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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DIALOGUE IN LEVINAS' ETHICS

Abstract

Levinas's ethics has not been able to address the plethora of human challenges arising from the ethical quicksand and moral quandaries in our existential world. The problem of ethics in Levinas's philosophical cum phenomenological analysis, is the problem of human communication, social interaction, human emancipation, freedom, and existential/ metaphysical relations. Freedom has become not just a hot concept in different fields of study, but a very powerful and a driving concept. For Levinas, freedom is not just the absence of constraints or impediments but obedience to laws and even the laws of nature inclusive. This paper adopted the method of hermeneutic to critically analyze Levinas's phenomenological ethics. This paper concludes by exposing the facts that human communication or interaction is based on understanding and the ethics of difference is part and parcel of inter-subjectivity. Dasein is always faced with the fulfilment in its lived temporality. A sharing of the world is an essential characteristics of human togetherness. Dasein, in its dialogical engagement and existential commitment is usually based on freedom, strife, world sharing and resistance. Dialogical philosophy is the foremost part of world's cosmic law of concrete social network.

Keywords: Dasein, freedom, existence, man, ethics.

1.1. Introduction

The concepts of dialogic and dialogism is simply a matter of semantics. The terms dialogic and dialogism arise out of the dynamics of the ethics of human communication with fellow humans, and even with nature. Scholars such as Buber, Levinas, Bakhtin, mead and William James have applied the concepts

of “dialogic” and “dialogism” to human existential relations. Dialogical philosophy reflects the cobweb of a social system or the cosmic network of things in our existential world. The dialogical engagement reflects the existential relations or conditions of human freedom. The dialogical engagement reflects the process that takes place between people involved in communication.

Dasein is the free temporal casting of itself out of nothingness which is thus its natural temporality. Each Dasein is faced with a common and shared horizon of time. Levinas’s dialogical ethics reveals the disclosed-ness of truth that is akin with the philosophy of Heidegger. The dialogical engagement or existential encounter is not just the clearing of the truth of being but the disclosed-ness of truth. Individual freedom reflects the dwelling confrontation with the metaphysical circumstance that we as individual live in the world together. The dialogical understanding is freedomsharing and understanding and sharing is embedded in the self-casting.

1.2. Understanding the Concept of Dialogue.

The English terms dialogic and dialogism often refer to the terminology used by the Russian Philosopher- Mikhail Bakhtin in his work of literary theory, ‘The Dialogic Imagination’. Mikhail Bakhtin contrasts the dialogic and the monologue. The term “dialogic”, however does not just apply to one direction. For Bakhtin, all thought appeared dialogic. This means that everything anybody ever says always exists in response to things that have been said before and anticipation of things that will be said in response. We, never, in other words, speak in a vacuum. As a result, all language (and the idea which language contains and communicates) is dynamic, relational and engaged in endless re-descriptions of the world. The concept ‘dialogical’ weaves two concepts, self and dialogue, together in such a way that a more profound understanding of the interconnection of self and society is usually achieved. Usually, the concept of “self” refers to something “internal” something that takes place within the mind of the individual person while dialogue is typically associated with something “external” that is, processes that take place between people involved in communication.

The composite “dialogic self” goes beyond the self-other dichotomy by infusing the external (society) alongside the internal (individual). According to the

intrinsic part of it, dialogical relationships emerge with the possibility to further development and renewed parts of the society at large. The concept of dialogical analysis is inspired by thinkers such as William James, George Herbert Mead and Mikhail Bakhtin. Levinas's method analyzes a conversation in terms of chains of dialogical patterns that is theory-guide, qualitative and sensitive to the verbal and the non-verbal aspects of utterances. The concepts "dialogic" and "dialogical" analysis is associated with communicational and relational contexts. It is the method of social interaction. It is simply the issue of two-fold thing, inter-dependence, inter-face or social connectedness or interpersonal relationship. The concept of "Dialogical Philosophy" is closely related with Martin Buber. He stresses the threshold of dialogical process that each thing and being has a two-fold nature: the passive and the active, comparable and incomparable, the reducible and irreducible. The contact between the inexpressible circle of things and the experiencing powers of our senses is more and other than a vibration of the 'Other' and the cobweb of a social system cum cosmic network, it is the incarnate spirit itself. In the Buberian tradition, man is bedraggled in a lived-experience or lived-immediacy and concreteness which means the bond of the absolute with the particular and hence points man back to the reality of the lives concrete to the ethical immediacy of real meeting with the beings over one another.

1.3. Levinas's Ethics of Encounter: the Imperative for Dialogical Philosophy

Levinas's ethics is hinged on dialogical existence; it portrays the mode of conscious interaction and through which an individual engages with other individuals, in animals, objects and all reality in general.

Broadly speaking, in dialogical philosophical encounter, this conceptualization expresses complex ideas about modes of being particularly when a person exist and actualizes his existence. The other is at all times engaged with the world in the modes of consciousness and ill-truth, i.e. the mode in which they are taken, withdrawn from us. What this presupposes, is that, we cannot entirely or totally know the 'Other' in our ethical relationship or dialogical engagement/encounter. We are gathered up together into this standing out into the openness of the truth of beings in their beingness. We stand out into this inescapable world; in another sense, however, it is fragile, provisional, well nigh impossible to live in isolation what slows itself of itself in the openness of the truth

of being come through language. Articulately expressed in language, being in their beings is defined through the power of dialogical communication from one Dasein to another Dasein.

This dialogical communication can be taken in cognizance by the other because the other also stands out exposed gathered into the open and also takes in being as such as they reveal themselves. We share things in common, there is common openness of life and truth in our existential relationship, in the first place, because we agree on how things show themselves, but, prior to this underlying dialogical encounter of ethical possibility and ethical sensibility of agreement and disagreement, because we share in common the radical openness within which being as such can come to stand over one another. This dialogical groundings of radical openness is shared in common through the ethics of difference, not only in being themselves but in their self definition, but also between us in what we take to be true.

Consequently, being is shared in common through their self-definition alongside radical openness in their definiteness or definite outline through the use of language, language summons things in common (which are themselves grounded by being through the power of language) to stand in presence and allow themselves through sharing things in common. Language evokes action. "Action speaks louder than words". Being in their totality is a unity not only for the being that are thus unified under the one, but also for us who stand out together in the common openness of truth. The openness of being is thus at least two-fold, on the one hand, enforcing everything that is into one, and on the other, enfolding us together into a unified togetherness of being out there in the open while at the same time keeping us apart as distinct as individual Dasein. "Dasein" inevitably and ineluctably means "Mitsein" and such a statement about being come before any tactical specificity; that is, being is defined and shared in togetherness.

Mitsein standing in existential relation to each other, not seeing eye-to-eye with each other is further deficient or deposed modes of sharing the truth of being. The world is open for beings, to show themselves as they truly are. This showing of themselves is taken in by dialogical understanding. Which in grisly details (singularity) can and does vary from individual to individual. Misunderstanding prevails between individual people (Dasein) happen for the most part as misunderstanding. Being and truth are thus intimately inter-related and elucidates ontological fundamentals of beings. Being is taken in its ontological

weight and depth, it reflects selfhood, and selfhood is an essential moment of Dasein; selfhood invariably means non-substitutability, as non-interchangeability. Nevertheless, the notion of "Being" in the Heideggerian sense of the word encapsulates time. Heidegger's main work is called 'Being and Time' and the philosophical explication of the "and" which conjoins being and time constitute the guiding thread of his thinking in the twenties and beyond. There is an intimate relationship, an essential connotation between Being and time. Dasein is embedded with three dimension of time frame- future, past (beenness) and present, whereby the future has primacy. Dasein is necessarily for its own sake, for the sake of its self which is in casting into its very own existential projects according to its abilities, powers and possibilities. Dasein's sake is the issue which it is and remains for its self as long as it exists. Dasein has its own history and it is regulated by time frame.

Moreover, everything and everybody is enmeshed in Dasein's projects and seen from their existential perspective. Dasein existing for the sake of itself is casting itself within the coming about of time, which is, synonymous with its existential freedom. Freedom, in itself, is a very powerful and driving concept. Freedom is thus, in the first place and always, individual freedom the world is a time space, i.e the temporal horizon that envelop the ecstasies of time that comes about as Daseins being the horizon of the world is the envelop that envelops the ecstasies of time. The individuation, selfhood and freedom of Dasein as a being is enclosed within its self-world. The mode of being, in its togetherness, is the existential condition of the ethical cum dialogical possibility of becoming misruled immediately with other Dasein as Dasein i.e. of allowing our respective worlds to intermingle, this inter-mingling is only possible (ontologically) because, each Dasein has a world and this world can be shared in common, and in one sense, always already shared, under the oneness of being.

To set the contours of world sharing and the existential encounter more starkly into relief, it is useful to study a widely diverging dialogical account of the phenomenon of being. Levinas's philosophy is eminently suited to such a contrast for it engages, albeit from a critical distance, the tradition of dialogical philosophy that surged in the early twentieth century associated with names such as Martin Buber, Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's later thinking is latently and explicitly present in all of Levinas's writings and form one of the major touchstones for his alternative to what he regards as the honorable tradition that Heidegger continues in his tradition of fundamental ontology. Thus, in one of

his efforts, metaphysics is prioritized over ontology. There is a metaphysical desire over ontological totalization. Furthermore, in an article first published in "1951" entitled "is ontology fundamental?" Levinas briefly presents a case for a negative contour to this existential question. Levinas remarks that this negative answer to such an extent is by and large a negative movement, akin even to negative theology, Levinas's philosophy has a genuine phenomenon in view, a phenomenon that opened up and provided the essential impetus for existential encounter or dialogical philosophy. Moreover, Levinas insists on mixing theology with philosophy. Levinas argues for a strong distinction between what he calls metaphysics, which is concerned with infinitude and ontology which he claims to be totalizing.

1.4. Understanding the Encounter of Meeting

What do we understand as the encounter of meeting? Do we need to know anything about each other? Do we have to address each other verbally or non-verbally? Is there any difference in meeting a friend from childhood or a stranger from the steps of the subway? How is the phenomenon of familiarity to be brought into play here? What about the mode in which we meet? Does it make any difference in meeting a person, in the same room? What does being together have to do with being bond-ly together in the same existential space? Do we have to see each other face-to-face for an encounter to take place? These can all be made into philosophical questions, if the self-evidence of the phenomenon of being is made questionable. First and foremost, what you and me meeting means and what its existential conditions of the possibilities of meeting. Where and how does meeting take place? This has already been said: we meet within the openness of the truth of being; but this answer lead only to further existential questions, for it is the specificity of the first and second person, of you and me that is questioned here. The first person or being consist in my being myself; first-person being is selfhood. I am singular, indivisible and individual being in my own existence, and there is no getting away from or around that. I am my own existence reflects an ontological condition. But, what is the gist of the second person, in its ontological peculiarity or specificity? You and I share a world share a world in common; that we are both cast out into an ontological/existential beingness, opened up into taking our being for granted in our

radical openness, i.e we are 'blessed' (or 'cursed') with an understanding of being and togetherness. Not taking our being for granted means engaging in ontology that is worked out in implicit pre-ontological understanding of being and that can be shared in speech act; and any dialogue at all pre-supposes an implicit sharing of an understanding of being in common; that is called into presence by being talked about and I being called or invoked to come forward into the opening of being to which Dasein is inevitably 'witness'. We can share the presence of these invoked beings through dialogical encounter/communication. The dialogue that arises between you and I is revealed; these invoked beings from various angles and perspectives are decrypted (i.e removed from the crypt of concealedness) and become malleable in the medium of our speech act.

Our respective beings as a matter of fact, these views may either converge or diverge even more widely during the course of our dialogue, i.e. our speaking to one another in our existential dialogue feasible through the whole problematic of existential interpretation that is opened up through dialogical engagement. Hermeneutic dialogue allows the matter at hand to come to existential presence, usually, it is assumed (hopefully) that an existential dialogue may lead to a convergence of interpretation of the whole phenomenon of being. Dialogue and hermeneutics, in this sense, is a sharing of the truth of being in the third person. Beings show themselves as such to our understanding and this understanding can be shared in common and re-formed through language or speech. Dialogue can bring about social change. Social change, is only possible in an atmosphere of human emancipation and social interaction. Dialogue expands the understanding of the world rather than teaching a correct understanding. A political dialogue, by contrast, aims not at an eventually shared interpretation of being, but at a compromise of interests or at defeating the opponent as a vote, and is, therefore, a power struggle. But talking about matters in dialogue is all about the dialogical encounter of you-and-I.

What does it mean for Dasein's presence to another Dasein? Put conversely, what does it mean for me to meet you (ontologically)? A meeting can only occur between the individual self and the other as soon the possibility of speaking takes place. Moreover, by entering into each other's world, we are also able to share each other's concerns. Forging a joint undertaking in a meeting is only one possible way in which we can share each other's world for the most part meeting each other is feeling and it entails ethical immediacy or educable sensibility.

1.5. Understanding the Other: Freedom and Resistance

Dasein's transcendence and freedom is on the obverse side, nothing other than the resistance of beings. Without freedom no resistance, and conversely; the resistance of things is the ontological reaction of things to Dasein's freedom. This resistance as Heidegger pointed out, is a metaphysical resistance in his own; the (ontological) plane of being. Resistance is an essential moment of Dasein's very metaphysical transcendence and essence. So beings only enter Dasein's world with resistance and Dasein is metaphysically impotent against their resistance. Dasein's impotence is the essential, obverse side of its freedom as Dasein. Thus, the "boat anchored on the beach" refers to an acquaintance that is thus "encountered" via the boat. The person's face-to-face dialogical encounter is left or pushed aside in favour of the encounter meddled by what each Dasein is currently involved. With the term 'dialogical encounter' here precisely represents an exceptional possibility within personally meeting the other in the present (barely encounter up to you). Being with the other in the broad sense that Heidegger uses the term is not properly speaking an encounter with the other but a coming-across or a commingling with the other and sharing a common concern.

Levinas believe that the existential relation to the other is prior to understanding. The priority of the other, he claims, is grounded in the priority of the particularity over universality which universality is seen as a character of western philosophy. Heidegger simply accepts and continues in his of fundamental ontology. The particular being is understood by assuming a position that is already beyond the particular; understanding means relating to the particular by means of knowledge of the universal. In fact, understanding a being as such is precisely the task of ontology, a being as such means that the individual is always already encompassed by the universality of being. The existential relation with the other as such is of manifold gradation; a being as such is thought to be a phenomenon of being in manifold. But being is manifold; it has many folds, and it is one of these folds that the other as such is situated. Levinas is apt in pointing out, that, "the other affects us and that this affectedness goes beyond understanding which goes without gain saying- a "fundamental ontology".

Addressability play a major role in dialogical encounter. Addressability is the conditions of the existential possibility of entering the other Dasein's world. Such addressability is in turn the other in the sense of non-reciprocity. Under-

standing or knowledge of this particular being as Levinas rightly pointed out: to understand a person means to already speak with them. Addressability and speaking with the other are essential aspects of existence (existential relation). The ontology of being of you-and-me reflects the notion of addressability. Addressability is the condition of possibility of talking to you and speaking with you. Addressability holds open the door to a potential sharing of world by talking to each other. Levinas, believes, in this regards, reflects the fundamental-ontological concept of Dasein. Dasein operates within the ethical-metaphysics of moral subjectivity.

1.6. Understanding and Moods

Levinas claim that in spite of fundamental ontology locating itself in the understanding, understanding is one mode in which the world opens up to Dasein; the other, Levinas even makes mention of attunement in passing but returns to the claim that understanding is all dominating in fundamental ontology. The existential relations or dialogical encounter reflects an affective attunement; to understand being means to exist. Perhaps, to understand being means, however, what we may call an affective attunement; it is more reasonable in engaging in the process of dialogical encounter. Moods opens Dasein up to the world more deeply than knowing it and moods is at par with understanding in opening-up the existential world. In Levinas's ethics, the truth does not exist because there are humans. Humanity exists because being in general is inseparable from its opening-up, because there is truth, or because, if you like, there is ethical insight into being. All misunderstanding is only a deficient mode of understanding. The dialogico-existential analysis of the existence of beings is thus nothing other than the description of the truth of being; the existential condition of the understandability itself of being.

The quintessence of fundamental ontology in Levinas's eye is the understanding of being, which is interpreted as the opening up of being in its truth through which included others are disclosed or unconcealed from the horizon of universal being as opposed to a being as such in its particularity and temporality.

1.7. Addressability, Proper-Named-ness and Freedom

Each factual Dasein carries its own sphere of openness with it in which the being appears as such. When one Dasein steps next to another Dasein, the one Dasein steps into the space of openness of the other, or more precisely their space and being-ness, a move within the same surrounding circle of openness or space and temporality. Being, however, in an attempt to think through the phenomenon of meeting and encounter as essential possibilities of existence (in the Heidegger's sense) is key to overcoming the metaphysics of subjectivity and the attendant theory of inter-subjectivity equated simply within the circle of existential ontological condition of togetherness. The meeting and encounter between Dasein and Dasein has to be thought without losing sight of what constitutes Dasein as such. Each Dasein brings its temporal circle of presence here along with it. The possibility of meeting is only given by virtue of Daseins' being addressable. Addressability, however, goes hand in hand with Dasein bearing its own proper named-ness, without a proper namedness, Dasein cannot be addressed. Proper named-ness is thus likewise a condition of possibility for meeting between you and I to take place.

Furthermore, addressability goes hand in hand with deference to other Dasein's freedom and its own individual radical openness to the truth of being. Dasein is always already (pre-ontologically) understood as such through proper-named-ness, so that, the radical openness of each Dasein is shared with other Dasein's world on the basis of interchange or commerce between Dasein and Dasein. This commerce between Dasein and Dasein can only tactically occur in the present and on the basis of the existential ontological conditions of addressability and proper named-ness. Addressability is the ontological gateway to Dasein and Dasein sharing the world in common. Dasein is implicitly addressed, acknowledged and recognized as free, as a rule, other Dasein does not simply man-handle other Dasein (which will negate its freedom by way of physical assault). Dasein's freedom can be abused through rudeness, violence, compelling subjugation and other psychological trauma. The interpersonal commerce between Dasein and Dasein when they meet is always essentially an interchange of Dasein as free beings, its existential ontological freedom is always acknowledged and respected. Dasein as a free being and its metaphysical relation and freedom is emphatically metaphysically inviolable. Dasein has always already opened itself up as Dasein so that it is always already disclosed as such.

The disclosed truth of Dasein's freedom is existentially and ontologically inviolable. Being presupposes disclosed-ness of truth. Dasein's inviolable freedom is the ontological condition of possibility for declaring human rights or enunciating any ethical principle and therefore comes prior to any political or moral considerations.

1.8. Existential Care in the World: Being Towards the Other

Levinas's ethics relates to the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre in the area of being towards the 'Other'. The 'Other' for Sartre is like a hell to me. Sartre, is of the view that "man is a being for himself and a being for others". Be that as it may, for Levinas, it is the unprecedented on the major function; the concept of social practice, the concept that guide individual freedom and responsibility even in relation to our most impersonal and necessary social structures, social gestures and it is the philosophy of existence and essence. The existentialists believe that "existence precedes essence". Levinas's philosophy is adored on the existential ontological freedom as well as it is akin with the humanist motto "you can always make something out of what you have been made into". It impinges on organic relation and hierarchical order, of substance and self which have yielded multiplicities of inter-subjectivity, it appeals to the logic of metaphysical relation, social reason, cohesion and cultural relation. Nonetheless, the metaphysical and ontological question of man is anchored on the vehemence of existentialist philosophy. An ethic of moral responsibility in post-modernist world, is the inherited fragmentation of unifying principles and absolute value that constitutes a particular challenge to ethical theory and moral practice in any recognizable sense of those terms. To start with, the very notion of an ethical identity seems to assume what we may call "the connectedness of a life". From ancient times, moralists have insisted on consistency as an essential ingredient in our moral life. Authentic existence in the Heideggerian sense, entails the overcoming of the dissipation of our efforts in sheer busyness and idle curiosity. Each Philosopher conceives of the human being as a responsible individual that is governed by reasoning. The popularity of French ethicist such as Levinas's ethics opens a door to the revival of Christian existentialist philosophy. What attracted many Postmodern thinkers to Levinas's position was his rejection of a metaphysical foundation for ethics and its realism to an ethics of moral impera-

tive of responsibility in place of one of universal principles or abstract values. Levinas's ethics, Derrida meant "hospitality" and it presupposes unraveling the unity of a concept by analysis of the loose end or traces that carries from a prior metaphysical assumption. Put more simply, justice was perhaps an absolute in a relativistic world. Levinas's philosophy is also anchored on cosmic-justice or radical-reciprocal-openness. Conversely speaking, Levinas accorded justice a certain "relative intimacy" and moral-cogency. For Levinas, justice is derived from the advent of the third party even though it is based on the original responsibility of the face to face relation; his fundamental ethical category, therefore, lies on ethical immediacy and lived experience. In this sense, justice resembles Sartre's concept of the upsurge of our being for others with the appearance of a third person in our midst. Levinas's ethics finds the concept of justice in accord with the canon of reason. Interpersonal justice indifferent to attenuating circumstances can cause great harm. It is at this point, that the existentialist' concept of the prudent person (*Phronimos*) presupposes the condition of rational- ethical-dialogical encounter. This is the one who knows the right thing to do at the right circumstance. Prudence, as ethicist says, is understood as "situation concreteness", it is about prudential judgments in the Aristotelian sense of the word. The virtuous person is someone who makes virtuous judgment but one must learn to be a virtuous person by making virtuous judgment. There is no absolute starting point, one can always be in a "via media". We find ourselves in the ethical version of the hermeneutic circle. Man is a moral being, unique in creation; possessing higher power. His conduct is controlled by thought, reason and emotions, by desires, needs and intentions. Ethical science seeks to examine conduct and to deliberate on correct modes of conduct. Down the centuries, man has speculated about what constitutes "the good life". Socrates, for example, maintained that education is the secret of virtue. For Socrates, "knowledge is virtue", this was his famous dictum. Ethics is concerned with the issues of the good and bad. The common good is something that many people will find familiar but may not have had a name for. Humanity ought to know what is right and wrong. The common good is for the well-being of human beings living together in so far as they are members of a concrete human society. The principles of subsidiary and harmony or solidarity are regarded as linked with the idea of the common good in our implicit, intimate, and inseparable way. Socrates illuminates his clarification of the complex features of human beings. In essence, Levinas's treatment of the face to face relation and man's moral responsibility to

himself and others centers on the evaluation of the nature and life of concrete human beings. No wonder Levinas was vociferous about the abstract philosophy of Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger that were so transcendental in their philosophies. Levinas prepared the foundation of his philosophy on the basis of the concrete existential situation of man and his social environment or social ethics. Be that as it may, Levinas's philosophy has existential position because his philosophy investigates and analyzes the concept of being in the world and his attempt to define ethics from a phenomenological standpoint is quite timely and imperative. In the existentialist tradition, the evaluation of the world is not in the light of knowledge or perception but in the light of a critical examination of the existential relationship of beings in their social world. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note, that Levinas's philosophy is indeed a Christian existentialist philosophy, because he tries to remind man of his responsibility to God and his fellow man. Hence, the Universal declaration "Live and let's live", "Do not kill me but help me to live". We become conscious of the world by the consciousness of the self and the other, that is, the dialectic of the self and the other. Man is characterized by consciousness, imagination and inviolable freedom. Levinas has the reputation of revealing his point through vivid or lucid images of life. Man is saddled with the unquestionable task of moral responsibility, because in the real sense, consciousness cannot be regarded just as an ordinary thing, it is essentially intentional. Man has the awareness of his life and the consciousness of others' existence; it is always directed to knowing the other's existence. In the light of this circumstance, thus, we understand the nature of the phenomenon by accepting our existence, volition, facticity, freedom, choice and responsibilities. Man suddenly exists not just as a series of aims and actions but he realizes that he would be described by the other as a being in a holistic world through his deliberate human actions.

Man is a holistic being in the world. Man is invariably conscious of the inevitable cosmic law of moral reciprocity. Man is always conscious of the existence of others. Man realizes the fraternity of his existential and metaphysical relations. Levinas's philosophy is basically on an anthropological position that is human existence and culture. What makes man what he is, is his consciousness and how he relates with others. The human being is surrounded with others; he finds himself in the world surrounded by lots of significant things and meaningful subjects and objects. Levinas's philosophy reveals man's position to relate

with others so that the possibility of his freedom will be meaningfully realized and guaranteed.

Furthermore, Levinas's 'otherwise than being' perceive freedom as an existentially established fact by deduction from the nature of man as a conscious being. Consciousness is the plenum of existence, and thus, this determination of itself by itself is an essential characteristic of man. Consciousness and intention have inextricable nexus in man's existence and intentions are the essence of man's existence. Man takes full responsibility for every facet of his consciousness and his emotion inclusive. Emotions are form of arrested actions. Man's idea about his existence as a being within the world involves the idea that there might be other free rational agent and conscious being that can obscure his self consciousness which defines his existence and human reality. Human consciousness and the idea of the mind are like a machine governed by natural forces, and at the same time admitting the motives and intentions behind man's conscious behavior. Self consciousness defines man's existence and human reality.

Consciousness on a pre-reflective (deep thinking) level is immediate, spontaneous and lived experience, the lived experience of man and his world reflects his metaphysical relations. Conversely speaking, the being of consciousness is the consciousness of being. The other that we meet will make consciousness more real. To grow up and live in a complete isolation will result in non-development of the human mind and our existent world remains veiled to us in an unconscious manner, that is, it would be unknown, 'anti-natura' and unbecoming. Consciousness of being in its innermost nature is a relation to a transcendent being or concrete being. Consciousness is a real subjectivity and the condition or impression is a subjective plenitude. Being constitutes the background and foundation of existentialist philosophy. Levinas's philosophy is a reflection and the social integration of man in his ontological-existential state and recognition of man as phenomenon of concretization of existence. In this connection, concreteness is a totality which can exist in itself alone. The concrete is a spatial-temporal thing with all its determination. Human reality embraces the recognition of the self and of the other's existence and the position of the other is like that of mediator between myself and me; it is a cobweb of cosmic network. It is the others preserve that made me to pass moral judgment on myself as an object because my presence before the other makes me act or react in a particular way. The other unveils me and establishes me in a new type of beingness, the gaze of the other on me makes me an object in the world thereby al-

alienating me from myself. The looks of the other disintegrates my own existence, my universe and recoups objects including my own body around it. Man requires the other to be fully aware of the social structure of his being-ness. The idea of my own existence as an object with the world involves the ideal that my very presence is observed by others' free and conscious being. For man, however, to fully realize the meaning of his existence, man needs to fully appreciate the existence of the other, and the relation of his being to the being of the other.

Consequently, in Sartre's existentialist philosophy, here Roquentin in the nausea brought out the need for the existence of others when he complained of his own loneliness and he asserts that perhaps it is impossible to understand ones' own face. People who live in society have learned how to see themselves like mirrors as they appear to their neighbours, that is, is that why my flesh is so marked? You might say yes; you might say nature with humanity. The above underscores our appreciation of the existence or the humanity of the other. The other subject me to my own transcendent being, thereby alienating me from the world of my own existence, consequently, alienating me from myself. Jean Paul Sartre believes that what I constantly aim at across my experiences are others' feelings and ideas; one who sees me in my true existence. By implication, the other sees me or look at me like a mirror. The entire human society is like a mirror through which we see ourselves through others. My existence becomes meaningless or rudderless without the others' existence. My existence is threatened by the other's existence. Similarly, my look places him under the same threat to his liberty. The other and I consist of two liberties confronting each other with the aim of paralyzing the other by our looks. Our existence is mediated by the ethical immediacy or reciprocal action of thinking substances upon each other. Most psychologists see the existence of others as certain and the knowledge we have of them as probable. Man refers to the appearance of others by the presence of organized forms such as gestures and expressions acts and conducts- these organized forms refer in an organizing unity which in principle is located outside of our lived experiences.

The other appears, look at me and finds myself no longer a free subjective being in relation to an ideal possible state of myself, instead, 'I am' constituted as a transcendent ego, conceded in a system, network or whole. The conception of the Dasein discovers me and partitions me within the heart of any system of representation.

1.9. Freedom Sharing, Strife and the Possibility of Meeting

The encounter is not a call to share our existence, but is rather the direct, linked characteristically mooded experience that we always already share in our existence on a fundamental ontological level by virtue of being here together. Although, enfolded into individuality, within the clearing of the truth of being, the existential encounter is simply the disclosed-ness of truth. The encounter does not necessarily lead to anything in particular, to any specific commitment in lowering each other or even to any kind act. In particular, for the most part, it does not lead to any constancy in the sharing of individual existence nor to any on-going responsibility for each other. An encounter is merely the immediate and the lived experienced inter-face of individual freedom. Individual freedom is the direct confrontation with the metaphysical circumstance that we as individuals live in the world together. The other as free Dasein is a being that is able to existentially relate with other being. Dasein must also understand the appeal being made by the other when they appear, and the horizon of its world in other to be able to respond to this appeal? i.e. it must interpret the signal of appeal given by the other as such. Dasein has existential solidarity and involvement with being in the structured totality of the world recouped and estimated also by others. Dasein and Dasien are stripped off their usual selves through the power of dialogical understanding that arises out of their respective existential involvement or commitment in the world.

Nonetheless, intimacy is the mutual disclosing to each other of one's self to the other; it reflects the casting temporality and temporal casting of being in its dialogical world. Understanding and sharing is embedded in a self-casting. The freedom of the self-casting is re-gigged through an existential encounter of beings to one another. The existential encounter itself comes into play or, more precisely, an inter-play that reflects or guarantees collective human freedom. Dasein is the free temporal casting of itself out of nothingness which is thus of its natural temporality. The temporality of Dasein implies the temporariness of its casting. This temporariness of it casting is made known through time, and this is, however, based on the possibilities of world-sharing, radical-reciprocal-openness and definite understanding of the world in general. Dasein is embedded in existential commitment and dialogical engagement. The truth of being in the world is usually multifaceted and can shimmer this way and that way, depending on which way the world guarantees its free temporal casting. The dis-

closed-ness of truth can impinge on Dasein's self casting, not just sharing by way of existential encounter alone. Dasein is faced with the possibility of the interface opened up by an encounter. There is that of you and me coming together to share our freedom concretely, i.e to mould a shared casting of ourselves in which our self-casting in our respective finite lifetimes are freely intertwined in a dialogical commitment to each other. Nevertheless, Dasein in a transient moment of insight into each other is fundamentally world sharing. In sharing the world opened by being, each of us shares the freedom granted by being, even though we live our own individual life in a singular direction. This is the fundamental ontological issues facing us: to think through the existence of one self and the other, each as free selves who are together in the world by means of, say, a prior moral imperatives or obligation or responsibilities. Each of us exist for the sake of our selves (even in self sacrifice). Each Dasein is a self who individually casts itself onto the temporal horizon of the world. The world is only for Dasein, and it is for Dasein only in passing through the machination of self. Selfhood is the ineludible gateway for anything to enter Dasein's world. Dasein in its selfhood is free; any relations between Dasein and Dasein are the relations between freely casting selves for each of which its free self is an issue. Each Dasein refers to a common and shared horizon of time.

Furthermore, since world sharing usually consists merely in taking common cognizance of happenings in the world, Dasein cannot escape its individuality with the other, but each individual "being-in-the-world" is always essentially shared in the sense that the world in its basic historical ontological truth is always held in common; it involves the commingling of two individual existence in time and space, because time itself is a unified shared horizon and as such, it is the perimeter of the clearing for truth (unconcealed-ness). Each individual Dasein leads its own existence in disposing of its life-time. Moreover, Dasein has to cohere with each other so as to realize the shared world project.

1.10. Concluding Remarks

A sharing of the world is an essential characteristic of *Mitsein* (togetherness). Dasein thus always has to rely on others making and sticking to common future existential commitment or dialogical engagement, keeping, their words and fulfilling agreements. *Mitsien* through others are ontologically inseparable,

Dasein as lived temporality is exposed to the double negation of imperfection. Only in certain rare moments of presence does Dasein experience a fulfillment. On the other hand, one therefore, needs recourse to the moral failings of Dasein to see why the sharing of world is full of strife, nor is there any possible projection of history in which the strife of togetherness would be sublimed (waived and raised) into a fruitful state of harmony, nor is there a need for a modern, up-dated ethics to instill moral virtues into mankind, or at least regulate its excesses through normative regulation. Dasein is perpetually a new Sisyphus-like, Janus-like in resolving the strife of togetherness. The phenomenon of commitment and reliability (in the broadest sense which includes also their opposites of non-commitment and unreliability) are essential. "ens ut mitsein" (being and togetherness) is the sharing of the world in a temporal ecstasy of the future. There is the phenomenon of reciprocal radical openness, which implies that Dasein and other Dasein are always dependent on each other in realizing their projects, thus, shaping the future together, although, thus, dependency is not necessarily stimulation to some extent. The obverse side of this is that the strife of being arises in togetherness when commitments are not fulfilled. Strife can only emerge when Dasein and other Dasein cannot reach an agreement on a common projection.

Furthermore, concrete togetherness in its reliance is the intermeshing of Dasein's individual projects in the world which is thus necessarily dialogical philosophy. Misunderstanding or difference, strife as well as blatant breaking of words are part of an individual Dasein. Dasein is essentially a being-able, Dasein's realization of its projects is essentially associated with misunderstanding, disappointment, disagreement, discord, in short, with strife. Dasein's dialogical engagement with other Dasein is inevitably characterized by freedom and strife over truth. Dialogical philosophy is for the most part world's cosmic law of concreteness and Mitsein.

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