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Nothing Sacred? Not Quite: Krzysztof Hejwowski as a Critic and Self-critic

Abstract. Krzysztof Hejwowski was one of the most eminent translation studies scholars and translators in Poland. Working within the paradigm of cognitive linguistics, he left a legacy embracing a host of articles and three books in which he formulated his theory of translation based on a communicative and cognitive approach to language. While working on his theory, he both subscribed to and challenged the views of other scholars, depending on their theoretical validity, practical pertinence, and lucidity, thus demonstrating his theoretically and practically-oriented attitude to scholarship. Nevertheless, he was not a rebel in the field or an iconoclast who criticized other scholars for the sake of criticism. Rather, he was critical of the ways in which the discipline was developing at the turn of the twenty-first century and searched for a more balanced approach to the theory and practice of translation. Striving for clarity and applicability of his propositions, he also continuously developed his ideas. The aim of this essay is to present some of those theoretical approaches and formulations that he disagreed with as evidenced mostly in his 2004 book *Translation: A Cognitive-Communicative Approach*. Additionally, his 2015 book *Iluzja przekładu. Przekładoznawstwo w ujęciu konstruktywnym* will serve to demonstrate how he self-corrected some of his ideas.

Keywords: Hejwowski, translation, translation theory, criticism, self-criticism

When Krzysztof Hejwowski embarked on his academic career, he set himself a formidable task: to formulate an all-encompassing theory of translation. The difficulty with such a project is at least two-fold. First, given the multiplicity of translation acts and specific situations, such a theory should be universal enough to account for the diversity of translation seen as a process and then realized as the various products (in a variety of media) of that process. As indicated in the seminal work by James Holmes: “It hardly needs to be pointed out that a *general translation theory* in such a true sense of the term, if indeed it is achievable, will necessarily be highly formalized and, however the scholar may strive after economy, also highly complex”

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(178; original emphasis). Second, presently, theoreticians are faced with a multitude of already proposed theories (both general and partial) that have appeared since the establishment of translation studies as a scientific discipline and need to find their own path to navigate among them in order to embrace what is consistent with their ideas and to reject what in their opinion is contradictory to the novel approach. This is what Hejwowski did in his two books published in 2004: *Kognitywno-komunikacyjna teoria przekładu* and its English version: *Translation: A Cognitive-Communicative Approach*. As scholars proceed with their research, they develop their ideas, which may involve re-evaluation of their previous proposals triggered by their more extensive practical and theoretical investigations, criticism launched by others, and self-criticism. This is the case with Hejwowski's last book, published in 2015, *Iluzja przekładu. Przekładoznawstwo w ujęciu konstruktywnym*. These processes (designing one's own theory and its self-critical evaluation and, perhaps, modification) require not only a solid theoretical background, but also a breadth of thinking characterized by considering insightfully different points of view and frames of reference, supported with what I would call scholarly courage: dealing critically with and constructively challenging already well-grounded approaches and eminent predecessors' ideas. But such an approach to academic research also calls for scholarly humbleness: openness to being assessed and readiness to admit that one's suggestions may be perfected. This is psychologically not easy: someone who (sometimes sharply) criticizes others may not be prepared to face criticism. Yet this was not what Krzysztof Hejwowski was like as a researcher. The purpose of this essay is to present him as a critic of others and as a self-critic—to show his open-mindedness and independent thinking, as well as his scholarly flexibility and modesty. This will be demonstrated on the basis of his books,² and if the following seems to be a collage of quotations, it is precisely to be so: to allow Krzysztof Hejwowski to speak with his own voice. Naturally, due to the scope of this essay, the presentation will be selective and therefore reductive. Before presenting him as a critic, however, it needs to be stressed that he was not a rebel in the field who wished to revolutionize research in translation, or an iconoclast who criticized other scholars for the sake of criticism. Rather, he was critical of the ways in which the discipline was developing at the turn of the twenty-first century and searched for a more balanced approach to the theory and practice of translation.

Given that Hejwowski's theory of translation is linguistically-oriented and, as indicated in the titles of his 2004 books, based on the communicative approach that requires the author, or sender in the traditional model of communication by Roman Jakobson (1960), and the reader (or receiver/recipient) for the meaning to emerge, one of the basic precepts of his approach is the undermining of the idea of "the death-of-the-author" as proposed in 1967 by Roland Barthes in his essay of that title, and subsequently embraced not only by literary scholars of poststructuralism and deconstructionism but also some linguists. Barthes intended to remove

2 The material will be taken from the English version of his first book and from his last one. Translations from Hejwowski's Polish texts are mine.

the author from the theoretical discourse, whereby he was concerned with the category of the author understood as the theoretical equivalent of the interpretative truth, that is, to put it bluntly, discovering what “the author had in mind” rather than the author *per se* (Burzyńska and Markowski 320). He argued that giving a text to an author means furnishing it with a final signification (Barthes 358). In other words, he was against determining a single interpretation of the text that would be aligned with the authorial intention. This led to the idea that it is the reader who becomes a second writer: reading is “another writing” (*lecture-re-écriture*), whereas interpretation is no longer connected with assigning meaning to the text but rather evaluating the multiplicity that has shaped that text (Burzyńska and Markowski 320–321). Consequently, the text has as many writers as there are its readers. For Hejwowski, the very concept of the-death-of-the-author was unfeasible, resembling “the doctrine of immaculate conception—interesting, but acceptable only in supernatural contexts” (*Translation* 92), which he most likely meant to stand for the Virgin Birth: the text has no “physical” father, just as Jesus had no earthly father. This critique arose directly from his approach: he was less concerned with theoretical literary deliberations and more with translation as a communicative phenomenon in line with the Leipzig School, which emphasises that translation is primarily concerned with communication. Allowing for different interpretations (after all discovering “what the author had in mind” is not only utopian as we can only know what he/she communicated, but it is also counterproductive as texts are open to interpretations), Hejwowski argued that “[t]he recipient can reconstruct the sense only after having constructed in his mind some representation of the sender” (*Translation* 92). In this perspective, understanding (interpretation) depends on the recipient’s cognitive base: the knowledge that encompasses also that of a given person (the author of the text even if this is only the representation of the author) and the structure already existing in one’s mind to which a given utterance can be attached. The representation of the author means that he/she is no longer dead as he/she is attributed with some features.

The death of the author simultaneously implied the death of the translator as the latter is perceived not merely as a reader but also as a kind of author (Hejwowski, *Translation* 94). This, paradoxically, might connect translation with the notion of *lecture-re-écriture*, yet this was also not quite acceptable for Hejwowski. Although he does not explicitly refer to translation as the double model of communication proposed by Anna Legeżyńska on the basis of Jakobson’s model (cf. Legeżyńska 11–12) in his section “The death-of-the-author myth” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 92–94), this model is inscribed in his theory. By fully subscribing to the idea that the reader is “the ultimate authority on the given text producing his or her own interpretation of it (or several different interpretations if a given text is worth reading several times)”, the translator becomes eradicated as the author of the target text because “translation is no longer important. It does not really matter who translates and how” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 94). But it does. Even if the translator as the reader of the original text is “the ultimate authority on its interpretation”, he/she then changes the role and actually, in reality not only theoretically, produces a target text. The final shape of this new text depends on a multiplicity of factors, interpretation being

only one of them, and it is the translator who decides on how he/she wants to communicate the message and needs to construct a representation of his/her recipients if he/she wants the process to be effective. Obviously, Hejwowski accepted different interpretations of a single text. This, after all, is one of the reasons for re-translations—the ontological status of translation as an open-ended series of target texts, as proposed in 1968 by Edward Balcerzan (17–18), though in reality this mostly applies to literary texts. Yet, in his approach Hejwowski combined the practice and theory of translation whereby the two are inseparable—“mutually dependent and equally important” (*Translation* 13). Given the former element—the practice—the translator can hardly be “dead” as his/her decisions and solutions are crucial for the emergence of the new text.

With his practical attitude, as well as communicative and cognitive aspects as the founding blocks of his approach to translation, Hejwowski undermined also the very notion of untranslatability as proposed by many scholars, especially as regards cultural differences. He did not reject culture as a translation problem. Quite the contrary. Yet, he would not subscribe to the view that cultural differences would result in “insurmountable barriers” and “absolute untranslatability” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 129). Criticising Teresa Bałuk-Ulewiczowa’s conclusions that target readers of Noel Clark’s translation of Stanisław Wyspiański’s *Wesele* “will never experience [elements rooted in Polish culture] in the same way as native audiences do” (Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 176–177), he would see such opinions as arising from “excessive and unrealistic expectations” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 129). Such claims reflect a utopian vision of translation as an ideal representation of the original text that would generate a similar (if not identical) response in both source and target readers. This is impossible because “what is familiar and domestic to the SL readers will be alien and exotic to the TL readers” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 129). Human reactions are individual. People may react to the same stimuli in completely diverse ways, depending on their knowledge, education, life experiences, current physical and mental conditions, and many other factors. In translation these reactions must by necessity be also affected by cultural differences, so translation, in practice, must be seen as only a process of approximation. Consequently, “[t]he myth of ‘identity of experience’ cannot be treated seriously: even the people living in the same country, speaking the same language and brought up in the same culture cannot react identically to the same stimuli” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 130).³ For Hejwowski, it is similarities (in interpretations) and not the differences that matter, and with his down-to-earth, pragmatic approach he observed: “Nobody can experience Yeats’s or Joyce’s works in quite the same way as the Irish—and yet the books are published in Britain, in the US, translated into

3 This echoed the ideas of Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, whom Hejwowski considered one of the greatest translation scholars, the founder of this discipline in Poland (*Translation* 17), in the understanding of what translation involves and how languages function in communication: “Languages fulfill their communicative function and therefore it cannot be denied that the reactions of different people to a given text may be, if not identical, then in any case very similar” (Wojtasiewicz 22; [Hejwowski’s] translation). Of course, we have to put aside the purely individual, idiosyncratic reactions to certain texts or parts of texts that each of us may have. We have to concentrate on ‘more average’, typical reactions (cf. Wojtasiewicz 23; Hejwowski, *Translation* 74).

many other languages and read all over the world” (*Translation* 129). Obviously, target readers will have different responses and even different interpretations than source readers, but this is the nature of translation, and also of literature as such. The important thing in translation is to elicit responses that would not be contradictory to those envisaged in the original message. As observed by Hejwowski, people read books “because they are more universal than particular or exotic” (*Translation* 37). Hence, in literary translation it is the universality of experience that matters, and cultural differences may be overcome in various ways.

This pragmatic attitude led Hejwowski to criticize the “biggest names” in translation studies and some well-established theories. One of them was Lawrence Venuti, whom he appreciated for “warning translators that it is very easy to fall into the trap of ‘improving’ and ‘polishing’ the original” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 35), but whom he disagreed with on many points. A proponent of signifying the foreign in translation, Venuti argued that translation is doomed because no matter how much the translator attempts to “invent domestic analogues for foreign forms and themes [...] the result will always go beyond any communication to release target-oriented possibilities of meaning” (“Translation, Community” 471). This is because “[t]he foreign text is rewritten in domestic dialects and discourses, registers and styles, and this results in the production of textual effects that signify only in the history of the domestic language and culture” (Venuti, “Translation, Community” 471). While the very nature of translation necessitates the employment of domestic language and its varieties (otherwise what would translation be?), Hejwowski could not agree with the idea that this would “signify only in the target culture”. Readers, in his understanding, are able to interpret a particular target language variety as signifying the difference in the source culture. This he illustrated with the replacement of cockney with Warsaw dialect in *Pygmalion*: “the reader knows that s/he is dealing with an English text, set in London, and is able to interpret the use of the Polish dialect as a representation of a certain sociolinguistic phenomenon occurring in the foreign culture” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 34). This does not mean that he supported such solutions, clearly controversial, but he opposed generalizations and, in particular, lack of clarity, as well as the selection of examples by Venuti to illustrate his theses concerning domestication that were “simply examples of poor translations” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 35). He believed that Venuti’s condemnation of domesticated translations missed the point as, paradoxically, thanks to such translations “we have learnt quite a lot about other cultures” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 35). If one considers the example of *Pygmalion*, with Eliza Doolittle’s speaking Warsaw dialect, clearly an extreme case of domestication, Polish readers still learn about the class differences in English society that are marked by language. Hejwowski was, however, against “unjustified domestication” (*Translation* 35), and equally against “the other extreme of excessive, unnecessary ‘foreignization’” (*Translation* 144) as suggested repeatedly by Venuti.⁴ If the translation is to be communicative, any excess is undesirable. Nevertheless,

4 Though Venuti did not write about excessive foreignization, one would wonder why the translator should disrupt the text at the linguistic level (via artificial, convoluted syntax, for instance) if the source text communicates

“[i]f translators are to be intermediaries between different nations, if translation is to build bridges between different cultures, then it should be every translator’s ambition to convey as much as possible from the original culture to the target language recipients” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 144). The crucial point is how to do that. How to achieve resistance that “assumes an ethics of foreignization, locating the alien in a cultural other, pursuing cultural diversity, signalling linguistic and cultural difference and unsettling the hierarchies in the translating language” as suggested by Venuti (*The Translator’s Invisibility* 266). Would this really be accomplished via deviations from the standard (colloquialisms, archaisms, calques)? For Hejwowski, Venuti’s discourse was too vague to be of assistance for theorists and practitioners: “it is difficult to see what Venuti really means by ‘foreignizing’. Here, Venuti is much less outspoken and explicit [as compared to domestication]” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 35). As a scholar, Hejwowski was concerned with clarity, that is communicating ideas in an understandable and explicit manner.

Consequently, Hejwowski questioned the formulations of theories that were not lucid. In referring to the unclear term “abusive fidelity” used by Venuti after Philip E. Lewis, who addressed the issues of domestication and foreignization based on English versions of Jacques Derrida’s French texts, and to Lewis’s deliberations, he stated: “We never learn what ‘the movement of difference’ is and why it should be ‘a fundamental property of languages’. Similarly we can never be quite sure what the term ‘abuse’ refers to” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 38). For Lewis, real translation (foreignized) is “translation that values experimentation, tampers with usage, seeks to match the polyvalencies or plurivocities or expressive stresses of the original by producing its own” (270). But what if the original employs typical non-experimental language. Should the translator still “tamper with usage”, otherwise he/she would not produce real translation? Lewis proposed a “new axiomatics of fidelity”, with the foreignizing approach being “abusive fidelity”, that “both resists the constraints of the translating language and interrogates the structures of the foreign text” (Venuti, “1980s” 218). As Hejwowski rightfully commented, the kind of discourse employed by Lewis (but also evident in Venuti’s works) is characterized by “ultimate vagueness”, whereby “[p]hrases like ‘clusters of textual energy’ are very nice metaphors, but they are hardly translatable into the terminology of linguistics, discourse analysis or in fact any discipline dealing with human communication” (*Translation* 38). Indeed, reading Lewis and, more importantly, comprehending his ideas, is a challenge, which Hejwowski actually dealt with quite well, as he concluded: “one gets the impression that Lewis is really opting for maximal literalness of translation. Again, most of the examples quoted are not really instances of domestication but of overdomestication, oversimplification or outright translation error” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 38).

Apart from terminological vagueness and extremist approaches, as in the case of Vladimir Nabokov, whose claims Hejwowski deemed “overgeneralized and misdirected” as “he seems

fluently. Would that indeed signify the foreign? Or would that merely deform the original message in misrepresenting how it was communicated?

to assume that there is nothing between a ‘free translation’ (which must be simplified, easy to read, primitive as compared with the original) and ‘literal translation’ (which must result from the sophisticated translator’s strife to render as much as possible from the original)” (*Translation* 40), the Polish scholar was particularly sensitive to imprecision within the field of linguistics. This is hardly surprising given his background. Hence, he would be more than ready to pinpoint illogicality in the arguments of most distinguished scholars, as when criticising Venuti, who discussed translation as “not so much communicated as inscribed with domestic intelligibilities and interests” (“Translation, Community” 468). This, of course, stemmed from Venuti’s ideological approach to (domesticated) translation as “[t]he inscription begins with the very choice of a text for translation, always a very selective, densely motivated choice, and continues in the development of discursive strategies to translate it, always a choice of certain domestic discourses over others. Hence, the domesticating process is totalizing” (Venuti, “Translation, Community” 468). But Hejwowski was more concerned with the linguistic aspect of communication and so indicated where Venuti erred: “This argument reveals basic misunderstanding of what communication really is. Venuti seems to assume that a monolingual act of communication is some kind of direct transfer of ideas or messages, resembling an exchange of goods, and communicative problems begin only with the intrusion of a translator. This is not the case. Monolingual communication is also based on overcoming cultural, educational, experiential, intellectual, temperamental and other differences between the participants in a communicative act” (*Translation* 90–91). ‘Borrowing’ Venuti’s language, he argued that any type of communication is approximative. In monolingual communication interlocutors “understand each other only to a certain extent and only by ‘inscribing the utterance with our personal intelligibilities’, i.e., by investing the utterance with significance in terms of our own memory structures” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 91).

The thorough linguistic background gave him the advantage, when referring to linguistic phenomena inherent in translation, over translation scholars rooted in the literary-oriented tradition of translation, irrespective of their authoritative position. But he was equally harsh on linguists specializing in translation studies. Whenever he found problematic aspects, he would bring them to light irrespective of the author’s worldwide recognition or background (literature, linguistics or translation studies per se).⁵ Such was the case of Venuti, but also of Peter Newmark, whose books in the 1980s were as groundbreaking as Venuti’s in the 1990s. Newmark’s *A Textbook of Translation*, which contains many inconsistencies, was awarded the British Association of Applied Linguistics prize in 1988. Such acclaim was never an obstacle for Hejwowski, and in his critical reading he would not refrain from demonstrating the flaws. For instance, while Newmark observed that “whilst the meaning of a completely context-determined word may appear to be remote from its non-contextual (core) meaning there must be some link

5 This comment is of a general nature, referring both to Polish and foreign scholars. In Poland, unfortunately, translation studies remain unrecognised as a separate scientific discipline. Consequently, scholars dealing with translation have either a linguistic or literary background, with the majority being linguists.

between the two meanings” (17), Hejwowski counterargued: “A word cannot have any ‘non-contextual meaning’ [...]—except in a dictionary. But even there—in a dictionary which provides no examples or explanations, but only the lemmata and their TL ‘equivalents’, the equivalents are there only due to the fact that the author of the dictionary imagined some of the contexts and situations in which a given SL word could appear” (*Translation* 49). More importantly from the point of view of students of translation, especially since Newmark’s book is targeted at such readership, Hejwowski indicated confusing terminology, as in the case of a functional equivalent that should actually mean the same as a cultural equivalent, and additionally confounding explanation (“deculturalizing a cultural word”) and examples for this type of equivalent (*Sejm* as *Polish parliament* that could easily be a descriptive equivalent (*Iluzja przekładu* 88). In fact, it is ever so difficult to discern the difference between functional and descriptive equivalents in Newmark. Similarly, synonymy is described in such vague terms that, according to Hejwowski, it is not clear what Newmark actually meant (*Iluzja przekładu* 88), whereas it would be difficult to state the difference between a componential analysis and a descriptive equivalent (*Iluzja przekładu* 89). Actually, the only difference I might possibly see is that a descriptive equivalent would refer to culture-related words (because it follows the discussion of cultural and functional equivalents) as no explanation is given for this procedure except for the vague “[i]n translation, description sometimes has to be weighed against function” (Newmark 83), whereas a componential analysis: “the splitting up of a lexical unit into its sense components” (Newmark 90) to other, non-culture-related words. Yet this is contradicted by Newmark’s further explanation: “The second use of a componential analysis is in translating cultural (and institutional) words that the readership is unlikely to understand” (119). Additionally, a functional equivalent is termed “a cultural componential analysis” (Newmark 83), and at this point one just feels helpless, especially when asked by more inquisitive students to clarify the differences between these procedures. Hence, Hejwowski’s argument of the lack of precision in Newmark’s typology and opinions is more than valid.

Actually, the Polish scholar was very generous in his criticism of the English one as many more problematic areas might be pinpointed in *A Textbook of Translation*. Just one example will suffice. Normally, a paraphrase means a restatement, i.e., expressing the meaning using different words to achieve greater clarity. But not for Newmark, who defines it as “an amplification or explanation of the meaning of a segment of the text” (90). If so, what would be the difference between this procedure and “notes, additions, glosses” that involve “supplying additional information in a translation” (Newmark 91) that may take various forms. In particular, additional information placed within the target text (Newmark enumerates different options, such as, for instance, “an alternative to the translated word”, “an adjectival clause”, “a participial group”, “classifier” [92]) would clearly equate to amplification. Moreover, why paraphrase should be “used as an ‘anonymous’ text when it is poorly written, or has important implications and omissions” (Newmark 90) is a mystery to me. As understood by Newmark (amplification or explanation of the meaning), paraphrase (or should we say “explicitation” after Hejwowski?) can be used

in any text that requires such clarification of meaning for completely different recipients, irrespective of whether it is well or poorly written and by whom (in any case, an ‘anonymous’ text is another vague idea). Rather than criticising each unclear technique, Hejwowski succinctly summarized: “Newmark’s other techniques—translation label, compensation, componential analysis, reduction and expansion, paraphrase—are either less important for our considerations, or described so vaguely that it is difficult to discern their role” (*Iluzja przekładu* 90).

This overview of criticism launched by Hejwowski at other researchers, both linguists and literary scholars, is far from exhaustive. The list might well continue. He was also dissatisfied with Ernst-August Gutt’s (1991) theory of translation, the first cognitive theory, which although interesting and valuable, has some drawbacks as “it is hard to believe that such a complicated sphere of human activity as verbal communication or translation can be explained by means of one or two simple rules” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 258), one of them being that “the translation should be expressed in such a manner that it yields the intended interpretation without putting the audience to unnecessary processing effort” (Gutt 377). Clearly, literature requires much processing effort, and Gutt’s ideas might imply unnecessary simplifications and clarifications, grossly deforming the original text. The translator’s task is to create a text that might generate a similar interpretation to its original, and not to interpret it for target readers. Though appreciating another cognitive theory of translation, the one formulated by Elżbieta Tabakowska (1993), based on Ronald W. Langacker’s cognitive grammar, he observed: “The theory definitely offers a very sensitive instrument for text analysis, which makes it useful both for translation training and for translation criticism. However, it is doubtful whether Langacker’s theory could be applied to such tasks as modelling the process of translation, as it is too concentrated on texts and as it avoids postulating any mental structures not directly reflected in texts” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 258). Hence in his model he focused, among other issues, on the process of translation *per se*.

Another approach in translation studies that Hejwowski was not quite convinced by was polysystem theory as formulated by Itamar Even-Zohar, who did not “take into account the statistical and the marketing factor: translated literature may become central (or only ‘important’) in the target polysystem only if a sufficient number of foreign books are actually translated and published, and only if they reach the reading public” (*Translation* 145). He indicated circumstances that also influence the position of the translated literature in a given system, mostly “publishing inertia: publishing houses will not publish translated books because people do not read them, people will not read translated books because hardly any are published, and almost none advertised” (Hejwowski, *Translation* 145–146). In such comments he combined common-sense and knowledge of the market as a practising translator with theoretical knowledge.

This overview does not mean that he was not appreciative of others and their ideas. He definitely was, and his own theory of translation was based on the propositions of many other scholars (that he duly referenced), especially utilizing the following concepts: verb frame, scenes, scripts, schemata, memory structures, propositional base and semantic input, conversational implicature, metaphor, sense constancy, but creating a conceptual whole. His views were always

based on scientific investigations, balanced, and never intuitive or prejudiced. Even when he criticized someone and modified that person's proposals, raising serious objections, as was the case with Leszek Berezowski's classification of techniques (strategies as he preferred to call them) for translating dialect, he was ready to offer compliments: "Berezowski's book is the most serious investigation of this problem in translation studies literature. It should be required reading for every self-respecting literary translator, because it presents this issue comprehensively, based on extensive research material" (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 221). On the other hand, he was not blindly uncritical of those whom he appreciated greatly, Wojtasiewicz being a case in point, whose book *Wstęp do teorii tłumaczenia (An Introduction to the theory of translation)*, written as early as 1957, has remained one of the most important books about translation" (Hejwowski, *Translation* 61). Wojtasiewicz is frequently referenced by Hejwowski, especially in *Iluzja przekładu*, in which he emphasized: "Wojtasiewicz's deliberations on the translation (or rather untranslatability) of linguistic varieties were well ahead of their time" (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 213), as they truly were, just like his view on human communication, which would later be echoed by cognitive linguistics. But on many occasions, Hejwowski disagreed with his intellectual mentor. Constructing his theory to embrace practical problems (and solutions), he wrote: "I do not agree with Wojtasiewicz when he states that translation theory requires an ideal translator and should disregard all the translation mistakes stemming from the translator's inattention, unskilfulness or inefficiency, insufficient command of the source or target language (Wojtasiewicz 8). I prefer to deal with a 'professional translator', whose translations are acceptable most of the time, but who inevitably makes mistakes, as there are no ideal translations. What is more, I think that the translator's mistakes, i.e., symptoms of his non-ideal competence, are a very important element of translation theory" (Hejwowski, *Translation* 239). He also challenged Wojtasiewicz's approach to allusions as "a renunciation of originality by the author", classification of untranslatability of allusions, and non-problematic translation (or transfer) of third-language elements (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 77, 210). Always, when disagreeing with some theses, he would justify why that was the case and would offer his alternatives or modifications. Criticism for the sake of criticism was neither his goal nor approach to scholarship.

As a scholar, Hejwowski was equally critical of others as of himself. He had a distance to himself and to his work, as can be seen in the examples that he provided in his discussion of proper names: "few people know how such names as Jeremy, Warszawa or Hejwowski came into being" (Hejwowski, *Translation* 150). This distance made him conscious of his own imperfections but also sensitive to criticism while harbouring no grudge against his critics. Rather, he was willing to introduce corrections and to re-evaluate his ideas. This is evident in his developed and revised typologies of techniques applicable to culture-bound items, proper names, and linguistically heterogeneous texts, as well as in his classification of translation errors in *Iluzja przekładu*. To his succinct classification of techniques for translating culture-bound items of 2004, designed on the basis of a critical analysis of several categorizations proposed by his predecessors, including transfer with and without explanation, syntagmatic translation with and without explanation,

recognized equivalent, functional equivalent, hypernym, descriptive equivalent, and omission, he added two more: hyponym (which was definitely missing since if the translator can replace a source element with one that has a broader meaning, why not with one of a narrower meaning?) and explicitation.⁶ The latter was most likely motivated by differentiating a descriptive equivalent typically offered for culture-bound items denoting realia from a technique that would be applicable to more allusive elements. Thus, if a descriptive equivalent involves the replacement of the original element with its description, explicitation relies on formulating *expressis verbis* what was only implied in the original, replacing a metaphor or metonymy with non-figurative expressions (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 93–94). This self-correction was well grounded, as clearly demonstrated by the provided example. Hejwowski admitted: “I would now classify the translation of the phrase ‘szkiełko i oko, czucie i wiara’ [literally: glass and eye, feeling and faith] as ‘no faith, except in reason, no sensibility, only sense’, described by me as an example of a descriptive equivalent, as an explicitation” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 94). Indeed, this example can hardly be treated as a descriptive equivalent as it does not describe an element but clarifies the allusion that otherwise would be rather incomprehensible for target readers.⁷ He also extended the scope of a functional equivalent (cultural replacement) to account for replacements from different cultures (source, target, and third) that covered various possibilities of such substitutions. The result of self-correction is a less confusing typology (considering the offered examples) and also one that accounts for more real-life choices made by translators.

As regards proper names, in his 2015 book Hejwowski presented Jan Van Coillie’s extensive typology of translation techniques that first appeared in 2006, with his critical commentary. This indicates that he constantly kept up-to-date with the latest research and incorporated the relevant results into his own. But he also updated and revised his previous observations: “In my earlier books [...] following Irina Bagajewa [...], I divided toponyms into macrotoponyms and microtoponyms. However, these terms can be misleading, because it is not the size of the place that determines possible translation problems. [...] The recognition of proper names is therefore determined not by the size of the objects they name, but by history” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 138–139). While in onomastics the two terms are obviously valid, Hejwowski refrained from that division owing to misleading conclusions that macrotoponyms would normally have recognized equivalents as their use exceeds the boundaries of one culture, whereas microtoponyms would be much more troublesome (Hejwowski, *Translation* 161). This may seem overcautious but given that the readers

6 He also differentiated between pure transfer and transfer with modification that was not made explicitly in the 2004 typology.

7 Obviously, it could be argued that this is a case of substitution (one allusion is replaced by another), as Hejwowski himself indicates: “It is worth noting that such a translation loses the allusion to the original [Adam Mickiewicz’s poem “Romantyczność”] and introduces an allusion to the target culture (Jane Austen’s *Sense and Sensibility*)” (*Iluzja przekładu* 94). Thus, this example could possibly be classified as a functional equivalent from the target culture; yet, in Hejwowski’s argumentation, it is not the substitution that is at the core of the explicitation but the clarification of the original phrase.

of the book include students of translation, making them aware of the possible traps and sensitive to the need for research in the case of toponyms, irrespective of the size of the place they denote, was crucial for him.

The most extensive self-correction, however, involved translation errors. Hejwowski frequently stressed that he disagreed with those scholars who disregarded the issue of translation errors as unnecessary and non-constructive in the analysis of translations, mostly Theo Hermans, André Lefevere, and Tomasz Wójcik (*Iluzja przekładu* 288–289, 290–291). With his pedagogical focus and stress placed on translator's competence, the problems of translation errors were a significant part of his approach, also considering translation as communication: what and how the target text communicates to its readers should not be underestimated, both for aesthetic and pragmatic reasons. Commenting on his revised typology of errors, he stated, quite generally, that: "In revising my earlier [2004] classification of translation errors, I came to the conclusion that all errors can be actually divided into two main types: interpretation errors and realization errors" (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 295). This led to the simplification of the earlier categorization in which four main groups were distinguished: errors of syntagmatic translation (now classified as interpretation errors, or actually lack or insufficient interpretation), misinterpretation errors, realization errors, and meta-translation errors (now placed in the realization errors group). This general statement veiled a much more extensive self-correction, as the 2004 typology lacked precision, and addition of new types of errors.

Since the comparison of the two taxonomies would require a separate study, only a few problematic areas will be pointed out here. In the 2004 division, insufficient knowledge of the subject-matter was categorized as belonging to realization errors (Hejwowski, *Translation* 220), with examples actually mostly indicating a wrong choice of equivalent (whereby it is not clear whether the translator lacked specific knowledge or selected some sort of functional equivalent) and omission (which was a separate category of meta-translation errors). In the 2015 typology, such errors fall into the category of interpretation errors, quite rightly. Yet, the examples might still better illustrate the problem. Demonstrating explicitly that the translator created an internally illogical text because he/she lacked specialized knowledge and therefore misinterpreted the original would be much more fitting here. The mistranslated phrase "canvas sharply peaked" in Aniela Zagórska's translation of Joseph Conrad's "Heart of Darkness" as "mocno napięte płótna", which indicates that the barges were moving, whereas in the original (and also in translation) they were standing still (Kujawska-Lis, *Marlow pod polską banderą* 98–99), is the case in point: the translator did not know specialized nautical vocabulary, misinterpreted the phrase, created a scene that was not only contradictory to the original but also impossible in real life, and could not self-correct the target text as she did not notice that the image was illogical.

While in the 2015 classification dictionary and commonly accepted equivalents, false friends, and calques were placed in the interpretation errors group, unnecessary transfers were rightly moved to realization errors as, on the one hand, it was rather difficult to accept that these were

errors of syntagmatic translation,⁸ and, in fact, in the 2004 typology would have better fitted the category of wrong choice of translation technique (meta-translation errors). Also, the division of meta-translation errors into subcategories was confusing. If omission, for instance, is listed as a separate technique for translating culture-bound items, why should it not be classified as a (wrong) choice of translation technique but as a separate category in the typology of errors? The same might apply to additions and also footnotes, as explanations provided in footnotes are a type of technique. Such inconsistencies necessitated self-correction, and the revised typology not only gained clarity but was also extended by new elements, such as censorship and selection of a wrong equivalent, the latter being very frequent in translation practice, whereby its absence in the 2004 typology made it difficult to apply as an analytical tool by students.

A similar, though less substantial, self-correction was introduced for the problematic group of linguistic varieties used in the source text. To his 2004 typology, which greatly simplified Berezowski's strategies for translating dialect, Hejwowski added transfer, transfer with explanation, transcription, and transcription with explanation and modified types of stylization by clearly differentiating its variants: sub-standard, rustic, urban, colloquial, slang, and archaic, thus accounting for more possibilities (*Iluzja przekładu* 208–245). Apart from that modification, which rightly extended the range of options to deal with problematical aspects, he refrained from the term “polyphonic text”. This was his response to critical comments. As he admitted: “When describing linguistically diversified texts earlier, I used the term ‘polyphonic texts’ to refer to them [...], and was accused of overusing the term introduced by Bakhtin (1983)” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 209). He went on to justify his previous terminology by stating that in translation practice the major problem related to polyphony would not be the content or worldviews (as understood by Bakhtin), but the manner of communicating them, which is a specific feature of characters' languages. Consequently, according to him, from the point of view of the translator, polyphony actually means stylistic, idiolectal, dialectal marking. This explanation indicates how consciously he selected terminology, although in hindsight he was ready to admit that it might be confusing. He did not indicate the source of criticism, but was ready to accept it, though typically for him, with some reservation.⁹ Thus, he modified the term: “However, in order not to cause unnecessary misunderstandings, I decided to return to the term introduced by Olgierd

8 Transfer does not involve any translation at all (though it is a valid translation technique), whereas Hejwowski defined syntagmatic translation as corresponding to literal translation in Vinay and Darblenet's and Newmark's classifications (*Translation* 138), whereby source elements are replaced by target language elements.

9 In May of 2015, when Krzysztof Hejwowski was writing his book, we met at the conference “Authenticity and Imitation in Translation and Culture” organized by SWPS in Warsaw. In my presentation, subsequently published in 2017 in a volume in which his paper also appeared, I criticized the term “polyphonic text” as used by him and we had a discussion about it, with me representing a school of literary studies. Paradoxically, in the title of my presentation I myself employed the term “polyphonic texts” after Hejwowski, changing it only later for the publication. Whether this triggered the change in his book, or any other comments, I have no idea as we remained in a friendly relationship and I never felt any trace of a grudge.

Wojtasiewicz and write about ‘linguistic allusions’” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 209). Though he changed the terminology, he must have been really attached to the previous formulation because at some point he seems to have forgotten about it: “Ultimately, one has to agree with Brodowicz (1998) that translations of polyphonic texts are generally flatter and more colourless than the originals” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 244).¹⁰

Krzysztof Hejwowski was a paragon of scholarship. His extensive theoretical knowledge in linguistics and practical experience as a translator made him acutely sensitive to theoretical inaccuracies and linguistic convolutions in scholarly texts that were either misleading or hardly communicative. In such cases, nothing was too sacred, and nobody was too great an authority to be criticized. Still, as all human beings, he also made mistakes, but unlike many people, was ready to concede and correct them. This is evidenced in his academic work, in which he not only revised previous observations but also looked critically at his own translations. As he openly admitted: “After reading *The Translator’s Invisibility*, I wrote an article criticizing my own translation solutions” (Hejwowski, “An Ethics of Translation” 37). This refers to his self-analysis of the translation of the anthroponym in the song “John Barleycorn must die” in Andrew Miller’s novel *Ingenious Pain*. Having considered all possible options, he turned John Barleycorn into the familiar Jan Żytko, thus himself joining the school of functionalists (Hejwowski, “Tekstualizm a funkcjonalizm” 190). Influenced by his analysis of propositions formulated by various scholars representing the opposing schools of functionalism and textualism, he concluded that neither extreme was welcome, yet, self-reflexively observed: “I’m not sure whether when re-translating the English novel mentioned at the beginning, I would now deal differently with the poor John Barleycorn” (Hejwowski, “Tekstualizm a funkcjonalizm” 200). Self-development in the scholarly and translatorial milieu was his credo. And yet, despite his open-mindedness, even he was occasionally limited in his vision, as when he stated: “In newer translations, names are most often left in their original forms [...]. This does not apply to children’s and young adult literature, where the names are still often translated into Polish, which sometimes results from the tradition of translating a given work—it is difficult to imagine, for example, changing the names of such famous characters as ‘Ania’ (Shirley z Zielonego Wzgórza), ‘Piotruś’ (Pan) or ‘Alicja’ (w Krainie Czarów). A special case is Kubuś Puchatek” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 149). He did not envisage what would come in 2022. Otherwise, he would not have written about the first translation of *Anne of Green Gables* as follows: “Admittedly, the translator found herself in a difficult situation, because ‘Ania z Zielonych Szczytów’ would sound odd and confusing, and the more unambiguous ‘Ania z Domu o Zielonych Szczytach’ is not quite suitable for a title. [...] None of the (at least ten) subsequent translators, however, decided to change the title, because ‘Ania z Zielonego Wzgórza’ is already part of Polish culture” (Hejwowski, *Iluzja przekładu* 157). Well, it is not the case anymore. With the appearance of *Anne z Zielonych Szczytów* in Anna Bańkowska’s

10 Olga Brodovich used the term non-standard speech.

translation everything has changed, and had he lived, Krzysztof would have had an opportunity to enter into another polemical discussion with himself, and I'm sure he would have.

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