.В. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...*, https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=stdforum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).

However, the primary cause was the loss and degradation of documents. Tatarnikov estimates the completeness of the collection at 85%.

Until the present, researchers have used "officer questionnaires" and "service record transcripts" in conventional ways, with analyses conducted concerning the lives of specific individuals or events unfolding at a given time. They were commonly used in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century for research papers on the history of individual units of the Russian army.[944] One cannot preclude the possibility of the ques-

[944] We have supplemented Kirill Tatarnikov's inventory with a number of preceding (and subsequent) publications concerning "officer questionnaires;" see Н. Гениев, *История Псковского*

tionnaires being referenced much earlier, as evidenced, for example, in Ivan Annienkov's publication on the history of the Leib-Guard Cavalry Regiment.[945] The aforementioned Moisei Rabinovich used them to characterize the social and material status of Peter I's army officers at the end of Russia's war with Sweden,[946] and in a compilation of the Russian regiments active between 1698 and 1725.[947]

The aggregate results we have obtained are surprising (see Chart 9). It turns out that Adam Weyde's influence on the Russian army was far greater than one might infer from the course of his service (especially considering his long-standing captivity in Sweden). The general had the greatest impact on his subordinates in the infantry grenadier regiments, with 31.4% of all officers in this group mentioned him by name. In total, forty-nine out of 156 officers acknowledged Weyde, with the high percentage primarily driven by the questionnaires returned by the officers of the First Weyde Grenadier Regiment, which he commanded.[948] The regiment ranked among the elite units of the Russian army, despite the ambiguous assessment passed by the French envoy Henry de La Vie. On August 23 (September 8), 1719, in St. Petersburg, the Frenchman reported that "a review of the

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пехотного Генерала-Фельдмаршала Князя Кутузова-Смоленского полка. 1700–1881, Москва 1883; В. Борисов, А.И. Сыцянко, *Походы 64-го пехотного Казанского Его Императорского Высочества Михаила Николаевича полка. 1642–1700–1886*, Санкт-Петербург 1888; П.О. Бобровский, *История 13-го лейб-гренадерского…*; Д.П. Багратион, *Историческая памятка 38-го Драгунского Владимирского Его Императорского Высочества Князя Михаила Николаевича полка*, Санкт-Петербург 1901; М.Н. Еленев, *Историческая хроника 63-го пехотного Углицкого полка за 200 лет его существования 1708–1709*, Варшава [1908?]; А.И. Григорович, *История 37-го драгунского Военного Ордена генерал-фельдмаршала графа Миниха полка*, т. 1: *1709–1809*, Санкт-Петербург 1907; Н. Зезюлинский, *К родословию 34-х пехотных полков Петра I*, Петроград 1915.

[945] И.В. Анненков, *История Лейб-гвардии Конного полка 1731–1848*, ч. 1–4, Санкт-Петербург 1849.

[946] М.Д. Рабинович, *Социальное происхождение…*, pp. 133–171.

[947] Idem, *Полки петровской армии…*, 1977.

[948] Only three second lieutenants failed to mention Adam Weyde, while the others (thirty-five out of thirty-eight) stated that the general's impact extended beyond their active military service.

splendid grenadier regiment of General Weyde took place. A French officer who accompanied me on site, well acquainted with both the strengths and weaknesses of this nation, told me that the Russian soldiers would be invincible if only their officers matched them in quality."[949]

In our opinion, General Weyde's impact on the officer corps was most noticeable in the infantry regiments. Nearly one in four soldiers (322 out of 1,297) mentioned him by name. One could argue that Weyde played a crucial role in shaping the personnel and overall condition of the line infantry regiments.[950] His impact is particularly evident among the highest-ranking officers, with 23% (seven out of thirty) referencing the general. However, it is important to approach these figures with caution due to the partial incompleteness of the "officer questionnaires" and "service records." Weyde exerted considerably less influence on the cavalry officer corps, playing a significant role in the careers of one in ten dragoons and one in twenty grenadiers. Overall, 445 officers referenced the general in their service records, often more than once. Out of the 2,195 surviving surveys, this amounts to a ratio of 20.3%. Thus, every fifth officer acknowledged Weyde at some stage of their respective military careers.

Naturally, Adam Weyde's influence on the officer corps was uneven. His impact on some regiments was minimal, while others operated under his overwhelming influence (see Chart 14). The greatest variation can be observed in the grenadier regiments, with nearly all officers

[949] *Донесения французского консула в Петербурге Лави...*, № 22, p. 56.

[950] Data such as official formulas addressed to General Weyde has been excluded from the compilation. The formula was routinely used by the officers of Samuel von Rentzel's (Rentzell) Infantry Regiment, also known as the Saxon Regiment. Since these mentions did not constitute the substance of the actual survey, they were disregarded, thus lending credibility to the data obtained. For more on Rentzel's regiment, see В.С. Великанов, *Русский вспомогательный корпус на польско-саксонской службе. 1704–1706. Организация и численность*, "Военно-исторический журнал Старый Цейхгауз" 2 (2012), pp. 92–99.



Chart 12. Percentage of officers from grenadier regiments referencing Adam Weyde in their résumés
Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...,* т. 1; K.B. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...,* https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=std-forum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).

from his own unit mentioning him in the documentation (see Chart 10), while officers from Ropp's regiment and the so-called Second Grenadier Regiment rarely referenced Weyde. The median for this group stands at 7.5%, with an arithmetic mean of 19.5%, (thus, the median amounts to just 38.5% of the second metric's value). These mentions primarily relate to promotion pathways, with less emphasis on "brotherhood in arms." For example, out of 301 soldiers and officers of the Blis Regiment participating in the naval Battle of Gangut, only 7.7% of the latter group mentioned Adam Weyde by name.

The next chart (No. 11) presents data on twenty-three dragoon regiments, with six additional regiments (Ingermanlandsky, Lutsky,



Chart 13. Percentage of officers from dragoon regiments referencing Adam Weyde in their résumés. Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1; К.В. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...*, https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=std-forum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).



Chart 14. Infantry regiments with the highest coefficient of references to Adam Weyde in officers' résumés.
Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...,* т. 1; К.В. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...,* https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=std-forum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).

Novgorodsky, Permsky, Rostovsky, and Troitsky) omitted due to a coefficient of 0. Here, too, the variation in Adam Weyde's influence across the regiments was relatively high. The median is 4.65%, with the arithmetic mean at 10.1%; thus, the median amounts to 46% of the mean. Notably, the Moscow Regiment stands out, with one in four officers reporting a significant influence of General Weyde on their career progression. This seems accurate, given that it was Adam Weyde who first formed the regiment in 1700. Later that same year, Colonel Yefim Gulic took command of the unit (see Chapter 5 for more details). In 1706, the unit was renamed



Chart 15. Infantry regiments with the lowest rate of references to Adam Weyde in officers' résumés. Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1; К.В. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...*, https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=stdforum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).

the Moscow Dragoon Regiment.[951] The Vladimirsky, Astrakhansky, and Yambursky regiments stand out with high coefficients above 10%. In only six regiments was the actant not mentioned, while in the others, a few to several officers referenced Weyde, which indicates a high rate of turnover or rotation within the ranks. Considering that General Weyde's limited direct involvement with the dragoons, these are remarkably high coefficients. This suggests that some among the soldiers who began their

[951] М.Д. Рабинович, *Полки петровской армии...*, p. 85.



Chart 16. Adam Weyde's influence on the formation of the officer corps in Russian army regiments. Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1; K.B. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...*, https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=stdforum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).

careers in infantry units later transferred to different regiments, even between various formations.

The largest number of officers linked to Adam Weyde can (rather understandably) be found in infantry units (see Charts 12 and 13). In as many as five regiments, his influence was so extensive that one should speak of their personal formation by the general, with the reference coefficient standing at over 50%. The highest rate of Weyde's influence on his subordinates was recorded in the Lefortovsky Regiment (85.3%.) These figures should not be doubted, since the general was the formal commander of this unit in 1699-1700 (assuming command immediately after the death of Franz Lefort, and serving in this capacity until his own

capture at Narva).[952] A high coefficient of the general's influence can also be observed in the Chernihivsky Regiment (66.7%), a unit he established on June 25, 1700, whose commander in the Battle of Narva was Colonel William von Schweyden (see Chart 5).[953] In ten other regiments, the coefficient ranged from 20% to 49%. For detailed data, see Chart 12.

Of the remaining nineteen regiments, in as many as eleven the coefficient of General Weyde's impact on fellow officers exceeds 10%. This suggests that the general exerted significant influence in nearly every unit (with the possible exceptions of the Azovsky Regiment at 2.6%, the Novgorodsky Regiment at 4.8%, and the Moscow Regiment at 4.9%). The scale of variation between individual infantry regiments was the lowest among the distinguished formations (the other two being dragoons and grenadiers—see Chart 9). This is corroborated by a median of 16.85%, with an arithmetic mean of 24.8% (the median representing 67.9% of the mean value).

In attempting to translate this model into the internal dynamics within individual regiments, seven types of influence exerted by the actant on his officers can be identified, expressed as a percentage coefficient:

from 75 to 100% – unit completely shaped by the general,
from 50 to 74,9% – unit overwhelmingly shaped by the general,
from 20 to 49,9% – unit largely shaped by the general,
from 10 to 19,9% – unit significantly shaped by the general,
from 5 to 9,9% – unit noticeably shaped by the general,
below 5% – unit minimally shaped by the general,
coefficient 0 – no measurable influence exerted by the general.

[952] Ibidem, p. 24.
[953] *Гренадерские и Пехотные Полки*, ред. В.К. Шенк, Санкт-Петербург 1909, p. 71.

The above variation in the officers surveyed across seventy-one infantry and cavalry regiments analyzed yielded the values presented in Chart 16.

The data presented in graphs 9–14 does not provide a comparative context. In order to demonstrate Adam Weyde's fundamental role in shaping the officer corps, we have compiled mentions concerning the most prominent members of the general staff. Unlike the earlier studies, this analysis does not focus on the number of officers referencing a given general but rather on the number of mentions recorded in the sources. It is important to note that this figure may not correspond to the number of individuals emphasizing the role of individual generals. Moreover, the results may be skewed by the naming of a regiment after its commander, which is especially relevant in the case of Samuel von Rentzel and his unit, also referred to as the Saxon Regiment. The objective here is to demonstrate the esteem and influence of specific generals on their officer subordinates, as reflected in the "officer questionnaires." (We have consistently sought to verify the results obtained.) A particular challenge arose in situations where the source mentioned two or more individuals with the same surname or when the same name was recorded using different spellings, which applied not only to foreign officers. These ambiguities were easier to resolve when the individuals in question were held in lower regard within the military community. However, it was more difficult to determine the number of officers concerned if they were widely respected, and especially when several individuals shared the same surname, such as Sheremetev or Golitsyn. The greatest difficulty stemmed from the imprecise nature of the surviving records, e.g., missing first names or listing ranks that corresponded to two or more individuals.

Each commander mentioned at least 150 times is listed in Chart 15. Following the eighteen most frequently referenced generals, subsequent names are provided as selected examples only. Missing from the list are



Chart 17. Number of mentions of respective generals across officer questionnaires (including names of respective units).
Source: own study based on: *Офицерские сказки первой четверти XVIII века...*, т. 1; K.B. Татарников, *Офицерские сказки XVIII века...*, https://forum.vgd.ru/3103/101376/10.htm?a=stdforum_view&o= (accessed October 15, 2020).

individuals in whose cases the source materials obscured the calculation of a viable coefficient, and officers who did not hold the highest military ranks.[954]

The following compilation could be expanded to include a larger number of names; however, it would still illustrate the same pattern, i.e., a significant disparity in the number of mentions of various generals. Only a few names were commonly referenced by officers of the field army. The most important commanders, as well as those with direct influence over the modernization of Peter I's army, included the likes of Field Marshal General Boris Sheremetev;[955] Admiral General Fyodor Apraksin;[956] Princes: General Anikita Repnin,[957] Field Marshal General Alexander Menshikov;[958] General Mikhail Golitsyn[959] (In the case of Sheremetev, the actual number of mentions in the officer documentation is significantly higher, likely reaching as many as 900 instances. One should emphasize that all the commanders mentioned were Russians. In this context, Adam Weyde's position in seventh position, just behind the renowned cavalry general Rodion Christian Bauer, stands out as particularly interesting. Considering the fact that Weyde spent the years between 1700 and 1710 (a period when the critical events of the war with Sweden took place) in captivity, he undoubtedly ranks among the most important

[954] In determining the names of commanders, we used the officer index featured in S. Chernikov's study; see С.В. Черников, op. cit., pp. 728–735.

[955] See А.И. Заозерский, *Фельдмаршал Б.П. Шереметев*, Москва 1989.

[956] See В.Н. Берх, *Жизнеописание генерал-адмирала Федора Матвеевича Апраксина*, Санкт-Петербург 1825; П.И. Белавенец, *Генерал-адмирал граф Феодор Матвеевич Апраксин. Краткий биографический очерк*, Ревел 1899.

[957] With regard to the biographical note on Prince Repnin, we have used a successive edition of D. Bantysz-Kamienskiy's publication, since the previous one, which serves as the basis of our research in this study, contained no such note; see Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, ч. 3, Санкт-Петербург 1847, pp. 13–23.

[958] See P. Krokosz, *Od sprzedawcy pierożków…*, pp. 139–166.

[959] See Д.Н. Бантыш-Каменский, *Словарь достопамятных людей…*, ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1836, pp. 82–91.

commanders and reformers of the Russian army. If one takes into account his absence during the key decade of the Great Northern War, Weyde could even make the top five, making his standing comparable to Repnin and Menshikov.

In addition to the "Big Seven," several other high-ranking commanders should be counted among the most influential generals, including General Feldzeugmeister Jacob Bruce and his older brother, Lieutenant General Roman Bruce,[960] generals Ludwig von Hallart, Nikolaus von Werden,[961] Samuel von Rentzel, Karl Ewald von Rönne,[962] Heinrich von Goltz,[963] Peter Lacy,[964] and Infantry General Avtamon Golovin (Adam Weyde's fellow prisoner in Swedish captivity, who returned to Russia only in 1718). This group was largely comprised of foreigners (with the exception of Golovin), who had participated for many years in reforming the Russian army while simultaneously commanding its individual regiments. Other generals, even those in the upper echelons, scored poorly on the influence charts, which suggests that their impact on their respective subordinates was quite limited, often confined to a single regiment. Thus, only fifteen commanders, of whom seven distinguished themselves

[960] Roman Bruce was an officer of the Preobrazhensky Regiment and participant in the war with Sweden (he commanded the defense of the expanding city of St. Petersburg). As the first commander (ober-commander) of the Fortress of St. Peter and Paul (Petropavlovskaya) Fortress in St. Petersburg, he oversaw the conversion of its fortifications from wood and earth to stone in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. While a Lutheran, in recognition of his military merits he obtained exceptional permission from Peter I to be buried in the first Orthodox cemetery of St. Petersburg, situated adjacent to St. Peter and Paul's Cathedral, inside the aforementioned fortress; see ЭВНМ, vol. т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1883; p. 523; P. Krokosz, *Twierdza Pietropawłowska w Sankt Petersburgu…*, pp. 107–131.

[961] See ЭВНМ, т. 1, p. 113.

[962] See РБС, т. 16, Санкт-Петербург 1913, pp. 57–59.

[963] See ВЭ, т. 8, Санкт-Петербург 1912, p. 392.

[964] See T. Ciesielski, *Irlandczyk na służbie carskiej Piotr Lacy – feldmarszałek u generał-gubernator Inflant*, [in:] *Stan badań nad wielokulturowym dziedzictwem dawnej Rzeczypospolitej*, t. 3: *Inflanty Polskie*, eds. W. Walczak, K. Łopatecki, Białystok 2012, pp. 227–265.

as leaders, exerted considerable influence on the infantry and cavalry officers of the Russian army. In contrast, the role of the other generals was not as substantial.[965]

[965] Detailed findings on the influence of the other commanders on their subordinate officer cadres will be available only after conducting analogous research as in the case of General Weyde. Therefore, the authors of this publication feel obliged to conduct and present the results of their quantitative research undertaken on the subject.

ANNEX

Principles adopted in the translation and publication of the document

At the outset, we should address the internal structure of the *Regulations*, which lack formal subdivisions, apart from the introduction. However, in the course of textual analysis, we have identified five distinct sections based on substance, and assigned them titles for greater clarity. The titles of the respective sections are provided in square brackets to help the reader locate specific parts of the text more easily. Following the introduction is the first section, which we titled *On Military Ranks and Army Organization.* This section details ranks and titles, introducing a standardized division into various types of units. Of particular importance are *rotas* (patterned after Western European companies) and their officers (captain, lieutenant, and standard), non-commissioned officers (sergeant, cadet, capternamus, scribe, corporal), and signalmen. However, Weyde does not prescribe the size of the *rota* authoritatively, suggesting it should comprise between sixty and 120 men. He further recommends that the *rota* should consist of smaller units known as *kapralstva* (squads), albeit not without some inconsistencies, as the *rota* is sometimes divided into two to four, and at other times into three to five *kapralstva*.

The larger organizational unit was the battalion, consisting of between three and five *rotas*, and constituting half or a third of a regiment (which in turn amounted to eight to twelve *rotas*). Colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors commanded regiments, with the help of

quartermasters, adjutants, camp commanders and provosts. Weyde tentatively advises that larger tactical units be formed, each composed of between two and five regiments, which he dubs a brigade. In turn, he terms a detachment of several brigades with a total strength of between 15,000 and 20,000 soldiers an army. At the same time, Weyde opposes excessively large armies, which, according to him, cause problems with supply train and chain of command, suggesting that the ideal force would amount to a total of 40,000 soldiers.

According to the guidelines outlined in the *Regulations*, the army was to be overseen by the *generalissimus* or *voivode*, who commanded the generals of infantry, cavalry, and the *feldzeugmeister* (chief of all artillery). The army was also to include generals serving as commissary, quartermaster, adjutant, auditor, and engineer. The author briefly outlines their respective capacities, not only in terms of duties and responsibilities but also in terms of personnel selection. However, it appears that Weyde fails to clarify the specific responsibilities of these officers in full detail, thus necessitating the drafting of additional regulations delineating the organizational structure of the army.

The second part of the *Regulations* covers army drill procedures. It bears its own title: *On Regular Exercises, with Brief Commentaries and Remarks on What to Pay Heed to and Consider*. In our view, it makes for the most innovative and inspiring section of the document. It contains a clear set of instructions for conducting training, intended for the newly formed Russian army. This part of the *Regulations* leaves no room for speculation, and is limited to a definitive set of rules to follow. The translation of all commands into Russian is particularly innovative, as it

would have made them accessible to recruits from various strata of Russian society.[1]

Adam Weyde dwells more extensively on one particular issue, namely, whether it is more effective to arrange soldiers in shallower formations of four ranks or in deeper yet narrower units composed of six ranks. In his view, the more traditional solution, which was more effective at the time, should be applied. This was due to the fact that, instead of employing the classic countermarch, another firing method was used, thereby avoiding confusion within the ranks. Such an arrangement allowed for more frequent volleys while also strengthening the flanks of the formation.[2]

As for the drill, it was to be conducted by the colonel or, in his absence, by the lieutenant colonel or major. They were to remain mounted and use signalers to call for the execution of subsequent maneuvers. During the drill, the soldiers were not to converse in order to avoid unnecessary noise. The considerations regarding actions executed in "three tempos" are particularly noteworthy. The key issue was the correct synchronization of weapon handling and movements, all of which were to be performed simultaneously. The author identifies three actions in each sequence of movements. The seven described sequences amounted to a total of twenty-one weapon grips to be mastered by rank-and-file soldiers.

Once the soldiers mastered the basic drill procedures, they were to be taught a combined sequence of eight actions: shoulder arms - present

[1] The nationalization of infantry troops was also evident in other Slavic countries, e.g., in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where an analogous phenomenon involving the regulatory adaptation of commands to the language used by rank-and-file soldiers occurred; see B. Lipowski, op cit.; source edition: J. Wimmer, op. cit., pp. 345–357.

[2] Until 1702, Russian infantry troops were arrayed in six ranks; subsequent instructions envisioned a formation of four ranks; see B. Davies, op. cit., p. 68.

arms - order arms - ground arms - take up arms - present arms - reverse arms - shoulder arms - present arms. In addition, the author included two special positions for funerals and rainy weather.

The activities related to the third phase of training, which concern the preparation of soldiers for shooting, turn out to be the most important. Given that Weyde cites the flintlock rifle—devoid of the fuse and rest—as a model weapon, all the loading, aiming and shooting actions described are rather straightforward. He lists just sixteen of them, from opening the pan to taking the shot.

Summarizing this section, it is worth comparing it with the provisions of von Wallhausen's treatise *The Art of War on Foot*, translated into Russian in 1647. In the case of handguns, the number of grips was as high as 143, compared to only forty-seven recommended in Weyde's *Regulations*.[3] What the tsar's associate failed to do was extend the drills performed in "three tempos," so that they encompassed all types of actions. Weyde glosses over this fact by merely acknowledging the need to draw the soldiers' attention to firing simultaneously. Moreover, in the descriptive passage, he clarifies that it is for this very reason that he inserted sixteen relevant commands. He postulates that the procedure should be shortened to only two commands: "load arms" and "at the ready" (and, by implication, two more orders: "aim" and "fire"). However, he emphasizes the need to train soldiers according to a single scheme (regulation). Without it, "one will execute it [the order] more ineptly, the other more efficiently and, in addition, each shall employ his own measures, causing a kind of disorder that is easy to envisage."[4] Ultimately, however, the four-

[3] J.J. von Wallhausen, op. cit., Leuwarden 1630, pp. 37–38; see O.[V.] Rusakovskiy, *The Russian Edition...*, pp. 1–25.

[4] А. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)..., л. 80.

teen grips can be summarized with a single command: "load arms and [hold them] at the ready."

The *Regulations* introduce three commands specific to grenadiers, as well as orders issued to soldiers when inserting a plug bayonet into the barrel of a rifle (nineteen commands).[5] Weyde does not recommend over-complicating the act of throwing grenades or handling the bayonet. Instead, he suggests assigning grenadiers to special (by implication, the heaviest) tasks, such as moving *chevaux-de-frise*, etc. The passage on bayonet use is the most laconic in the entire *Regulations*. The eleven positions exercised with the bayonet rifle are patterned after the old pikemen's grips (unfortunately, Weyde only emphasizes their defensive nature).[6]

The third part, which concerns maneuvers of entire detachments, is titled *On Changes*. This section, too, is highly relevant, as it provides drill instructions for the newly-formed *rotas* and regiments. In contrast to the second part, which contains some novel solutions, this section of the *Regulations* directly draws on the work of Johann Sebastian Gruber.[7] Thus, what we are actually dealing with here is a process of doubling rows and ranks and rotating troops. While the prints of the soldier's grips allude to Giffart's work, the illustrations in this section are more complicated, as Weyde references seven prints absent from the manuscripts of the *Regulations* as we know them, and from three other handwritten copies (for more on this, see the subsequent part of the *Introduction*). The matter becomes clearer after confronting Weyde's descriptions

[5] Bayonets were not introduced with the intention to replace the pikemen formation as such, but were primarily addressed to units in which spades were not present, i.e., grenadiers and dragoons. Perhaps therein lies the key to understanding Weyde's proposal, which may have been limited to grenadiers only. J.J. Sowa, *One more time about tactics and weaponry*, "Петербургские славянские и балканские исследования" 30 (2021), 2, pp. 170–174; M.W. Shearwood, *The Perfection of military discipline. The plug bayonet and the English army 1660–1705*, Warwick 2020, passim.

[6] B. Davies, op. cit., p. 68.

[7] J.S. Gruber, op. cit., Th. III, p. 140–163.

with Gruber's book. One can notice that the specific descriptions found in the German edition are accompanied by diagrams, which are absent from analogous passages in Adam Weyde's *Regulations*.[8] By comparing the two works, we were able to solve the mystery of the missing illustrations and at the same time establish the pattern (source of inspiration) used by Weyde when drafting the *Regulations*.

The *Regulations* provide a detailed description of the *battaillon de quarré* (actually *bataillon carré*).[9] This formation was used in clashes with cavalry, which could strike infantry units by surprise. The solution was notable for its effectiveness especially against the Tatar, Turkish and Polish-Lithuanian armies. From the perspective of the Russian military, it was an invaluable, battle-tested formation, employed successfully, among others, in the last war of the Holy League states against the Ottoman Porte (1683-1699).[10] Weyde recommends forming the ranks by breaking battalions into smaller units, i.e. *rotas*, consisting of three squads standing in four rows each. Assuming six *rotas* per battalion, this means seventy-two rows (six by three by four). Two-thirds of the rows form four sides, and the remaining one-third is divided into four parts to bolster the

[8] Weyde must have nonetheless produced illustrations analogous to those in Gruber's work, as he described an arrangement of twenty-four soldiers arrayed in four ranks and six rows, while Gruber's consists of four and eight, respectively (thirty-two soldiers in total). When doubling the rows, Gruber has sixteen soldiers standing in each of the two lines, while Weyde's variant only featured twelve soldiers.

[9] In the mid-eighteenth century, Denis Diderot defined this type of formation as one that featured two distinct variants: the classical, in which the square was entirely filled with soldiers (Fr. *bataillon quarré à center plein*), and the hollow one, empty in the middle (Fr. *bataillon quarré à centre vuide*). According to the author, the first type was completely outdated at the time, as it rendered the entire unit exposed to cannon fire, and prevented the soldiers located in the center of the formation from shooting. Thus, the solution recommended by Adam Weyde proved to be significantly more effective and easier to implement; see D. Diderot, *Encyclopédie: ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, vol. 2, Paris 1751, p. 136.

[10] For more on the potential use of this formation in the Russian army, see L.R. Lewitter, op. cit., p. 525.

corners. The corner section consists of six rows and six ranks, so it would extend the length of the side (twelve) by six additional rows on each flank. The result is a square with a width of twenty-four soldiers and a depth of six rows, totaling 432 soldiers. Admittedly, this proposal required refinement. Indeed, the author had already eliminated pikemen from the calculations but had not added the locations of grenadiers and field artillery. While this formation was also described in Gruber, it was Weyde who simplified and shortened its description (at the expense of legibility), following distinctly different assumptions based not on the total number of soldiers, but on the *rotas* and squads comprising the battalion.[11]

The fourth part of the *Regulations* concerns the principles of firing. The author ties them to the functioning of the *battaillon de quarre*, but in this case one should treat the description more broadly. The method of continuous firing is another important concept noted by Adam Weyde. He proposed to abandon the use of countermarching, that is, having the first rank step out to fire a volley before retiring to the rear of the unit for reloading. Instead, he opts for two distinct types of firing. The first involves shooting a volley followed by "reloading while kneeling" (*niederfahlen*). This entailed the soldiers kneeling down to reload, with the firing rank standing up to shoot its own volley in the meantime. The downside of this solution was the need to reload while kneeling, which was incompatible with grip training. For better clarity, we further characterize this type of shooting in a relevant footnote, added to the passage that outlines it in the main text of the *Regulations*. The second method was platoon firing, with all ranks firing simultaneously. However, for this to be possible, the formation had to contract to three ranks (therefore doubling the number of rows in the formation). The number of rows designates a platoon; Weyde indicates that the front should consist of four platoons. This

[11] J.S. Gruber, op. cit., Th. III, pp. 209–218.

solution was reportedly popular throughout Europe, especially in France. These two methods of continuous firing had proved their superiority during the Duke of Savoy's Hunagrian campaign of 1697.[12]

The last section of the *Regulations*, titled *On guard duty, and how to post and change guards*, outlines dispatching principles and the various types of guards. It is a typical description devoid of innovative solutions.[13] It covers such issues as the number of sentries around the officers, the need to announce the password, making one's rounds, as well as the main sound signals announcing curfew and wake-up.[14]

In conclusion, as of the end of 1698, the Russian army received complete training materials concerning the principles of military drills, continuous fire exercises and basic commands for unit rotations. Added to these was Weyde's proposal on the formation of the *bataillon de quarré* (Fr. *Le Bataillon carré*), which was innovative on Russian soil. Readily applicable solutions were also presented for the system of guards and the introduction of a special, more radical nocturnal regime. On the other hand, some of the less systematized proposals involved the typology of military ranks and, above all, the typology of units and their structure. This first part of Weyde's work appears to have laid the foundation for the successive, more detailed regulations discussed therein.

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Below, we present the English translation of the foundational document regulating the functioning of the Russian army at the outset of its reorganization by Peter I at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth

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[12] See B. Davies, op. cit., p. 68.

[13] Pavel Bobrovsky argued that these provisions did not contribute much to the stipulations of the code previously in force in the Russian army, i.e., *The Training and Methods of Forming Ranks of Men on Foot*; see. П.О. Бобровский, *Адам Адамович Вейде…*, p. 21; see И.Я. Вальхаузен, op. cit., pp. 264–272.

[14] See K. Łopatecki, *Instytucja wytrębowania hasła…*, pp. 75–100; idem, *Cykl dobowy wojska…*, pp. 116–129.

centuries: Adam Weyde's *Military Regulations of 1698*. Importantly, this publication marks the first-ever translation of the document from Russian into English. As already mentioned, the *Regulations* have been published in printed version only once (in the original form, in Church Slavonic, accompanied by lithographs based on original drawings), nearly two centuries ago, in 1841. The sole concession for the readers of that edition was the inclusion of a Russian translation parallel to the Church Slavonic text. Moreover, apart from the publisher (Military Publishing House), the publication did not contain the name of its editor, nor any critical commentary (see Figure 4.5).[15]

This translation of the *Regulations* is based on the manuscript kept in the collection of the Manuscripts Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg,[16] collated with the aforementioned 1841 source edition of the work.[17] The source edition was the first to include the illustrations found in the original manuscript; the nineteenth-century edition only featured lithographs based on these images. This translated edition of the *Regulations* includes all of the diagrams illustrating military drills, to which Adam Weyde makes clear references, but which, for unknown reasons, were missing from the manuscript version of the *Regulations*. In editing these diagrams, we relied on the methods outlined in the work of Johann Sebastian Gruber, whose solutions the author of the *Regulations* directly referenced.[18]

The publishers have made every effort to render the translation readable and intelligible to modern-day readers without losing the essence of its message. It should be noted that the text of the translated document is extremely complicated linguistically, with numerous borrowings

[15] A.A. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный...*, p. 1 (title page).
[16] A. Вейде, (О военном обучении и обязанностях воинских чинов)...
[17] A.A. Вейде, *Воинский устав, составленный...*, passim.
[18] J.S. Gruber, op. cit., Th. III, pp. 140–163.

from foreign languages, including German, Polish, Swedish, French and frequently used words from the Church-Slavonic language. Accordingly, we have retained the original terms of foreign provenance deemed appropriate for the clarity of reception of the translation. We approached punctuation far less rigidly than in the translation of *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*. The original forms were not conducive to a clear conveyance of the document's contents. We consider this level of editorial intervention acceptable, as the source does not consist of legal regulations where sentence structure, designators, and conjunctions carry significant weight for the legal norm. We also simplified the syntax; however, our guiding principle was to replicate the content of the regulations as closely as possible. Additionally, to ensure clarity in the translated text, we inserted necessary translator's notes in square brackets, albeit without listing the translator's initials.

To clarify specialist military terms and regulations of the Russian army, the authors of this study relied on multi-volume encyclopedic studies. The first attempt to compile a "military encyclopedia" in Russia was made by a tsarist engineer, General Sergei Tuchkov, who lived in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. His work, titled *A Military Dictionary, Containing Names or Terms Used in the Russian Land Army...*, served as a signpost for subsequent studies of this kind.[19] One of the subsequent Russian compendia of military knowledge that has retained much of its value to this day is the monumental eight-volume *Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences*, published between 1883 and 1897 under the chief editorship of military historian Genrikh Leer, aided by a team of over sixty assistants, comprised primarily of senior officers

[19] С.А. Тучков, *Военный словарь, заключающий наименования или термины, в Российском сухопутном войске употребляемые, с показанием рода науки, к которому принадлежат, из какого языка взяты, как могут быть переведены на российский, какое оных употребление и к чему служат*, предисловие С.В. Львов, Л.В. Митрошенкова, Москва 2008.

of the Russian army.[20] 1911 saw the release of the first volume of the *Military Encyclopedia*, edited by high-ranking tsarist officers Vasily Novitsky, Alexei von Schwarz, Vladimir Apushkin, Gustav (Gustaf) von Schultz (Schoultz) with contributions from Roman Bashinsky, Nikolai Vishniakov, Alexander Geru (Gueroi), Nikolai Dukhanin, Nikolai Klado and Nikolai Kuteynikov. Between 1911 and 1915, fifteen volumes of the *Encyclopedia* were published, containing rich factual and illustrative material in the form of drawings, diagrams and photographs, providing historians of the Russian army with invaluable assistance in their research.[21] Many of the military and legal terms in force in Russia at the time were included in the eighty-odd volume first comprehensive encyclopedia published in Russia, i.e., the *Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopaedic Dictionary*,

[20] ЭВНМ, т. I–VIII, Санкт-Петербург 1883–1897. The encyclopedia compiled the existing state of knowledge in the field of military history at the time, and adapted it to a more accessible form by a team led by Genrikh Leer, who sought primarily to enhance the general understanding of military theory and practice among officers and soldiers in active service. It should be noted that this compendium was based on earlier works of its kind, particularly the fourteen-volume *Military Encyclopedic Lexicon*, edited by Lieutenant General Ludwig von Seddeler and published between 1837 and 1851; see ВЭЛ, т. 1–14, Санкт-Петербург 1852–1858.

[21] ВЭ, т. 1–18, Санкт-Петербург–Петроград 1911–1915. The impetus for starting work on this innovative work capturing the existing body of knowledge in military history at the time came from the changes instituted in the Russian army after the unsuccessful war with Japan (1904-1905). The Russians also did not want to lag behind other European countries, which were publishing new military encyclopedias at the time; e.g., Germany saw the publication of *Handbook for the Army and Navy* (*Handbuch für Herr und Flotte. Enzyklopädie der Kriegswissenschaften und verwandter Gebiete, unter Mitwirkung von zahlreichen Offizieren,Sanitätsoffizieren, Beamten, Gelehrten,Technikern, Künstlern usw.*, hrsg. von Georg von Alten, vol. 1–9, Berlin, Leipzig, Wien 1909–1913); the French published their *Military Dictionary* (*Dictionnaire militaire. Encyclopédie des sciences militaires, rediger par un comté d'officiers de toutes armes*, vol. I–II, Nancy, Paris 1898–1910); Austro-Hungary issued the tenth edition of the Pocket-sized Military Lexicon in 1911 (*Militär-Taschenlexikon*, zusammengestellt von Karl Friedrich Kurz, Bd. 1–2, Wien 1911). In addition, the *Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences*, which had been used in military circles until then with regard to the latest developments in the "sciences of war," proved to be inadequate and outdated. Therefore, the Russians opted to re-edit and supplement all information on the functioning of the tsarist army and the wars waged by Russia until the beginning of the twentieth century.

published in 1890-1907.[22] The publication also incorporated information contained in subsequent encyclopedic publications, edited in the Soviet Union (*Soviet Military Encyclopedia*[23] and *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*).[24] Specialized dictionaries of the Old Russian language were also valuable, as they included a range of vocabulary from the period between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries[25] and the eighteenth century.[26] Another relevant source were the entries of Vladimir Dal's seminal dictionary of the Russian language, published in the early twentieth century,[27] and the alphabetical listing of military ranks and functions compiled by Pavel Koryavtsev, which is also available in digital form.[28] Among the relevant encyclopedias, lexicons and dictionaries, the multi-volume pre-war *Polish Military Encyclopedia* edited by military historian Major Otton Laskowski is also worthy of mention.[29] We provide footnotes referencing specialist literature on each occasion.

[22] ЭСБЕ, т. 1–Доп.–т. 2А, Санкт-Петербург 1892–1907.
[23] СВЭ, ред. А.А. Гречко, т. 1–8, Москва 1976–1980.
[24] БСЭ, т. 1–16, изд. 3, Москва 1961–1976.
[25] СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 1–30, Москва 1975–2015.
[26] СРЯ XVIII, вып. 1–22, Ленинград–Санкт-Петербург 1984–2019.
[27] ТСД, т. 1–4, Санкт-Петербург–Москва 1904–1909.
[28] П.М. Корявцев, *Большая Абевега чинов и званий* [П.М. Корявцев, *Большая Абевега чинов и званий*, Санкт-Петербург 2011], http://antisys.ru/abevega.html#Цейгдинер (accessed September 16, 2016).
[29] EWOL, vol. 1–8, Warszawa 1931–1939.

ADAM WEYDE. MILITARY REGULATIONS OF 1698

Introduction

Part I. On military ranks and army organization

What, namely, constitutes a soldier
On the soldiers' rota
On the captain and his subordinates
On the battalion
On the infantry regiment
On the colonel
On the lieutenant colonel
On the major
On the regimental quartermaster
On the regimental adjutant
On the regimental camp commander
On the regimental provost
On the brigade, brigadier and brigadier general
On the army
On the regimental voivode [i.e., supreme commander]
On the infantry general
On the feldzeugmeister general
On the commissary general
On the major general referenced in the brigade

On the adjutant general
On auditor general or justice general
On the engineer general

Part II. On Regular Exercises, with Brief Commentaries and Remarks on What to Pay Heed to and be Concerned with

On musket grips, with an explanation
On loading grips
On grenadier grips

Part III. On turns

On soldiers' returns
On doubling rows
On doubling ranks

Part IV. [On firing continuously]

On the Battaillon de Quarre. How to fight the enemy by firing and reloading while kneeling.
On platoons

Part V. On guard duty, and how to post and change guards

On guard duty and making rounds in the rota
On guards, how long to stand guard with the commander
How many soldiers to post with the infantry general
How many [soldiers to post] with the major general
How many [soldiers to post] with the brigadier general

How many [soldiers to post] with the colonel
How many [soldiers to post] with the lieutenant colonel
How many [guards to post] with the captain
On guards altogether
On patrolling
On curfew or wake-up calls
On making rounds or policing
Table of contents, or what this book includes

[DEDICATION]

Military code, drafted by General Weyde in 1698 and dedicated to Peter the Great, the Most Illustrious and Regal[30] Grand Gosudar, Tsar and Grand Prince Peter Alekseyevich, Autocrat of All of Great Russia and Little Russia, Muscovy, Kyiv, Vladimir and Novgorod, Tsar of Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan, Tsar of Siberia, Gosudar of Pskov, Grand Prince of Smolensk, Tver, Yugorsk, Perm, Vyatka, Bulgaria and other lands, Gosudar and Grand Prince of Novgorod, the Lower Land, Chernihiv, Ryazan, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Beloozersk, Udorsk, Obdorsk, Kondinsk, Ruler of All Lands in the North, Gosydar Iversky, Kartli and the Georgian Tsars, Kabardian Land, Princes of Circassian and the Mountaineers of Caucasus, and many other countries and lands in the East, West, and the North, Father and Heir, Gosudar and Ruler, Your Imperial Highness, My Most Beloved Tsar and Gosudar.

[30] For an analogous titulature of Russian rulers in Polish; see M. Malinowski, A. Przezdziecki, *Zrzódła do dziejów polskich wydawane przez Mikołaja Malinowskiego i Alexandra Przezdzieckiego*, vol. 2, Wilno 1884, pp. 31–32; *Pamiętnik dziejów polskich. Z aktów urzędowych lwowskich i rękopismów*, wyd. S. Barącz, Lwów 1855, p. 109; *Volumina Legum*, vol. 6, wyd. J. Ohryzko, Petersburg 1860, p. 73.

Most Regal Great Gosudar the Tsar, Most Gracious Gosudar

Although victory comes from God,[31] this is not to say that those who fight the enemy are to give up on their efforts and remain idle or unconcerned until they face the adversary. First and foremost, they must not make little of anything, but rather focus on fulfilling all their duties and do anything that is advantageous for their military readiness, so that they may be well-prepared in advance of facing the enemy. For, whenever in the history of the world great and renowned campaigns have been undertaken, ensuring victories and defeating the enemy has been accomplished by avoiding any and all shortcomings in preparation, maintaining correct order, and making proper provisions, always with prudence and upon due consultation, for sound advice often walks hand in hand with fortuitous execution. To be well-trained, one must rely on firm guidance and diligent study. One must undertake painstaking efforts[32] in any matters one intends to pursue, and supervise with prudent attention all strictly military affairs, for one is like a clock, which by means of proper construction

[31] The author refers to the concept of God as the Lord of History, which was widespread in European military circles at the time. It involved equating the outcome of warfare with God's will; see U. Augustyniak, *W służbie hetmana i Rzeczypospolitej. Klientela wojskowa Krzysztofa Radziwiłła (1585–1640)*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 128–133; K. Łopatecki, *Koncepcja Boga – Pana Historii wśród żołnierzy Rzeczypospolitej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*, [in:] *Religia wobec historii, historia wobec religii*, ed. E. Przybył, Kraków 2006, pp. 360–370. Such references were only natural in the military regulations of the era. A case in point is the body of work of Johann Jacob von Wallhausen, who on some occasions makes extensive reference to the aforementioned concept; see J.J. von Wallhausen, op. cit., Oppenheim 1615, [pp. 1–4], pp. 1–23; idem, *Programma Scholiae Militaris, ex veteri veterum Romanorum instituto laudatissimo*, Frankfurt am Main 1616, passim; idem, *Defensio Patrie, Oder Landtrettung…*, Frankfurt am Main 1621, pp. 4–31. Laurentius von Troupitzen did the same in his treatise on drills in the Swedish army, which includes numerous borrowings von Wllhausen's regulations; see L. Troupitzen, *Kriegs Kunst Nach Königlicher Schwedischer Manier…*, Frankfurt am Main 1633, p. 1. See also J. Boxel, *Anweisung Der Kriegsübung So absonderlich mit Musquet und Piquen…*, [Bd. 1–2], Hage 1675, unpag.

[32] Here in the sense of "training."

and the efficient movement of the cogs and chains inherent in its operations, is preserved in decent running order. If, during war, one desires to elicit the expected conduct from the soldiers, it is essential that both individually and collectively they act according to the will of their commander. In executing the orders of their leader, the soldiers must move their bodies and legs in such a manner as not to hinder one another or, through poor execution, risk their complete perdition. Therefore, it is crucial to exercise proper supervision over a significant portion of the army and to uphold discipline at all times. Whereas, one should not understand the military knowledge in question as mere [theoretical] learning, but as all military activities that are indispensable for a large part of the men bound to serve in the army and the soldiers, and which an old private knows better than even his commander himself. Therefore, he [the commander] should teach this to his subordinates, yet it befits him to also construe of this word as all other warfare that he should know of during expeditions and retreats of the army, or during stopovers, but also in the course of sieges, and defenses of cities and fortresses.[33] Thus, each subordinate will properly fulfill their duties and, when needed, offer sound advice that can be put to good use and for the benefit of all. For this reason, every soldier in their respective military capacity must be prepared for courageous deeds and conscientious service, so that one after another, they are led and trained until all is brought into good harmony. However, if one soldier acts one way and another does otherwise, then instead of unity only quarrels and divisions shall ensue. Therefore, anyone in

[33] In this regard, the author most likely directly refences the provisions of von Wallhausen's treatise *Defensio Patriae...*, which, in addition to military drill issues, covers a wide range of issues concerning the conduct of general warfare, including the storming of fortresses; see J.J. von Wallhausen, *Defensio Patriae...*, passim. Adam Weyde refers to the preexisting seminal war treatise by Wilhelm Dilich, which expounds on almost all matters related to the functioning of the army and its engagement in warfare; see W. Dilich, *Kriegsbuch, darin die Alte und Neue Militia eigentich beschreiben...*, Casell 1607, passim.

command must continuously ensure that his soldiers receive good training and keep due formation. One must keep this in mind and seek counsel in such matters, which is what I have done thus far and what I have striven to fulfill to demonstrate obedience through my loyal service to Your Imperial Majesty.[34]

For since the time Your Imperial Majesty honored me by accepting me into his military service,[35] I have not regretted my zeal and have endeavored to fulfill my duties in accordance with the tenets of military art, especially when Your Most Gracious Imperial Majesty instructed that I call on various European courts before the commencement of Your Grand Embassy[36] two years ago. At my request, Your Majesty ordered me to travel to the Hungarian land, where I was to stay with the German army, in order to witness and test whatever I deemed best and most necessary, both in mounting an army and in readying it for a great battle, a task I fulfilled with great zeal.[37] I then determined to recount in this book the new customs of military art I had learned, along with a brief description of military hierarchy,[38] rank by rank, and what to take note of with each of them, and also of other military customs and preparations.

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[34] Weyde's introduction testifies to the concept known in modern historiography as "disciplinary society," part of which involved the imposition of military-style discipline on the general population; see G. Oestreich, *Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates*, Berlin 1969, pp. 179–197; D. Tilgner, *Sozialdisziplinierung und Sozialregulierung: die Policeyordnungen für Schleswig-Holstein von 1636 und für das Amt Bergedorf von 1623*, Münster 2000.

[35] The author joined the tsar's army before 1692.

[36] In this instance, Adam Weyde refers to his participation in the Grand Embassy; see Chapter 3. See also В.Г. Кретинин, *Прусские маршруты Петра Первого*, Калининград 1996; Г.М. Карпов, *Великое посолство и первое заграничное путешествие Петра I. 1697–1698*, Калининград 1997.

[37] Weyde refers to a mission he went on together with a junior deacon of the Posolsky Prikaz, Mikhail Volkov, at the end of January 1697, which took them to Vienna; see. П.О. Бобровский, *Петр Великий как военный…*, p. 19; B. Davies, op. cit., p. 63; СВМ, т. 3, отд. IV, p. 3; ВЭ, т. 3, pp. 274–275; ВЭЛ, т. 3, pp. 168–169.

[38] I.e., military ranks.

I have taken the liberty to write this study and submit it to Your Imperial Majesty to reciprocate the love you have extended to me on numerous occasions. I also hope that your Your Imperial Majesty shall regard the contents of this book with benevolent favor, regardless of its minor proportions and for all its faults. This is especially so because it concerns military matters that are not foreign to Your Majesty; for Your Imperial Majesty, chosen by Him who strengthens arms and muscles to defend the faith [i.e., by God], has been appointed to wage war and to break the strength of the enemy. For this reason, Your gracious person has shown no fear on water or on land, but out of love for Your subjects, You have courageously sortied against the enemy of the Christian faith. An example is Azov, which was taken solely thanks to Your wise counsel and valor [likely referring to the courage of both the Tsar and his soldiers],[39] thanks to which Your Imperial Majesty achieved victory and attained well-deserved glory. Subsequently, Your Majesty, having set aside all matters of the state, traversed nearly all of Europe for nearly two years (a feat unprecedented in recent and distant times alike), disregarding the significance of Your high station in the world.[40] And during that time, You indulged in very little amusement or pleasure, but tirelessly devoted Your efforts to seeking out and learning the most valuable military advancements, both at sea and on land, for the common good.

May the Almighty God, from whom all the power described above originates, clothe Your Imperial Majesty with profound wisdom, strength, and might. May Your reign be fortified, and Your enemies scatter, so that

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[39] At this point, Adam Weyde refers to his participation in the Azov expeditions of 1695-1696; see Chapter 2.

[40] Peter I's journeys can be compared to the analogous expedition of Prince Ladislaus Vasa (later King Ladislaus IV of Poland), undertaken in 1624-1625. In the latter case, however, Vasa was not yet crowned as the ruler of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; see A. Przyboś, *Podróż królewicza Władysława Wazy do Europy Zachodniej w 1624 i 1625 r.*, "Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny. Prace Historyczne" 8 (1977), pp. 93–106.

through Your victorious arms, the oppressed Christian people, who look for deliverance from the hands of the eternal enemy of the name of Christ, may be freed by force, as expressed by [King] David: "I pursued my enemies and overtook them; I did not turn back till they were destroyed."[41]

I remain Your servant,
Most Illustrious and Regal Gosudar,

Written in Moscow
in the year 1698,

Subject,
kholop and rab Adamko[42] Weyde

[41] The authors of this study elaborate on Adam Weyde's reference by quoting verbatim the words of the Jewish King David, as put in one of the Biblical psalms; see Psalm 18: 37 https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Psalm%2018&version=NIV (accessed November 15, 2017); Псалом 17, https://www.molitvoslov.com/text323.htm (accessed November 15,2017), [17 according to Greek, and 18 according to Hebrew numeration]. This motto also figures in the ribbon interlacing the three crowns of the tsar's two-headed eagle (two on the heads and the third above them), whose torso features a portrait of the young Peter I. Encircling the entire image is an oval mirror made to honor the tsar's victory over the Swedes at Poltava in 1709; see Ю.В. Арсеньев, В.К. Трутовский, *Оружейная палата. Путеводитель*, Москва 1911, p. 217.

[42] General Weyde signed his entreaty using the so-called humble form. In the Muscovite State of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this was binding to anyone supplicating the ruler, including representatives of the most distinguished families; see Е.П. Карнович, *Родовые прозвания и титулы в России*, Москва 1991, pp. 19–20. The term *kholop* referred to a category of slaves in the Ruthenian lands. In turn, *rab* was a term applied to a slave or servant.

[PART I. ON MILITARY RANKS AND ARMY ORGANIZATION]

What, namely, constitutes a soldier

The term "soldier" refers to all individuals in the army, from the highest-ranking general down to the lowest [private].[43] They are divided into officers[44] and common soldiers, both mounted and on foot, while officers are divided into higher and lower ranks. All those below the rank of standard bearer are referred to as junior officers, while the rest are senior officers. Thus, the commanders issue orders or govern [the troops], and the rest faithfully carry out their instructions, each according to their rank and in keeping with military custom. However, in order for everyone to operate in proper order during wartime, and to prevent undesirable actions among such a large number of people, they are divided into various units, namely companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades. When many such soldiers[45] gather together, numbering at least ten to twelve thousand, such a unit is called an army. The practices adopted in the Imperial and Saxon armies

[43] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* clarifies this passage by using the phrase "down to the last musketeer;" see KWPI, p. 338; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 443.

[44] In the original text: the principal men (Rus. *началные люди*). In this study, the term "principal men," meaning those exercising any command, is consistently rendered by the term "commander(s)."

[45] In the original text: military men, serving in the army (Rus. *ратные люди*). In this study, we refer to them as "soldiers;" see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 22, Москва 1997, pp. 115–116.

will be described in greater detail in each chapter where necessary.[46] Here, however, I wish to briefly present the ranks. I shall begin with the company [sic!],[47] followed by the battalion, regiment, brigade, and army.

On the infantry rota

There are various ways in which one can serve in the infantry, namely as a musketeer, grenadier, or pikeman, the latter of which has been all but abandoned nowadays, since bayonets were first affixed to muskets.[48] To maintain a strong rate of fire, a company of infantry consists of 100 to

[46] Saxony first established its standing army in 1681. The infantry numbered 12,000 men (during peacetime) based on a system of voluntary-compulsory enlistment (from 1696 onwards). The army was divided into regiments and companies, and for tactical purposes, battalions, divisions, and platoons were used (with squadrons in the cavalry as well). Starting in 1696, each regiment consisted of three battalions, each of which was divided into five companies of 150 men. Beginning in 1686, the army introduced bayonets, followed by flintlock rifles two years later; by the end of the seventeenth century, some units were still pending rearming; see J. Wojtasik, *Podhajce 1698*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 37–39. For more on the subject, see A. Querengässer, op. cit.

[47] This is the lone instance throughout the Regulations in which the term "company" is used (on the company / Rus. *о компание*). In the subsequent parts of the work, the term "company" no longer appears; instead, the author uses the term "rota." The vocabulary employed indicates that the author had a good understanding of contemporary European military affairs, including those of Poland. It is worth noting that the term "rota" itself was already used in Russia in the early seventeenth century to designate a unit of foreigners detached from a regiment, and subsequently denoted soldiers from newly organized regiments. It was borrowed directly from the Polish language, omitting its German meaning ("Rotte"), which denotes a squad. See Н.А. Смирнов, *Западное влияние на русский язык в петровскую эпоху*, "Сборник Отделения русского языка и словесности императорской Академии наук," т. 88, кн. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1910, p. 266; Ф.П. Сороколетов, *История военной лексики в русском языке*, Ленинград 1970, p. 271.

[48] It is worth noting that Weyde inconsistently applies two terms to the firearms used by soldiers, which he refers to by the interchangeable terms "rifle" or "musket." It is not ruled out that the author of the Regulations used both forms entirely unconsciously, for in Russia at that time both "musket" and "rifle" were used to designate all firearms without distinguishing between their types. For more details, see Г.Ф. Одинцов, *К истории старорусских названий фитильного ружья*, [in:] *Этимология. 1986–1987*, отв. ред. О.Н. Трубачев, Москва 1989, pp. 171–177; Ю.В. Шокарев, *Ручное огнестрельное оружие русской армии XVIII в.*, [in:] *Из истории армии и оружия. Труды Государственного ордена Ленина Исторического музея*, отв. ред. С.О. Шмидт, вып. 64, Москва 1987, pp. 18–50.

120 men, as is customary in the Imperial armies.[49] In the French forces, a company comprises no more than sixty to seventy men.[50]

An infantry rota comprises the following ranks

Captain
Lieutenant
Standard Bearer
Two, three or four sergeants
Cadet
Captenarmus

[49] From the end of the Thirty Years' War until the end of the seventeenth century, the Holy Roman Empire maintained a consistent division of a regiment of infantry into ten companies, each comprising 150 soldiers. In 1695, by the decree of Emperor Leopold I, the number of companies was increased to twelve, without changing their personnel strength; see Ф.В. Рюстов, *История пехоты*, перевод с немецкого А.К. Пузыревского, под ред. А.Е. Станкевича, т. II, Санкт-Петербург 1876, p. 88.

[50] During the reign of Louis XIII and Louis XIV, a battalion in the French army consisted of 900 men divided into seventeen companies, which amounted to over fifty men per company. From the 1670s to the 1680s, the number of soldiers in battalions systematically decreased. During the War of the Spanish Succession, French battalions numbered around 500 men, with no more than 250 remaining under arms. Over the years, this trend began to change, and the strength of a battalion varied from 500 to 1,000 soldiers. The number of companies also fluctuated, ranging from nine to thirteen; see ВЭЛ, т. 2, p. 170. As noted by Friedrich Wilhelm Rüstow, the companies of French regiments were not numerous in terms of personnel, although in the 1680s and 1690s, there could be as many as twenty in a battalion, each with thirty soldiers; see Ф.В. Рюстов, op. cit., pp. 84–85.

Inspector[51] or company scribe[52]
Two drummers

Captain[53]

The captain is the commander[54] of the company and holds the highest authority to issue orders therein. In the Imperial armies, it is customary for him to provide the soldiers with uniforms and pay their wages. During marches, the captain travels on horseback, but in battle and other formations, he stands before his company on foot. His weapon is either a pike or a musket with a bayonet.[55] In the evenings and mornings, he must be informed about the condition of his company. He should ensure that the unit is at full strength and pay particular attention to the care of the sick. Every evening, he receives

[51] In the original text: *overseer, inspector, controller* (Rus. *смотровой*). The soldier performing this role was responsible for maintaining the nominal rosters in the company (Rus. *смотровые списки*), which included the names of all soldiers in a given unit. These rosters also recorded other information related to the functioning of the company, such as notes on soldiers who were sick at a given time or on the types of weapons issued, among others. In the early 1730s, a soldier entrusted with these duties was referred to as an "inspector," and it is this term that we adopted for the lack of clearly defined terminology in both Russian and Polish to describe the soldier performing these tasks; see. СРЯ XI–XVIII, вып, 25, Москва 2000, pp. 206–208, 210–213; ПСЗРИ, т. 8, Санкт-Петербург 1830, № 5900.

[52] The company scribe is mentioned in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 341; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 447.

[53] This description of the rank of captain also features in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, albeit with minor changes. Some sentences were rephrased: "He must go on guard duty with his entire company, and take command during convoys;" "He should carry out with due care the drills and other military duties that fall under his responsibility. He must also properly tend to his soldiers and watch over them, ensuring that they do not neglect their duties;" see KWPI, p. 338; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 444.

[54] In the original text: *the head*.

[55] In contrast, the description of the rank of captain featured in the French military regulations published in 1697 included illustrations and a caption indicating that the proper weapon for this military rank was a half-pike (in the French version, a spontoon); see P. Giffart, op. cit., (1697), pp. 1–8, fig. I–VIII.

the password from his sergeants,[56] and when a need arises to act as a rota, he gives orders to the sergeants, who are obligated to carry out his commands. He must go on guard duty, leading no fewer than sixty men. However, the captain does not take his place in formation [among the soldiers] unless necessary, and in such cases, he marches with his entire rota. He also participates in procuring provisions. Should the colonel request a personnel roster of the rota, the captain shall compile it according to the instructions and then submit it. He must be well-versed in the drills assigned to him, as he is responsible for teaching them to his soldiers, ensuring that everyone in his rota performs their duties accordingly and with diligence.

Lieutentant[57]

In the absence of the captain, the lieutenant carries out all duties in the rota. His involvement in guard duties varies, but he does not command them if they consist of fewer than forty men. Every evening, he receives the password from the sergeants, but he does nothing without the captain's knowledge. He trains the company and works with it as much as the captain himself. His weapon is a musket with a bayonet or a half-pike.[58] During the march, he travels on horseback, but during battle, in ceremonial formations, and during the retreat, he marches on foot at the rear of the rota.

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[56] As a rule, nighttime begins at dusk, ushering in heightened legal rigor, with a password introduced to protect the encampment against spies, enemies; see K. Łopatecki, *Instytucja wytrębowania hasła…*, pp. 75–99.

[57] A similar description of the lieutenant can be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*. However, the last three sentences differ: among others, the Code contains no mention of the lieutenant's armament: "He must take absolute care of discipline and drills, no less than the captain himself. During the march, he travels on horseback, and during battle and in ceremonial formations, he is on foot." See KWPI, p. 339; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 445.

[58] Halfpike was a pole weapon used by officers and non-commissioned officers (similar in form to the spontoon and therefore referred to by that term); see *Немецко-русский словарь, составленный по лучшим источникам В. Эртелем*, т. I, вып. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1846, p. 609.

Standard bearer[59]

When the lieutenant is absent, the standard bearer takes charge of all matters within the rota. In particular, it is his duty to visit and tend to the sick daily, ensuring they lack nothing in the care received. Each evening, he receives the password from the sergeants, who report to him on any special orders received. When on guard duty, he is always present with his standard. When necessary, he substitutes for the lieutenant and carries a half-pike or a musket with a bayonet.[60] He should have great affection for his soldiers and, therefore, when they are to be punished, he should intercede on their behalf. In battle, he is not allowed to abandon his standard under penalty of death, but must hold it in his left hand and defend himself with his right,[61] and if it happens that he can no longer fight with his right hand, it is better for him to be cut to pieces by the standard than to abandon it, for the entire rota follows the standard. For this reason, he is bound to swear an oath upon the standard, and if danger arises and retreat or withdrawal to the rear becomes necessary, it is proper for him to tear the standard from its staff, stow it or wrap it around his body, and thus save himself with it.[62]

[59] Similar regulations can be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*. Differences result from the introduction of the rank of second lieutenant in the eighteenth century; see KWPI, p. 339; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 445.

[60] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* does not mention the type of weapons carried by the standard bearer; see KWPI, p. 339; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 445.

[61] This passage is identical to the description of the duties of the standard bearer featured in Pierre Giffart's French regulations; see P. Giffart, op. cit., (1697), p. 11, fig. XI. Giffart advises that the standard bearer rest the standard, held in his left hand, against his left hip, while holding a drawn sword in his right hand.

[62] In Peter I's Military Code of 1716, the instructions regarding the defense of the standard by the standard bearer were slightly revised: "In battle, he is not allowed to abandon his standard under penalty of death, but must hold it in his left hand and defend himself with his right hand until death, never abandoning the standard, as the entire rota rallies around it. Therefore, he is bound to swear an oath upon the standard, and if a dangerous circumstance arises during retreat, he must tear the standard off from its staff and either stow it or tuck it around his body as he seeks safety with it." See KWPI, p. 339; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 445.

Sergeant

Depending on whether the rotas are large or small, they have more or fewer sergeants. Typically, there are two, three, or four sergeants in a rota. Every evening, the sergeant receives the password[63] and receives it either from the major or the regimental adjutant, and then passes it on to his superiors within the company, imparting the information that he has been ordered to deliver. Whether on the march or on any other occasion, he moves on foot, sometimes positioned at the rear, sometimes at the forefront of the rota.[64] It is he who properly ensures that the ranks and files are maintained.[65] However, his designated position is with the corporal's squad on the right hand side. His weapon is a halberd, which he carries along with a baton, slung over his right shoulder.[66] Many important duties within the company rest upon the sergeant, therefore he should be a seasoned soldier who has risen from the lowest ranks, so that he may know all his obligations and [military] drills.[67]

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[63] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, this stipulation saw a slight modification, e.g. there is no mention of how many sergeants should serve in a company (*rota*); see KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 445–446.

[64] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, this passage is phrased somewhat differently: "sometimes at the sides of the company;" see KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 446.

[65] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the wording is: "well-maintained;" see KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 446.

[66] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* makes no mention of the sergeant's weaponry.

[67] The word "drills" is absent from the analogous passage of *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see. KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 446.

Cadet[68]

He [the cadet] duly tends to the sick,[69] visiting them duly each day, and assists the standard bearer in all matters. Whether in battle or in formation, he marches behind the standard bearer, and should the standard bearer be wounded and unable to carry the standard, he is to assume it. During the march, he typically carries the standard himself.

Captenarmus[70]

It is he who receives military equipment, that is, powder and lead, which he distributes to the soldiers. During the march, he is always near the treasury wagon. He supervises the weapons, inspecting them at drill sites. He also oversees the repair of cartridges and arms, and duly reports this to the captain. His weapons are a halberd or a musket.

[68] The description of the obligations of the standard bearer is more extensive in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*: "During the march, he typically carries the standard, except in battle and during public ceremonies; and particularly, under no circumstances should the standard bearer be abandoned with the standard during battle;" see KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 446.

[69] The word "duly" is not to be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 446.

[70] The duties of the captenarmus remained largely unchanged in Peter I's 1716 military regulations. However, there are some differences: the "treasury wagon" was replaced with the "caisson;" the obligation to carefully inspect the "flints" in the locks was added, reflecting the introduction of more modern flintlock weapons. Additionally, the regulations make no mention of the captenarmus's personal armament. The updated text reads: "He receives the powder and lead, which he distributes to the soldiers, ensuring that the cartridges are of adequate quality. During the march, he is always near his caisson; he also has supervision over the arms, inspecting them at drill sites, checking whether everyone is fully supplied and whether the flints affixed in the locks require repair, also checking the cartridges and the soldiers' arms, before reporting it to the captain;" see KWPI, p. 339; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 446.

Company scribe[71]

Whenever the captain wishes to conduct an inspection, he always instructs the scribe to be present with paper and pen to properly carry out the roll call. He [the scribe] must also disburse pay to all soldiers according to the captain's orders and present a reliable report thereon. Additionally, he must keep a ledger in which he records any and all items assigned to and repaired in the company, and he is obliged to report this to the captain every month.[72]

Company doctor[73]

When in the field, as well as during sieges, he must carry with him the necessary medicines. However, he should not handle difficult cases alone but should consult with others [doctors]. He should give the soldiers a weekly shave and duly tend to the wounded. Every week, he also collects one and a half kopeks from each soldier, with officers contributing at their discretion.

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[71] The description of this rank differs slightly from the entry in the 1716 regulations, which make no mention of the company scribe being responsible for disbursing the soldiers' wages. Additionally, the following provision was added, expanding his obligations: "He is also required, at the designated time, to read military articles to the entire company; he must also keep an accurate record of the penalties imposed on anyone in the rota;" see KWPI, p. 341; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 447.

[72] As outlined by General Weyde, the duties of the company scribe largely corresponded with those performed by soldiers holding similar roles in European armies. In addition to handling the payment of wages, the company scribe was also responsible for issuing clothing (uniforms) to soldiers. Given the nature of his role, he was exempt from guard duty and participation in skirmishes and combat, as his primary responsibility was the safeguarding of all records pertaining to the company's personnel and supplies. However, these aspects were not the subject of Adam Weyde's *Regulations*; see H.C. Lavater, *Kriegs-Büchlein: Das ist Grundtliche Anleitung Zum Kriegswerfen…*, Zürich 1659, p. 43.

[73] In the 1716 regulations, the company doctor is instructed to seek advice from a specific individual, namely the regimental doctor. Additionally, there is no mention of the company doctor receiving payments from soldiers for medical treatment; see KWPI, pp. 340–341; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 447.

Corporal[74]

The corporal must know the condition of all his subordinates, both in the morning and in the evening. Should any soldier be inclined to lead a dissolute life, he [the corporal] must pay heed to such individuals and strive to prevent such behavior, particularly by fiercely combating gambling, especially card games. If someone disobeys him, he should report such cases to the sergeant. He stands with his squad, on the right side of the front rank. There are typically three, four, or five corporals in a rota, depending on its size.[75] His weapons are such as those of other common soldiers.

Gefreiter[76]

Gefreiters are soldiers who stand in the front rank alongside the corporal. Their weapons are the same as those of the other common soldiers. They themselves do not perform guard duty but are responsible for overseeing the changing of the guards at the appointed time, which are posted at various distances from the rota in groups of two, three, or more; specifically, he must ensure that the guards are relieved every three hours and brought back accordingly.

[74] The analogous stipulation in the 1716 document also includes enforcing a ban on dice games; see KWPI, p. 340; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 446–447.
[75] This passage is somewhat inconsistent. While the section on the sergeant stipulates that two to four squads be designated per rota, the section on the corporal raises this number to three to five.
[76] A slightly different provision can be found in Peter's *Military Code*, which mandates that changing of the guard should occur every two or three hours; see KWPI, p. 341; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 447.

Leib-Schütz or escort rifleman[77]

This role is analogous to that of an orderly. He remains constantly at the commander's side. Whenever the commander needs the assistance of someone from his rota or anything else, he promptly dispatches the escort rifleman. The captain typically has two such riflemen always by his side, and in battle, they always stand behind the captain. Their weapons consist of a musket and a sword.

Drummer[78]

There are always two men assigned to each company. They should not participate in combat and must stand behind the company. They must always be ready when the order to beat the drum is issued. They must be well-versed in all the signals necessary within the regiment. The drummers should be swift, so that they can promptly carry out the captain's orders or be deployed somewhere as per instructions.

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[77] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the passage remains nearly unchanged, with one notable difference concerning the name of the escort rifleman's weapons. The text states: "They are to be armed with firearms and a sword, and when an officer is wounded, they must carry him out, and not the soldiers;" see KWPI, p.341; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 447–448.

[78] The wording is virtually identical in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, except for the indication that drummers should be young men, which naturally corresponds to the provision in General Weyde's code about "being swift," i.e., energetic and physically fit; see KWPI, p. 342; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 448.

On the battalion[79]

The battalion consists of three, four, or five companies and is usually the size of a half or a third of a regiment. The one who commands the battalion holds the rank of lieutenant colonel or major.

On the infantry regiment[80]

An infantry regiment always consists of eight to twelve rotas. Regiments protecting great rulers may number as many as sixteen or even twenty rotas. Due to significant challenges in very large regiments, two regimental adjutants are appointed in addition to the major.

[79] The division of regiments into battalions in the Russian army was instituted during the reign of Peter I. The regiment remained the primary tactical and administrative combat unit, usually divided into two battalions. An exception was made for the guard regiments—the Preobrazhensky and the Semyonovsky—which, given their expanded personnel, were divided into four and three battalions, respectively. A three-battalion division was also used at various times in other selected infantry regiments. On January 31, 1712, the tsar decreed that all infantry regiments, except for the Ingermanlandsky, Moscow, Kyivsky, and the Narevsky, should retain their hitherto division into two battalions; see ЭВМН, т. 1, p. 363; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne…*, pp. 73–74; ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2478.

[80] Adam Weyde drafted this provision before Peter I commenced the main phase of the military reform, which took place between 1699 and 1700, when entirely new regiments were formed, including twenty-seven infantry regiments and two cavalry (dragoon) regiments, modeled after Western European standards. The defeat at Narva in 1700 forced the Russians to rebuild the potential of the land army, which essentially involved forming infantry and cavalry regiments anew. The original number of rotas within the infantry and cavalry regiments, established at the beginning of the war with Sweden, changed over time due to the separation of grenadier companies and their formation into independent regiments. It was only *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* that stipulated that an infantry regiment should consist of eight rotas. An exception was made for guard regiments and other units specified by special decree, which retained their division into three battalions; see KWPI, p. 342; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 448. For more on the subject, see ПСЗРИ, т. 4, № 2319; Д.Ф. Масловский, *Строевая и полевая служба русских войск времен Императора Петра Великого и Императрицы Елизаветы*, Москва 1883, passim; О.Г. Леонов, И.Э. Ульянов, op. cit., p. 24; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne…*, passim.

A regiment features the following commanders

Colonel
Lieutenant colonel
Major

They are followed by the successive regimental ranks

Regimental quartermaster
Regimental adjutant
Regimental camp commander
Regimental provost

Colonel[81]

In the regiment, no officer makes decisions on important matters without his [colonel's] knowledge. Just as a captain oversees his rota, so the

[81] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the description of the colonel's duties is much more elaborate: "The colonel must be a distinguished, skilled, and prudent man so that he can carry his honorable rank with proper virtue, ensuring that in all circumstances he does not disgrace his regiment. He should care for his senior and junior officers, ensuring that they not only oversee the drills of their companies but also maintain good order, particularly in the details. He is to ensure proper care of uniforms, well-maintained weapons, and that soldiers are neat in their attire. The colonel leads the regiment during ceremonial marches or when entering or exiting a fortress. Also, when marching out or entering camp, he always walks on foot in front of the regiment, as described in more detail elsewhere in ceremonial instructions. However, in battle, he rides a horse behind the front line, as close as possible (with his sword drawn), so he can better see and command his regiment, riding from one end of the line to the other. He should encourage everyone to fulfill their duty against the enemy. In garrison, he does not stand guard, except during convoys or patrols. Each evening, the major brings him the parole, which he is required to accept with his sword drawn, standing with an uncovered head. No officer in the regiment initiates anything important without his knowledge. Just as a captain holds authority over his company, the colonel has even greater authority and oversight over the regiment. If his subordinates have complaints or reports that need to be brought to the attention of the general staff, they must first inform their colonel, who will either report it himself or promptly refer the matter to a higher commander. The colonel must extend his full care for good order and proper conduct, and for everything within the regiment that pertains to the interests of the state;" see KWPI, pp. 342–343; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 448–449.

colonel exercises even greater oversight over the regiment. When his subordinates have complaints or reports that should be brought to the attention of the general staff, they must first inform their colonel, who shall either allow them to proceed or shall report to the general staff himself. In battle, he is to march on foot in front of the regiment. He carries a half-pike and does not stand guard himself. Upon receiving orders, he assumes direct command and leads the formation. Each evening, the major or regimental adjutant relays the password and detailed orders to him, and he in turn issues the commands necessary to properly direct the regiment. The colonel must show great care in ensuring he has capable officers and well-trained soldiers, as well as other proper arrangements and order. In the Imperial army, the colonel holds full authority, such that, after a court-martial, he may order a soldier to be hanged or beheaded, but may also spare him at his discretion and for justified reasons.[82]

Lieutenant colonel[83]

A lieutenant colonel does not stand guard unless he is sent to a post with a battalion. He is second only to the colonel and assumes supreme command in the colonel's absence. His duties include relaying the password to the major or regimental adjutant, and passing on orders, which the major or adjutant then relay to the sergeants of the rotas. The lieutenant colonel should also diligently oversee his subordinates during drills and ensure

[82] As a rule, military law did not provide for an appeal, which could only be brought by the provost general. The expedited court procedure, followed by immediate execution was referred to as an immediate (i.e., held in the open air) standing court, also known as the summary court (*Standrecht*); see W. Organiściak, *Środki prawne przeciwko wyrokom sądów wojskowych autoramentu cudzoziemskiego w Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej w sprawach karnych*, "Problemy Prawa Karnego" 25 (2002), p. 224; idem, *Z badań nad postępowaniami szczególnymi w prawie karnym wojskowym Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej*, "Problemy Prawa Karnego" 23 (2000), pp. 123–125.

[83] The duties of the lieutenant colonel as defined by General Weyde remained almost unchanged in the 1716 military code; see KWPI, p. 343; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 449–450.

that order is maintained. In battle, he always marches on foot, armed with a half-pike.

Major[84]

When both the colonel and lieutenant colonel are absent, he commands the entire regiment. He also bears the brunt of responsibilities within the regiment, particularly during drills and in preparing the guards. He inspects the regiment, assessing whether it is in good condition, both in terms of the number of soldiers and in military equipment, clothing, and weapons. The adjutant and all sergeants are his assistants, carrying out his orders, and enabling him to manage the entire regiment. Whether on the march or in battle, he moves on horseback, carefully overseeing that everything proceeds in an orderly manner. It is especially desirable that the major has a thorough understanding of the military affairs that apply to the regiment. In addition, he should also be in good health and not too old.[85]

[84] The list of responsibilities entrusted to the major is essentially the same as the one found in the 1716 military code; see KWPI, p. 343; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 450. The only difference is General Weyde's use of the ambiguous military term *sbruya* (Rus. *сбруя*). The word may refer to the harness or the entire trappings, but also to all military equipment, including both small arms and firearms, as well as the protective armament of soldiers (armor, body armor). In this context, *sbruya* refers to military equipment; see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 23, Москва 1996, pp. 89–90.

[85] Additionally, *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* mentions the rank of second major: "The second major should fulfill the same duties as the first major;" see KWPI, p. 343; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 450.

Regimental quartermaster[86]

The regimental quartermaster in the Russian state is not charged with so many affairs as in other countries, especially the [Holy Roman] Empire. When marching, he must always be in front of the army, designating positions for the regiment. He should be partially familiar with the principles of fortification and fortress construction so that a superior and more convenient position for the regiment can be measured and prepared. Every evening, he must ride to the quartermaster general. If the marching order is given the next morning, or if the regiment is to besiege some city, the quartermaster should also endeavor to arrange for regimental quarters.

Regimental adjutant[87]

He is the major's assistant and receives the password from him each evening, after which he relays it to the three senior commanders in the regiment. He also relays it, along with other orders, to the sergeants in front of the major's quarters. He assists the major in forming the regiment

[86] A considerably more detailed description of the quartermaster's duties can be found in the Petrine code: "He should arrange quarters for the entire regiment, both in the field and in the garrison. Each evening, he is also to ride to the headquarters of the general quartermaster to learn the orders concerning the march route and the location and arrangement of the camp. When the march begins, the general quartermaster rides ahead, surveying the places where it would be proper to set up camp; following him are the chief quartermasters and regimental quartermasters, along with the quartermasters carrying the markers. When the general quartermaster, the lieutenant general quartermaster, or the chief quartermaster points out the location to the regimental quartermaster, he should mark the locations (to be taken by the respective troops) and then return to the regiment and lead it to the designated camp. In the garrison, he also allocates quarters to his regiment and distributes notes, according to which each man finds accommodation adequate to his rank. He should be skilled in drawing, a good mathematician and surveyor, and also have some knowledge of geography;" see KWPI, pp. 343–344; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 450–451.

[87] The text essentially corresponds to the provision in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, which also stipulates that the regimental adjutant assist the major in posting guards; see KWPI, p. 344; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 451.

and stays with him during the march. In battle, he is always mounted. This position involves difficulties, but those who hold it are often good commanders.

Regimental camp commander[88]

The regimental camp commander must closely watch that all wagons move in their respective columns and in good order, and maintain their correct position.[89] In carrying out his tasks, he receives great help from the regimental camp commanders,[90] who assist him diligently in all matters and obey him fully. He obtains information from the general camp commander concerning the marching orders and other matters assigned to him. In particular, he oversees the stock of gunpowder and other military equipment in the regiment, ensuring that they can be transported properly and in good order. Since the person holding this rank has no other duties, he consequently has few or almost no responsibilities during a halt. Therefore, I believe it is appropriate that, here in Moscow [i.e., in

[88] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the description of the regimental quartermaster's duties is significantly shorter and differs from the one found in Weyde's *Regulations*: "He must be a fine accountant and should ensure that all wagons are properly arranged in columns, drawn in an orderly manner, and stationed in their due positions. The company camp commanders must be obedient to the regimental camp commander and diligently assist him in everything. The regimental camp commander obtains information about the march route from the general camp commander and demands orders from him for everything. He must pay close attention to ensure that the wagons of any officer rank, as well as those of innkeepers and all others, proceed in their assigned positions, allowing no disorder or insubordination in this matter;" see KWPI, pp. 344–345; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 451–452.

[89] A detailed description of the movement of wagons in marching formation during military campaigns can be found in the work of Captain Hans Conrad Lavater, op. cit., p. 118–119. For more on the use of wagons in the military in the eighteenth century, including the Russian army, see A.L. Oelsnitz, op. cit., passim.

[90] The *Regulations* lack consistency in this regard, as General Weyde does not mention company camp commanders when describing the structure of the rota.

Russia], the management of gunpowder supplies be taken from the majors and entrusted to the regimental camp commander.

[Artillery major][91]

I cannot determine when such majors were first established, as no such majors are to be found in any other country. They are considered to be of higher stature than regimental majors, and if someone claims that they are majors of artillery or artillery equipment, I would argue that this is not the case at all, for an artillery major must know much more than merely how to protect a few cannons and wagons. In an entire army's artillery, there is only one major, and they are not assigned to each individual regiment. The artillery major must have the knowledge of all matters related to artillery, particularly the types and uses of cannons and mortars, bombs, and all incendiary devices that comprise the artillery. Additionally, they must understand the construction of fortresses so that they can explain how the cannons can function more effectively within batteries[92] during a siege. Moreover, they must be familiar with all the ranks in the artillery, so they can determine the worthiness of recruits for service and properly correct them should they [the recruits] perform any of their duties inadequately.[93]

[91] Heading added by the editors. In the original, the description constitutes a part of the section on the regimental camp commander.

[92] The term "raskat" (Rus. *раскат*) used in the text refers to a wooden, stone, or earthen structure with a platform (sometimes simply a platform) for setting up cannons. Depending on the context, this term could signify a tower, rampart, or bastion; see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 21, p. 277; С.А. Тучков, op. cit., p. 55; А.М. Губайдуллин, *Фортификационный словарь*, Казань 2003, p. 76.

[93] The method of setting up cannon batteries during a siege is depicted on one of the plates included at the end of von Wallhausen's treatise, dedicated to Emperor Ferdinand II; see J. Wallhausen, *Defensio Patriae…*, unpag.

Regimental provost[94]

He is an indispensable man who must always carefully ensure that cleanliness is maintained within the regiment. He has three to four servants from the regiment, as well as all the shackles with which criminals are bound. When the camp is established, he must order the immediate construction of latrines, and he obtains the laborers for this task from the major.

Since we have now learned what a rota, battalion, and regiment are, it is necessary to examine the remaining matters related to these, therefore below we wish to briefly consider what a brigade is and what duties the brigadiers have.

Brigade[95]

It is an indispensable unit, although experience shows that they differ from one country to another, depending on regiment size. It [a brigade] consists of two, three, four, or even five regiments, the one who commands them is known as a brigadier. It is possible to form both uniform cavalry and infantry brigades. In the Imperial army, they do not appoint brigadiers, but instead assign major generals over three or four regiments.

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[94] The provision is repeated without major changes in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 346; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 453. Regimental provosts not only managed the detention cell where soldiers were sent for offenses they committed, but also participated in executions ordered by provost courts. All provosts (including company provosts) also inspected the observance of hygiene and cleanliness during marches and at permanent military quarters, among others by inspecting the condition of the premises and latrines used by soldiers. Authority over the provosts rested in the hands of the provost general (according to a decree issued in 1711, there were to be two provosts general in the army) and the staff provost general; see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 20, Москва 1995, p. 277; *Дворянские роды Российской империи*, науч. ред. С.В. Думин, т. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1993, p. 51.

[95] The 1716 regulations contained an almost identical provision, omitting only the last sentence that characterized brigades in foreign armies; see KWPI, p. 99; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 210.

However, this rank exists and is widespread among the Dutch and the French.

[Brigadier][96]

When in the field, the brigadier stays with his regiments. He ensures that the colonels under his command keep their regiments well-trained and in proper formation, which he must always report on to his superior field commander.[97] Each evening, he rides with his subordinate majors to his commanding officer[98] and receives the password along with other orders. He then passes them on, with his head uncovered, to the majors, who should return to their regiments. If a battle is expected, the brigadier

[96] Name added by the editors. In the Russian army, the duties of a brigadier, who was counted among the general staff, were defined in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*: "A brigadier has under his command as many regiments or fewer as a major general, and he also commands them in all matters and takes diligent care of them in accordance with the regulations. He has no direct authority over the affairs of the major general but must report all his actions to him. When the lieutenant general is absent and only the major general is present, such a brigadier does not command a separate part of the army, but the brigadier's regiments are divided, while he assumes command in place of the lieutenant general. The brigadier receives the password from the major general and relays it to his officers, but in the absence of the major general, the brigadier is expected to fulfill all duties in his stead;" see KWPI, p. 114; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 229.

[97] In the original text: to the *field voivode* (Rus. *полевему воеводе*), namely the commander of the army in the field; here translated as the "superior field commander."

[98] In the original text: *full voivode* (Rus. *полной воевода*), meaning the commander-in-chief of an entire army (compound). The term "voivode" itself was used to denote any military commander (sometimes referring only to the commander of a regiment). In this context, it should be understood as commander-in-chief; see П.И. Соколов, *Общий церковно-славяно-российский словарь, или Собрание речений как отечественных, так и иностранных, в церковно-славянском и российском наречиях употребляемых... по поручению Комитета устройства учебных заведений составленное П.С.: с присовокуплением таблиц склонений и спряжений, заимствованных из Грамматики г. Востокова, напечатанной в 1832 г. и введенной в употребление в нижних и средних учебных заведениях*, ч. 1, Санкт-Петербург 1834, col. 270; ч. 2, Санкт-Петербург 1834, col. 626–627; *Воевода*, http://www.orthodic.org/word/3713 (accessed February 10, 2018).

must ensure his regiment is well-prepared. He also firmly instructs his colonels on how and in what manner they should prepare for the fight.

The brigadier rides on horseback with his sword drawn, leading his troops into battle, paying close attention to whether each colonel and commander performs their duties perfectly and diligently. He must always have three to four good, brave, and well-trained horses, so that during battle he can carry out his duties effectively and without hindrance. The brigadier should also have the knowledge of fortifications, so that when he is tasked with leading a siege or conducting an assault, he can carry it out properly and effectively, and train his engineers in this art as well.

What, namely, is an army

An army is a compound of several brigades, which can number from 15,000 to 20,000 men in total. One cannot lay siege with such a small number of men, unless the fortress is small or guarded by a sparse garrison. It is also not right to maintain too large an army, for it causes many complications and high prices. However, one should proceed in this regard by taking into account the size of the enemy, the personnel composition of his [the enemy's] army, and the military custom he observes. It often occurs that a ruler's army of 40,000 men is superior to another's army of 80,000, which follows from a due course of training and the order established therein. It is imperative and essential for a military boasting a high number of armed men to implement sound military drills and legislation. However, their adoption alone is insufficient, as it is necessary to prescribe firmly and resolutely their observation and obeyance, with no exceptions for anyone, so that any disorder, lawlessness and dissension may be suppressed and relieved permanently.

Once again, I shall return to my prior observation regarding the difference between fine and well-trained and those who do not know combat and are poorly trained. I state that in the year 1697 in the land of Hungary I myself saw that the Imperial army stood at little more than 44,000; however, it faced the Turks, who fielded some 85,000 men, valiantly and without fear. This occurred on September 12 at Zenta, when more than 25,000 people were killed, in which the Imperial force suffered less than fifteen hundred dead and wounded in total. And the entire camp, cannons, military equipment, tents and everything that the Turks in their army, they [the Holy Roman Empire's army] took as loot.[99]

Generalissimus[100] or full voivode[101]

He diligently oversees the army and sometimes orders regiments to perform drills in his presence. He carefully observes each commanding officer and his actions, doing so in order to either promote him according to custom or punish him severely. He frequently inspects the area

[99] For more on the subject, see Ł. Pabich, op. cit.

[100] The function of generalissimus was first introduced in the Russian army by Peter I, shortly before General Weyde drafted his Regulations. The first generalissimus was boyar Alexei Shein, commander-in-chief of the Russian army that captured the Turkish fortress of Azov in 1696. For more details, see *Поход боярина и большого полку воеводы...*; Е. Лихач, *Алексей Семенович Шейн*, [in:] *Русский биографический словарь*, т. 23: *Шебанов–Шютц*, Санкт-Петербург 1911, pp. 36–38; В.В. Каргалов, *Русские воеводы XVI–XVII в.*, Москва 2002, pp. 297–326; П.В. Седов, *К истории ранней биографии «генералиссимуса» Алексея Семеновича Шейна*, "Петербургский исторический журнал исследования по российской и всеобщей истории," 2 (10) 2016, pp. 6–16.

[101] In the original text: full voivode (Rus. *полной воевода*), also referred to as the first voivode of the grand regiment, or commander-in-chief. Until the reign of Peter I, this function was associated with exercising supreme authority over the Russian army; see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 2, Москва 1975, pp. 261–262; ibidem, вып. 16, Москва 1900, pp. 229–230; E. Razin, op. cit., p. 243. The juxtaposition of the functions of a generalissimus and a full voivode in the title of the chapter of Adam Weyde's *Regulations* perfectly illustrates the author's efforts to draft new military regulations that would clearly juxtapose the "new" (European) and "old" (Russian) military developments.

surrounding his encamped army. He commands the entire army, first and foremost by managing it accordingly, maintaining order and discipline, and bearing responsibility for it both before God and the law, vouching for them with his head. He is always mounted and during battle leads from wherever his presence is most needed. He must act with great caution, without hastily engaging the enemy in battle or laying a siege without first obtaining permission from his top commanders. During marches, he positions himself either at the front or rear of the army, ensuring that all matters proceed smoothly and orderly. Every evening, his adjutant generals, who serve as his assistants, receive the password from him, and through them, he issues orders and instructions. The Generalissimus has at least three or four such adjutants.[102]

[102] General Weyde merely outlined the duties incumbent on the generalissimus, which were redrafted in a more elaborate form in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*: "This rank is reserved for crowned heads and ruling princes, particularly those whose armies are under their command. During their absence, the ruler entrusts the command of the entire army to their General Field Marshal, who is empowered to act independently according to circumstances, as he deems necessary, and he is accountable to his sovereign for such actions. However, he must seek the advice of the war council (which should always be done) or act according to the instructions received, and without such instructions, he must not undertake anything significant with the aforementioned army. He must first inform his sovereign and the war council about it, and without their consent and approval, he should not make any major decisions on his own. Yet, if something is not specified in the instructions, and he observes an opportunity to secure a certain advantage, then with the advice of the war council, he may certainly carry it out and not lose the occasion. The most crucial matter, when the generalissimus intends to wage war, is that the war council ensures the supply and maintenance of the army through the preparation of adequate supply depots in appropriate locations, and in all matters, they should take actions to not only meet the army's needs in advance but to also ensure that it is properly supplied (and that all troops are eager for service) to the fullest extent possible, and that it has no reason for poor service;" see KWPI, pp. 102–103; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 213–219.

In the section below, the ranks shall once again be listed

Infantry general

This rank is common in the Imperial armies and also exists among the French. By order of the voivode [the commander-in-chief], he commands the entire infantry. He carefully oversees the major-generals and brigadiers, ensuring that they maintain their regiments and brigades with diligence and supervise them with zeal. He frequently orders the regiments to conduct drills in his presence. During battle, he is always mounted, supervising the major-generals and brigadiers as they lead their regiments, riding with his sword drawn, moving from the front to the rear as needed. Two adjutant generals accompany him.

And just as there is one above the infantry, so too is there a cavalry general in the Imperial army.[103]

Feldzeugmeister general[104]

He is the commander of all artillery, and must have excellent and thorough knowledge thereof, as he oversees the entire artillery park, powder, and ammunition. He drafts the requisitions and estimates for the materials necessary for the army: charges, powder, lead, and other essential supplies. He should also be well-versed in the art of fortification, as during a siege, he must properly designate and establish the batteries.

[103] General Weyde does not distinguish the rank of cavalry general, nor does he detail it in his *Regulations*.

[104] A much more elaborate and somewhat different overview of the rank of general feldzeugmeister general can be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*: "The general feldzeugmeister, together with the generals of cavalry and infantry, ranks immediately behind the field marshal general and the field marshal lieutenant general. In the absence of the field marshal general and the field marshal

But if someone were to ask: how many cannons are needed for an army of 50,000 men, I would in turn ask whether the army intends to conduct a siege or only engage the enemy in the field. It is inappropriate and unnecessary to bring and drag heavy artillery into the field. The feldzeugmeister general must know this in advance, especially before the start of such operations, so that he can prepare everything that the army requires with respect to artillery, in a timely fashion.

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lieutenant general, the senior among the three (whoever received his rank first) shall assume command. If all three were promoted at the same time, then the one to whom the rank was first conferred takes precedence. The feldzeugmeister general must possess complete knowledge of fortifications, artillery, and infantry, over which he may occasionally be placed in command. For instance, if the general is absent during an event, the feldzeugmeister general shall take command of the infantry or cavalry, managing all in accordance with his high position and issuing orders to subordinate officers as the situation requires. Additionally, he is responsible for maintaining an inventory, a detailed record of all artillery, ammunition, supplies, and soldiers, including their locations, and must report this every week to the College of War. When a new campaign is announced, or a resolution concerning the siege of a city or field operations is passed, or a battle with the enemy is planned, he must first consult with distinguished artillery officers and then submit his proposal to the general staff and the war council. During the siege of a city, he is tasked with determining the placement of all batteries, how they should be constructed, which cannons should be placed on them, and how the defensive walls, towers, and fortifications can be destroyed—ensuring that ammunition and resources are not wasted in vain. Should there be a shortage of artillery supplies, he must, by order of the commanding general, ensure that they are delivered from the appropriate locations in a timely manner, preventing any shortages. He receives the password and orders from the field marshal general (or field marshal lieutenant general) and remains in his proximity, frequently consulting with them on military operations. He is responsible for relaying the password and orders within his unit as instructed, and he issues orders concerning the ongoing operations of the artillery. His subordinates do likewise, each according to their rank. In large armies, the feldzeugmeister general does not command the infantry, as special infantry generals are appointed for this purpose. His command extends only to the artillery, ammunition, and related matters, all of which fall under the field marshal general's authority. The feldzeugmeister general must be a highly diligent, careful individual, who not only thoroughly understands all artillery regulations but also takes utmost care to ensure that nothing in this field deteriorates, but rather grows with proper attention. He oversees the state of arsenals and field artillery in all circumstances. He ensures that cannons, mortars, and all other artillery-related equipment are made properly and with skill. He also strives to have expert specialists in all areas, whom he assigns to tasks and occasionally orders to train others in these matters, ensuring that those receiving wages from their sovereign are working continuously, and that they perform these duties especially during peacetime." See KWPI, pp. 108–109; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 220–222.

Commissary general[105]

In the Imperial army, this rank carries a number of responsibilities. When he deems it necessary, he [commissary general] conducts a review of the soldiers in the army. He must be a skilled accountant or mathematician, as he is entrusted with overseeing all the funds that belong to the army. He always has one colonel or a senior commissary under his command, as well as two or three regular commissaries and several clerks. When it comes time to disburse pay to the regiments during wartime, he inspects the regiments one by one, checking whether anyone has died or deserted. If he is unable to do this himself, the senior commissary performs the task on his behalf. Once all of the above is completed, the money for all the months is disbursed to the colonels through the commissaries, and the colonels, in turn, pass it to their majors, who then hand it over to the captains. To prevent the soldiers from wasting their pay on drinking or

[105] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* specifies the duties incumbent on the quartermaster general of the Russian army, known as the war commissary: "The war commissary is not only required to know and understand all the main duties established within the army, in order to perform his entrusted tasks in a proper manner, but he must also possess the skills of a senior steward and a good accountant. This is because he manages the financial expenditures that concern the entire army, including the payment for both higher-ranking and lower-ranking personnel, as well as for supplies and equipment for all military necessities. He receives funds either from the treasury (or war chest) or from contributions collected from enemy territory, and he must keep accurate accounts of these, both for himself and for the general staff and regiments. He distributes the money to the other war commissaries who, in turn, disburse it to the general staff and regiments according to the allocations. He inspects the entire army whenever he deems it appropriate, depending on the circumstances. He also orders his subordinate commissaries to review the regiments and companies. He must not show favoritism to any officer but must safeguard his sovereign's interests, ensuring that there is no theft, or any unworthy individuals, horses, uniforms, or weapons [in the army]. He is responsible for investigating all misconduct, and those found guilty of mismanagement must be punished according to their offense. The war commissary must always maintain a complete and accurate inventory of the entire army and base all accounts thereon. Under the command of the war commissary, there should be one oberst commissary in both the cavalry and infantry, with an ober commissary in each division, and in every regiment a commissary responsible for managing regimental

misusing it otherwise, the captains do not issue it on a monthly basis, but rather every week or twice a week. He also has control over the entire military stockpile, and no general or commander responsible for financial matters[106] may disburse anything without his permission.

finances. The commissary office must ensure that the monarch's army in all lands has everything it needs to maintain its efficiency, according to the regulations and established standards. Therefore, during inspections, weapons, uniforms, and all other equipment should be carefully examined, and at an appropriate time, every dragoon and soldier should be asked if they are receiving everything they are entitled to, and whether there have been any delays in payments or uniform distribution. Should any deficiencies be found—whether in personnel, weapons, uniforms, equipment, or supplies—proper investigations must be conducted, and if negligence is identified, the guilty parties should be punished. Any damaged items must be recorded, and it must be determined whether such damage was caused by negligence. Furthermore, if anything is found to be substandard or not in line with the set standards, the suppliers should be penalized accordingly, and the faulty items should be returned, so that in the future, they act more responsibly and do not cause unnecessary losses to the sovereign. The commissary general must report all military expenses—how much is spent, and on what, as well as payments to the general staff and regiments—to the College of War, each year, without any personal interference, ensuring that all hands responsible for receiving and distributing funds sign off on the accounts. The war commissary is also in charge of all proviant masters and their associated staff. Since the general staff does not always assemble in full and the regiments are rarely at full strength, the commissary office must maintain precise records for all divisions, noting the duration of vacancies (empty posts) in the ranks of generals, staff, and both higher and lower-ranking officers and soldiers. This shall allow a clear understanding of how much money remains in the war chest each year, how many officers were promoted, and how many recruits were lost. Moreover, it provides exact information on the funds allocated for personnel pay and material purchases. Therefore, the annual financial report must not be misused. The war commissary must report in detail every year to the College of War, so that any relaxations or failures can be identified, and a reliable protocol can be maintained without any misconduct. If someone is involved in the theft of money or other items, a representative from the commissary office (acting as an attorney) must be assigned to such trials, depending on the rank of the accused;" see KWPI, pp. 111–112; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 224–227. Therein, too, there were relevant provisions regulating the duties of the Oberst-Commissar and Ober-Commissar; KWPI, pp. 114–115, 120–121; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 229–230, 238–239.

[106] In the original text, *zapasnoy nachalnik* (Rus: *запасной начальник*); while not clearly defined in Russian, the term refers to a commanding officer overseeing matters related to financial provisions. The word *zapasnoy* relates to anything connected with the preparation and securing of supplies, primarily food. One definition refers to a person responsible for collecting or delivering the tax paid on grain reserves to the designated location. Additionally, the word *zapas* (Rus: *запас*) may, among other things, refer to a payment or tax, either in money or in kind. See also СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 5, Москва 1978, pp. 258–260.

Quartermaster general

In the Russian state, this position is unnecessary, as the entire army always marches together[107] and camps together as well. In the Imperial armies, however, he [quartermaster general] has numerous duties. Quartermasters from all regiments are under his command, and they must always travel with him ahead of the army to assist him in assigning positions. A man in this rank must be proficient in the art of fortification, particularly in geography, to ensure he can read maps and terrain sketches.[108] If necessary, when the chief engineer is absent from the army, and a siege has been laid, he is responsible for establishing batteries and field fortifications for the placement of artillery,[109] drafting a sketch of this, and presenting it to the voivode. This rank is highly demanding and onerous. Quartermaster generals only take orders from the commander-in-chief, with whom they must always maintain a good understanding.

[107] The typical marching order of individual *rotas*—including the sequence of *rotas* in the formation, the number of soldiers marching in the ranks and files of each *rotas*, and the placement of specific personnel—such as the captain, lieutenant, standard bearer, and drummer—within the marching formation, as well as regimental arrangements used in European armies of the time, was described by Captain-Lieutenant Johan Boxel. Boxel supplemented the descriptions with suitable illustrations; see J. Boxel, op. cit., Bd. 3: *Der Kriegsübung*, Hage 1675, pp. 8–11. On the other hand, for a more extensive discussion of the march formation used in the Russian army during the Crimean expeditions of 1687-1689, i.e., shortly before Peter I undertook his fundamental reform of the army, see E. Razin, op. cit., pp. 238–250.

[108] Here in the sense of "analyze."

[109] In the original text: "*raskat*."

Adjutant general[110]

He must be a prudent and eloquent man. He is always positioned beside the field commander, and when he is sent with an order, he must execute the command promptly and proficiently, for the delivery of his verbal orders is crucial, and all military leaders are bound to act in accordance with it, as if receiving the order directly from the field commander. The adjutant general must carefully record all orders, noting the time and date each was given, so that if the field commander inquires on any matter, he can respond accurately and provide a detailed report. At least three or four adjutants always ride in the vicinity of the field commander. Adjutant generals are to be intimately familiar with both cavalry and infantry discipline, so as to clarify how an attack or retreat should be executed should the field commander, while preparing for combat, send them with

[110] The duties of the adjutant general—spelled "adjutant-general," in accordance with the systematics adopted in the Russian army—were significantly expanded and specified in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, which assigned the individual adjutant general ranks to specific military titles: "Given the significant and numerous duties they shoulder, all generals in the entire army have their own adjutants, who, like their superiors, are subordinate to each other in rank (those serving rulers, field marshals, and commanding generals are called adjutant generals, while those serving other generals are called generals, rather than adjutant generals). These adjutants are responsible for delivering orders and commands to designated locations. Since the field marshal wields the highest command over the troops, adjutant generals are assigned to him; likewise, the next highest-ranking generals each have their own adjutant general. Their duties entail ensuring that passwords and orders are clearly communicated, so that all necessary instructions reach the entire army. To maintain order, the following procedure is observed: When the generals of cavalry and infantry receive orders and passwords from the field marshal, they convey them in turn to the field marshal's adjutant general, who then distributes them to the general-adjutants in the cavalry and infantry. These adjutants, in turn, pass the password and orders on to the wing adjutants of the remaining generals according to rank. The right-wing adjutant relays the password to all regimental adjutants on the right wing, and the left-wing adjutant does the same on the left, along with any orders issued by the chief general alongside the parole. Everything is to be recorded appropriately in registers and presented subsequently to the regimental majors. This process must be strictly organized according to the ranks of regiments and the commanders of the infantry and cavalry, so that no regiment suffers any disadvantage. The artillery adjutant typically receives the password from the field marshal's adjutant general. Should the adjutant general of the field marshal be ill-disposed and unable to

orders to the infantry general or brigadiers. They should perform their duties with wisdom and sound judgment, and they often possess substantial military aptitude, able to discern and learn more than others.

receive the password directly, it is relayed to him either orally or in writing. Young, intelligent, diligent, and brave men should be selected for the ranks of adjutant generals, wing adjutants, and regimental adjutants, as they are entrusted with the responsibility of announcing their superiors' orders precisely, overlooking nothing, as the entire army may, at times, depend on their clarity and timeliness. Adjutant generals arrange the password, once authorized by the superior general, and document its details in the war chancery. These adjutant generals also record the day, location, and recipients—such as the names of regiments and companies—of the password. During marches, they ride ahead of the senior commanding general and remain beside him at all times during battles or other engagements, ready to deliver their superiors' orders promptly and report back on all matters. No young man can gain better practical experience than in this rank, which is why many young men of noble birth are often hired in the service of the field marshal. The adjutant ranks are as follows: an adjutant general to the ruler holds the rank and pay of a colonel; for a field marshal, a lieutenant colonel; for a lieutenant field marshal, a junior lieutenant colonel. General-adjutants hold the rank of major; wing adjutants, the rank of captain; adjutants to a major general, that of standard bearer. Their numbers are determined as follows: the field marshal is assigned three adjutant generals and four wing adjutants; the lieutenant field marshal has two adjutant generals and three wing adjutants; each general has one general and two wing adjutants; each lieutenant general has one wing adjutant; each major general has one adjutant." See KWPI, p. 119; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 236–238. Provided with the appropriate instructions, tsarist adjutant generals accompanied the commanders of the respective corps, performing a sort of control function there; see И.И. Голиков, op. cit., т. 7, Дополнения, pp. 397–398.

Auditor general[111]

This rank is very common in all foreign armies. When a court martial is held,[112] he [auditor general] collects all the votes and draws up a report. Then, based on all the accusations brought in, he pronounces the verdict to and its justification to the guilty party, in accordance with the military articles or laws. He must be a man who is truthful and well-read in books, and

[111] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* details the responsibilities of the auditor general in the following provision: "Regarded within the army as the director of the military chancery (and the judge of all offenses, whatever they may be), the auditor general should be not only a learned man, well-versed in military and civil laws, but also cautious and conscientious, so as not to unduly burden an offender when drafting and issuing a verdict. First, he must carefully weigh all the circumstances of the offense and hear witness testimonies to render a fair judgment, ensuring his conscience remains unburdened by ignorance, inexperience, or malice. The final and ultimate conclusion depends on him; it is he who clarifies to the generals and other officers the provisions of both civil and military laws in all uncertain cases, and is impartial in his judgment regardless of the rank [of the accused], friendship, or gifts offered. He keeps all case records confidential, outlines them appropriately to the generals, and passes the final judgment. When an agreement on prisoner exchange is to be made between warring parties, he, together with the general, is sent to the designated place to conduct negotiations with the enemy and return with the signed agreement;" see KWPI, p. 118; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 235–236. The Code also outlined the duties of the lieutenant auditor general who assists the auditor general: "Since fulfilling the duties of the auditor general alone may be very difficult, especially if he falls ill and cannot perform his functions, it is necessary to appoint a lieutenant auditor general and several senior auditors, who are to heed their auditor general and perform the tasks assigned;" see KWPI, p. 119; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 236.

[112] The original text refers to the convening of a "military council" (Rus. *воинская дума*). Such a military council, also mentioned by Adam Weyde, first played a vital role in the years 1708–1709 during the Swedish offensive that culminated in the Battle of Poltava. At that time, a council composed of the army's highest commanders—rather than the tsar, who held supreme command over the military in an autocratic manner—made decisions on the strategic and tactical matters of ongoing military operations. See P. Krokosz, *Gdzie przyjąć wroga – w twierdzy czy w polu? Strategia i taktyka armii rosyjskiej w latach 1707–1709*, [in:] *Twierdze osiemnastowiecznej Europy. Studia z dziejów nowożytnej sztuki wojskowej*, ed. M. Trąbski, vol. III, Częstochowa 2020, pp. 49–85. No less important were the decisions of the war councils convened during the Russo-Turkish War of 1710-1713, when the tsarist army took the offensive toward the Danube and found itself in a catastrophic predicament, with the threat of total annihilation; see В.А. Артамонов, *Русско-турецкая война...*, passim.

knows military regulations by heart.[113] He has one judge and two regular scribes under him. And since there are always two courts or military councils in the army, acting as courts-martial of the higher and lower instance, therefore it is appropriate for the lower court scribe to exercise his function on a par with the auditor general and draft the verdicts in writing for him.

Engineer general[114]

He must carry out his duties with due deliberation, as great losses—or, conversely, immense advantages—may arise through his actions. For if a general engineer lays a siege ineptly and approaches a fortress very slowly, not only is the army forced to linger and waste time, but such

[113] The author refers to the compendium of military laws known as *Corpus Iuris Militaris*. The first work of this kind was *Holländisch Kriegs-Recht und Artickels-Brieff*, published in 1632 by Peter Pappus von Tratzberg; see K. Łopatecki, *Artykuły wojskowe autoramentu cudzoziemskiego Władysława IV – okoliczności powstania i ich charakterystyka*, "Zeszyty Prawnicze" 11 (2011), 2, pp. 247–248.

[114] The first general engineer in Peter I's army, with an annual salary of 400 rubles, was the experienced French engineer Joseph-Gaspard Lambert de Guerin, who entered Russian service in 1701. Almost immediately, he was sent to the front, participating in the Russian capture of the Swedish fortress Nöteburg in 1702. The following year, he directed the successful siege of Nienschantz and took part in the selection of the site for the Peter and Paul Fortress at the mouth of the Neva, in the future city of St. Petersburg, founded by Peter I. In 1706, he accompanied the tsar to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and was ordered to travel to Gdańsk, Berlin, and Copenhagen to recruit military engineers for Russian service. He failed to complete this mission and also refused to return to Russia, claiming that he encountered hostility from the local aristocracy. As a result, Peter I stripped him of the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, the highest Russian military honor. In 1711, he was arrested in Prussia by members of a Russian diplomatic mission on charges of deserting his post. Nevertheless, Joseph-Gaspard Lambert de Guerin soon managed to escape to Italy, from where he unsuccessfully petitioned Peter I over the next five years for permission to return to Russia. The subsequent fate of the first engineer general of the Russian army remains unknown; see ВЭ, т. 14, Петроградъ 1914, pp. 474–475; М.Ю. Данков, *Баловень фортуны. О загадочной судьбе Ламбера де Герэна*, [in:] ТГЭ *«Петровское время в лицах-2006." Материалы научной конференции, посвящённой 25-летию открытия экспозиции Эрмитажа «Дворец Меншикова. Культура России первой трети XVIII века,"* науч. ред. А.А. Трофимова, т. 32, Санкт-Петербург 2006, pp. 113–122; K. Łopatecki, *The role of Russian army cartographers during the Great Northern War – the example of the Campaign of Grodno of 1706*, "Klio. Czasopismo poświęcone dziejom Polski i powszechnym" 57 (2021), 1, pp. 60–66.

conduct may even provoke suspicions that he may benefit from the delay. On the other hand, a person who conducts siege operations efficiently, advancing upon the fortress swiftly, can reap many benefits, since he can execute the necessary actions, such as the construction of saps and breaches beneath the walls, more easily and in an orderly manner. Such a man must have a perfect knowledge of geometry and the art of fortification, not only to skillfully render these on paper with precise representation but also to be an experienced practitioner, one who has served extensively in the field and personally led earthworks.

All fortresses entrusted to him for construction should be built solidly and securely, taking into account proper forms and accurate dimensions for their bastions.[115] However, while exercising the utmost caution in these operations, he should not undertake any costly construction until the person entrusted with drafting the plan has submitted it and provided a sound and thorough judgment thereon. He reports directly only to the voivode, and all engineers must obey him. Every morning, the engineer general inspects the established entrenchments and saps, reviewing all work completed by the engineers. Where any errors are found, he corrects them and instructs the others on how the works should proceed.

[115] In the original text: flank (Rus. *фланк*), referring to the shorter side of a bastion; see А.М. Губайдуллин, op. cit., p. 87. The *Regulations* lack precise provisions regarding the individual components of a fortress, including bastions. Therefore, the authors of this study, in reference to the term *flank*, have chosen to apply it to all sides of the bastion.

[PART II]
ON REGULAR EXERCISES, WITH BRIEF COMMENTARIES AND REMARKS ON WHAT TO PAY HEED TO AND CONSIDER[116]

At the very beginning, before I delve into the actual instruction, I should mention the size of the individual units, specifically how many men make up a rota and a battalion. I can describe what I have observed in various countries, where they form some regiments in such a way that there are only four men in a row,[117] arguing that placing six

[116] In the original text: *osmotrieniye* (Rus. *осмотрение*), see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 13, Москва 1987, p. 118.

[117] At this point it is necessary to refer to the crucial terms used by the author of the Regulations with regard to the formation of formations by soldiers, i.e. "row" and "rank." In the Dictionary of the Polish Language, published by the Polish Scientific Publishers PWN (electronic version), the following definition of "row" can be found: "a certain number of persons or things standing or placed one behind another or one next to another;" see; *rząd*, https://sjp.pwn.pl/slowniki/rz%C4%85d.html (accessed April 16, 2021) the dictionary defines a "rank" as "a series of persons or things situated next to one another in a single, straight line;" see *szereg*, https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/szereg.html, (accessed April 16, 2021). Given that the term "rząd" (row) can be understood in two ways regarding the formation of ranks, we wish to note that, whenever Adam Weyde refers to "rows" of soldiers, he consistently adheres to the first part of the cited definition of "rząd" (row)—"a certain number of persons or things standing or placed one behind the other"—thus confirming the interpretation of "szereg" (rank) established in the definition. This is not a flawed concept, since similar solutions can

men there is not advisable, especially in confrontations with the enemy, as the confusion thus created outweighs the advantages. Whereas others say that although these rows arrayed in six men form a strong flank, such an arrangement produces a small and short front. In accordance with my opinion, to this I answer that in the first case it is much safer[118] to form rows of six men than four, because [as a commander] I can fire faster and with greater frequency,[119] and they [my soldiers] have no need to fear confusion, since the countermarch is hardly used these days, as shall be discussed in the appropriate passage. To the second question I answer that if rows of six men are formed, then not only the flank itself will be stronger, but also the front. So I wish to second the opinion that it is better, more beneficial, and safer to form rows of six soldiers. And whenever a regiment is learning the drills, no commander should disengage or move away completely without orders, but always lead every soldier holding a weapon to his rightful position. The colonel stands in front of the regiment and, without uttering a word yet, orders to sound the snare drum,[120] and at the same time the commanders, as they stand, do an about face and walk past the successive rows, lining up behind the regiment, and should then watch as the colonel conducts the drill.

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be found in the work of Johann Sebastian Gruber, *Die heutige Kriegs-Disciplin…*, which served as an inspiration for Adam Weyde during his work on his *Regulations*. When discussing the respective formations, the author clearly and distinctly defines in both written and graphic form what he understands by the terms "row" and "rank;" see J.S. Gruber, op. cit., Th. III, pp. 143–196. See E. Razin, op. cit., vol. 2: *Sztuka wojenna okresu feudalnego*, transl. I. Bukowski, Warszawa 1960, p. 528.

[118] The original states erroneously that such a way of forming ranks is not safe, which naturally contradicts the Weyde's subsequent statements in the *Regulations*.

[119] For more on the issue of rapid firing in the eighteenth century; see H. Delbrück, op. cit., pp. 219–222.

[120] In the original text: drumroll (Rus. *дробь*), referring to a signal sounded on a snare drum, not the musical instrument itself. The drumroll consisted of rapid, alternating blows produced with both sticks; see KWPI, p. 326; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 325.

If the colonel is not present, the above actions are to be performed by a lieutenant colonel, and if a major drills or readies the entire regiment, he should always be seated on horseback and hold his sword bare in his hand.

During drills, soldiers should willingly and courageously line up in formation, also without talking to one another, but instead paying close attention and performing the orders of their commanding officer with zeal.[121]

First, one must exercise weapon grips, and all this must be done in three tempos.[122] Secondly, one must learn how to load and fire, which cannot be done in three tempos; rather, one should perform these actions in accordance with the commands given.

Thirdly, one must learn how to fire in platoons, particularly by employing the so-called loading while kneeling,[123] so as to maintain con-

[121] Maintaining silence by soldiers participating in a drill was a fundamental one, in particular with regard to their participation in direct combat with the enemy. Silence ensured that commands issued by commanders were properly heard. In the European military regulations of the era, one of the commands in force was the command, "Keep quiet," "Remain quiet," or "Silence;" see [Anonymous], *The Exercise For Yong Artillery Men or the Militia of the Kingdom in its Posture of Warre...*, London 1642, p. 3 (command: "Silence"); S. Berndt, *Heutige Teutsche Krieges – Waffenhandlung zu Fuss...*, Halla 1665, p. 38 (command: "Remain quiet. Stand at the ready"). Also emphasizing the need to remain silent and listen carefully to the commands issued during the drill was Lieutenant Captain Johan Boxel; see J. Boxel, op. cit., Bd. 3, p. 6.

[122] The author distinguishes the three tempos using three letters: A, B, C.

[123] In the original text: "with the ranks dropping down" (Rus. *с падением шеренг*). This was one of the established methods of musket fire at the time, known in Russia as *niderfallen shooting* (Rus. *нидерфален*, Ger. *niederfallen*). According to this method, soldiers in the sixth — i.e., the last — rank would prepare to fire, while the ranks in front would kneel on one knee, creating clear space for the rear rank to fire unimpeded. After the sixth rank fired their volley and began reloading, the soldiers in the fifth rank would rise from their knees and fire. Once they had discharged their weapons, they would also begin reloading, while the fourth rank rose to fire. This sequence continued for the remaining ranks. Such a formation enabled continuous, uninterrupted musket fire. Naturally, before initiating this method, all six ranks had to ensure their weapons were loaded; see Л.Г. Бескровный, op. cit., p. 137. One should also note that such a method of firing entailed certain inconveniences, since the soldiers of the front ranks—once the first rank fired—were forced to load their weapons while kneeling (alternatively, the first three ranks, after firing, could leave sideways to the rear). In such an array, other ways of firing were also possible: four ranks would kneel, while

tinuous fire against the enemy, attacking and retreating as necessary. I shall briefly present all of this with clear explanations.

the fifth row would fire while leaning and the sixth row while standing; it was also possible to fire "at three planes," with the first row kneeling, the second leaning, and the third standing; see C. Jany, op.cit., pp. 185–186.

MUSKETEERS LISTEN AND REMEMBER

After these words, each soldier prepares to act according to the order and instructions of the commanding officer.

A. [Grasp the] musket with the right hand[124]

Figure A1

Upon this command, the soldier should turn his musket slightly towards himself with his left hand, while simultaneously grasping the musket below the pan with his right hand, ensuring the thumb is pointed along the musket's length. Both elbows should align in a straight line, and the musket should be lifted slightly upwards from below, as clearly shown in the figure.

[124] In the *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command is rendered with the words: "Place your hand on the musket;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

B. Muskets up[125]

Figure A2

Upon this command, the musketeer should push his musket forward with both hands, remove his left hand from the weapon, letting it hang alongside his torso, holding the musket with only his right hand so that the lock faces outward and the thumb is positioned inside. His legs should remain straight.

[125] The command remained unchanged and was rendered accordingly in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.



C. Present muskets[126]

Figure A3

Upon this command, the musketeer should lower his musket, holding it downward with his right hand while slightly stepping back with his right foot. He should then grasp the musket with his left hand, positioned at two hand-widths from the trigger guard, and then place the musket in the "present muskets" stance.

[126] In the 1716 military code, the command did not change: "Present muskets;" see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command is conveyed in slightly different words: "Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.



A. Muskets in front[127]

Figure A4

As the musketeer holds his musket in the "present muskets" stance,[128] he should push it forward with both hands, keeping his legs straight.

[127] The command remained unchanged in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.
[128] See Figure A3.

B. [Grasp] the barrel with the right hand[129]

Figure A5

Ater this command, the soldier should remove his right hand from the musket and grasp it by the top of the barrel.

[129] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command is shorter: "Grip the barrel;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

C. Order muskets[130]

Figure A6

Upon this command, the soldier should position the musket beside his right leg, grasping it from above by the barrel with his right hand, so that the hammer is in perpendicular position and facing backward. In this stance, he holds the musket by his side.

[130] The command remained unchanged in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

A. Right hand down[131]

Figure A7

Upon this command, the musketeer should lower his right hand and turn the musket away from himself so that the lock is positioned directly at the back. However, the illustration on this page contains an error, as the lock is depicted on the left side of the musket, making it visible from the front.[132]

[131] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command takes on a more specific form: "Right hand down the musket;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.
[132] According to the provision of the *Regulations*, as a rule, the lock in the illustrations is depicted on the right side of the musket. However, Figure A7 shows it in the opposite way.



B. Step forward with the right foot[133]

Figure A8

Then the soldier should step forward with his right foot without moving his left foot.

[133] A slightly abbreviated yet more precise form of this command can be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.



C. Ground muskets[134]

Figure A9

Upon this command, the musketeers must quickly lay down their muskets and immediately get up again.

[134] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command is given in the singular form; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

A. Step forward with the right foot[135]

Figure A10

Upon this command, the musketeers should step forward with their right foot, and keep their left foot motionless.

[135] A slightly altered and shortened form of this command, "Right foot forward," can be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

B. Take up muskets[136]

Figure A11

Upon this command, the musketeer should immediately step forward with his right foot and, extending his right hand, the rile a little further from its middle section

[136] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command is spelled in the singular form; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

C. Rise up[137]

Figure A12

Upon this command, the musketeers stand up quickly with their weapons and at the same time place them next to their right leg, in the same position as before.[138]

[137] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716,* this command is rendered as: "Rise up and order arms;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.
[138] See Figure A6.

A. Right hand down[139]

Figure A13[140]

Upon this command, the soldiers should slide their right hands down the musket.

[139] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command has a similar form: "Hand down the musket;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.
[140] Illustration identical to that in Figure A7.



B. Muskets in front[141]

Figure A14

Upon this command, the soldiers raise their muskets straight in front of them with their right hand, and grasp them from below with their left hand, holding the musket in front of them with their right hand.

[141] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command remains almost unchanged: "Grip the musket;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.



C. Present muskets[142]

Figure A15[143]

Then the soldiers lower their arms with their right hand and slightly pull their right leg back, letting the muskets drop down to the right side with their left hand. At the same time, they grasp the lock with their right hand, ensuring that the thumb rests on the hammer and the other fingers are on the trigger guard.

[142] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command appears in the singular: "Present the musket;" see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command is conveyed in slightly different words: "Present arms," see KWPI, p. 316.
[143] Illustration identical to that in Figure A3.



A. Muskets in front[144]

Figure A16

Upon this command, the soldiers should hold their weapons in the "present muskets" stance,[145] at the same time pushing it forward with both hands, while standing with their feet evenly balanced.

[144] The command remained unchanged in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.
[145] See Figure A15.

B. Reverse muskets[146]

Figure A17

Then the soldiers are to lower their muskets with their right hand and, with their left hand turned, grasp them and turn the barrel accordingly.

[146] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* uses the following wording "Weapons butt up;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.



C. Shoulder muskets[147]

Figure A18

Upon this command, the musketeers should lower their left hand and grasp the lower end of the barrel with it, thereby resting the musket on their shoulder, while lowering their right hand along their torso.

[147] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command appears in the singular: "Shoulder the musket;" see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. The Polish translation of the text, the command is conveyed as "Shoulder arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.



A. For the third time [grasp] the muskets with the right hand[148]

Figure A19

Just as the soldiers hold the muskets turned on their shoulders, they should quickly grasp them by the barrel with their right hand, and then move them away [from their bodies] with both hands.

[148] The third command related to weapon grips performed by soldiers. *In Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command carries the same message as the one in General Weyde's *Regulations*, yet reads, "Pull [arms] from the shoulder with the right hand;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

B. Reverse muskets[149]

Figure A20

Upon this command, the soldiers lower their muskets with their left hand and grasp them with their right, then turn their muskets back so that the barrels are facing upward again.

[149] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command remained almost unchanged: "Reverse the musket;" see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command was rendered with the words: "Turn the weapon with the butt up;" see KWPI, p. 316.



C. Present muskets[150]

Figure A21

Upon this command, they immediately lower their muskets with their right hand and step slightly back with their right foot. Next, they grasp their muskets with their right hand at the lock, placing their thumb on the hammer and their fingers on the trigger guard.

[150] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command did not change: "Present the musket;" see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command is conveyed in slightly different words: "Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.



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Described above are the manual grips to be performed by the soldier in three tempos, accompanied by brief explanations and illustrations. Just as previously, when all commands were exercised in three tempos, we now aim to combine these actions, requiring the soldiers to master these grips as detailed in the explanation. This will begin from the shoulder (i.e., from the command: "Shoulder arms"), as demonstrated by the examples in the illustrations.[151]

Shoulder muskets[152]

Figure A22

[151] The order of the commands below is different from those found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 412–413. The very command used here, "Shoulder Muskets," remained unchanged in the Petrine Code; see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. The Polish translation uses the expression: "Shoulder arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.

[152] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print.

Мушкетъ на плечо.

Present muskets[153]

Figure A23

[153] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, its phrasing remained unchanged; see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. The Polish translation of the code uses a slightly different phrasing: "Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.

мушкетъ напарядъ

Order muskets[154]

Figure A24

[154] The command remained unchanged in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print.

Ground muskets[155]

Figure A25

[155] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command is spelled in the singular; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print.

Положите мушкетъ наземь

Raise and order muskets[156]

Figure A26

[156] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, this command is rendered as: "Order arms;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

Подымите мушкеты и поставте
иногѣ .

Present muskets[157]

Figure A27

[157] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, it takes on the singular form; see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command is conveyed using slightly different wording: "Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.

Мушкетъı напарядъ .

Shoulder reversed muskets [158]

Figure A28

[158] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. It was not included in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*.

Предращенно полофите мѣшіеты наплеѣо

Present muskets[159]

Figure A29

[159] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, it takes on the singular form; see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command is conveyed using slightly different wording: "Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316

мушкетны напарядъ

Protect locks from the rain[160]

Figure A30

[160] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. It was not included in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*.

сохраните зємли ѻдождь .

Funeral position[161]

Figure A31

[161] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. It was not included in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*.

рѹжьѥ напоѕребенїѥ.

COMMANDS FOR LOADING ARMS ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER

Open pan[162]

Figure A32

[162] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print; it was reiterated without any changes in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

Бирокте Полк

Powder on the pan[163]

Figure A33

[163] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, it reads: "Powder the pan;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Порохъ наполнъ

Close the pans[164]

Figure A34

[164] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print; it was reiterated without any changes in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Запройте полки .

Reverse arms to load[165]

Figure A35

Upon this command, the soldiers should step forward with their right foot and reverse their muskets counter-clockwise, as accurately shown in the adjacent sketch.

[165] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, the command reads: "Muskets to load;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412.

Cartridge out of the ammunition bag[166]

Figure A36

[166] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* uses an abbreviated version: "Cartridge out;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Зарядъ изладънии .

Cartridge in the barrel[167]

Figure A37

[167] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, it takes on a slightly different wording: "In the barrel;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Зарядъ вступовъ .

[Ramrods out][168]

Figure A38

[168] This figure was originally without a caption; however, the action performed by the soldier corresponds to one of the commands involving the ramrod, performed in three tempos, accurately described in Peter *I's Military Code of 1716*: "1. Ramrod out, one! 2. Two! 3. Three, hold it against your chest;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.



Ramrods in the barrel[169]

Figure A39

Immediately upon this command, the musketeers should press the ramrod into the barrel and ram the charge three times.

[169] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, this maneuver was performed in three tempos: "1. In the barrel, one! 2. Two! 3. Ram the charge, three!," see KWPI, p. 316.

Ramrods out of the barrel[170]

Figure A40

Upon this command, the soldiers should pull the ramrods out of the barrels, in two motions, and extend them forward with the third, so that one end of the ramrod points downwards, and the other, thicker one, upwards.

[170] Peter I's Military Code of 1716 describes this maneuver in the following words: "1. Ramrods out, one! 2. Two! 3. Three, present ramrod and press it against the chest;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.



Ramrods back in place [171]

Figure A41

Upon this command, the soldiers put the ramrods back in their rightful place and press them twice.

[171] This maneuver was described in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* in the following manner: "1. Put the ramrod back in place, one! 2. Two! 3. Back in place, three!" See KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Muskets up[172]

Figure A42

Upon this command, the soldiers raise their muskets upward with the left hand, extending them forward. Next, they grasp the musket below with the right hand, below the left, positioning it so that the barrel faces inward, and the stock is outward.

[172] The command remained unchanged *in Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Grasp [the musket] with the left hand below the right[173]

Figure A43

[173] The command placed beneath the print is directly related to the preceding instruction (see Figure A42), as is clear from the accompanying images. As before, the soldier holds the musket raised, but adjusts his grip. He places his left hand just above the lock, thereby changing its position relative to the right hand. According to General Weyde's description, the weapon shifts position slightly as this maneuver is performed. This maneuver is also captured in the concise, three-step commands included in Peter I's Military Code of 1716: "1.Raise muskets, 2. Muskets up, 3. Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Хватите левой рукой пороу поправо.

Present muskets[174]

Figure A44

[174] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print; it remained unchanged in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 412. In the Polish translation of the code, the command takes on a slightly different wording: "Present arms;" see KWPI, p. 316.

Мушкетъ напарадѣ.

Aim

Figure A45

Upon this command, the soldiers should cock the hammers and immediately take aim.



Fire[175]

Figure A46

the soldiers must remain vigilant to ensure they all fire simultaneously.[176]

[175] The command placed under the print in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* uses the term "Fire." According to the provisions of this code, the commands "Aim" and "Fire" were executed in three steps, along with the preceding command "Cock the hammer;" see KWPI, p. 316; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

[176] Command and commentary originally inserted underneath the print.

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Someone might say that using so many unnecessary words for loading a weapon is not beneficial. I beg to argue to the contrary. It is not enough to simply say, "load your muskets and get ready" in one word;[177] rather, soldiers must first be trained to proceed uniformly according to a single standard. I would further add that if a regiment, untaught in the fundamentals of loading, receives the command "load your weapons and get ready," one will find that some soldiers perform better, others worse, with each acting according to their own method. This would cause such disorder that anyone could readily imagine it, with one turning right, another left, a third across, resulting only in confusion. However, once soldiers have thoroughly learned the loading grips according to a standard pattern, there will be no need for extra space or unnecessary words, but rather one will simply say to them:

1. Load your weapons and get ready
2. Aim
3.1Fire

However, it is essential that the grips are always performed according to the single standard shown to them, so that they carry the actions not only correctly but also with perfection.

[177] One should refer the command "Load muskets and get ready" to the commands and actions carried out by the soldiers, shown in Figures A32–A44.

On grenadier grips[178]

The commander gives the following command: grenades out of the pouch.

[178] Commands related to actions performed by grenadiers found their due place in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*. Unlike the entries compiled by General Weyde, Peter's regulations expanded and systematized the grenadier commands: "Grenadiers handle their weapons in the same manner as musketeers, except that when throwing grenades, they should proceed as follows: 1. Musket forward 2. Loosen belt 3. Musket on back. 1. Open pouch 2. Grenades out 3. Bite down and cover the fuse with the finger. 1. Blow to prepare the fuse 2. Step back with the right foot 3. Light and throw. Once the actions described above become well known, shorter commands may be issued: 1. Musket on back 2. Granade out, bite down 3. Light and throw. Grenadiers use their muskets and bayonets in the same manner as all other soldiers, except that when marching in parade formation, they carry their muskets on their left arm;" see KWPI, p. 319; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 417.

Open and get ready

Upon this command, the grenadiers reach into their pouches with their right hand to grab a grenade, then bite off the fuses with their teeth. They step back with their right foot and hold the grenades in front of them, with their thumb on the primer, while holding the fuse in their left hand.

Figure A47

Light up and throw your grenades

Upon this command, the grenadiers immediately blow their fuses and, having ignited them, throw grenades forward with all their might.

Figure A48

Take the muskets off the shoulders, place them in front and reach for bayonets[179]

[179] *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* greatly expanded the grips associated with arms and bayonets when compared with General Weyde's proposals, as they no longer corresponded with the commands included in the Regulations that he drew up; see KWPI, pp. 316–317; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 413–414.

[Reach for bayonets][180]

Figure A49

[180] Figure devoid of caption and description. The command was added by the authors of this study. It is noteworthy that the soldiers in Figures 49–54 and 56 are depicted wearing the same uniforms, primarily with the same headgear, as the grenadiers in Figures 47–48. Such a depiction may indicate that the commands attributed to Figures A49–A54 and A56 refer specifically to grenadiers. This is confirmed by the prints of the grips performed by grenadiers included in Pierre Giffart's regulations, one of which depicts a soldier ready to throw a lit grenade (fig. XVII), while the others show a soldier performing grips with a rifle (fig. XIV–XV) and a sword (fig. XVI). What attests to the hypothesis that all the prints featured grenadiers (all wearing uniforms of the same cut) are the captions underneath them in French and German; see P. Giffart, op. cit., (1697), p. 14–17, fig. XIV–XVII.



Bayonets up[181]

Figure A50

[181] The command inserted underneath the print was not included in Peter I's *Military Code of 1716*.

Багинеты держа

Apply bayonets to the musket and fix them[182]

Figure A51

[182] The command was originally inserted as a caption to the print. *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* divided this command into two actions: applying the bayonet to the barrel of the weapon and fixing the bayonet; see KWPI, p. 317; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 413.

Принесите бајинетьі нлъшіетъ
и принаправландните .

Fix bayonets[183]

Figure A52

[183] The command was originally inserted as a caption to the print. It is referenced in the preceding footnote.

Примыкате Багнѣты!

Grasp the muskets at mid-length with your right hand[184]

Figure A53

[184] The command was originally inserted underneath the print.

ухватите мушкѣтъ правою рукою По
средине

Grasp [the musket] with your left hand below the right[185]

Figure A54

[185] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print. It was excluded from *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*.

Держати лѣвою рукою Пороховъ

Present musket with bayonet [186]

Figure A55

[186] This command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print; it is absent from *Peter I's Military Code of 1716.*

мѣшіетъ збагинетомъ напарат,

Point bayonet [with musket] at man's chest [187]

Figure A56

To anyone who should inquire whether the grenadiers perhaps know additional maneuvers beyond those previously mentioned, I reply that they do not require any further knowledge in the exercises with the grenade, musket, or bayonet beyond what they have seen already.[188] At the same time, they may be employed in a variety of situations, such as during assaults, battles, when setting off mines, or to hold firm to their stations and withstand the enemy's advance.[189] All these duties are to be undertaken and accomplished according to the wise instructions of the colonels. In the Saxon forces, when they expect a formidable foe, grenadiers bear forth chevaux-de-frise.[190]

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[187] The command was originally inserted as a caption underneath the print; it is absent from *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*. The provision therein stipulates that soldiers should "learn to thrust with a lunge;" see KWPI, p. 317; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, p. 414.

[188] See commands accompanying Figures A47–A56.

[189] In his treatise dedicated to the French infantry, Pierre Giffart provides basic information concerning grenadiers, noting that they are soldiers removed from the main company structure and attached to the battalion. He further emphasizes that they must keep their muskets in impeccable condition and ready for action. Naturally, they fight with grenades, which they light and throw as the situation requires; see P. Giffart, op. cit., (1697), pp. 14–17, fig. XIV–XVII.

[190] *Chevaux-de-frise* were field fortification elements primarily employed against cavalry. Constructed from wood, a thick beam or plank was drilled with holes, through which sharpened stakes were then inserted. An illustrative example of *chevaux-de-frise* appears in the manual of Captain Hans Conrad Lavater and, subsequently, in the work of Lieutenant Captain Johan Boxel; see H.C. Lavater, op. cit., unpag. [Bl. II]; J. Boxel, op. cit., [Bd. 1–2], unpag.

Simon Stinet's armour

[PART III] ON TURNS[191]

Right-face
Left as before
Left-face
Right as before
Right about-face
Left as before
Left about-face
Right as before

Right-face and left-face with muskets held in "present muskets" stance

First, the musketeer must know how to turn rightward and leftward while holding the musket in the present muskets position,[192] before he returns to his previous stance. Therefore, I shall explain briefly when to address this matter with the soldiers.

[191] Descriptions of turns performed by soldiers with fixed bayonets can also be found in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, p. 317; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 413–414.
[192] See Figures A3 and A15.

RIGHT-FACE

Upon this command, the musketeers must together raise their muskets aloft, holding them with both hands not too far apart, and pivot their left foot rightward; thus, they shall again position their muskets in the "present muskets" stance.

LEFT-FACE AS BEFORE

As the soldiers turn rightward, they are to position themselves exactly as they stood before.

This can be performed thus: an about-face rightward and leftward; then, about-face leftward and rightward, so as to return to their previous position.

And as one does with a musket, one should do accordingly with a fixed bayonet.

ON THE NEED TO DOUBLE ROWS AND RANKS[193]

Yet this command is not described in full, as it is employed more for the sake of form rather than for any practical utility.[194]

DOUBLE ROWS RIGHTWARD

In executing this order, the soldiers must understand which ranks are to remain in place and which are to insert into others. They may first

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[193] Rows denote the depth of the formed troop, while ranks refer to the width of the front. *Peter I's Military Code of 1716* also stipulates how to double rows and ranks, albeit in a much less elaborate manner; see KWPI, pp. 317–318; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 414–115.

[194] Another author to include complicated, multifaceted diagrams involving the doubling, and even tripling, of rows and ranks was Carlo Giovine (Giouine); see C. Giovine, *Ars Militiae Pedestris oder Kriegskunst zu Fuss*, Zelle 1683, pp. 39–84. Notably, Adam Weyde explained the complicated aspects of doubling rows and ranks in a concise yet precise manner. An equally simple account of these actions can be found in the work of Captain Hans Conrad Lavater; see. H.C. Lavater, op. cit., pp. 86–92.

consider how many ranks there are within the squad—generally four, which will make it easier to grasp the command: double your ranks rightward. Here, in each squad, the second and fourth ranks are to turn right, while the first and third ranks must double, forming rows of twelve men each, as depicted in the figure below.[195]



Illustration 1. Double rows rightward. Editors' sketch.

Thus, one can double rows instantly in a rota, battalion, or regiment.

[195] In this instance, General Weyde refers to a sketch accompanying the *Regulations* that illustrates the doubling of rows. However, the sole manuscript copy of the original work, preserved in the manuscript collection of the BAN, lacks this and other sketches depicting the respective drill maneuvers. Military historians specializing in the Russian military have not addressed the absence of these sketches in Adam Weyde's work. In light of this, and based on the author's descriptions in the *Regulations*, we have recreated all missing sketches and included them with appropriate commentary in the relevant passages of the text.

Left-face as before

Those who stepped forward and doubled [the rows] turn leftward and stand yet again as they stood previously, as shown below.[196] In the same manner, they also double leftward.



Illustration 2. Left-face as before. Editors' sketch.

[196] No relevant sketch in the *Regulations*.

Double rows rightward with half the ranks

They then order half the soldiers in each rank to turn rightward and to proceed from the center of each ranks toward its other half, thus doubling it.



Illustration 3. Double rows rightward with half the ranks. Editors' sketch.

Left-face as before

As per this order, the soldiers pivot their left foot leftward and step out, returning to the previous formation, as shown below.[197]



Illustration 4. Left-face as before. Editors' sketch.

[197] No relevant sketch in the *Regulations*.

Double rows leftward with half the ranks

Upon this command, half the soldiers in each rank turn leftward and proceed from the center of each ranks toward its other half, thus doubling it, so as to form rows of twelve men, as shown in the figure below.[198]



Illustration 5. Double rows leftward with half the ranks. Editors' sketch.

[198] No relevant sketch in the *Regulations*. Notably, the command and description are based on the traditional division of the regiment into six rows, resulting in the formation of twelve rows after the doubling maneuver.

Then those soldiers who inserted turn rightward, and so they step back out, and stand once more as they stood before.

To any who would inquire into the benefit or purpose of this doubling of ranks, as aforementioned, I first declare that it serves well in exercises aimed at forming fronts or ranks that are, in effect, half the actual size. This proves especially advantageous should you seek to deceive the enemy, when the number of men in your line is not as numerous as it might appear. Secondly, in anticipation of a strong attack upon the flanks, one may double the ranks in advance, thereby allowing a swift and potent volley of fire, such that the enemy is likely compelled to abandon their assault. Thirdly, this doubling is most useful when navigating narrow passages, enabling one to pass others encountered upon the road abreast.

Though there are numerous other methods of rank doubling, I shall not dwell upon them, as I have not discerned their utility; yet I am most willing to be instructed by those well-practiced in such maneuvers. In the meantime, I shall set forth the manner by which the doubling of ranks is to be carried out.



Illustration 6. On doubling ranks. Editors' sketch.

On doubling ranks

Have half the rows double their ranks rightward. Upon this command, the three ranks in the rear shall move rightward to align with the foremost three, thereby forming three ranks from the original six, as shown in the figure below.[199]



Illustration 7. On doubling ranks (reconstructed by editors). Editors' sketch.

[199] No relevant sketch in the *Regulations*.

Left-face

Proceed and take your previous positions

Then it is necessary for the soldiers who have ascended to turn to the left and return to the rear, to their previous positions, so that they form six ranks again instead of three.

Double ranks leftward with half the ranks

Then the three ranks in the rear insert leftward to the left, into the three front ranks, as shown below.[200]

Right-face as before

Then the soldiers who stepped into the first three ranks turn to the right and return to their original positions.

Such a doubling of ranks is necessary when firing at the enemy by platoons while standing [in the field],[201] during an assault, or in retreat. This practice is also useful when desiring to discharge volleys with an entire regiment or brigade at once.[202]

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[200] No relevant sketch in the *Regulations*.

[201] This provision could also apply to army encampments and sieges.

[202] Such concentrated fire from handheld firearms by entire units was a common practice in European armies. In his treatise, Captain Hans Conrad Lavarten presents two such methods—by "squadrons" (with eight commands) and by "volleys" (with nine commands), with three firing variations: on both sides, or solely on one, either left or right, depending on the formation's arrangement; see H.C. Lavarten, op. cit., p. 83. A similar method of directing fire by musketeers on both sides was also included by Lieutenant Captain Wendelin Backhausen and Carlo Giovine; see W. Backhausen, *Nützliche gründliche und lustige Beschreibung deren bey der...*, Marburg 1664, p. 21; C. Giovine, op. cit., p. 101.

The doubling of ranks and files, as we have seen, needs no further description. We shall limit ourselves, then, to explaining where we shall observe the Battaillon de Quarre,[203] and how such [a formation] may be used to advantage, which we shall address and elucidate in two manners.[204]

For instance, when a lieutenant colonel is dispatched with half the regiment to such a post, where during the march he may fear an attack from enemy cavalry, especially when he sees them charging towards him, he must be able to immediately prepare a Battaillon de Quarre. This formation enables defense on all four sides in the best possible manner. However, before this can be accomplished, he must first ascertain how many rotas the lieutenant colonel has in half of the regiment, their numbers, and the total count of soldiers.

Let us take an example: if he has a battalion of six rotas, each consisting of three sections with twelve rows each, then by multiplying, I shall determine that six rotas would give a total of seventy two rows. Next, I must arrange the Battaillon de Quarre so that an equal number of ranks may be allocated to all four fronts. To begin, I shall mentally subtract twenty-four ranks from the seventy-two, leaving forty-eight. I shall divide these forty eight ranks by four, thus positioning the Battaillon de

[203] This was a formation used in combat, arranging soldiers in a square, thereby enabling the entire unit to defend itself against enemy attacks from any side. The application of the *Battaillon de Quarre* is also noted, albeit not as extensively as in Weyde's *Regulations*, in *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, which details the use of grenadiers and artillery in establishing this formation; see KWPI, pp. 320–321; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 418–419.

[204] Importantly, in this regard General Weyde draws upon the formations widely used in Europe at that time, whose soldiers were arranged in squares capable of firing in all directions. An illustration of the square formation, comprising twelve rotas—three on each side—can be found in the work of Lieutenant Captain Wendelin Backhausen; see W. Backhausen, op. cit., pp. 60–61, fig. B, fig. 1. In this same figure, other square formations and the so-called "ravelin" are also shown, though only fig. 1 features a description of a musketeer formation, while fig. 2–9 present a mixed formation of musketeers and pikemen. Various square formation diagrams can also be found in Carlo Giovine's treatise; see C. Giovine, op. cit., p. 107–111.

Quarre evenly on all sides. The twenty four ranks that I subtracted in my mind shall also be divided into four parts, and I shall assign each part, consisting of six ranks, to each of the four corners. In this manner, the Battaillon de Quarre will be ready, providing me with an equal front of twenty-four ranks on all four sides, as shown below.[205]

Battaillon de Quarre



Illustration 8. Bataillon de Quarre. Editors' sketch.

[205] No relevant sketch in the *Regulations*.

[PART IV. ON FIRING CONTINUOUSLY]

Once the Battaillon de Quarre has been thus arrayed, it may fire towards the enemy from all four sides. In such cases, it is most fitting to fire and reload while kneeling, whereby the commanding officer orders as follows:

Present muskets

Upon this command, the soldiers are to lower their muskets from their shoulders in three tempos until standing in the "present muskets" stance.[206]

Front five ranks kneel

Upon this command, the first five ranks on all four sides are to kneel, lean forward, and place their muskets at their right sides, holding them at the ready, close to the ground. The sixth and last rank remains standing, their muskets in the "present muskets" stance[207] until the commanding officer gives the next command:

[206] See commands in Figures A3 and A15.
[207] See Figures A3 and A15.

Aim

At that point, the soldiers are to cock their muskets and immediately take aim.[208]

Fire

Upon this command, all soldiers should fire simultaneously,[209] and immediately kneel and proceed to reload their weapons. At the same time, the next rank rises and positions themselves, holding their muskets in the "present muskets" stance. The commanding officer then repeats the same command. Once the sequence reaches the first rank and they, too, have fired, it begins anew, starting with the last rank, as previously described. When the soldiers master this drill, it shall enable them to fire in rapid succession, simultaneously, in good order and without interruption, and with the following commands issued:

First five ranks, kneel and be ready with your muskets. At this signal, the first five ranks are to kneel. However, the rear rank must remain standing at the ready, aiming their muskets, as the commanding officer orders them to:

Fire

As soon as they fire, they, too, are to take a knee and load their muskets promptly, while the fourth rank should stand with their weapons ready, until the commanding officer orders them to:

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[208] See command in Figure A45.
[209] See command in Figure A46.

Fire

And thus, it is always the first [rank] that finishes and the last one that begins. This model of continuous firing used in the Battalion de Quarré formation can also be applied by a brigade or even an entire army. Should you expect, by any means, that the enemy will attempt with great force to break through [into the aligned ranks], at which time the first rank is unable to fire, then the soldiers in the first rank should fix bayonets to their muskets and lay down on the ground. The remaining ranks are to continue firing at the enemy without pause, but as the enemy draws near and attempts to break through the lines, the entire first rank must fire a volley and then repel them with bayonets. If you wish to fire at the enemy with your platoons arrayed in a Battalion de Quarré, proceed as follows.

At first, the front ranks should double, forming three ranks are out of [the initial] six.

Next, array [the soldiers] into a Battalion de Quarré, so that they form an even front on all four sides, as previously mentioned.

Thus, should the Battalion de Quarré have to fire continuously, it is essential to deploy the platoons on all four sides and divide them into sufficient sections, ensuring that as one set of guns is fired, others stand ready. A platoon consists of a portion of soldiers across several rows.

When the musketeers take aim, the first rank should kneel on the right knee, and the next two ranks follow suit. At this moment, the commander issues the command:

First platoons

Aim
Fire

Second platoons

Aim
Fire

Third platoons

Aim
Fire

Fourth platoons

Aim
Fire

And so, they fire one after another without interruption until reaching the first [rank], thus one platoon fires after another, each reloading in turn.

Such a method—firing by platoons—is greatly effective in battle and is now employed by nearly all sovereigns, especially by the French, from whom it originated. However, I consider reloading while kneeling to be an even better method of fighting, which has yet to be used in any other country except by the Saxons, who have adopted it, and it has also been widely applied by the Imperial army. The advantage of this is considerable. Just last year, in 1697, in the land of Hungary, one could still witness the use of the countermarch in battle, which remains in effect there, though it has fallen out of practice elsewhere for over a decade. Both the

Imperial and Saxon forces marvel that such an inexplicit method[210] was long held in high regard, both among them and in many other nations. Yet, upon deeper reflection, one can see the great effort required to practice the countermarch, especially in training this type of firing while still maintaining the ranks and files in order, so that they might proceed in proper formation.[211] Should it happen that, in the meantime, as regiments drill and one crosses the path of another, I hold that no worse example could be cited than this. Others may argue that, by employing this method of combat in various lands, many victories were won in the old days, which is indeed true. To this, I answer immediately that those who lost the battle also used countermarch. Otherwise, I would also like to witness the best armies in the world, ones that can field as many as 30,000 soldiers, apply countermarch against the enemy in battle, and if the enemy were equally strong and applied platoon firing or, in particular, firing with reloading while kneeling, it is all but certain that the latter shall always defeat the former and prevail.

Since he who elects to reload while kneeling in battle, not only gains the advantage of delivering fire more frequently and rapidly, but also needs not to fear that his men will easily be thrown into disarray, thereby sparing them from heavy losses. Since always but a sixth of the ranks stands apart from those required to fire, while the others, having discharged, kneel and reload their weapons, it follows that in any regiment advancing to attack, it is only this sixth of the ranks that can be harmed. In contrast, he who would fight by countermarch must from the outset fear great confusion and disorder, which might undo them all.

[210] In the original text: *smiatnoy* (Rus. *смятной*) – characterized by confusion; see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 25, p. 240. In view of the above, the authors of the study chose to use the word "inexplicit."
[211] The diagrams related to the various uses of countermarching by ranks, half-ranks, rows, half-rows, rows, with half rows, can be found in the work of Carlo Giovine; see C. Giovine, op. cit. pp. 102–103; see E. Razin, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 527–528.

Secondly, they will inevitably fire slowly and without due order. Thirdly, it stands to reason they will suffer greater losses, for all of them are compelled to remain upright [i.e., some will not kneel]. Among the Imperial forces, they are much astonished at how often they had, in former times, been bested by the Turks, such that before this war,[212] they held a great fear of them; indeed, whenever that nation was merely mentioned, a pall of dread fell upon them. Yet, as they have now claimed victory repeatedly and captured many strongholds from the Turks, they hold them in little regard, declaring that if they had known this dog as they have come to know him during this war, the Emperor would long since have reached the gates of Constantinople.

And I too have heard it said by various learned officers of the Imperial forces that they could not bring the same harm upon the Turks in years past as they can now, owing to the fact that they had no knowledge of such refined drilling—whether by platoons or by falling ranks—as is now practiced; and who would deny that this alone was the cause of their defeats?

[212] Adam Weyde refers to the 1683–1699 war fought between the Holy League alliance (the Holy Roman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Republic of Venice, the Papal States and, from 1686, Russia) and Turkey.

[PART V]
ON GUARD DUTY, AND HOW TO POST AND CHANGE GUARDS[213]

When the commander[214] is present with the army, it is generally customary for a captain and his rota to stand guard each day, and this must always start with the first regiment. From this rota, two or three men, or as many as needed, are to be posted around various tents and wagons of the voivode [commander]. These sentries are arranged so that the sergeants of this rota can supervise them and change guard every three hours. Gefreiters are to closely observe these orderly rotations, and thus, in many armies, it is common for six to eight men per rota not to participate in guard duty. When one rota is to relieve another, it approaches with drum beats, and as soon as the captain on duty hears them coming, he orders his soldiers to stand ready under arms. And he stands before them, as does the one who approaches to relieve him. He then orders his standard and arms to be held in the *present muskets* position. The newly arrived captain and his company also stand facing him

[213] A detailed description and regulations concerning all matters pertaining to guard duty in Peter I's army can be found in individual chapters (LIX, LXI-LXIII, LXV) of Book One of *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, pp. 153-170; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 287–312.

[214] Rus. *полководец*. During the reign of Peter I, the term "commander" became equivalent to the rank of field marshal general (Rus. *генералъ-фельдмаршалкъ или проководецъ*); see СРЯ XI–XVII, вып. 16, Москва 1990, p. 222.

and likewise instruct their soldiers to hold their standard and arms in the *present muskets* position. Then he greets him and asks his comrade if there are any orders to pass on regarding the guard duty. The other captain must efficiently and thoroughly relay all pertinent instructions concerning his watch and any other orders.

Once the captain on duty has reported everything properly and gathered his soldiers, he commands them to fix bayonets, sling their muskets over their shoulders, and hold their standard unfurled before them, marching off from the guard post to the beat of the drums.

An infantry general may also post a captain and his rota on guard duty, though this is rare; more commonly, a lieutenant with half a rota is assigned. Those serving in the cavalry do not receive guards from infantry troops but rather from their own troopers or cavalry.[215]

With an infantry major general, guard duty is assigned to a sergeant with sixteen soldiers.

With a brigadier general, a sergeant with fourteen men.

With a colonel, eight men with a corporal.

With a lieutenant colonel, six men with a gefreiter.[216]

With a major, four men.

With a captain, two man.

With a lieutenant, one man, if the colonel so decides.[217]

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[215] For a detailed discussion on posting guards in cavalry units—addressed perfunctorily in Weyde's Regulations—see Chapter LXIII of Book One of *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; KWPI, pp. 164–166; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 303–306.

[216] According to the provisions of the *Regulations*, the *gefreiter* oversaw the soldiers standing guard.

[217] With the modernization of the army undertaken by Peter I, the number of soldiers standing guard with individual commanders changed entirely, as specified in the provisions of Chapter LXI of Book One of *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; see KWPI, pp. 159-160; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 295–297.

On guards altogether

All guards, wherever they may be stationed—whether during a siege or in an encampment—must remain vigilant, keep their weapons in hand at all times, and, under penalty of death, not abandon their post until relieved. When the commanding officer passes by the guard, the sentries must set their muskets to the "present muskets" stance.[218]

When the patrol or any other person passes nearby, the guard should always call out, "Who goes there? Who goes there?"[219] If no answer is given, he is to repeat the call a third time; and if there is still no response, the guard should fire, whether it be friend or foe, for no one is permitted to deceive or provoke the guard.

On the password[220]

The password is an essential element, highly necessary for greater security both within the army and in border towns. In the Imperial forces, each evening major generals ride to the commander-in-chief with their subordinate majors to receive the password along with other orders. The majors then proceed to their regiments, where they relay the password to their regimental adjutants. Each adjutant takes it to their colonel and presents any additional instructions issued. They also report to the lieutenant colonel and the major, who listens to ensure everything was done properly. Furthermore, sergeants must stand assembled in front of the major's tent.

[218] See Figures A3, A15, A21, A23.
[219] In the original text, the phrase "Who goes there?" is reiterated once more.
[220] In *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*, matters related to the password did not merit a separate chapter, as was the case in General Weyde's *Regulations*; instead, they were covered in the respective chapters devoted to guard duty.

Once the adjutant has completed these duties, he goes to the sergeants, who then form a circle, holding their partisans in their left hands, and standing with uncovered heads, they receive the password from both the right and left. The adjutant then asks again, to the right and left, to ensure that they understood it correctly. The sergeants then proceed with the password and additional orders to their officers, delivering the commands as issued. The officers then instruct the sergeants on any further actions required for the rota, which the sergeants, in turn, relay to the corporals, who must execute them as thoroughly as possible. Thus, everyone is to perform their duties as ordered.

In order for the entire army to know that the password has been issued, a cannon shot is fired immediately afterward. At that signal, everyone who has gone out foraging and anyone who remains outside the camp must return. This also marks the beginning of preparations in all regiments to take up guard duty.

On curfew or wake-up calls[221]

When all the guards in the army have been posted and inspected, and evening falls, the tattoo—or sometimes the reveille—is sounded at the main guard station near the voivode's [commander-in-chief's] and infantry general's positions. At this time, drummers in all regiments must stand ready, and as soon as the main guard stop beating their drums, they begin to beat theirs throughout all the regiments. All drummers must form two ranks and march back and forth in this manner. The chief drummer leads at the front, and the two ranks follow him in this order until they return to their original position, where they then put down

[221] For a detailed and precise discussion of this topic, see Chapter LX of Book One of *Peter I's Military Code of 1716*; KWPI, pp. 157-159; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 292–295.

their drums. In the Imperial forces, it is customary to sound the *Schaarwacht* (midnight guard call) at midnight as well, to keep the troops alert. This practice originated from the times past when the enemy attacked the Imperial forces at midnight and defeated them.[222]

In the morning, at daybreak, it is customary to sound the wake-up call, but no one dares to signal it before the main guard has done so.

On making rounds[223] or policing[224]

It is a matter of great necessity, both in the army and in border towns, as it enables all guard duties to be performed vigilantly and cautiously; it consists of three elements in particular:

Main round
Middle round
Morning round

The main round is the most important of all guard duties. When the round approaches, all soldiers must immediately step forward with their weapons, but when he requests the password, everyone must dismount from his horse, even the highest-ranking general, since such

[222] The *Schaarwacht* or *Schaar-Wacht* (in German) was a drumbeat signal. The term also refers to nocturnal patrols (rounds); see J.R. Fäsch, *Kriegs-, Ingenieur- und Artillerie-Lexikon: Worinnen Die einem Ingenieur. Officier und Artilleristen, bey eines jedweden Profeßion vorkommende Wörter, ihrem eigentlichen Verstande nach, In Alphabetischer Ordnung, deutlich und mit hierzu nöthigen Kupfern, erkläret werden...*, Nürnberg 1726, pp. 172, 214; *Bequemes Correspondenz- und Conversations-Lexikon, Worinnen Die meisten fremden Wörter, und Redens-Arten, welche bey der Handlung, in Zeitungen und gemeinen Umgang täglich vorkommen und führet sind...*, Nürnberg 1727, p. 346. For more on the subject; see S. Brodowski, *Corpus Juris Militaris Polonicum*, Elbląg 1753, p. 376.
[223] In the original text: *руне*.
[224] Making rounds is provisioned in detail in Chapters LXV-LVI of Book One of the Petrine code; see KWPI, pp. 167-171; ПСЗРИ, т. 5, № 3006, pp. 307–313.

is the military custom, because the password must be respected. The main round always accepts the password from the commanding officer who stands guard. The one requested to utter the password must point his weapon—held in his right and left hand—toward the guards making rounds, and so he utters the password. And should the password be incorrect, the round orders such a man to be taken under guard.

The middle round is usually made at midnight. All guards asked to provide the password must utter it accordingly.

The morning round is similar to the main round, and should be performed when the day and night part ways. He accepts the password from all the guards, evaluates whether it is true and whether nothing new happened during the night, and then announces everything to the voivode [commander-in-chief]. When expecting the enemy, the guards are particularly vulnerable, and in such cases all regiments are ordered to make rounds every hour. This is carried out by the lower officers; however, the higher-ranking officers themselves sometimes attend to see if all the guards are posted correctly and safely; after the wake-up call has been sounded, the rounds should cease.

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[225] In the original text: *soldatskoi* (Rus. *солдатской*). With reference to the rota, the authors of this study have adopted the possessive noun "soldiers' rota."

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[226] Om the original text: *soldatskoie.*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFSt –Archive of the Francke Foundations
AGAD – Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie [The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw]
BAN – Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg
Bd. – Band, Bind, band [volume]
bearb. Bearbeitete, bearbeitet – edited by
call no. – call number
col. – column
Cf. – confer [compare]
comp. – compiled by
d. – deceased
DBL – *Dansk Biografisk Lexikon* [Danish Biographical Dictionary]
Dut. – Dutch
e.g. – exempli gratia, for example
ed. – edited, edition, editor
ed./eds. – edited by
et al. – et alii
ff – and the following pages
fig. – figure, figures
Fr. – French
Ger. – German
h. – heft [no.]
hg. – herausgegeber [publisher]
Hrgst. – Hergestellt
Hrsg. – Herausgegeber [publisher]

HT – "Historisk tidskrift"
KA – KA [Military Archives of Sweden]
KB – Kungliga Biblioteket [National Library of Sweden]
KFÅ – "Karolinska förbundets årsbok" [Yearbook of the Swedish Caroline Society]
km – kilometre, kilometres
KWPI – *Kodeks wojskowy Piotra I z 1716 roku* [*Peter I's Military Code of 1716*], compiled, translated and edited for print by Paweł Krokosz and Karol Łopatecki, Kraków–Oświęcim 2016
MK – Metryka Koronna [Metrica Regni Poloniae]
Mjr – major
n.p. – no place
nd. – no date of publication
No., № – number, номер
Nos. – numbers
npd – no place and date of publication
nr – numer [number]
op. cit. – opus citatum
p. – page
Pl. – plan
pp. – pages
phot. – photography
pt. – part
RA – Riksarkivet [Royal Palace Archives]
Rus. – Russian
sht. – sheet
St. Petersburg – Saint Petersburg
t. – tom [volume]
Th. – Theil [part]
Transl. – translated by

transl. – translation
unpag. – unpaginated
v. – verso
vol. – volume
Б. І П. – Библиотека Петра I
БАН – Библиотека Российской академии наук
БСЭ – *Большая советская энциклопедия*
в. – век
вв. – века, веков, веках
відп. – відповідальний
відп. ред. – відповідальний редактор
вип. – випуск
ВС – „Военный сборник"
вступ. ст. и коммент. – вступительная статья и комментарий
ВЭ – *Военная Энциклопедия*, ред. В.Ф. Новицкий и др.
ВЭЛ – *Военный энциклопедический лексикон, издаваемый Обществом военных и литераторов*, гл. ред. Л.И. Зедделер, изд. второе: гл. ред. М.И. Богданович
вып. – выпуск
г. – год
гг. – годы
гл. науч. ред. – главный научный редактор
гл. ред. – главный редактор
глосс. – глоссарий
д. – дело
и др. – и другие
изд. – издание, изданый
изд. подгот. – издание подготовил (подготовили)
ил. – илюстрация
инв. – инвентовий

инв. № – инвентарный номер

ИПС – *История Правительствующего сената за двести лет. 1711–1911 гг.*

к. – карта

кн. – книга

коммент. – комментарий

л. – лист

лл. – листы

МИГО – *Материалы для истории Гангутской операции*

МИРФ – *Материалы для истории русского флота*

науч. ред. – научный редактор

№ – номер

об. – оборот

оп. – опис

ОР – Отдел рукописей

ОСРК – Основное собрание рукописной книги

отв. ред. – ответственный редактор

отв. сост. – ответственный составитель

отд. – отдел, отделение

оформл. – оформление

П. и Б. – *Письма и бумаги императора Петра Великого*

ПДС – *Памятники дипломатических сношений древней России с державами иностранными*

пер. – перевод

пер. с анг. – перевод с английского

пер., ст., примеч. – перевод, статья, примечания

Петр. гал. – Петровская галлерея

пл. – план

под. ред. – под редакцей

подгот. – подготовил

послесл. – послесловие
предисл. – предисловие
преувед. – преуведомление
примеч. – примечания
ПСЗРИ – *Полное собрание законов Российской Империи*
публ. – публикация
РБС – *Русский биографический словарь*
РГАДА – Российский государственный архив древних актов
ред. – редактор
редколл. – редакционная коллегия
ред. колл. – редакционная коллегия
РНБ – Российская национальная библиотека
СА – „Северный архив"
СВМ – *Столетие военного министерства 1802-1902*
СВЭ – *Советская Военная Энциклопедия*
СИРИО – *Сборник Императорского Русского Исторического Общества*
собр. – собрание
сост. – составитель, составители
сост., вступ. ст., коммент. – составил (составили), вступительная статья, комментарий
СРЯ XI–XVII – *Словарь русского языка XI – XVII вв.*
СРЯ XVIII – *Словарь русского языка XVIII века*
т. – *том, томы* [volume]
ТГЭ - *Труды Государственного Эрмитажа*
ТСД – В. Даль, *Толковый словарь живого великорусского языка Владимира Даля*
Тек. пост. – Текущие поступления
указ. – указатель
УЦСЄ – *Україна в Центрально-Східній Європі*

ф. – фонд
ч. – часть, части
ЧИОДР – *Чтения в Императорском Обществе Истории и Древностей Российских при Московском Университете*
ЭВМН – *Энциклопедия военных и морских наук*, сост. под гл. ред. Г.А. Леера
Эрм. собр. – Эрмитажное собрание
ЭСБЕ – *Энциклопедический словарь Брокгауза и Ефрона*

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